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ABSTRACT 
Anthropogenic climate change and environmental degradation impacts are no longer a 
worry for the distant future but a real concern for the present. Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS) and the poor, who often live by fragile ecosystems, are amongst the most vulnerable 
and exposed to the impacts of climate change. For these populations, climate related risks 
exacerbate other stressors and negatively impact livelihoods, security, and health.  For low 
lying SIDS in particular, an additional fear is that climate change endangers their whole way 
of life, with their nationhood and culture being slowly engulfed by the approaching sea.  
Whilst the need to adapt is apparent, adaptation funding and motivating people to take 
up adaptive behaviours is a serious challenge. According to the ODI, financing climate 
change adaptation in the developing world can cost upwards of US$ 100-450 billion a year. 
Building adaptive capacity through cost effective solutions such as microloans for adaptive 
investments can be a promising strategy. By utilising the case study of Fiji, this Thesis 
attempts to unpack the cognitive drivers of climate change adaptive stated investment 
behaviour through a survey-based experiment (N=205). The prominent empirical method 
employed in this thesis was mediation analysis and specifically path analysis whereby the 
model specified is driven by theory. The choice of this method is justified through a 
comparison with multinomial logit. 
In the first instance, the antecedents of climate adaptive stated behaviour and the 
impact of information on subsequent stated behaviour were assessed through the framework 
of the Theory of Planned Behaviour.  In addition perceptions to climate change in Fiji were 
explored through guided interviews (N=50). Overall positive attitudes, subjective norms and 
perceived behavioural control towards conservation and adaptation positively influenced 
intention to invest in adaptive strategies though intention only significantly influenced 
subsequent stated behaviour when information on climate change adaptation was provided.   
Next, the efficacy of incentives in engaging adaptive investments was assessed. The 
results indicated that the use of ‘green’ incentives (whereby loans are contingent on 
ecosystem impacts) was most conducive to the choice of adaptive investments over non-
adaptive. In addition behavioural intention significantly mediated stated investment 
behaviour under the green incentive condition – which it is argued may show that such 
incentives crowd-in internal motives for engaging in environmentally protective behaviours. 
VIII 
 
We also found that ethnicity was a strong positive moderator of behavioural antecedents and 
subsequent stated investment behaviour.  
Lastly the moderators of stated behaviour and its antecedents were examined by 
exploring resource dependence, perceived shocks, and perceived severity of environmental 
and other issues. Again, it was found that green incentives were successful in engaging 
people to take up adaptive investments more so then under a dynamic (whereby loans are 
contingent on repayement) and a no incentive condition.  It was found that perceived shocks, 
and resource dependence could significantly impact cognitive antecedents of behaviour as 
specified by the Theory of Planned Behaviour and in particular perceptions of behavioural 
control. Shocks, resource dependence and perceived severity also moderated subsequent 
stated behaviour, with greater variability between between adaptive and non-adaptive 
investment choices under the no incentive and dynamic incentive conditions. The latter had a 
greater probablity of agents choosing non-adaptive over adaptive investments whilst in the 
former the opposite was true. Overall the results can be useful for adaptation policies, 
microloan best practice, and behavioural change interventions in SIDS in particular.  
 
 From this point forward, any reference to behaviour as examined by this thesis –  
specifically microloan investment behaviour refers to stated behaviour. 
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1 A REVIEW OF ECOSYSTEM-BASED ADAPTATION, 
MICROLOANS & PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF BEHAVIOUR  
 
1 
  
                                                             
1
 Nausori highlands – sugar cane farmer walking home. 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
A prominent challenge in promoting environmental conservation and climate change 
adaptation behaviours centres on the creation of pecuniary and non-pecuniary value around 
common pool resources such that it leads to improved environmental stewardship.  New 
strategies will need to be sought where possible such that the objectives of conservation and 
development are maintained. One strategy which may show promise in meeting the triple 
bottom line of sound economic, social and environmental objectives is microloans.  Over the 
last several decades microfinance has transformed into a social movement and has widened 
its focus from poverty alleviation to addressing the myriad problems that surround poverty 
such as (but not limited to) empowering women, environmental degradation, lack of 
education and access to healthcare. In recent years we have seen a greater movement towards 
microfinance being used as a tool in the struggle to conserve the natural world.  Some have 
put forth the usefulness of microfinance as a positive adaptive strategy against climate change 
as it enables the diversification of incomes and provides a buffer against shocks (Anderson & 
Locker, 2002; Araya & Christen, 2004; Agrawal & Carraro, 2010; Polman & Uniyal, 2008). 
Indeed Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) are picking up on its utility as a strategy to promote 
positive environmental behaviours alongside social and economic agendas, with popular 
microfinance databases such as the ‘themix.org’ showing a growing number of MFIs paying 
attention to their social responsibility to the environment.  
A lack of impact assessments and literature means that there remains a gap in 
understanding whether microfinance is a viable tool in reaching conservation and climate 
change adaptation objectives. This thesis focuses on the microcredit
2
 component of MFIs.  It 
attempts to unpack some of the processes at work in environmentally responsible applications 
of microloans by exploring the effect of endogenous behavioural antecedents (specifically 
attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control and behavioural intention), 
exogenous variables (such as exposure to information and threat) and explicit microloan 
incentives on climate adaptive investment behaviour. 
As those most vulnerable to the effects of climate change also live within fragile 
ecosystems, it is important to look at climate change adaptation and conservation in 
conjunction. In doing so we are referring to ecosystem-based adaptation.  Ecosystem-based 
adaptation is a term coined by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). It refers to 
                                                             
2
 Microcredit  is the extension of small loans to the poor. Such a loan is referred to as a 
microloan.  
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“[the integration of] biodiversity and ecosystem services into an overall adaptive strategy 
[which] can be cost-effective and generate social, economic and cultural co-benefits and 
contribute to the conservation of biodiversity” (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 2009, p9.)  At its core such adaptation looks at the impact of climate change on 
humans and nature, taking into consideration the indirect and direct impact of climate change 
on conservation targets, ecosystem processes and human communities. Strategies are focused 
on the restoration and conservation of ecosystems which in turn help people adapt to the 
impacts of climate change. It includes strategies such as: mangrove restoration for coastal 
defense and flood regulation, agro-biodiversity conservation (crop diversity) and sustainable 
land management for soil health.   
Ecosystem-based adaptation is important as it does not only focus on human well-
being but the well-being of the planet as a whole. The state and quantity of natural capital 
provide flows of value to human well-being and is known as ecosystem services.  Ecosystems 
provide supporting (for example soil formation and photosynthesis), provisioning (for 
example crops and fresh water), regulating (for example carbon sequestration and climate 
regulation) and cultural services (for example spiritual and recreational values).   
Anthropogenic climate change directly threatens ecosystem services by placing pressure on 
natural systems and species that are unable to naturally adapt at the current rate of warming. 
Ecosystems and species which inhabit narrow geographic and climatic ranges such as 
mangroves, montane forests, and  overall island ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to 
adverse impacts of climate change (TEEB, 2010; Secretariat of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 2009).  Such important and unique ecosystems constitute what we refer to as 
‘fragile ecosystems’. The fact that much of the rural poor are also clustered around such 
fragile ecosystems and rely on the resources it provides for subsistence, can compound 
degradation of the system and poverty of the populations which call it home (Barbier, 2012).  
However herein arises an opportunity for microcredit. Microcredit, theoretically, is a 
tool to empower the poorest and most vulnerable people in society. As such it could show 
potential in reaching the rural poor who live by fragile ecosystems. From an ecosystem-based 
adaptation perspective the additional draw of microcredit is in engaging and empowering 
women. In the Global South women also experience the most acute effects of climate change 
as they are left to manage natural resource needs (such as water and foraged wood and food) 
with little legal or social control over resources and limited capital accumulation 
opportunities (Jones et al, 2010).  At the same time women are integral to successful 
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adaptation and conservation measures as they possess critical knowledge and experience in 
agriculture, food security, livelihoods, income generation, management of households and 
natural resources in diverse eco-systems (Goh, 2012). By including environmental 
dimensions to microcredit, the potential to empower women and protect ecosystems seems 
viable yet we are still at the embryonic stages of understanding how such tools can change 
behaviour.   
In 1794, as the revolution raged in France, Condorcet wrote his masterwork, Sketch 
for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind. In it he put forth the idea that the 
laws that govern nature need not be limited to the natural sciences. In fact, he proposed that 
the development of intellectual and moral faculties have similar laws which govern them. 
Condorcet opened the realm of the social sciences with his optimistic intellectual and social 
history of humanity (Wilson, 1999) urging us to examine every nook and cranny of why we 
are who we are. Why is this relevant to this thesis? The fact is that humanity resides in a 
space which is not separate from the natural world. We were born from it and one day we 
will return to it. We do not own it, but we are its stewards. In the last few centuries our 
stewardship has faltered and we have begun to view the earth no longer as a vital component 
to our being but as a commodity to be used.  In fact, the prevailing school of thought is that 
nature needs to be treated as a commodity to justify saving it. However such a view is short-
sighted as it presents the intact value of natural resources as implicitly for those alive at the 
present time and into the relatively near future (a few generations at best). Indeed novel 
financing methods are being developed to bridge capital from microloans to the local and 
global value of intact environmental resources to facilitate environmental stewardship. 
However at the same time there is much potential of the same tools to create value around 
good behaviour, for instance through the use of incentives.  In doing so you have the potential 
to create lasting change, for instance;  through shifting attitudes and values, the social norm 
may become one of environmentally responsible behaviour which is passed down to future 
generations.  
To correct the maladaptive relationship which we have adopted it is important to 
understand the mechanisms which drive environmental behaviour.  This thesis seeks to assess 
the potential of microloans and the deeper cognitive drivers it may tap into to drive adaptive 
investment behaviours for people living near fragile ecosystems. It does so through the case 
study of Fiji where a survey-based experiment was employed. The thesis is arranged over 11 
chapters. Chapter one  sets the scene by introducing the concepts of Common Pool Resources 
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(CPR), Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs), microfinance, theories of 
environmentally protective behaviours and ecosystem-based adaptation initiatives which have 
incorporated microfinance within its strategy. The gaps in the literature are identified and 
wider contributions stated.  
Chapter two is very brief. It arranges the scope, contribution and research questions 
for this thesis. Chapter three looks at the problems climate change poses to Small Island 
Developing States and smallholders. It presents solutions and illustrates the issues through 
case-studies. Chapter four  introduces the case study of Fiji. 
Chapter five is a personal narrative of the research experience. Chapter six introduces 
the research methodology and also discusses survey based experiments and the design of the 
psychological survey instrument. 
The next three chapters are three different studies. Chapter seven builds an 
understanding of climate change perceptions of people living by fragile ecosystems in Fiji. 
Chapter eight, Employing Structural Equation Modelling utilizes the psychological 
framework of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), to examine the cognitive antecedents 
of adaptive microloan investment behaviour and the role of information in inducing 
behaviour change. Chapter nine looks at whether extrinsic motivation can crowd-in adaptive 
behaviour. It does so through a path analysis that extends the TPB to understand how 
contextual factors and microloan incentives impact subsequent adaptive investment 
behaviour. Chapter 10 weighs up the empirical method employed in the previous chapter by 
replicating the study but this time using the analytical method of multinomial logit. Chapter 
11 further extends our understanding of incentives. It borrows the concept of threat appraisal 
from Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) which is added to the TPB framework to assess 
the effect of perceived shocks and threats on subsequent adaptive investment behaviour. 
Chapter 12 draws together findings and draws the thesis to an end.  
1.2 CLIMATE CHANGE AS A COMMONS DILEMMA 
Following the critical decisions made at the UN Climate Summit in New York in 
September 2014, the twenty first session of the UNFCCC Conference of Parties will see 
world leaders attempting to come to a global agreement to reduce emissions and strengthen 
climate resilience. For scientists, COP 21 is the last chance for our representatives to take 
action and secure the future for subsequent generations. Whilst there is debate surrounding 
24 
 
the economic price of concerted political action, one thing is clear; the price of inaction is far 
too great. Whilst mitigation remains crucial, the speed at which warming is now occurring 
highlights the urgency of climate change adaptation. To better understand how such decisions 
are made, it is important to consider the nature of climate change from a commons and game 
theoretic perspective. 
1.2.1 NATURE OF RIGHTS 
The subject of rights to property is already complex and becomes more so when 
dealing with natural resources such as water, oil or land. To start, let us look at some basic 
features of property rights. Firstly, it is important to note that it is not the property that is 
owned but rather the rights to use the property. It is the nature of the rights which will 
determine how we are able to use the property. The delineation of types of property can be 
summarised by the excludability and rivalness of the resources in question. Generally private 
property is owned by a private entity which controls access, withdrawal, management and 
exclusion of the resource. Public property is owned by all but access and use is controlled by 
the state. Open access is property which is not owned by anyone and thus no one has the right 
to exclude anyone (Guerin, 2003).  Lastly, the ‘commons’ refers to resources that are non-
excludable as its sufficient size makes it costly to exclude potential beneficiaries. As such the 
resource is held in common, or shared between or within communities. Natural resources 
such as land, water, and the atmosphere and man-made resources such as the Internet can be 
seen as common pool resources (CPR).  
The stock and flow of the resource indicates its natural replacement rate.  A key 
problem with CPR is that individuals are drawn to extract more or invest less in the resource 
than is optimal for the collective, thus arises the CPR dilemma, where individual rationality is 
detrimental to group rationality.  Hardin (1968) describes this as the tragedy of the commons 
where “ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own interest in a 
society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to 
all” (Hardin, 1968, p.1244).  Ostrom (2000)  notes that for many such a dilemma can best be 
represented by an N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game where the predicted equilibrium 
is zero contribution to the provision of the resource. This is known as the ‘zero contribution 
thesis’ and assumes that people are rational egoists with individualistic mindsets. Such Homo 
Economicus reasoning can be applied to anthropogenic climate change.  In the traditional PD 
game, assuming perfect information regarding the payoff structure,  the best individual 
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outcome for a country would be to free ride by defecting (and continue producing GHG’s at 
the same rate) whilst other countries cooperate and reduce emissions, thus giving the free 
rider an economic advantage. Traditionally the pareto optimum outcome would be for all 
countries to cooperate, whilst the worst outcome would be for all to defect. Unfortunately 
such a simple model does not take in the complexity of anthropogenic climate change which 
elicits a problematic payoff structure. 
Scientific uncertainty over the magnitude and distribution of negative effects makes it 
unclear whether total cooperation will be able to significantly halt the hypothesised harmful 
effects of climate change. Thus countries, in reducing dependence on fossil fuels, may still 
experience potentially catastrophic, negative outcomes. In addition the distribution of these 
outcomes may mean that some countries are relatively better off than others which further 
complicates the game theoretic model as these countries can essentially contribute less to 
avoid future costs.  Furthermore, as the causes of anthropogenic climate change are deeply 
rooted within our social and economic structures, incentives to switch to a low carbon-
economy can create distortions in rent-seeking behaviour with countries attempting to 
maximise any advantage they can attain from their individual quotas; and companies 
attempting to arbitrage between  geographic production caps (Helm, 2008; Gardener, 2006).  
The resulting payoff structures for mitigation and adaptation may be better explained 
through other games such as:  the symmetric assurance, and chicken games, the asymmetric 
harmony game, and the multi-player tree-correlated equilibrium model. In the assurance 
game only collective cooperation will produce a joint benefit, driving each player to 
cooperate only if the other does so too. If one does not cooperate then there is no benefit for 
the other to do so.   In the chicken game, if two coastal smallholders do not prepare for 
climatic events such as flooding through planting hedges and maintaining drainage through 
mangroves, then the effects would be disastrous for both. As such both parties should 
cooperate but it is not necessary as one would need to pick up the slack if the other did not as 
the cost associated would be too great. The harmony game takes place between two unequal 
players and requires communication between parties. Here, cooperation is the best strategy as 
no externality for non-cooperation exists thus no incentive to free-ride. An example of 
harmony can be shown through the example of the Montreal Protocol which saw all United 
Nations member states ratify the treaty. Widespread adoption and implementation of the 
international agreement is a unique example of international cooperation and has resulted in 
significant improvements in ozone health.  The tree-correlated equilibrium model (Forgó, 
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Fülöp & Prill, 2005), plays out like a chess game. Each player has one move in a given 
sequence. Once all players have moved then the next round begins. Here the best strategy 
will depend on the results of the preceding round.  
Returning to the general game theoretic model of the PD game, Ostrom (2000) notes 
that generally those who envision the commons through such a game fall into two camps 
when it comes to the management of CPRs. One promotes the role of a central government to 
effectively govern the commons whilst the other advocates converting the commons into 
smaller units of private property thereby incentivising people to take up optimal use patterns.  
Looking at the latter, neoliberal’s have long held that the absence of clear private property 
rights is the greatest institutional barrier to economic development and human  welfare. For 
neoliberals, state deregulation and privatisation of assets are necessary to not only preserve 
resources but to allocate it to its best possible use. Private property rights in distinguishing 
individual vs public rights creates scarcity of the resource/property thus giving it value which 
is argued to be the best way in which to conserve resources (Thobani, 1995). Furthermore it 
creates competition thereby improving efficiency and productivity, and lowers prices 
according to true market values thereby controlling inflationary tendencies (Harvey, 2005).  
However, the tragedy of the commons can be extended into private property as well. 
An example can be found in the case of the American Dust Bowl  – here farmers in the 
1930’s went about extensively tilling fragile soils in private lands, causing widespread 
draught which resulted in wind erosion and extreme dust storms. These storms covered the 
land, devastating its productive capacity. The inefficacy of governing the commons through 
private property can be illustrated through the prisoner’s dilemma (Thompson & Kutach, 
1990): if everyone followed their own self-interest as private property rights would urge, the 
resulting outcomes will likely be suboptimal to the individual and the self. When applied to 
the Dust Bowl, it shows how individual property owners making self-interested decisions can 
cause ecological and social disasters. Sinden (2007) argues that perhaps to preserve soil and 
water resources, coercion is necessary. Furthermore, Freyfogle (2003) states that in dividing 
up common land, you risk increasing externalities by reducing accountability, a by-product of 
which can be increased political tensions and a crisis in management.   
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1.2.2 COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOUR 
An alternative view point regarding the management of CPRs is presented by 
Gardener, Ostrom, and Walker (1989).  They attempt to explain the many examples of 
cooperation in real world commons dilemmas by turning to cultural evolution. They put forth 
that cooperative behaviour was an integral component to adaptive fitness in the early 
development of our species. As such, regarding resource use, we learnt to adopt coordinated 
strategies that would lead to positive joint and individual payoffs. Learning social norms and 
being able to identify deceit and trustworthiness in members would have been a select 
advantage. Indeed it is argued that social problem solving alongside ecological conditions 
were integral in the evolution of our cognitive adaptations.  According to the Ecological 
Dominance-Social Competition model, competition with conspecifics and reciprocity based 
coalitions were integral to the evolution of our vast and highly complex cognitive abilities 
(Flinn, Geary & Ward, 2005). She puts forth an indirect evolutionary approach as an 
alternative to the standard rational choice theory. 
 Within the indirect evolutionary approach she accounts for different types of resource 
users as participants in a collective action problem as their levels of conformity to social 
norms of trust and reciprocity will elicit differential intrinsic preferences over outcomes 
(Ostrom 2000). The types of resource users she identifies are rational egoists, norm users and 
conditional co-operators.  For rational egoists, the social norm of reciprocity is not valued, 
whilst norm users will behave in accordance to the level that they value conforming to a 
norm. Conditional co-operators are trustworthy users to begin with who reward trust with 
further trustworthy behaviour. Payoffs will depend on the players type and the level of 
information available regarding other players. Ostrom (2000) shows that those who adopt 
conditional cooperation strategies are better able to survive in dilemma situations if some 
conspecifics are also norm driven and some information about other users is also known. The 
level of cooperative behaviour is impacted by a plethora of contextual factors however a 
consistent finding is that CPR users are more likely to sustainably manage the use of the 
resource when they are left to organise their own strategy for its management over externally 
imposed rules. 
An example is given by Shiva (2002) and the management of water in India. Shiva 
(2002) states that water has been managed as a commons throughout human history. The 
transition of India from a water abundant to a water stressed nation is attributed to the demise 
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of this collective management of water which was the key to water conservation and 
harvesting. Collective management has the power of social capital, group norms, trust, 
tradition, and group sanctions which guides sustainable use and conservation of a resource. 
For Shiva (2002), eroding community control, introducing private property rights and new 
technologies violates the water cycle. As a consequence scarcity becomes inevitable. She 
warns that the public-private partnerships (whereby private property rights are assigned to 
certain assets) operate under the guise of democracy, accountability and public participation, 
but in fact such partnerships involve the transfer of public funds to privatise public goods. 
Indeed such public-private partnerships can exacerbate negative externalities (such as 
further environmental degradation) in an attempt to provide a cost-efficient service (Lee & 
Floris 2003). Furthermore, with resources such as water, which is integral to all life, 
assignment of private property rights can exclude vulnerable populations who do not have the 
capacity to attain rights or purchase water from the rights owner. Such issues do not 
necessarily mean the removal of private property rights, in fact, when looking at 
conservation, public-private partnerships can enhance resilience as they can bring in a unique 
profit motive which may not exist for a public entity (Andonova, 2010). Yet it is important to 
keep in mind that if the use of such market-based instruments is appropriate in managing the 
commons, then factors such as the independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption 
within the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts must be 
considered for fair outcomes (Scott, 2002).  
The commons need not be seen in Hardin’s (1969) stark view. Many studies have 
shown the power of the commons in preserving resources if certain conditions are met. 
Agrawal’s (2003) review of three studies show that these conditions pertain to: 1) aspects of 
social capital
3
 (such as group norms, solidarity and size), 2) the characteristics of the resource 
(whether it has well-defined boundaries, riskiness of the resource, etc.), 3) institutional 
regimes (monitoring, sanctions, regulations) , 4) the  external environment (considering 
linkages with state, as in power and governance structures and adequate compensatory 
measures for resource conservation and 5) the availability of technological means through 
which to exploit the commons. The effectiveness of the type of right assigned will depend on 
the context within which it is legislated. In collectivist cultures with strong social norms, 
resource users’ management of common property may be the way to go whilst in more 
                                                             
3 Social capital brings together people through shared  norms, values and understandings that 
facilitate co-operation. 
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individualistic cultures and perhaps the domain of the rational-egoist, other solutions may be 
sought.  
For Ostrom (1990), the design principles which lead to sustainable common pool 
resource use regimes have been identified as:  
 Clear boundary rules which delineate the population effected by the resource use 
regime and importantly with whom social norms are formed. 
 Acknowledgement of local resource use traditions, a clear indication of how much, 
when, and how resources are to be harvested as well as allocating benefits in 
proportion to inputs.  
 Resource users are actively involved in making and modifying resource use rules. 
This enables the creation of mutually accepted rules in line with local traditions. 
 Monitors who are accountable to resource users or are in themselves resource users. 
They are tasked with not only monitoring the state of the resource but also user 
behaviour.  
  The use of graduated sanctions whereby the seriousness of the rule infraction is taken 
into consideration.   This acknowledges small infringements such that the rule breaker 
is aware that their behaviour is observed and may then take corrective measures to 
step in line with norms, or may escalate infractions at the risk of higher sanctions and 
potential exit out of the group.  
 Access to local conflict resolution platforms to deal with resource use grievances in 
order to maintain rule conformance.  
 Some level of legitimacy regarding the local-users resource use regime is necessary 
by the local or national government so that they are not undermined by the entrance of 
other potential resource users. 
 The need for nested regimes when dealing with large scale CPR problems.  
Ostrom (1990) does not see the application of her principles to be a panacea to CPR 
management regimes, instead they do provide a framework through which we can explore 
those factors which can impact the capability of people working in collaborative management 
of CPRs.  Some have argued that these design principles do not pay adequate attention to the 
contextual background of the resource regime, and instead, predominantly focuses on the 
community’s internal conditions (Husain & Bhattacharya, 2004; Edwards & Stein, 1999).  
The significance of external actors on CPR management is just as important, especially 
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NGOs and Intergovernmental Organisations who can provide an interesting array of 
resources to its management and which in itself are influenced by exogenous factors. 
Edwards and Stein (1999) argue that such external actors require greater representation 
within the design principles to be able to elicit contextual analysis. The debate of self 
governance of the commons will continue as the nature of our planet places us in such a 
dilemma. That self governance has worked in some instances but failed dramatically in others 
(as the story of man-made climate change attests too) requires alternative solutions to be 
sought when necessary. One such solution came in the form of Integrated Development and 
Conservation Projects (ICDPs). 
1.3 INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT AND CONSERVATION PROJECTS 
In the decades preceding Our Common Future, and the Millennium Declaration, the 
link between poverty and environmental degradation has strengthened. This is evident in the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which comment on the poverty-environment nexus 
and the mutually reinforcing relationship between poverty and environmental degradation. 
Thus poverty reduction and environmental protection have come to be seen as 
complementary goals (Dasgupta, Deichman, Mesiner & Wheeler, 2005).  
Such shifts in discourse have manifested itself in movements away from the 
traditional ‘fences and fines’ approaches to conservation, where generally local users are 
excluded, to more holistic Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs); an 
umbrella term housing within it concepts such as Community-Based-Conservation (CBC). 
Incorporating local development with conservation saw ICDPs enjoy a rapid period of growth 
over the last three decades. However from its earliest days the approach has garnered much 
criticism with some stating the crucial links between conservation and development has 
remained nonexistent (Barrett & Arcese, 1995). Regardless, such strategies have drawn 
considerable amounts of donor funding directed at conservation (Hughes & Flintan, 2001) 
and though there remains criticisms, the use of microfinance and credit lending models by 
ICDPs to facilitate its developmental agenda, can provide insights into the use of microloans 
in ecosystem-based adaptation.   
ICDPs were popularised in the mid 1980s. It represented a new approach to 
synergistically address the issues surrounding conservation and development in the Global 
South. The interrelationship between the environment and development was increasingly 
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entering the global discourse as evidenced by the 1972 United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment and the subsequent creation of the United Nations Commission on 
Environment and Development in 1983.  
 It was during this time that the world saw an exponential growth in protected areas 
(Figure 1.1). Foremost, protected areas were envisioned as a means through which to protect 
species and conserve biodiversity (Lee, Sodhi & Prawiradulaga, 2007). There are many types 
of protected areas, allowing differing levels of user rights in an attempt to curb the increasing 
fragmentation and conversion of habitats to address the significant loss in biodiversity in the 
last several decades
4
. Naturally this growth would come at a price. Often, the costs and 
benefits generated by such areas are not evenly distributed. Benefits are felt globally and 
nationally whilst the costs are more so borne locally. Indigenous communities, dependent on 
the land and the resources that had shaped and given life to their cultures were suddenly faced 
with displacement through physical translocation and/or restrictions on access to resources, 
impacting upon their livelihoods and traditions (Krueger, 2009).  
The growth in protected areas was also followed by a period of intense wildlife 
exploitation within certain of these areas.  With 1.1 billion of the poorest people living in 
biodiversity hotspots, the links between development and conservation became harder to 
ignore (Araya & Christen, 2004). To address the dual needs of the local community and 
species, conservationist begun taking a more ecosystem or landscape approach towards 
conservation whereby the inclusion of local communities within and around protected areas 
was seen as potentially aiding in achieving conservation objectives (Mackinnon, 2001).  The 
ICDP approach was thus born.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
4
 The Convention on Biodiversity Biological Indicators Partnership (2010) indicating wildlife 
populations have declined by more than a quarter in the last 35 years whilst the recent Living 
Planet Report (2014) reported a 52% decrease in wildlife populations since 1970.  
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FIGURE 1-1: GROWTH IN PROTECTED AREAS (1872-2007) ) - (UNEP-WCMC, 2012) 
 
ICDP is more of an umbrella term. It has been applied to a diverse range of projects 
each sharing a common goal; attempting to preserve the biological diversity of ecosystems 
through linking conservation efforts within protected areas with poverty alleviation strategies 
for those living within buffer zones (Wells, 1999).  
Over the years the definition of ICDPs has evolved, in essence it is an adaptive term 
that incorporates concepts of decentralisation, community participation, and sustainable 
development amongst other things. Furthermore such projects range in size and scope, 
reflected not only in project design and implementation but in the different types of 
organisations spearheading efforts (Damania et al., 2008). For instance, in its early days the 
projects were largely run by small NGOs before being embraced by global actors such as the 
World Bank Group’s Global Environmental Facility (GEF). For GEF, ICDPs enabled the 
engagement in projects to empower and benefit local communities living by protected areas 
through small scale poverty alleviation strategies to large scale programs that could integrate 
conservation with regional and national development goals (Jansen & Shen, 1997). It is 
perhaps this flexibility and the promised benefits which added to the popularity of ICDPs at 
that time. To enable biodiversity conservation, increased local community participation, more 
equitable sharing of benefits and economic development for the rural poor is alluring 
(Mckinnon, 2001).  
Despite its popularity, no clear set of strategies in meeting the goals of ICDPs have 
been developed. Instead it opts for hybrid methods such as community-based-conservation 
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(CBC), wildlife management, eco-tourism, and agricultural based methods (Agrawal & 
Redford, 2006). The seemingly broad body of practices utilised by ICDPs do display 
underlying similarities. These are displayed by Peters (1998) who identifies four basic 
strategies utilised by ICDPs linking conservation with development. These are: management 
of protected areas, the establishment and maintenance of buffer zones, compensating or 
enabling viable substitutes to local people, and promoting local and social development. 
Some of these strategies are evident in the CBC approach wherein the key aspect is 
the community focus. Management of resources is carried out primarily by the community 
relevant user groups but it also involves locally and nationally relevant institutional and 
private stakeholders. This makes optimum use of social capital, existing (or assigned) 
resource rights, local governance, traditional and local information, self-interest and self-
enforcement capacity (Govan, 2007). CBC is therefore a collaborative approach to 
management which shifts the power balance in conservation decision making from top-down 
to bottom-up. Importantly it utilises the motivating force of the community to drive 
conservation. Keeping in mind Ostrom’s (1990) design principles, well set-up Community 
Based Natural Resource Management with well defined user rights can be very fruitful to 
conservation efforts by including stakeholders at every level of design and management. 
 In addition, CBC is foremost conceptualised as a conservation initiative (Tai, 2007) 
and assumes the following: biodiversity conservation will succeed only if local communities 
receive sufficient benefits and participate in its management therefore having a stake in 
conserving the resource (Mehta and Kellert, 1998). Furthermore it assumes that conservation 
and development are complementary and can be achieved in concert. Lastly the locus of 
‘blame’ is placed upon the community – it is internal factors, representing local people and 
their subsistence practices, rather than external factors, such as market demand for protected 
goods, which pose the greatest threat to conservation in protected areas.  These assumptions 
of CBC are mirrored in ICDPs. With Hughes and Flintan (2001), in a review of the ICDP 
literature, collating the following list of the assumptions behind ICDPs: 
1) Through diversification of livelihoods, the exploitation of resources integral to 
maintaining biodiversity can be reduced, thus improving conservation. 
2) Internal factors, representing local people and their subsistence practices, rather than 
external factors, such as market demand for protected goods, pose the greatest threat 
to conservation in protected areas.  
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3) ICDPs are a sustainable alternative to the protectionist approach to the management of 
local areas. (Hughes & Flintan, 2001) 
1.3.1 KEY PROBLEMS OF ICDPS 
However, it is these unexamined assumptions which have been attributed to the often 
mediocre performance of ICDPs (Herrold-Menzies, 2006). In particular, a search of the 
literature revealed the following key issues emerging from ICDPs linked to these 
assumptions. Firstly ICDPs see local rural populations as the problem rather than solution to 
habitat destruction (Horwich & Lyon, 2007) but clearly this is not always the case. For 
example, external interests in wildlife trade and forest products place pressure on PA’s 
globally as does corruption within governance structures. This leads to the second issue 
whereby ICDPs are foremost designed to address the environmental problems arising from 
local livelihood practices. In doing so, they cannot address issues that arise from external 
sources such as the demand for illegal wildlife products that drives the activity of poachers, 
or inefficient/contesting policies (Damania et al., 2008; Herrold-Menzies, 2006). Winkler 
(2011) suggests that ICDPs need to cover a wider policy base to be successful with more 
encompassing tax and subsidy regimes.  
Another concern surrounding ICDPs is that the provision of alternate employment 
opportunities may further deteriorate, rather than ameliorate, conservation objectives. In the 
first instance, alternative livelihoods are seen as complements rather than substitutes for 
activities that degrade the ecosystem (Engel et al, 2008). Secondly it has been shown that in 
some instances new sources of income are more likely to be complementary to existing 
exploitative activities as households attempt to maximise their incomes (Ferraro & Kiss, 
2002). Kiss (2002) gives the example of the CAMPFIRE project in Zimbabwe where 
incomes generated by trophy hunting fees were invested into the expansion of agriculture into 
wildlife areas rather than conserving wildlife habitats. Furthermore as disposable income 
increases it is possible that demand for resources will also increase, placing further pressure 
on ecosystems (Herrold-Menzies, 2006). 
Considering these criticisms new opportunities offered by ICDPs must be attractive 
enough to outweigh those offered by activities leading to further environmental degradation. 
However if benefits are highly attractive it may draw in migrants to the area, in effect further 
straining resources within the protected area. Thus well established property rights are 
integral such that rewards remain within the targeted community (Gaveau et al, 2009). In 
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addition, Winkler (2011) shows that ICDPs often are unable to achieve optimal levels of 
conservation because of externalities associated with the local communities. Thus the success 
of ICDPs will largely depend upon the strength of traditional local governance structures and 
the power relations therein. As such successes may be misleading with powerful actors within 
the community benefiting more than others (Locher, 2006; Damania et al., 2008).  
For many the concepts of conservation and development are mutually exclusive. 
Invariably you cannot have one without sacrificing the other (Brosius & Russell, 2003). For 
instance Peters (1998) finds that the local people viewed conservation within the Ranomafana 
National Park in Madagascar to occur at the cost of development with villagers struggling to 
meet subsistence needs. Peters (1998) found that the western ideals prevailing over the 
Ranomafana ICDP failed to take into account the longstanding traditional land-use practices 
and the deep seated cultural norms governing them. Furthermore the Ranomafana ICDP 
urged an unequivocally biocentric agenda, placing preservation above and beyond the needs 
of local residents thereby further alienating communities which invariably would be 
detrimental to nature (Peters, 1998).  
An example that incorporates some of these issues is the Sundarbans (West Bengal) 
eco-region. The last of the great mangrove forests, this region is fed by the deltas of the 
mighty Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna, forming a unique habitat for many rare 
and endangered species. The human population is dependent on the land to meet their 
subsistence needs and thus frequently clash with other local species, having converted vast 
areas of the forest into paddy fields and shrimp farms (Gopal & Chauhan, 2006). The rich 
biodiversity of the region is threatened by anthropogenic activities that regulate river flow 
upstream for human needs causing changes in sedimentation, fresh water inflow, and 
increased salinity (Gopal & Chauhan, 2006). 
 The eco-region is isolated, which means that for those who call it home, poor 
infrastructure, lack of adequate education, healthcare, and modern energy services are major 
barriers to their development. Furthermore it has weak/misaligned institutional arrangements 
with limited economic opportunities. In order to enhance biodiversity conservation and meet 
the development needs of the local population within the region two large-scale ICDPs were 
implemented. One was funded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Global 
Environment Fund (GEF), and the other by the United Nations Development Programme, but 
neither had any formal linkages (Danda, 2007).  
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For the Sundarbans eco-region, competing interests complicated conservation and 
development objectives from the offset. On the one hand, the eco-region has been shown to 
be of great global significance, and is designated as a World Heritage Site and Biosphere 
Reserve. Locally however, for its inhabitants the region is seen as a ‘great provider’, allowing 
people to meet their subsistence needs. Nationally the Ministry of Environment and Forest 
recognised the significance of the region as a biodiversity hotspot and have attempted to 
protect various aspects of it.  However the Ministry of Renewable Energy viewed the region 
as an unbounded source of energy, constructing a full-scale tidal power station next to the 
sanctuary, without clear assessments of how such an action would impact the already fragile 
ecosystem. In addition, by blocking off vital waterways, the power station would negatively 
impact the rural poor within the region. Furthermore, within the eco-region competing 
conservation interests became an issue with marine and forest conservation placing differing 
demands on the local population, and often leading to alternate livelihoods which were 
counterfactual to overall conservation goals (Danda, 2002). Having faced opposition from 
local communities and NGOs, The ADB/GEF funded ICDP closed half way through 
implementation. It was argued that the project lacked social and environmental impact 
assessments, that the needs of the local resource users were not met, and benefits from eco-
tourism and other initiatives were largely being realised by outsiders rather than the local 
communities in addition to lacking accountability and transparency (Griffiths, 2005).    
These problems have led many to question the effectiveness of ICDPs with many 
reporting that ICDPs have achieved neither conservation nor rural development objectives 
(Browder, 2002; Peters, 1998; Horwich & Lyon, 2007; Brosius & Russell, 2003). The World 
Bank, in a review of ICDPs in Indonesia found that only very few such projects could claim 
to have enhanced conservation biodiversity conservation within the region (Wells et al, 
1999). Though such negative reviews of ICDPs are daunting to overcome, we can still learn 
from its successes. There are inspiring examples where ICDPs have achieved remarkable 
successes in not only promoting the conservation agenda but in fostering local support, 
ameliorating local development and increasing the area of land under protection for 
biodiversity. Commonly in these successful models, the development component of ICDPs 
incorporates some form of microlending as a strategy. 
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1.4 AN INTRODUCTION TO MICROFINANCE –  THE GRAMEEN BANK 
The notion of development is not static; it evolves with emerging practices and 
worldviews. For instance, the nation or society, once the standard unit of development, has 
now been displaced by concepts such as regionalisation and globalisation. The state, which 
once stood as the conventional agent through which development occurred is no longer the 
sole focus, with international institutions and market forces emerging as new drivers of 
change. There is change underfoot with ‘traditional’ development ideas such as 
modernisation and westernisation being challenged as cultural diversity is re-examined and 
environmental sustainability has pervasively entered the agenda (Pieterse, 2002).  
Microcredit and microfinance are development initiatives which have evolved with 
the shifting trends in development theory. It is a concept which has informed theory as much 
as it has been guided by it. Microfinance refers to the provision of financial services such as  
small loans, savings, fund transfers and insurance to the rural and urban poor whilst 
microcredit solely refers to the provision of small loans to this same population (Crichton, 
2009). Microfinance as such typically includes a microcredit component. There are various 
strands of microfinance utilising different lending models such as associations, bank 
guarantees, rotating savings and credit associations,   cooperatives, credit unions, Non-
Governmental Organizations, for-profit banks and the group lending/ Grameen 
community banking model. Essentially models differ in how funds are governed and from 
where they are sourced. Here we will focus on the Grameen model popularised by 
Muhammad Yunus. 
Microfinance has become a worldwide movement with the microcredit summit 
campaign (Daley-Harris, 2009) reporting 3552 microfinance institutions reaching 106.6 
million of the poorest clients in 2007.  In spite of the hype, microcredit and microfinance 
remain controversial as their contributions as well as effects on poverty alleviation have 
rightly come under scrutiny. So it bears careful scrutiny when these tools spread into new 
domains such as environmental protection.   
Whilst microfinance is an old concept dating back to the 19
th
 century when credit 
cooperatives were introduced in Germany (Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999) and to the ancient 
rotating savings and credit associations whose existence is pervasive in developing countries 
(Besley, Coate & Loury, 2001), its popularised form was pioneered by Muhammad Yunus 
who wished to challenge the overwhelming poverty that plighted his home country of 
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Bangladesh. Yunus saw that the governmental institutions were ineffective and incapable of 
solving the abject poverty and that quite a different structure would be required that could 
enable the people of his country to live outside of such deprivation. The ensuing Grameen 
Bank, owned by the poor borrowers (Grameen Bank, 2009), would merge profit 
maximisation - the foremost value of conventional economics - with a novel humanist 
approach to development by realising that financial systems could in fact operate within the 
bounds of social values which sees each person as having the right to credit, growth and 
development (Fuglesang, Chandler & Akuretiyagama, 1993).  
The neoliberalist approach of microcredit to alleviate poverty has been widely 
supported by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the United Nations since the 
1980’s (Weber, 2002) as it falls within their dual sided development framework. This 
framework joins sound economic policy with social and institutional reform which espouses 
participatory tactics to empower the poor who are not seen as liabilities but as assets (Taylor, 
2004). The support of high level donor agencies, NGO’s and political leaders enabled the 
proliferation of Grameen-like models of microcredit and microfinance institutions. Instigating 
these models as ‘best practice’ poverty alleviation tools (Bateman & Chang, 2009). 
The concept of microfinance is simple. As with any retail bank it provides financial 
services and loans which are repaid along with interest. Although unlike normal banking 
institutions, the main difference is with the clients and loan amounts. Microfinance 
institutions commenced by lending to the poorest of the poor, namely women living below 
the poverty line, by providing them with minute loans at affordable interest rates. These 
women tend to have no collateral therefore making them high risk clients. To get around this 
many microfinance institutions employ a novel group lending method through which social 
collateral is formed.  
For the Grameen Bank, social collateral is formed by specifying that in order to 
acquire loans, the landless poor must form a group of five members from the same village 
who are in a similar economic situation and who share mutual trust and confidence in each 
other. The group elects a Chairman and Secretary who then become responsible for 
acquiring, managing and repaying loans. The group members meet on a weekly basis to make 
loan repayments and also to place a specified amount into savings which goes into a 
‘collective group savings fund’. This fund then becomes a sustainable banking system, with 
deposits feeding more loans and also enabling group members to withdraw and invest funds 
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from their account to enable greater returns. Each withdrawal must be approved by every 
member of the group (Fuglesan, Chandler & Akuretiyagama, 1993). A further characteristic 
of the Grameen credit system is that the lenders meet with the borrowers thus opening up 
banking services to isolated and marginalised populations who cannot leave their villages or 
slums for various reasons as disparate as cultural traditions or lack of transport (Panos, 1997). 
For some, Grameen Bank has been an overwhelming success story, distributing 
US$8.26 billion worth of loans since its inception in 1976 to 7.93 million clients, of which 97 
per cent are women.  Grameen (2009) reports its loan recovery rate at 97.89 per cent, which 
is surely to be applauded in a time of such global financial unrest.  From its inception, Yunus 
and Grameen have since inspired thousands (Gutierrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca & Mar 
Molinero, 2007) of microfinance banks and programmes the world over. Whilst the methods 
employed in delivering their service differs according to context and objectives, each entity 
shares the same ideals as the Grameen Bank – the poor need not be seen as unskilled 
beneficiaries, but rather as clients striving for a better life through dignified employment 
(Bornstein,1997).  
1.4.1 CRITICISMS OF MICROFINANCE  
When done right, research has shown the successes of microfinance, for instance it 
builds strong communities through building social capital, it enables skills development, 
rewards entrepreneurship, it empowers women, significantly improves standards of living, 
and contributes to sustainable economic development (Crichton, 2009). Yet, microfinance 
cannot be seen as a panacea. Its rapid growth and the profit which exists at the base of the 
pyramid have left some questioning the impact it has upon the poor, and on ecosystems. For 
instance Ellerman (in Bateman, 2010) questions the viability of impact assessments utilised 
by MFIs. The current methodologies evaluate client versus non-client impact, with 
differences viewed as a consequence of microfinance. However without assigning true 
counterfactuals, the resulting assessments can be grossly misleading as it does not compare 
one development intervention with another but rather with no intervention at all.  
Further failings emerge when looking at impact assessments even when randomized 
control trials are utilised. These are: displacement, and client microenterprise failure. 
Essentially the former relates to non-client entrepreneurs being displaced by incoming 
microenterprise entrepreneurs who overcrowd market spaces, ignoring the concept of fallacy 
of composition.  Client microenterprise failure comments on survivor bias commonly 
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demonstrated in impact assessments. Only the stories of successful micro-entrepreneurs are 
ever recorded even though most microenterprise programmes are faced with failure. Bateman 
(2010) states that such failure can indeed push the poor individuals into a spiral of ever 
greater poverty as they must bear the associated social costs (for instance shame) and the 
termination of a vital income stream.  
In addition to these failings, it has also been argued that by emphasising on financial 
sustainability (thereby needing no donor aid) such institutions are not able to meet broader 
welfare needs for instance disaster relief for all citizens (Panos, 1997). Contrarily it can be 
argued that by providing insurance and savings to clients that these institutions in fact provide 
an effective safety net in times of trouble. For instance the macroeconomic role of 
microfinance during times of financial unrest has been questioned with conflicting findings. 
Marconi and Mosley (2006) argue that minimalist microcredit institutions could in fact 
intensify financial unrest, whilst microfinance institutions tended to be more resilient.  
In relation to empowerment, it has been argued that such programmes can actually 
lead to disempowerment with tensions increasing between women over loan repayment, and 
between spouses as men have been shown to withdraw their own income as women begin 
earning. An additional concern that became apparent was the difficulty women had in 
retaining ownership over their earnings (Mayoux, 1999). Furthermore,  microfinance can  
increase the burden on women as they must continue their traditional roles within the 
informal economy whilst also dealing with running a business with the added stress, 
responsibility and pressure of not defaulting on loans thereby bringing about social 
consequences upon themselves and their family (Bateman, 2010). 
Furthermore, Bateman and Chang (2009) demonstrate that the neoliberal nature of 
microfinance has three critical failings. Firstly it ignores the role of scale economies by 
flooding markets with an over-supply of inefficient micro-entrepreneurs who stifle the ability 
of small and medium enterprises to grow. This is closely related to the aforementioned issue 
of displacement. Secondly Bateman and Chang (2009) further argue that microfinance, in 
enabling liberalisation, ignores the previously introduced fallacy of composition; as 
facilitating a constant flow of new entrants into the informal sector will only saturate markets 
driving incomes and retail prices down and further degrading life conditions especially for 
slum dwellers. Lastly Bateman and Chang (2009) argue that according to neoliberal ideals of 
deregulation, there has been an increase in the number of microfinance institutions, which has 
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driven interest rates up. The consequence is that such institutions regress to the level of 
informal moneylenders, encouraging debt rather than savings. An additional criticism 
concerns the reach of such institutions. The World Bank estimates the potential market for 
microfinance to be 3 billion adults, of which only 5 million are able to receive loans (World 
Bank, 2007).  
1.4.2 MICROCREDIT AND COMMON POOL RESOURCES 
So what has microcredit in particular have  to do with conservation, and ICDPs? The 
fact is that microcredit has recently extended into an array of different applications such as 
the provision of loans to support water and sanitation facilities, energy needs, etc. 
Microcredit, although typically seen as a development aid for reducing poverty and 
stimulating economies, can also be applied directly or indirectly to environmental 
sustainability and as a strategy to reach the goals of ICDPs. For instance Anderson and 
Locker (2002), through an e-mail survey to 147 members of the Microcredit Summit, 
identified how three central tenets of many microfinance institutions indirectly encourages 
the sustainable use of common pool resources such as forest resources which is characterised 
by high subtractability and high exclusion costs.  
These tenets are: extending credit to the poor, targeting women and the concept of 
group lending and social collateral. They argue that the extension of credit to the poor for 
enterprise development enables income generation which in turn can change the demand for 
common pool resources and the technology for their use. Anderson and Locker (2002) note 
that whilst activities made possible through loans could be damaging to these same resources, 
for instance enabling chemical intensive agriculture, research shows a demand for increased 
environmental quality is positively correlated to rising incomes. Anderson and Locker (2002) 
also note that women tend to be the stewards of natural resources, which enables them to 
develop an intimate understanding of local ecosystems. This, they argue, provides an 
incentive for women to uphold and, when necessary, improve the quality of common pool 
resources and the natural environment. Finally Anderson and Locker (2002) maintain that 
through group lending, microfinance institutions facilitate the development of social capital. 
As we have seen earlier, social capital refers to the networks of linkages between people 
which can have a positive effect on the overall productivity of the community. It includes 
concepts such as goodwill, reciprocity and trust.   They argue that through social capital a 
shared sense of responsibility is created for common pool resources, encouraging sustainable 
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and equitable use. In effect group lending becomes the vital mechanism through which to 
check and enforce adherence to social norms, which form an important component of CPR 
management (Ostrom, 1990).   
1.4.3 MICROCREDIT AND ICDPS 
In regards to ICDPs, the popularity of microredit, and its design as a development tool 
for those at the bottom of the pyramid theoretically makes it a readily available and often well 
established strategy through which to reach the 1.1 billion poor who live within biological 
hotspots (Agrawal & Carraro, 2010).  Araya and Christensen (2003) argue that microfinance 
can aid in abating the unsustainable resources use practices of these communities by 
providing: loans for asset building, insurance to protect against unforeseen shocks, 
opportunities for livelihoods diversification, and social infrastructure. In addition microcredit 
with its lending requirements can indeed help to raise the productivity of the poor by enabling 
them to invest in eco-agricultural techniques and skill development which otherwise would 
not be available to them. Thus Araya and Christensen (2004) argue microfinance can 
contribute to the triple bottom line of sustainable use of natural resources, sustainable 
livelihoods for those living in buffer zones and sustainable financial institutions.  
When looking at microcredit and ICDPs, it is important to note that whilst microcredit 
is seen as a valuable support to diversify livelihoods, thus enabling less of a reliance on 
natural resources, it will only be successful in reaching conservation goals as specified in 
ICDPs if an appropriate link to conservation is made. Without forging such linkages the long-
term sustainability of ICDPs is threatened, as they do not enable the appropriate attitudinal 
and behavioural changes which make conservation a natural aspect of everyday life (Flintan, 
2003). Whilst microinsurance and microsavings have obvious benefits for climate change 
affected futures, microcredit has been linked to conservation in three ways in particular: the 
first is by way of environmental conditions placed on loan contracts, with access to the loan 
or repayment being dependent on carrying out certain conservation behaviours or prohibiting 
other behaviours such a fishing with monofilaments (Ndiaye, 2008). The second relates to 
selective lending. Selective lending is evident in programmes such as Grameen Shakti or 
Water.org. In the former, loans are only extended for the provision of solar PV technology 
whilst in the latter, microloans are provided to communities for potable water and sanitation. 
The third way in which microloans are linked to conservation is by holding the natural 
resource as collateral. Here, for example, the successful management of an ecosystem drives 
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favourable repayment conditions and the likelihood of future lending. Such a method is 
evident in snow leopard conservation in the Annapurna Conservation Area Project (Gurung, 
2003) a review of which will shortly follow. 
The suitability of these different types of microloans to meet conservation and 
development objectives will be dependent upon the context within which the initiative takes 
place. For instance an ICDP which utilises microcredit by making loans conditional on intact 
ecosystems, will have different property right requirements to selective lending models. In 
addition effective change can only be achieved via rigorous and unbiased impact assessments 
that can identify best practice of microfinance with a specific environmental focus. To the 
best of the author’s knowledge such impact assessments have not surfaced. Indeed 
microfinance also fits well with certain of the assumptions of ICDPs as it a) contributes to the 
diversification of livelihoods through alternate income generating activities and b) it too 
views local people as the champions of their lives, with external factors being less of a focus. 
Importantly it addresses the aforementioned key problems present in ICDPs which will be 
discussed in the case studies.  
1.5 ATTITUDE AND BEHAVIOUR  
In addition to understanding the tools used to attain healthier ecosystems it is of 
significance to better comprehend the drivers of environmentally protective behaviour within 
such schemes. In the last few decades environmental psychology has collated an impressive 
body of insights into how we perceive and interact with our physical environment. These 
insights have indicated the multifaceted nature of how we use and value resources, pressing 
home the notion that the crisis in the depletion of resources is largely a social phenomenon, 
resulting from faulty decision-making and its subsequent actions (Edney, 1981). Whilst 
climate change is invariably a global problem a search of the literature revealed 
psychological texts for the most part to be limited to Western nations. As such theoretical 
frameworks have be developed and tested predominantly in the West, with very little 
application on those communities that will be effected the most – namely the poorest of the 
poor living within vulnerable ecosystems in the Global South.  
For instance Chokor and Mene (1992) displayed that the values placed by rural 
Nigerians on natural areas had little to do with ecocentric motives (reasoning in favour of 
nature for the sake of nature) and more to do with its value as a food source – which 
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generally is not a value held by western populations. Those living in poverty in the Global 
South often inhabit extremely fragile environments and are subjected to the tangible effects 
of climate change. They experience ever greater occurrences of droughts and extreme climate 
variability which threatens their very existence. In western nations, climate change 
predominantly remains a distant threat and would thus elicit different cognitive adaptive 
strategies (Oskamp, 2000) which invariably would also impact upon social dilemmas 
involving resource use.  
Here we give a brief overview to a set of relevant theoretical models and concepts. 
These are:  ‘The theory of planned behaviour’ (Ajzen, 1991), implicit connections to nature 
(Shultz et al, 2004), ‘value-belief-norm model’ (Stern, 2000), ‘structural developmental 
theory’ (Kahn, 1999), and more generally to our understanding of inter-psychic and 
behavioural responses. Each of these theoretical models and concepts is bound together by 
the concept of morality and each deals either directly or indirectly with attitudes. 
1.5.1 THE VALUE BELIEF NORM (VBN) MODEL 
Within environmental psychology, the concept of environmental attitudes has for the 
most part been the focus of study.  Kaiser, Wolfing & Fuhrer (1999) found that almost two 
thirds of environmental psychology journals between 1965 and 1995 examined 
environmental attitudes with many attempting, with no consistent results, to tease apart causal 
relationships between attitudes and  socio-demographic variables such as socio-economic 
status, age and gender (see Wiidegren, 1998; Davidson & Freudenberg, 1996; Chalwa & 
Cushing, 2007 respectively).  
The relationship between attitudes and behaviour remains a dubious one. For decades, 
it has been shown that there is little consistency between attitudes and subsequent behaviour 
(Fazio & Zanna, 1981; Swim et al, 2009). This led to the creation of two major theoretical 
frameworks applied to environmental behaviour in particular, namely the ‘Theory of Planned 
Behaviour’ (TPB) and the ‘Value Belief Norm model’ (VBN).   
Stern (2000), an eminent scholar in environmental behaviour, defines environmentally 
significant behaviour from an impact-oriented and intent-oriented perspective. The former 
perspective defines behaviour from its impact on the environment. Its study would include 
relatively easily quantifiable measures such as energy use or water use. An intent-oriented 
perspective in contrast is defined by the actor’s motivation to behave in a way that is 
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beneficial to the environment. Intent-oriented research attempts to unpack the behavioural 
ecology
5
, motivations, internal and external barriers that drive environmentally responsible 
behaviours (Whitmarsh, 2009). Stern’s Value-Belief-Norm model builds upon value theory 
and norm-activation theory to present a specialised model directed at environmental 
behaviour. It posits that a causal chain of values, attitudes, beliefs and norms result in pro-
environmental behaviours.  
The value set consists of egoistic (concerned about own welfare), social altruistic 
(concerned about the welfare of others) and biospheric (concerned about the welfare of the 
biosphere) values. The second construct of attitudes relates to the individual’s environmental 
worldview or human/environment relationship. Typically this is measured via Dunlap and 
Vanliere’s New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) scale. The NEP scale is the most widely 
used measure of environmental concern (Dunlap, 2008) and attempts to tease apart one’s 
worldview as either biocentric or anthropocentric. Thus the VBN assumes that egoistic, 
social-altruistic and biospheric value orientations mediates beliefs which in turn affects 
personal norms, which essentially are internal moral standards. This then leads to behaviour. 
Stern (2000) notes that personal moral norms are the crucial element predisposing an 
individual to behave pro-environmentally. The VBN has been applied widely to 
environmental behaviour and activism however its application in the Global South seems to 
be limited.  
1.5.2 THE THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOUR (TPB) 
The TPB originated through the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA; Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1975). It has since become one of the most widely applied frameworks for predicting human 
behaviour (Armitage & Connor, 2001). The TRA proposed a framework through which to 
assess rational, volitional, and systematic behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). It states that 
behavioural intentions are determined by a person’s attitudes and subjective norms. Attitudes 
are ones beliefs regarding the behaviour weighted by our evaluation of the importance of 
these beliefs whilst subjective norms refers to the beliefs of relevant others, weighted by the 
importance we give to their viewpoints. A critical factor within the TRA and subsequently 
the TPB is that general attitudes are viewed as external to the model, and the focus instead is 
attitudes towards the behaviour in question (Fishbein, 1979). Behavioural intentions in turn 
                                                             
5
 Behavioural ecology is broadly defined as the study of the fitness consequences of 
behaviour – it asks how behaviour evolved and the adaptive consequences thereof. 
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capture the motivational factors or drive that pushes us towards the act of performing or not 
performing the behaviour.  Intentions are seen as the most proximal determinate of volitional 
behaviour. The attitudinal and normative constructs within the theory have been shown to 
influence the development of moral behaviour (Vallerand et al, 1992). This is significant as 
environmental issues generally take on a moral element. For instance, keeping in mind the 
state of solar technology today, when considering the installation of solar panels on your 
house you do not only think of the fact that you will save money on future power bills but 
also perhaps that you will reduce your carbon footprint which is for the good of the global 
commons. Similarly if you lay a living roof, you are considering the benefits to the ecosystem 
you inhabit, the joy it brings you and perhaps also to your neighbours. If all your neighbours 
have similar roofs, and you get on with them and value their opinions, you would be more 
inclined to lay your own.  
The TRA in itself is a successful model (Bagozzi, Wong & Bergami, 2000; Bright, 
Manfredo, Fishbein & Bath, 1993) however the criticisms against the assumption of the 
behaviour in question as being rational, volitional and systematic led to the development of 
the TPB. The TPB will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, however the key 
difference between the two theories is that the later one adds the construct of perceived 
behaviour control as a determinant of intention (Ajzen, 1991). This allows for factors outside 
of volitional control to be considered, such as ease of access to resources. Looking at the 
example of the living roof, if you do not have a supplier nearby from whom to buy the 
appropriate waterproof membranes or vegetation, then regardless of one’s intention you’d be 
severely limited by factors outside of your control.   
The TPB has been applied across many contexts – from sexual behaviour in 
adolescents in Sub-Saharan Africa (Aarø et al., 2006) to conservation in the West (Kaiser, 
Hübner & Bogner, 2006). The TPB states that behaviour is a function of one’s attitude 
towards the behaviour, subjective norm and perceived behavioural control. Therefore a 
positive attitude, a positive subjective norm, and high perceived behavioural control would be 
related to stronger intentions to perform the behaviour. With its roots in explaining health 
related behaviour, the TPB has shown great flexibility in explaining behaviour across 
contexts. The VBN model in contrast came into being specifically to understand 
environmentalism. Kaiser, Hübner and Bogner (2006) in a study exploring conservation 
behaviour in a sample of university students found the predictive validity of the TPB and 
VBN model to be high, though the TPB was better at explaining its embedded concepts.  
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1.5.3 STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY 
Unlike the TPB and VBN models, structural developmental theory came into fruition 
to explain cognitive development in children; commenting on the nature of knowledge and 
how we acquire it. Structural developmental theory originated through the pioneering work of 
Piaget. It is a cognitive theory as it utilises behaviour to understand how the human mind 
develops. Piaget noticed that a newborn baby displays biological patterns of action, for 
instance through demonstrating a sucking reflex to gain nourishment. However it is only as 
the baby develops day by day that it will hone this reflex through psychological assimilation 
such that it can differentiate its source of nourishment from other parts of its mother’s body. 
Thus Piaget concluded that our initial biological processes are transformed into more 
complex cognitive structures as we interact with the world (Piaget, 1970).  In sum, the theory 
posits that learning involves the transformation of knowledge which occurs as a child 
develops ever more active and original thinking schemes which include moral reasoning 
(Kahn, 1999).   
Kahn (1999), focusing on children, applied the theoretical framework of structural 
developmental theory to examine their relationship with nature. He ultimately provides a 
psychosocial explanation for Wilson’s (1984) biophilia hypothesis which essentially states 
that human beings have an innate affiliation with nature. His cross-cultural study is 
interesting in that it looks at impoverished communities in America, Brazil and Portugal. 
Through a series of semi-structured interviews Kahn and his colleagues found that children 
living in economically impoverished urban communities and those living by tropical forests 
each displayed an abiding affiliation to nature. In addition children seemed to embed 
environmental reasoning within their wider understanding framed by their interactions in the 
social and natural world.  
1.5.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN AND SELF-CONSTRUAL 
Chokor’s (2004) investigation into environmental concerns and resource values of the 
rural poor living by the Niger Delta is one of a handful of studies that seeks to understand 
how environmental values mediates the use of common pool resources in such populations. 
He cites literature on social dilemmas and group behaviour. His study utilised questionnaire 
survey, open-ended responses, discussion frameworks and rating scales to ascertain 
environmental values and priorities held by resource scarce people in Nigeria. He found that 
these groups are environmentally rational however their lack of assets and resources means 
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that they are unable to embrace traditional environmental conservation measures. Importantly 
Chokor (2004) found that self perception is a key element in subsequent environmental 
reasoning, with self-interest rather than community or common-good evaluations driving 
environmental thinking and decision-making.  Such findings are important in developing a 
better understanding of natural resource issues and the development of appropriate 
interventions to target them.  
A subsequent investigation by Arnocky, Stroink and DeCicco (2007) on self-construal 
adds to Chokor’s (2004) work. Self-construal connotes one’s perception of self which 
according to Arnocky and colleagues (2007) is a dynamic concept consisting of cultural 
influences, values and the inclusion of others in self. How we perceive ourselves will 
ultimately influence our environmental attitudes. Arnocky and colleagues (2007) explain that 
the often weak relationship found between environmental attitudes and environmentally 
protective behaviour may be a consequence of the type of environmental concern held by 
people which is in turn shaped by our perceptions of self. 
Self-construal is of particular importance when investigating social dilemmas such as 
those presented by the use of commons. Through an experimental manipulation, Arnocky et 
al (2008) were able to investigate how much one’s perception of self predicted action in the 
face of a commons dilemma. Students from an American university were asked to complete a 
set of measures looking at self-construal, environmental concern and cooperation in a 
commons dilemma. Utilising the latter in the form of a questionnaire rather than the more 
traditional game scenarios enabled the creation of a situation utilising hypothetical in-group 
and out-group members, in which competition, cooperation with others and cooperation for 
the sake of the environment (the common good) could be assessed. Arnoncky et al (2008) 
found that self-construal directly related to environmental concern, cooperation and 
behaviour. In addition, they found that it determined how one would behave in a commons 
dilemma with people demonstrating more independent conceptualisations showing greater 
self-preservation behaviour, as was found in Chokor’s (2004) study. However Chokor also 
found that this was driven by a necessity that a university student in America may not 
experience.   
In the Global South, when one is faced with survival would such simple 
representations work in understanding behaviour? Kahn (1999) states: “a theory of behaviour 
without reasoning can only come up short (p. 58).”  With such little research into reasoning in 
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regards to environmental protection in the Global South we cannot adequately understand the 
drivers of behaviour.  
1.5.5 THE SIGNIFICANCE TO MICROCREDIT 
Through the theoretical principles and examples discussed we can see that attitudes 
are an important though not entirely powerful predictor of conservation behaviour, indeed 
factors such as the resources available to us, values, norms, beliefs about ourselves and others 
play significant roles. Why is this of significance for microfinance and conservation?  In the 
case of microfinance much work has been conducted within the South exploring notions of 
social capital, group behaviour, and norms however very few studies have delved deeper into 
attitudes and how entrepreneurial desires may be fostered.  
In the case of microcredit institutions targeting conservation, a search of the literature 
revealed that no entirely psychological perspective has been explored. How do these 
institutions foster behavioural changes such that long after loans have gone people maintain 
their environmentally protective behaviours? As we have seen, how one behaves involves a 
complex mosaic of cognitive processes, influenced by socio-economic and cultural situations. 
If microcredit institutions instil the wrong values, or utilise incentive schemes in a short 
sighted manner then it is likely conservation behaviour will not be maintained. When done 
correctly however it can result in sustainable behaviour change.  
Interestingly one of the advantages of ICDPs as identified by Abbot et al (2001) was 
in attitude and behaviour change. They noted that often we focus on the outputs rather than 
the outcomes of such programmes.  They looked at one component of an ICDP instigated in 
the Kilum-Ijim forest in the Bamenda highlands of Cameroon. The component they focused 
on was that of the ‘livelihoods programme’ whose core assumption was that through 
developing income and livelihood opportunities, the local users would place less pressure on 
the forest ecosystem. They found that with time, attitudes towards the protection of the forest 
and demarcation of its boundary became more positive, so much so that the majority shifted 
from a negative view of forest conservation to a supportive view. The project changed 
attitudes through its long-term presence (beginning in 1987) which allowed people to reap the 
benefits of a healing ecosystem and let go of any suspicions and contempt that arose as the 
forest areas were marked for conservation.     
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1.6 THE CASE OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
Indeed these considerations can shed new insights into microfinance in Sub-Saharan 
Africa where resource pressures, spatial characteristics, and cultural norms  provide new 
challenges. The Sub-Saharan context is a good way to highlight the differences that arise in 
ecosystem-based conservation across contexts.  In the new century, Africa as a continent has 
displayed impressive amounts of growth, with high levels of natural and human capital 
driving progress. Yet despite this, Africa continues to be the poorest and most unequal 
continent in the world (Anderson et al, 2006). Indeed, it remains a disheartening fact that 
irrespective of the laudable efforts by governments in striving to achieve the United Nations 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets some of the world’s poorest people still 
represent the majority of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Accordingly the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organisation (2004) has stated that Sub-Saharan Africa 
represents the final frontier in the fight against abject poverty.  
Ethiopia, lying in the horn of Africa, is an interesting example of Sub-Saharan 
growth. In the last decade Ethiopia has shown slow yet steady economic growth however this  
has not been enough to leverage its people out of desolation, with Ethiopia ranked as 173 out 
of 187 in the United Nations Human Development Report (UNDP, 2013). The remaining 12 
countries fall within Sub-Saharan Africa, with a total of 33 out of 41 countries ranked as ‘low 
development’ coming from the region. Nigeria, ranked at a 142, has the highest population in 
this region whilst Ethiopia has the second highest.  
Sub-Saharan countries ability to reach development targets is hindered by natural and 
anthropogenic environmental threats. Whilst in the start of this century the region’s 
macroeconomic situation has slowly been stabilising its endurance is clearly threatened by 
climate change. Scenarios have shown that for Sub-Saharan Africa, climate change will 
present unparalleled threats (McIntyre et al, 2009). The region is already experiencing 
climatic variations which pose significant risks to countries due to low adaptive ability and 
high sensitivity within socio-economic systems. Ethiopia already has the added burden of 
reporting the largest number of environmental refugees relative to its population density. 
These are people who were no longer able to secure livelihoods because of environmental 
factors such as drought and desertification. These in turn feed into socio-political and socio-
economic circumstances exacerbating conflicts over resources, informing political agendas 
and negatively compounding development aspirations (Myers 2002). Indeed climate change 
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has been reframed from solely an environmental threat to being a security threat (Brown, 
Hammill & McLeman, 2007). 
As most Sub-Saharan economies are agriculturally driven (McIntyre et al, 2009), with 
small to medium sized enterprises being considerable contributors to the economy, the scope 
of environmental threats becomes evident. Currently, Ethiopia leads the way as the largest 
producer of coffee, maize and wheat in Africa (Francesconi and Heerink, 2010). To 
accommodate agricultural needs, significant proportions of forest area have been converted 
into pastures throughout Sub-Saharan Africa (McIntyre et al, 2009). Yet in Ethiopia and Sub-
Saharan Africa in general, food insecurity remains an issue. Studies have shown that in part 
this may be due to the degradation in forest cover (McIntyre et al, 2009; Clover, 2003).  
Forest area as a percentage of total land area, as represented in the World 
Development Indicators Database has decreased from 29% in 1990 to 26% in 2009. These 
figures are disheartening for in Africa, forests constitute an integral part of livelihoods for the 
poor. Kaimowitz (2003) notes that tens of millions of people in Sub-Saharan Africa rely on 
forest products, with the poorest households generally being the most dependent especially in 
times of crises. In such populations, people rely on forests for food, medicinal plants, fuel 
wood, and charcoal. As forests offer many integral ecosystem services their degradation can 
result in  reduced agricultural capacity (Kaimowitz, 2003) and less resilience against negative 
climate events.  
Realising that sometimes those who are dependent on forests are also the cause of 
their degradation, governments have assigned protected areas. As we have seen earlier, this 
results in the displacement of local forest dwellers and impacts on the subsistence practices of 
bordering communities. In Ethiopia, 85% of the population lives within rural areas with the 
majority dependent upon natural resources. With 80% of the rural population living in 
highlands, 97% of original highland vegetation has been lost and still increasing numbers of 
rural poor with resource needs live within and surrounding protected areas (Challenges, n.d). 
With the rise of development strategies such as microfinance, these populations are now able 
to benefit from financial services which may remediate their dependence on forest resources, 
though such strategies should be implemented with caution. 
A recent comprehensive review by Stewart and colleagues (2010) has shed light on 
the impact of microfinance on poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa. Through a systematic review 
of the literature they concluded that micro-savings and microcredit can potentially improve 
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the lives of the poor, however microcredit also can do much harm, potentially plunging 
people deeper into poverty. They found considerable evidence that clients can choose to 
consume more rather than invest in their futures. Invariably this leads to an inability to repay 
loans thereby increasing their debt rather than relieving it. Stewart and colleagues (2010) did 
report that micro-credit and micro-savings did have a positive effect on health and food 
security though the latter was not observed across the board. In addition they found that it 
resulted in increased client expenditure and a greater accumulation of assets. However the 
mixed results, and overall negative conclusion points to need for greater research assessing 
the viability of microfinance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed with greater client expenditure 
and the increased proliferation of microfinance in Africa, there becomes an urgent need to 
assess the environmental impacts which arise from spending. 
Within rural Ethiopia, microfinance has been pursued with vigour, with the country 
being one of the early implementers of regulated microfinance (Gobezie, 2007). 
Unfortunately, the reality remains that in very poor Sub-Saharan countries like Ethiopia the 
supply of financial products to the rural poor is constrained by inadequate policy design, 
regulation, organisational behaviours and incentive problems along with the remoteness of 
populations (Gobezie, 2005). Poor policy and regulations can impede growth in MFI’s by 
limiting competition (such as through interest rate ceilings) and adaptation to contextual 
needs. In addition without strict supervision and monitoring policies, effective and 
sustainable rural financial intermediaries can be crowded-out by MFIs operating as charities 
without the added discipline afforded by market terms (Gobezie, 2005).  Furthermore 
incentives must run in both directions – the provider of financial services in countries where 
MFIs are government regulated will determine their performance based upon these incentives 
whilst the performance of the MFI will drive borrowers incentives to repay loans and save.   
In Ethiopia MFI’s have largely sprouted as replications of the Gramen model. 
Theoretically, considering the collective solidarity represented in rural Ethiopian life, such a 
model would seem conducive to the context. However the Grameen model was designed in 
Bangladesh, a country with extremely high population density such that groups live in close 
proximity to each other thereby facilitating loan guarantees via information symmetry 
(Gobezie, 2007). This sharply contrasts with the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa where 
populations are spatially distant. Of course this scattered living style coupled with poor 
infrastructure connotes further implications for the viability of sustainably providing 
microfinance services to the very poor. With populations living in remote and hard to reach 
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areas far from each other, the costs of providing services becomes a significant hindrance 
(Gobezie, 2007). In addition Gobezie (2005) shows that in some localities the group lending 
model can be an impediment to microcredit, with religion – a glue for solidarity – dictating 
how one maintains their personal finances. For instance some Muslim Ethiopians are 
forbidden by their beliefs to pay or receive interest. Therefore they do not seek loans nor save 
in banks (Gobezie, 2005), whilst in Bangladesh, Islamic microcredit has been designed to go 
beyond some of the prohibitions of Sharia law.  
Thus, as is the case in much of the African continent, whether in lieu of or in addition 
to various credit lending models, multifaceted traditional risk sharing mechanisms are already 
entrenched within subjective norms and can indeed impact upon Grameen type lending 
methods. In addition Gobezie (2005) notes that within rural Ethiopia certain alternative 
income generating activities are restricted by cultural norms. Curiously such activities are 
usually those that are environmentally friendly and do not disregard indigenous knowledge. 
For instance creating handicrafts, tannery, pottery and blacksmithing. Consequentially 
Gobezie (2005) reports that only 5% of loans were directed at such non-agricultural based 
activities. Thus cultural norms dictate the use of loans which in turn may shape the targeting 
and marketing of loans by MFIs who in turn are driven by their own incentive mechanisms.  
This along with the state of  land  rights - which have largely remained under the 
possession and control of the state, with usufruct rights of differing degrees of formality 
awarded to land users (Gavian and Ehui 2011) - would indeed impact on the ability of 
conservation and development initiatives to successfully incorporate microfinance or credit 
lending models. It is clear that the need for such services exists as displayed in the case of 
Ethiopia. For instance, Flintan (2000) reports on the WWF sponsored ICDP in the Bale 
Mountains National Park in Ethiopia; here local communities communicated the need for 
financial services to enable diversification of livelihoods. Such services were suggested in the 
form of microfinance however a search of the literature did not reveal whether microfinance 
was eventually instigated.  
There are some successful examples of ICDPs incorporating microfinance in Sub-
Saharan African context, one such example will be displayed in the case study of Senegal in 
the following section.  However these examples for the most part do not come from rigorous 
impact assessments. In addition there remains little research on the psychological and cultural 
barriers that may affect the uptake and use of loans. Furthermore the way in which loans are 
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distributed and activities monitored to assess its impact upon developmental and 
environmental agendas bears further consideration.  
1.7 WWF WEST AFRICA MARINE ECO-REGION (WAMER)  – SENEGALESE 
CASE STUDY 
Senegal lies nestled along the coast of West Africa surrounded by abundant forests 
and coastlines. In Senegal the fisheries industry remains the most lucrative export market. 
However in recent years, the increasing reliance of the people and indeed the economy on 
fishery products has resulted in overexploitation, subsequently threatening livelihoods, food 
security and biodiversity. This has further been compounded by the degradation of 
agricultural production systems in rural in-land areas which led to the migration of people to 
coastal regions placing ever greater strain on resources and space.  
Microfinance arrived into Senegal under this context, with political leaders and 
development professionals pushing microfinance as a tool to enable people to lift them-selves 
out of poverty. WWF WAMER realising the potential of microfinance in diversifying 
livelihoods incorporated lending models into its conservation strategy in Senegal. This 
strategy included actively engaging in the creation of several Marine Protected Areas 
(MPAs), utilising the principles of community-based management. Here we focus on the case 
study Popenguine.  
Popenguine provides an interesting case, with community driven conservation 
initiatives being developed and implemented long before the involvement of WWF WAMER. 
The initiative commenced in 1987, preceding the classification of the Popenguine forest as a 
natural reserve – an action provoked by intense resource exploitation. The women of 
Popenguine with the help of reserve officials and the Peace Corps established the 
‘Regroupement des Femmes de Popenguine pour la Protection de la Nature (RFPPN). The 
group was tasked with protecting and managing the natural resources held within the reserve. 
In 1996 RFPPN took it upon themselves to sensitise other villages subsisting off the forest by 
creating a collective – Collectif des Groupements de Femmes Pour la Protection de la Nature 
(COPRONAT).  Starting with only a few members the collective grew to 1,555 women each 
trained in managing mangrove nurseries, reforestation, waste management and environmental 
education. (Najatang, 2002). The women significantly contributed to the restoration of the 
mangrove ecosystem and the preservation of biodiversity within the reserve and its 
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surrounding areas.  For instance they managed to reintroduce numerous indigenous trees, 
flora and fauna with 195 species of birds reappearing to the reserve (Najatang, 2002).  
Expanding the conservation agenda to include development objectives, in 2005 WWF 
WAMER established mutual savings and credit operations.  The mutuals were divided into 
community and institutional structures. The community structure included members and 
governing bodies whilst the institutional structure included WWF and the technical/functional 
components required in the creation of mutuals. Only residents of the territorial area within 
which the mutuals operate could apply for membership which was secured with a 3,000FCFA 
payment. Once a member, women (and a small percentage of men) could commence 
applying for loans but these were attached with strict conditions prohibiting activities that 
could be detrimental to conservation. These included: fishing with monofilament and/or 
explosives and the felling of trees and other degrading forestry activities. Interest was 
charged at one percent of the total loan amount, which was then partly used to fund 
community development projects. For the most part, 93.9% of credit in Popenguine was 
destined towards commerce, with activities including recycling materials into jewellery and 
other gift products which were targeted for sale to tourists (Ndiaye, 2008).  
The socio-economic status of communities improved as did conservation which 
benefited the local people by improved ecosystem services and providing revenue from 
tourism. The initiative has been tremendously successful, winning the UNDP Equator Prize 
in 2006 and has been replicated throughout Senegal and West Africa with the women of 
Popenguine providing training to these new collectives. In addition the COPRONAT has 
empowered women, enabling them to be active participants in policy development (Ndiaye, 
2008).  
Popenguine commenced as a solely conservation based initiative led by the 
community. The women became the stewards of protecting and maintaining the fragile 
ecosystem which formed a part of their culture and livelihoods. As such it could be that they 
already had developed complex emotional connections to the land which shaped their 
attitudes and values such that when the land became too degraded they were inclined to act 
positively. In their actions it would seem that they gradually developed a culture of 
conservation driven by ecosystem based incentives. When merged with micro-credit and 
development objectives, additional livelihood incentives were developed however these 
would remain embedded in and reliant on the wider benefits offered by conservation. 
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1.8 THE ANNAPURNA CONSERVATION AREA PROJECT (ACAP) - 
PROTECTING SNOW LEOPARDS 
ACAP, established in 1986, was the first and largest conservation area in Nepal. It has 
widely been recognised for its innovative approach to protected area management, seamlessly 
linking multiple land use practices such that biodiversity conservation and development of 
rural communities have flourished. ACAP has included many activities such as the local 
management of forests, seedling planting  for distribution to  private and project plantations, 
eco-tourism through the development of world renowned trekking routes, eco-agriculture, 
introduction of alternative energy sources and education in conservation to name a few 
(Hughes & Flintan, 2001). ACAP, linked with corridors to other conservation areas within 
Nepal, has been a successful model in snow leopard conservation (Ale & Karky, 2002). The 
ACAP approach is highly participatory in nature with local communities taking charge of 
many activities. In particular the management of wildlife was encouraged via the creation of 
legally formed ‘local’ committees.  
Microfinance in ACAP has been applied effectively to the conservation of snow 
leopards in two ways. The first is through the creation of a revolving community fund, 
sustained through park levies in the form of entrance fees. In essence accessing funds would 
require communities to provide environmental assets as collateral for loans. Credit was thus 
extended with the condition of the asset driving the loan – creating an incentive to conserve 
the asset. The funds enabled local conservation bodies to be self-sustaining, giving complete 
ownership over the project and giving them the ability to form different conservation bodies 
with economic incentives to protect the environmental asset (Gurung, 2003).  
With consensus from local community members, snow leopards  – who are present in 
four of the six buffer zones –  were identified as a species in need of protection. The ensuing 
snow leopard conservation committee would go on to make use of  funds to finance various 
activities such as creating alternative pastures, hiring local herders and investing in 
infrastructure such as schools through which local communities and tourists could engage in 
awareness building activities (Ale & Karky, 2002). Such services would build social capital, 
strengthening communities and their resolve to engage in conservation activities. 
Furthermore as the committee consisted of local actors, it viewed the local population as the 
solution rather than the problem to achieve effective conservation. Additionally the legal 
position of the committee provided it with a certain amount of voice to address external 
factors that may have impacted development and conservation goals. 
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The second and more traditional way in which microfinance has been applied in the 
successful conservation of snow leopards is in the Upper Mustang biodiversity conservation 
project. Here the population is extremely poor, with agricultural practices barely covering 
subsistence needs. As a consequence people were having to rely more and more on 
unsustainable resource use practices to feed themselves. Microfinance has been used as a tool 
to revitalise the economy, impacting on conservation by creating alternative income 
generating activities (Ale & Karky, 2002). The project successfully developed a self-
sustaining community owned microfinance institution where community members could 
access savings, credit groups and community trust funds. The Community Resource Action 
Committee (CRAC) was assigned with managing the system, whilst also acting as the 
steering body for biodiversity conservation within the region through setting up activities 
such as a livestock insurance scheme. Such schemes compensate farmers for livestock 
depredation by snow leopards and wolves thus avoiding retaliatory killings (Ale & Karky, 
2002).  
Furthermore women were targeted to access loans to enable them to diversify 
livelihoods through purchasing livestock. Women in these communities often experience 
greater levels of poverty with very little land and property rights. In addition women are 
generally engaged in ‘non-market’ work in the care economy (Gurung, Tulachan & Gauchan, 
2005). Through loan schemes women not only are empowered but the benefits of the ICDP 
was more evenly distributed as it targeted those groups that hold the least amount of power 
(namely women). In this ACAP example we have seen that the incentives to engage in 
conservation were great enough to ensure conservation objectives were met. As such 
conservation and development goals were not seen as mutually exclusive.  
1.9 KANCHENJUNGA CONSERVATION AREA PROJECT 
Another successful example of microfinance as a tool to achieve ICDP goals is 
evident in Kanchenjunga Conservation Area Project (KCAP) an ICDP in East Nepal. Here as 
in Annapurna and  Popenguine,  the project also includes a women’s development approach 
which creates a direct link between women, conservation and development. Women are 
directly involved in conservation through awareness raising activities, maintaining tree 
nurseries, and wildlife monitoring. In addition they engage in community development 
schemes such as infrastructure development and were required, through the establishment of 
managerial bodies, to operate within the different political levels within the community. The 
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microfinance scheme distributed funds using the traditional Grameen method. Women form 
cooperatives through which they were provisioned funds for village development activities, 
girls’ scholarships and accessing loans for alternative income activities (Locher, 2006).  
As we saw with the other case studies women play a significant role in the use and 
management of natural resources which provides them with a strong incentive to conserve 
them. As such each of these ICPD case studies  have acknowledged the integral role of 
women in conservation.  The KCAP project has recast the role of women in conservation, 
effectively addressing externalities existing within the community and providing a crucial 
access point for women to engage in conservation and development activities (Locher, 2006). 
Furthermore the alternate income generating activities do not clash with the conservation 
goals of ICDP and instead are complementary to it. Activities include: Kitchen gardening, 
sewing training and horticulture and the implementation of environmental and social 
programmes. The latter not only aids the community but generates income through eco-
tourism. By raising awareness in tourists, external factors to environmental degradation are 
also addressed. In just five years KCAP had seen an increase in forest cover and became a 
self-sustaining project run entirely by the local community (Gnyawali, 2007).   
1.10 MICROCREDIT AT CAOHAI NATURE RESERVE –  A LESS SUCCESSFUL 
MODEL 
Caohai Nature Reserve in China is another instance in which microfinance has been 
applied to ICDPs but perhaps with a little less success then that achieved in Annapurna. The 
Caohai Nature Reserve was formally established in 1985 in one of the poorest regions within 
the Guizhous province. Here the reserve houses 89 villages, each of which were heavily 
reliant on subsistence activities that led to the rapid degradation of Caohai Lake. Such 
activities included: the draining of wetlands, clearing wooded hillsides, trapping waterfowl 
and fishing during spawning season. The enforcement of restrictions to limit resource use was 
an increasingly difficult task, with villagers vehemently resisting conservation efforts. Thus 
in 1993 the International Crane Foundation (ICF) and the Trickle Up Program (TUP) 
commenced a microcredit programme (Herrold-Menzies, 2008).  
The programme commenced by extending small grants to farmers with no repayment 
conditions. These grants were offered as a way to instigate micro-enterprises, testing 
villager’s management abilities. Once villagers were able to demonstrate that they could 
indeed manage their micro-enterprise, they were able to access a revolving microcredit based 
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community trust fund with repayment obligations. Interest accrued would return to the 
community trust fund such that villages could utilise the money to engage in community 
projects, such as improving village wells, or loan it out to members (Herrold-Menzies, 2008). 
The scheme led to empowerment of farmers and significant improvement in water 
quality and household livelihoods; however it had mixed results when looking at the 
environmental impacts of alternative income generating activities. In some instances farmers 
could raise more pigs whilst in others, by absorbing surplus labour; it enabled people to shift 
away from engaging in illegal activities. Crucially though, the evolving credit system eased 
tensions between reserve officials and villagers, such that villagers would co-operate by 
following enforced bans on fishing during spawning season. Through strengthened social 
capital – arising from the revolving credit scheme – it allowed the local community to self-
police conservation activities between and within villages (Herrold-Menzies, 2006).In spite 
of this, in Caohai the conservation goal has yet to be achieved.  Microcredit as a component 
of the ICDP was crucial in building alliances, reducing tensions and opening lines of 
communication but perhaps in this instance it was more so a development strategy, 
highlighting the argument that development and conservation are perhaps opposing goals. 
1.11 BIO-RIGHTS 
As we have seen, microfinance can be an important addition to an ICDP if it is 
handled correctly. If it is not, then it could overpower conservation objectives by shifting the 
focus to development.  Recently a new form of loan, termed Bio-rights, inspired by 
microfinance and payment for ecosystem services schemes, and directly linked to 
conservation objectives has come into fruition. Bio-rights meet all the assumptions of ICDPs. 
To recap, these are as follows: the diversification of livelihoods will improve conservation as 
it reduces the unsustainable exploitation of resources; local people and their subsistence 
practices are the key threat to conservation within protected areas; and it is a sustainable 
alternative to protectionist measures (Hughes & Flintan, 2001).  
Bio-rights is a novel approach to conservation combining traditional conservation and 
development measures with market-driven instruments.  It came into fruition in 1996 and is 
the brainchild of Wetlands International.  As such, it has been applied, for the most part, in 
the context of wetlands. Within this approach microcredit is extended to local communities 
who then must actively participate in meeting specified conservation and restoration targets 
60 
 
as stated within the loan criteria. If the community meets their targets then credit is converted 
into definitive payments, and communities need not pay back their loans (van Eijk & Kumar, 
2009; Figure 1.2).  As such the Bio-rights model sees the potential of local communities as 
the stewards of conservation.  
FIGURE 1-2: SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF BIO-RIGHTS APPROACH6  
 
 
Ideally funding for Bio-rights would address the market failures whereby ecosystem 
services have been undervalued such that low-cost availability of environmental services 
have led to widespread degradation thereby constricting long-term use. Thus, funding of Bio-
rights can generally be seen as an assessment of flows with funding acquired from those who 
benefit the most from the sustainable management of resources. However as attempts to 
address such market failures have a long way yet to go multi-lateral and bi-lateral aid can also 
be applied (van Eijk & Kumar, 2009).  
Wetlands International clearly states that the Bio-rights approach to conservation is 
not a silver bullet and is a tool to be used in conjunction with others. The literature is sparse 
on this strategy however those results which have been presented do seem promising. Though 
there are clearly constraints in the approach and these are presented by the limited contexts in 
                                                             
6 Local communities in receipt of bio-right micro-credits, upon the successful 
completion of conservation or restoration of ecosystem services, can either convert 
credit into a one-off payment or reinter their loan in a community-based revolving 
fund - (van eijk & kumar, 2009, p.23).  
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which it can be applied. Foremost for bio-rights to be successful – van Eijk and Kumar 
(2008) state the need for local communities to hold formal property rights over land and 
resources. If the community does not hold such rights then the approach can be in conflict 
with the intended land use plans of the legal land owner, thereby jeopardising the viability of 
conservation initiatives. As communities living in and around fragile ecosystems typically do 
not have such rights this limits the scope of application.  
In addition, for the Bio-rights approach to be successful and sustainable it requires full 
support from the community as discordance would likely result in conflict land and resource 
use objectives which could complicate the project’s viability. Typically such support can be 
attained in extremely homogenous societies which are few and far between (Ruben and 
Pender 2004). Importantly – as we saw earlier, the sustainability of conservation subsequent 
to Bio-rights will be conditional upon the reasons behind which communities choose to 
engage in the initiative. If an appropriate link to conservation is not made and communities 
cooperate in activities mainly for the financial incentives then the long-term sustainability of 
maintaining conservation efforts is threatened (van Eijk & Kumar, 2008; Flintan, 2003). 
Appropriate behavioural and attitudinal changes will thus ensure long-term sustainability 
after purely financial incentives for conservation have gone. 
1.12 BIO-RIGHTS IN BERBAK-SEMBILANG NATIONAL PARK – SUMATRA 
The Berbak-Sembilang National Park in Sumatra covers 162,700ha of which 90% is 
peatswamp forests. Peat swamps offer many ecosystem services and in the Berbak region are 
integral in flood control, flow regulation, water supply, the prevention of saline water 
intrusion and Carbon sequestration which together maintain the integrity of surrounding 
ecosystems and also provide a habitat for numerous species of plant, insects and animals 
(Noor, Cahyo, Wibisono & Suryadiputra, 2007).  
However land conversion and logging in the upper catchment of the Air Hitam Laut 
river, as well as illegal fishing and collection of non-timber products, have threatened the peat 
swamps with increased incidence of droughts and fires which results in the release of millions 
of tonnes of Carbon Dioxide into the atmosphere (Koopmanschap, Vehmeyer, & Snellen, 
2003). In addition the unsustainable management of the ecosystem led to increased regional 
poverty (Wetlands International, 2009). 
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In an effort to conserve the Sumatran peatswamp forests, Wetlands International 
(2009) stepped in, instigating a two year project which applied their novel bio-rights model to 
the national park. The project generated alternative livelihood options through the provision 
of microcredit with conservation conditions attached to loans. With the aid of two local 
partners the project was able to reach 23 community groups living in and around the 
peatswamp forests (Wetlands International, 2009).  
Seeing the local community as key players in protecting the forests, the project 
incorporated them as valuable project partners, including them in design and decision stages 
from early on. Through consultation with the community and local authorities, the following 
focal areas were defined:  
a) Diversifying income such that people are less dependent on wetlands for subsistence 
needs.  
b) Protecting and restoring peat swamps. Stakeholders took charge of monitoring, 
restoration (planting seedlings), and fire prevention activities. 
c) Awareness and the development of policy. Park managers, local authorities and local 
communities were encouraged to work alongside each other in the management of the 
wetland (Wetlands International, 2009).  
To achieve the diversification of incomes, training for wetland restoration and 
diversification of livelihoods was instigated along with market analysis to advise local people 
on the crops and products that would be most productive for them to provide to local markets 
and the avenues through which to go about it. In addition the development of community 
plans/proposals detailing business plans, the amount of funding required for activities to be 
undertaken and also agreed upon conservation activities were submitted. If the proposals 
were approved then microcredit and revolving funds were initiated. Here, the Bio-rights 
model specified areas of peat swamps that communities would need to maintain, planting and 
caring for seedlings till maturity. The microloans and revolving funds provided the incentives 
for local communities to preserve the peat swamps, as if communities were able to maintain 
the long-term survival of a specified amount of seedlings then they would not need to repay 
loans (Wetlands International, 2009). 
Individuals were able to apply for loans through their community groups to invest in 
their chosen income generating activity. At the individual level the loans were not subject to 
repayment with interest if the borrower met the conservation conditions specified in the loan 
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criteria and community proposals. In the case of the Sumatra, this was achieved in the form 
of planting and maintaining a certain amount of trees dependent on the size of loan sought. 
Upon the successful completion of projects, the communities involved opted to have repaid 
loans enter into a revolving fund rather then switch over to grants as the original Bio-rights 
model conceptualises. These revolving funds could then be used by other bordering villages – 
creating a sense of community and a culture of conservation whilst at the same time limiting 
issues surrounding migration into successful conservation areas (Wetlands International, 
2009).  
Protection and restoration of peat swamps thus took place through tree-planting and the 
diversification of livelihoods into conservation activities such as setting up fire-brigades, with 
members receiving compensation for their time. Women also were taught how to grow 
seedlings which could be sold to outsiders and provided free to other nearby communities. 
Awareness raising activities took place incorporating park managers, local authorities and 
local communities whilst the development of policy was achieved by actively seeking a 
champion of the cause.  This came in the form of the Governor of South Sumatra who pushed 
forward the work of the community fire brigades who became local heroes for their work 
(Wetlands International, 2009).  
Whilst no in-depth impact assessment was carried out, the project reported increased 
incomes and yields from crops, with some farmers able to expand their farms thereby 
increasing local employment opportunities and others diversifying away from chicken 
farming to raising cattle and growing rice seedlings. The focus on development, limited 
timeframe and lack of funds meant that the ecological impact of the project were not able to 
be ascertained in any detail however forest fires did significantly decrease as did the amount 
of illegal logging. Together these would have reduced threats to biodiversity, protecting the 
habitats necessary for the various endangered species to flourish (Wetlands International, 
2009) 
Unfortunately recent studies have shown that degradation continues to threaten the 
remaining peat swamps in Indonesia. Logging, land conversion to palm oil for bio-fuel, and 
drainage are issues that extend beyond the small area of peat swamps that is protected (Yule, 
2010; Wibisono and Pusparini 2010). By not addressing external drivers nor running detailed 
impact assessments long term sustainability and viability of the project cannot be ascertained, 
hence the effectiveness of Bio-rights in this case is not clear. The same is true for the other 
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case-studies presented. There is not much critical research available on the processes which 
have driven success or failure. There is no tie in with cognitive drivers which should be 
integral when looking at any initiative which attempts to change behaviour. Such insights 
would be priceless for best practice.   
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2 SCOPE, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND MAIN CONTRIBUTION OF 
THIS THESIS  
 
7
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 Newly raised livestock platforms in a smallholding by the river which had 
been damaged by floods.  
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2.1 SCOPE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
So far we have seen different ways in which to manage resources for the good of the 
collective. We have drawn out the dominant themes as being ecosystem-based adaptation, 
microfinance and behaviour. Whilst we have seen that microfinance is being used more and 
more in ecosystem-based adaptation, there remains very little critical research on its efficacy. 
It seems plausible that microloans can increase adaptive capacity however we do not know 
which processes drive its success and which may lead to an illusory short term change in 
behaviour.  In order to build a comprehensive understanding of how we can engage people to 
take up adaptive behaviours through microloans, a sociopsychological perspective would be 
invaluable. After all, applied psychology is all about understanding, explaining and changing 
behaviour. With the problem set that climate change poses, the importance of a psychological 
perspective on the design of initiatives becomes ever more pertinent as one could crowd-out 
intrinsic drivers formed of our beliefs and value, through the introduction of extrinsic 
rewards.  
As the most vulnerable populations live within the developing world and by fragile 
ecosystems it is important to understand the deeper motivators of their behaviour. These 
populations face an entirely different set of problems than others. For a middle class family in 
London for instance, climate change is experienced in a completely different way to a farmer 
living by the Bale eco-region, or a family in the Sundarbans, or coastal dwellers in a South 
Pacific island nation. Policymakers are aware that in order to attain sustainable development, 
and to put in place effective adaptation strategies at the local and national levels, will require 
behaviour change (UNFCCC, 2005). As such understanding the drivers of adaptive behaviour 
is a pertinent topic within the context of  policy formation.  
In addition to meet the triple bottom line of environmental, economic, and social 
development for SIDS and other developing economies, seeking cost-effective solutions 
where possible is necessary. In these contexts, climate change adaptation financing is limited 
and can end up diverting critical funds from other sectors (Schalatek et al, 2012).  Microloans 
with environmental objectives can help international and national actors meet the objectives 
laid out within the Pacific Island region’s Nature Conservation and Protected Areas 
Framework and the Mauritius Strategy of Implementation, amongst other national and 
international agreements for conservation, development and adaptation in SIDS.   
77 
 
The thesis investigates the microloans, incentives and stated climate change adaptive 
investment behaviour and perceptions through the following sets of questions: 
 
1. What are the local perceptions of climate change in Fiji? 
• Islanders are used to climate variability. In Fiji climate has always been very 
variable but the severity of extreme events has been increasing in the last 
decade. As such we would expect that people are aware of changes in weather 
but perhaps link it to natural rather than anthropogenic processes  
 
1. What are the antecedents of stated adaptive investment behaviour? 
• According to the Theory of Planned Behaviour, positive subjective norms, 
attitudes, and perceived behavioural control will lead to a greater intention to 
perform a behaviour.  
• As such we hypothesis that positive set of intrinsic motives would be reflected in 
positive intentions to conserve and protect natural ecosystems.  
• As intention is the most proximal determinant of behaviour – we hypothesis that  
positive intentions will increase the probability of choosing adaptive over non-
adaptive investments.   
2. What is the effect of information on stated climate change adaptive investment 
Behaviour?  
• According to knowledge deficit theory access to information will allow people to 
make better informed choices - therefore providing information on the benefits 
of adaptive behaviour should be reflected in more adaptive stated behaviour. 
Thus our hypothesis is that information will  increase the probability of choosing 
adaptive investments.  
 
1. What are the behavioural drivers of climate adaptive investments under different 
microloan incentive conditions  
Chapter 7 
Chapter 8 
Chapter 9 
78 
 
• According to the theory of planned behaviour, behavioural intentions are the 
most proximal determinant of behaviour. Intention in turn is influenced by 
activity specific attitudes, subjective norms, and  perceived behavioural control. 
As such we hypothesis that : a) regardless of incentive condition behavioural 
intention should mediate investment choice.  b) attitudes, subjective norms and 
perceived behavioural control should moderate behavioural intention. 
2. Can environmental conditionality on loans induce uptake of climate adaptive investment 
behaviour?  
• We hypothesis that green incentives, if congruent with internal drivers of 
behaviour will crowd-in internal motivations - aligning intentions with 
subsequent stated adaptive investment behaviour.  
• Green incentives will thus increase the probability of adaptive investments 
especially if people are already that way inclined. 
3. Do demographic and contextual factors impact stated behaviour?  
• We hypothesis that the demographic variables of ethnicity and gender would 
influence stated behaviour.  Specifically, for Fijians, their cultural and spiritual 
connection to Vanua, the land and sea, is hypothesized to lead to the choice of 
more adaptive investment portfolios. In addition it is hypothesized that  this will 
also be reflected in the antecedents of behaviour, with Fijians being inclined to 
positive attitudes, subjective norms particularly.  
• Studies have shown that women are more inclined to environmentally 
protective behaviours. As such we hypothesis women to choose more adaptive 
portfolios over men.  
• Income and access to microcredit have also been shown as facilitators of 
adaptive behaviour. As such we hypothesis that higher incomes, access to credit 
and having a current microloan would be correlated with greater uptake of 
stated adaptive investments.  
 
1. Is mediation analysis the most appropriate empirical method for this research 
• This research hinges on an established theoretical basis thorough which to 
examine stated investment behaviour. It is argued that because of the 
constraints of the data and causal schema of the theory  path analysis is the more 
Chapter 10 
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appropriate method to use. However multinomial logit can be a complementary 
method.  
 
1. Are threat appraisal and resource dependence moderators of the cognitive antecedents 
of behaviour as  specified by the Theory of Planned Behaviour?  
• Where threat appraisal is defined as exposure to shocks - according to the 
Protection Motivation Theory when a threshold level of threat is experienced it 
instigates coping appraisal (or our efficacy to deal with the threat) which then 
mediates intention to act on the threat. In Fiji, with flooding and cyclones 
increasing in severity and frequency our alternative hypothesis is that shocks 
and resource dependence will impact the cognitive antecedents of behaviour.  
2. Do global and local shock exposure, resource dependence, and the perceived severity of 
environmental and socio-political issues pose a barrier to the adoption of stated 
adaptive investment behaviour? 
• The response options available to people will form their coping response which 
will be reflected in their choice of investment portfolios as either maladaptive or 
adaptive investments. 
• We hypothesis that the different incentive conditions will influence coping 
response. If people have positive internal motivations (which is reflected in 
behavioural intention), then we hypothesise that a) people will take on an 
adaptive coping response in congruence with their internal motivations when 
faced with shocks and perceived severity of issues and b) that this effect will be 
strongest under green incentives which will facilitate adaptive coping response. 
In summary, this thesis takes on a sociopsychological perspective to understand 
climate adaptive microloan investment behaviour in order to understand how we can motivate 
those who are amongst the most vulnerable in society to become more resilient to the 
impending and worrying prospect of anthropogenic climate change. The central contribution 
of this thesis has been to advance a sociopsychological understanding of stated adaptive 
investment behaviour, showing how people in a developing world context think about climate 
change, how they perceive risks and how these in turn impact stated microloan investment 
decisions. 
Chapter 11 
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2.2 CONTRIBUTIONS 
 In terms of novel contributions: to the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is 
the first to look at the cognitive antecedents of stated adaptive microloan investment 
behaviours.  In addition it is the first to look at the efficacy of incentives in driving stated 
adaptive investment behaviour and the first experimental study to look at the impact of 
information on subsequent stated investment behaviour.  
Regarding contributions to existing literature: this thesis adds to the literature on 
microcredit and in particular its role in ecosystem-based adaptation. It also adds to the 
literature on smallholder agriculture in Small Island Developing States. 
In addition it adds to our understanding of psychological models of climate change 
adaptive behaviour – in particular it extends the scope of the Theory of Planned Behaviour by 
applying it to environmentally protective behaviour in the context of a developing economy. 
It also adds to the literature on behavioural economics through its investigation of the 
extrinsic motivators of behaviour.  Lastly it contributes to research on building climate 
change adaptive capacity for vulnerable populations and identifies microloans as a viable tool 
to increase adaptive capacity.   
In regards to practical contributions: the research has important implications for 
microloan and climate change adaptation best practice and specifically the efficacy of 
microloan incentives to enable SIDS smallholders to adapt. It has shown that access to 
information can influence adaptive investment behaviour and that the appraisal of threats can 
differ in the presence of pecuniary incentives and does influence subsequent stated behaviour. 
In regards to methodological contributions: this research used a novel survey-based 
experiment to investigate the effect of different design aspects of microloans on subsequent 
investment behaviour, and compares the use of multinomial logit models with path analysis.  
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3  CLIMATE CHANGE, SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES, 
AND SMALLHOLDERS 
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3.1 THE CASE OF SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES (SIDS) 
In the previous chapter we presented case studies from Sub-Saharan Africa, Nepal, 
China, and Indonesia. The focus of this research however is that of Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS) which are the most vulnerable in the world to the effects of anthropogenic 
climate change (UNFCCC, 2005).  As for other developing nations, for SIDS climate change 
threatens to impede growth and development. However an additional existential threat exists 
for a number of low lying states. Whilst SIDS do share many social, economic and 
environmental similarities (Mimura et al, 2007), one particular constant is their rich terrestrial 
and marine ecosystems upon which the people have a high level of dependence for 
livelihoods (Pelling & Uitto, 2001).  
In the next several decades the IPCC predicts significant changes in climate will be 
felt throughout the globe with islands nations and their fragile ecosystems being particularly 
at risk of climate related damages (Mimiura et al, 2007). Small island states represent areas 
with the highest vulnerability and lowest adaptive capacity to climate change. These nations, 
built on fragile ecosystems, account for just a fraction (1%) of global Greenhouse Gas (GHG) 
emissions but are amongst the first nations to feel the consequences elicited by anthropogenic 
climate change. As early as 1992, there was recognition of SIDS’ special status regarding 
environment and development. Agenda 21 states: ‘Small island developing states and islands 
supporting small communities are a special case both for environment and development. 
They are ecologically fragile and vulnerable. Their small size, limited resources, geographic 
dispersion and isolation from markets, place them at a disadvantage and prevent economies 
of scale.” 
Whilst small and often isolated, these island ecosystems are of global significance. An 
array of SIDS rest within the most threatened of the World’s 34 biodiversity hotspots (Brooks 
et al. 2002). Oceanic island ecosystems contribute disproportionately to biodiversity 
compared to their land mass, with one in six of the earth’s known plant species occurring on 
such ecosystems. The high degree of endemism makes SIDS rich stores of evolutionary data 
which is of global value. In addition they provide atmospheric gas (including CO2) regulating 
services and climate regulation services whose beneficiaries are global (UNEP, 2014).  
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FIGURE 3-1: THE VULNERABILITY OF SIDS 
 
 
 
3.2 THE  PROBLEM 
3.2.1 TWO DEGREES CENTIGRADE OF WARMING  
There is overwhelming scientific evidence that we are now living on a planet where 
global temperatures are warmer than it has been for most of the last 11,000 years. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has identified the amount of carbon 
dioxide which can be emitted before the accumulation of GHGs in our atmosphere reaches a 
point of no return. This tipping point is expected to result in an increase of two degrees 
centigrade (2°C) of global average mean surface temperatures above pre-industrial levels.  
In order to limit the rise in global temperatures to 2°C of warming, the carbon quota 
estimated by the scientific community is one trillion tonnes of carbon (1,000 PgC). 52% of 
this target had already been utilised by 2011, and it is anticipated that if emissions continue 
unabated then we would have burned through the quota by 2045.  Indeed 2015 marks an 
important phase of warming, as we are set to breach the 1°C of warming threshold (WMO, 
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2015). With this 1°C of warming, the impact on natural earth systems will exacerbate the 
accumulation of GHGs. For instance thawing tundra will release methane and other GHGs, 
and as ice caps melt the amount of solar radiation reflected back into space will also decrease.  
What needs to be done to meet this target? Emissions will have to be curbed by an 
estimated 36 billion tonnes a year. Also existing commitments will have to be honoured, in 
addition to pursuing new actions. Greater reductions are needed ensure that emissions peak 
by 2020 and thereafter steadily decline. In addition the stocks of fossil fuels which are in 
reserve (estimated at 1,053 PgC) would have to stay in the ground if the carbon quota is to be 
met.  
The 2°C target has been adopted by countries within the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), with most countries submitting their Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) to the UNFCCC ahead of COP21. The 
intended national contributions as it stands will not be consistent with meeting the 2°C target 
with accumulated emissions from the INDCs amounting to between 55-56bn tonnes a year by 
2030(Boyd, Turner & Ward, 2015). 
For SIDS, even under the 2°C warming scenario, the challenges will remain 
significant – just taking the example of rainfall – for Caribbean SIDS the IPCC projects that 
they will experience more drought conditions, whilst some Pacific SIDS will be wetter. 
Essentially under the 2°C scenario all the aforementioned impacts will be intensified: the rate 
of climate change will become too rapid for some species to adapt; the risk of mass coral 
bleaching will become very high, affecting over half of all reefs; sea level could rise above 
one meter; crop production would be at high risk; and more extreme and severe weather 
events will prevail (Schelussner, & Hare, 2015).   
The cost of climate change will further place a strain on already limited resources – 
the overall cost of climate change for Pacific SIDS under the 2°C scenario would reach 
between 2-3% of GDP per annum by 2100, affecting SIDS development trajectory. 
Adaptation costs under the 2°C scenario are estimated to be around 0.5% of GDP per annum 
(ADB, 2013). Climate change effects on agriculture production, fisheries, human health, 
tourism and well-being will have the consequences of decreasing national income while 
increasing key social and infrastructure costs. SIDS will need support to meet these costs.  
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FIGURE 3-2: A SUMMARY OF CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON SIDS 
 
3.2.2 MORE FREQUENT AND SEVERE WEATHER AND CLIMATE EVENTS 
Within the last two decades hurricanes and cyclones in the Atlantic, Pacific and 
Indian Oceans have been becoming more powerful and consequently destructive. A well-
publicised and particularly devastating impact of climate change for SIDS is more frequent 
and severe weather and climate events – Recent examples include Hurricanes Ivan, Tomas, 
Katrina, Cyclones Pam, and Winston, and Typhoon Haiyan which caused considerable 
damage to infrastructure and affected livelihoods.   
Even when they are not as devastating these weather events cause considerable loss 
and destruction. Tropical storm Erika caused an estimated US$41 million in damages and 
losses to the agricultural sector in Dominica. These were associated with infrastructure 
damages, loss of land and livestock. Agricultural losses reflected the ability to realise a 
harvest in accordance with projected production for 2015, in addition to the inability to 
harvest at the appropriate time and increased expenditures for land preparation and re-
treatment. The principal cause of loss and damage was lowland flooding, erosion and 
landslide. Apart from crop loss and damage, this also blocked farm to market roads and also 
destroyed some important agricultural operations.  Two rum distilleries were destroyed with 
partial damages to a third. In addition the bay oil distillery and the bay leaf crop in Petite 
Savanne were completely destroyed.  In total Erika cost US$482.84 million in loss and 
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damages across the productive sectors, infrastructure, and social sectors (Government of 
Dominica, 2015).   
In the Pacific region, Small Island States have collectively experienced losses from 
natural disasters of approximately US$1 billion per decade, increasing to US$4 billion in the 
1980s and 1990s (The World Bank, 2012).  In 2014 tropical cyclone Ita caused severe 
flooding which cost the Solomon Islands US$107 million in damages and losses. In 2014 
tropical cyclone Ian cost Tonga US$49.3 million in damages and losses. Fiji and Samoa 
suffered US$108.4 million and US$203.9 million in damages and losses respectively from 
tropical cyclone Evan in 2012 (Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment & Financing Initiative, 
2015). 
In the Pacific region, the cost to cash crops, infrastructure and buildings at risk of 
climate change related natural disasters are estimated at US$112 billion (Bettencourt, Pryce, 
Gitay, 2006). Such events are detrimental to biodiversity, they damage and degrade 
infrastructure, wipe out crops and livelihoods, displace populations, strain social cohesion 
and derail the economic development trajectory of SIDS.  
3.2.3 WEATHER CHANGES INCLUDING IN RAINFALL PATTERNS AND DROUGHT 
In addition to the extreme weather events that are already becoming more frequent, 
climate change is also predicted to change rainfall patterns. The Caribbean is projected to 
experience decreased rainfall, whilst increased rainfall is projected for  the Indian and Pacific 
Ocean SIDS (Nurse et al, 2014). 
As rainfall patterns change Caribbean SIDS will experience greater drought events as 
evidenced in the extended 2015 drought. The amount of water that is able to be harvested 
reduces, whilst the rate of recharge for freshwater lenses and the flow of rivers also decreases 
leading to prolonged droughts. This  negatively impacts agricultural productivity in countries 
where rain fed agriculture is the norm. In the Caribbean prolonged seasonal dry periods, and 
increasing frequency of drought, are expected to increase demand for water throughout the 
region.  
The rise in average temperatures can also impact on agricultural output. It is estimated 
that a one percentage increase in temperature would result in a 5.1% decrease in growth of 
banana exports. Under the IPCC climate projections, by 2050, banana exports are therefore 
projected to be minimal with the cumulative yield loss estimated to be EC$165 million.   
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3.2.4 SEA-LEVEL RISE 
There is a disproportionate impact of sea-level rise on SIDS. For example, the global 
mean of sea-level rise is 3.2mm per year, however in some SIDS regions, such as the western 
Pacific sea-levels had risen by 12mm per year between 1993 and 2009 (UNEP, 2014). The 
result of sea-level rise in SIDS is an increase in: 
 Coastal erosion  
 Coastal inundation 
 Encroachment of tidal water into estuaries and coastal river systems 
 Saline intrusion of groundwater acquifers 
 Increased salinity in soil  
 Increased landward reach of storm surges and sea waves 
Saline intrusion to aquifers, in addition to shifts in seasonality and rainfall, will 
impact access to potable water and limit harvestable volumes of water. Storm surges and sea 
waves could also further degrade freshwater lenses. Coastal erosion and inundation will place 
stressors on coastal livelihoods, impacting coastal farm systems, and displacing communities. 
In addition it also poses an existential threat, whilst an increase in salinity from salt water 
intrusion will impact crop yield.  
Sea-level rise constitutes a major threat to SIDS resource base, and in particular to 
agriculture. On average 26% SIDS have their land area five meters or less above sea-level, 
with some Small Islands having a significantly greater proportion of their population living 
below 5m (refer to Figure 3.3). The United Nations Environment Programme (2014) predicts 
that the rate of sea level rise is up to four times the global average in the tropical western 
SIDS. For example between 1993 and 2009, sea level rose by 12mm a year, about four times 
more than the global average of around 2.8mm. The Carterert Island in Papua New Guinea 
was arguably the first official island to have to relocate 2600 citizens because of sea-level 
rise.  
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FIGURE 3-3: TOP 5 SIDS WITH HIGHEST PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION LIVING 5M OR LESS ABOVE SEA-
LEVEL9 
 
The encroaching sea could deplete agricultural lands, impacting livelihoods and food 
security. Coastal small holders may be forced to abandon their farms. This could result in 
internal migration (UN-OHRLLS, 2013), to cities or to other rural lands, or external 
migration
10
 with small farmers opting out of agriculture all together, reducing the agricultural 
labour force and putting greater strain on food security.  
With livelihoods threatened by rising seas, ocean acidification and deoxygenation, 
coral bleaching, shifts in rainfall patterns, invasive species, disease and sustained, frequent 
and more extreme weather events – without resilient smallholder agriculture, SIDS may have 
to increase their import dependence for food and water. This in turn can impact their 
vulnerability to price spikes and pre-existing pressures to migrate for economic reasons.  
3.2.5 OCEAN ACIDIFICATION AND DEOXYGENATION 
Ocean Acidification and deoxygenation is negatively impacting SIDS’ vast exclusive 
economic zones. Seawater chemistry is changing due to the subsequent uptake of emissions 
by the oceans. Whilst some marine organisms are tolerant to acidification, some of the 
species that form the base of the marine food web, such as phytoplankton, zooplankton, and 
other shell making marine species (essential to coral reefs) are negatively reacting to 
                                                             
9 UN-OHRLLS (2013) 
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 With external labour migration, small countries like Kiribati and Tuvalu, whose citizens 
may migrate to Australia or New Zealand, may find it hard to compete in especially with 
larger Asian countries. 
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acidification. The result is: changes in marine assemblages, food webs and marine 
ecosystems; biodiversity loss; changes in biogas production by oceans and feedback into the 
atmosphere (Turley, & Gattuso, 2012). Deoxygenation is the loss of oxygen in the oceans 
from climate change and similarly impacts ocean productivity, nutrient cycling, carbon 
cycling, and marine habitats (Keeling, Kortzinger & Gruber, 2010). 
Fisheries play an important role in the economy, livelihoods, food security and the 
culture of SIDS. In some SIDS it accounts for 12% of GDP (UNEP, n.d).  As marine health 
continues to deteriorate fisheries, aquaculture, food security, tourism, climate regulation, 
carbon storage, and coastal protection will be compromised in SIDS.  
3.2.6 VULNERABILITY TO INVASION BY INVASIVE SPECIES 
Climate change also increases SIDS’ vulnerability to invasion by alien species. 
Natural ecosystems cannot adapt as quickly to a changing environment, which can allow 
alien species to become established and even to dominate. Whilst this impacts biodiversity, it 
also impacts smallholders, agriculture and fisheries in general. Some regions, with wetter and 
warmer climates, will also experience an increase in some vector and non-vector borne 
diseases such as dengue and malaria which will impact human health and consequently carry 
indirect economic costs.  
Because of data gaps, precision of the likely impacts of increased risk of crop pests 
and diseases due to climate change in smallholder systems in SIDS is not clearly defined. 
However in recent years there has been a loss of wildlife, property, food and livelihood 
security in the Pacific Islands caused by ants, fruit flies, termites, and plant pathogens. This 
has cost millions in in terms of cash and subsistence incomes, pest control, and human health 
(Thaman, 2014).  
The Taro Leaf Blight (TLB) is one example of a disease that is impacted by climate 
change. Temperature and rainfall are important in the spread of the disease. For those regions 
where taro is cultivated, and where climate change will result in warmer and wetter 
conditions, the spread of TLB may be accelerated (FAO, 2010).  
In a survey of smallholders in the Caribbean SIDS, farmers found that crop their 
yields were being impacted by a greater incidence of pests and disease. They also found that 
the productivity of agricultural lands was decreasing. They were concerned that incomes 
were being further and negatively affected as a result of having to meet the additional cost of 
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pesticides to deal with biological threats. This was also compounding the already existing 
income pressures (not climate related) from various factors including lower international 
prices and increasing freight chargers and praedial larceny (Laurent & Sharma-Khushal, 
2015) 
3.2.7 DISPLACEMENT IN SMALL ISLAND STATES  
According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, in 2014, 17.5 million 
people were displaced by weather-related hazards, with 1.7 million being displaced by 
geophysical hazards, and  an average of 22.5 million people being displaced each year by 
climate or weather-related disasters in the last seven years. These numbers are only expected 
to grow as climate change effects take hold in the coming decades. One estimate is that 200 
million people will be displaced by 2050 as a result of climate change related disruptions 
such as changes in rainfall patterns (Myers, 2005). 
Population movements are influenced by interconnected and dynamic processes 
which can make it difficult to estimate future displacements from a single source. To 
illustrate the complexities of migration, we can look at the case of Fiji. There,  trade 
liberalisation through the end of the Lomé Convention and the trade component of the 
Cotonou Agreement, coupled with the expiration of land leases
11
, increased severity of 
natural disasters, and governance failures has resulted in reduced production, unemployment 
and deeper impoverishment of sugarcane smallholders. Consequently, many of these 
smallholders are moving from rural areas to urban squatter settlements (The Eurpoean 
Commission, 2006). Such settlements tend to be in highly exposed locations that lack basic 
amenities, leaving inhabitants highly vulnerable to climate risks. In addition the loss of vital 
social networks leads to a heightened social vulnerability to climate change. This is 
something which is shared amongst island states and particularly in smallholder communities. 
Traditional values, social cohesion and collective identities are a major component in the 
resilience of local communities in Pacific islands (Mimura, et al 2007). 
  
                                                             
11
 Greater than 80% of land in the Pacific Islands is under customary ownership and managed 
by indigenous groups. Such indigenous ownership steeps the land with social and spiritual 
beliefs and collective and individual identity is tied to the land.    
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3.2.8 CONSEQUENCES FOR SMALL FARMERS IN SIDS  
Some of the handicaps that agricultural production in SIDS face are: smallness, 
remoteness, geographical dispersion, vulnerability to natural disasters, limited access to 
markets, lack of human and technological capacity, price volatility, growing populations, 
weak governance structures and land tenure security. These problems are compounded by the 
negative impact and consequences of climate change.  
FIGURE 3-4: CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS OF SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURE 
 
The dependency of SIDS on agriculture and their competitiveness in markets differs. 
In some SIDS, agriculture accounts for approximately 50% of GDP and 75% of employment 
whilst in others, it accounts for less than 10% of GDP, employing 20% of the workforce 
(FAO, 1999). The agricultural capacity of SIDS also differs, and whilst data limitations make 
it difficult to understand the true number and distribution of smallholders globally, let alone 
in SIDS, smallholders do constitute a large majority of agricultural producers in SIDS. These 
small farmers on average operate one hectare of cropland. The World Bank’s Rural Strategy 
defines smallholders as those with a low asset base, operating less than two hectares of 
cropland (Dixon, Tanyeri-Abur, & Wattenbach, n.d). The definition of smallholders differs 
between countries and between agro-ecological zones (IFPRI, 2005), with definitions by 
scale being relative to national contexts (Morton, 2007). The following table gives an 
indication of farm size for a sample of SIDS for which data was available. As we can see, the 
majority of holdings are less than one hectare.  
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Severity and 
Frequency of 
extreme 
weather/climate 
events 
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TABLE 3-1: SMALLHOLDER HOLDINGS BY SIZE IN SELECTED SIDS12 
 
Despite the differences that may exist between smallholders in SIDS, agriculture has 
always played an important role in their economic history and subsistence agricultural 
production remains universally vital to their economies, nutritional status, and social well-
being, as does the production of cash crops for export. Because of their geophysical and 
geospatial characteristics which restricts agricultural production –  reflected in low diversity 
of crops and food products – and  their great distance from markets, export led development 
is often undermined in SIDS, with high import dependence challenging food security and 
green growth. Whilst their smallness does provide barriers, it can also be seen as a great 
opportunity for smallholder agriculture. The reason being that smallholders are generally 
characterised by smaller applications of capital and higher use of family labour and other 
family-owned inputs (Thapa, & Gaiha, 2011), as such modestly financed projects in SIDS 
can have a significant impact and bring substantial socio-economic benefits (IFAD, 2014). 
3.2.9 VARYING IMPACTS ON SMALLHOLDERS 
With different population dynamics, policies and agricultural practices in place, the 
specific issues faced by each small island state in its agricultural sector means that the 
compounding impacts of climate change will be different across SIDS. In addition, the 
complexity of impacts will vary according to socio-political circumstances. Haiti for instance 
ranks 153 on the Human Development Index, the development issues are many, including 
food insecurity which is intensified by natural disasters. Following the earthquake in 2010 
that caused widespread devastation, a cholera outbreak spread through the country. This 
outbreak remains the largest in recent world history. Population pressures, corruption, poor 
governance and a lack of infrastructure compound efforts for smallholders in Haiti to become 
                                                             
12 Data source: Lowder, Skoet & Singh (2014) 
Census Year Total
American Samoa 2003 4064 1867 926 189 40 8 7094
Cook Islands 2000 1403 236 82 1721
Fiji 1991 41320 11211 18703 12703 6332 3173 1407 551 95400
Samoa 1999 1108 5954 13408 11970 9553 11389 52382
Dominica 1995 800 1922 1654 443 89 69 30 14 5 9026
Grenada 1995 15534 1372 978 243 74 76 18277
Jamaica 1996 130247 28548 3886 1351 795 263 164 205 187791
Saint Lucia 1996 5375 1102 712 121 42 28 7380
Total 199851 52212 40349 27020 16925 15006 1601 770 5 379071
50-
100ha
100-
200ha
200-
500ha2-5ha<1ha 1-2ha 5-10ha
10-
20ha
20-
50ha
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resilient. Compare this to the Bahamas which ranks 42 on the HDI, it shares the common 
vulnerabilities of SIDS but because of its development status and stronger governance, small 
farmers may have greater risk resilience.  
Climate change impacts on SIDS smallholders will vary according to the farm system 
and its location and the interaction between weather, topography, soil types, water 
availability, crop diversity, livestock, and the type of trees used in agro-ecosystems (Oritz, 
2012). There is however, strong consensus (Nurse et al, 2015) that climate change will 
impact smallholder agriculture in SIDS via rain quantity and distribution, water availability, 
reduced solar radiation, soil degradation (salinization, erosion, and humus depletion), vector 
and non-vector borne diseases, higher temperatures, shifting seasons and of course the 
increased severity, and frequency of extreme events such as tropical cyclones, hurricanes, 
floods, and droughts.  
Furthermore, these impacts can influence important ecosystem services such as 
pollination and soil biodiversity. In addition, the rate of climate change may exceed the rate 
of adaptation for natural systems, including crops. Crops that were once strong and viable in 
one region may no longer be suitable, whilst another region may gain the advantage.  
For example, one projection shows that an extended dry season (by 45 days) will 
decrease maize yields by 30-50%, sugarcane yields by 10-53%, and taro yields by 35-75% in 
the islands of the Pacific. Whilst a greater than 50% increase in rainfall during the wet season 
on the windward side of some larger islands would cause taro yields to increase by 5-15%, it 
would also reduce rice yields by approximately 10-20% and maize yields by 30-100% 
(Singh, 1994). As we see in Figure 3.5, decrease in sugarcane yields will prove costly to 
many SIDS.  
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FIGURE 3-5: TOP PRODUCTION IN SIDS – 2012   (WHERE INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICES ARE 
USED TO CALCULATE THE TOTAL VALUE OF EACH COMMODITY)13 
 
In summary climate change will be costly to SIDS even under the 2°C of warming 
target. The cost to SIDS could reach between 2-5% of the GDP per annum. Smallholder 
agriculture in SIDS is particularly vulnerable to climate change. Climate change poses a 
threat to smallholder production which is exacerbated by the challenges that SIDS already 
face, namely:  Smallness, remoteness, geographical dispersion, vulnerability to natural 
disasters, limited access to markets, lack of human and technological capacity, price 
volatility, growing populations, weak governance structures and land tenure security. The 
consequences for small farmers are increased volatility in yields, prices, and competitiveness, 
with negative impacts on livelihoods, subsistence, and food security. 
3.3 INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS – THE SAMOA PATHWAY  
There is no doubt a global awareness of the special case that SIDS present for 
sustainable development. SIDS, multilateral and bilateral partners have made previous 
commitments to the sustainable development of SIDS (Figure 3.6). World leaders renewed 
these commitments at the conclusion of the United Nations Third International Conference on 
Small Island Developing States held in Apia, Samoa through the adoption of the Small Island 
States Accelerated Modalities of Action (SAMOA Pathway; UN, 2014). At the conference, 
                                                             
13 Data Source: FAOSTAT – Production (2015) 
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new pledges amounting to approximately USD1.9 billion were made for the implementation 
of the Pathway. 
FIGURE 3-6: PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
 
The SAMOA Pathway provides direction, measurement tools and milestones towards 
sustainable development. In addition it aims to build climate change adaptive capacity, 
develop partnerships, and gain access to funding and other resources. However without 
concrete implementation measures these and the earlier commitments to provide support are 
of little value. 
This concern is being addressed; the UN has developed a SIDS Action Platform to 
chart progress and in addition it has facilitated the discussion of the position of SIDS in the 
post-2015 development agenda. 
For small farmers, the task of adaptation can be overwhelming. However it is 
encouraging that the international community is offering support. It is with the support of 
their governments and through collaboration with others, both within their regions and 
internationally, small farmers can take collective action to adapt and build the required 
resilience to climate change.   
Paragraph 63 of the Samoa Pathway makes the following commitments relating to food 
security and nutrition: 
“63. ... we are committed to working together to support the efforts of small island 
developing States:  
1) Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Agenda 21 
2) Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 
3) Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(Johannesburg Plan of Implementation),  including chapter VII, on the 
sustainable development of small island developing States, and the Johannesburg 
Declaration on Sustainable Development, 
4) Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island 
Developing States (Barbados Programme of Action) 
5)  Mauritius Strategy for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action 
for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States (MSI), and 
MSI+5  
6) The outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable 
Development, entitled “The future we want”. 
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a) To promote the further use of sustainable practices relating to agriculture, crops, 
livestock, forestry, fisheries and aquaculture to improve food and nutrition security 
while ensuring the sustainable management of the required water resources;  
b) To promote open and efficient international and domestic markets to support 
economic development and optimize food security and nutrition  
c) To enhance international cooperation to maintain access to global food markets, 
particularly during periods of higher volatility in commodity markets;  
d) To increase rural income and jobs, with a focus on the empowerment of smallholders 
and small-scale food producers, especially women;  
e) To end malnutrition in all its forms, including by securing year-round access to 
sufficient, safe, affordable, diverse and nutritious food;  
f) To enhance the resilience of agriculture and fisheries to the adverse impacts of 
climate change, ocean acidification and natural disasters; 
g) To maintain natural ecological processes that support sustainable food production 
systems through international technical cooperation.” 
3.3.1 MAURITIUS AND BEYOND, QUERIES AROUND PROGRESS 
Small farmers in SIDS are critical to the domestic production of food which is central 
to helping these often remote and low income countries meet their long term food security 
needs. This issue had been addressed since 2005 in the Mauritius Strategy of Implementation 
which came during a period of declining investment in agriculture (FAO, 2005)
14
.  Five years 
after the MSI, MSI+5 called upon the international community to prioritise food security and 
continue enhancing efforts of SIDS to foster agricultural production, productivity and 
sustainability.  
There is a lack of data on successful implementation on the agreements and on 
tracking the progress of smallholders in building their resilience. However, with external 
factors like increasing food prices, continued high import dependency (Figure 3.7), and 
occurrence of extreme events (Figure 3.8) we can see that this will be an ongoing process. 
In Samoa, it was realised that implementation of commitments has been slow. A more 
integrated approach to the sustainable development was called for, with greater support 
                                                             
14
FAO (2005). International Meeting to Review the Implementation of the Programme of 
Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States. Statement of the 
FAO Director-General. Retrieved from: ftp://ftp.fao.org 
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needed from the international community and all stakeholders. Partnership agreements across 
a diverse range of actors, including public-private partnerships were secured at Samoa. 
FIGURE 3-7:  FOOD IMPORTS (% OF MERCHANDISE IMPORTS)15 
 
FIGURE 3-8: NUMBER OF PEOPLE AFFECTED BY NATURAL DISASTERS IN SIDS16 
 
In summary the SAMOA Pathway and subsequent Milan Declaration highlighted the 
urgent need to develop food security in SIDS, with multi-lateral trading systems and trade 
policies playing a critical role. Implementation would be achieved through developing 
                                                             
15 Data source: World Bank Data – Indicators (2015) 
16 Data source: Global Environment Outlook – GEO4, 2007 
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partnerships, the technology facilitation mechanism and financing. These offer SIDS an 
important basis for seeking support for the support required by small farmers to adapt and 
build residence to climate change.   
3.4 SOLUTIONS FOR SIDS 
3.4.1 MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE  
Globally, agriculture accounts for approximately 19-29% of GHG emissions 
(Vermeulen, Campbell, Ingram, 2012). To meet the 2 degree target in 2030, reduction in 
emission from agriculture will need to be in the region of one gigaton of CO2 equivalent a 
year (Wollenberg, et al, 2007). At current rates, this would seem impossible, with massive 
innovation and scale required. Whilst it is difficult to quantify the amount of emissions 
attributed to smallholders, because of the scale of the problem leaving them out of the 
mitigation conversation  is  not an option, indeed smallholders will be a critical part of the 
solution especially as small farmers produce 70% of the World’s food needs.  
We already know that SIDS are low carbon emitters (Figure 3.9). The meagre 
emissions that are attributable to them is for the most part due to their dependence on fossil 
fuel imports, with one estimate stating that SIDS consume in excess of 220 million barrels of 
petroleum annually (Henderson, 2013).  That SIDS are willing to mitigate and have indicated 
so in their Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions and in their Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions, shows their commitment and determination to reducing the effects 
of climate change globally. For all their smallness and fragility they have chosen to act to 
protect the global commons. 
FIGURE 3-9: CO2 EMISSIONS (KT)17 
 
                                                             
17Data  source: World Bank Data – Indicators (2015) 
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In addition, for SIDS in order to transition to sustainable development and green 
growth it is necessary to shift away from fossil fuels.  The high dependence of SIDS on 
imported fossil fuels is a major source of economic volatility. SIDS generally have rich 
renewable energy sources but structural problems and limited resources hinders their ability 
to convert these to a tangible product.  
The development of long-term green growth strategies across SIDS will enable them 
to create new opportunities, enhance competitive advantages and importantly capture 
mitigation finance. Whilst agricultural emissions in some SIDS are quite low (Table 3.2), 
capturing mitigation finance still provides a useful opportunity for SIDS  in developing more 
resilient and sustainable agricultural sectors and ultimately advancing their green economy 
potential. 
TABLE 3-2: AGRICULTURE’S CONTRIBUTION TO TOTAL EMISSIONS IN SIDS18 
Country 
Agriculture’s contribution 
to total emissions (%) 
Sao Tome and Principe 16 
Antigua and Barbuda 12 
Cook Islands 11 
Palau 9 
St Lucia 7 
Seychelles 5 
Mauritius 4 
Barbados 2 
Tuvalu 2 
Trinidad and Tobago 0 
Belize 0 
Niue 0 
 
3.4.2 LOW EMISSIONS AGRICULTURE 
Low emissions agriculture is still a relatively new field and the development of 
appropriate policy, financing and incentive measures are still being investigated. However 
research has shown that the largest decrease in emissions from agriculture can be realised 
                                                             
18
 Data retrieved from: Richards, Wollenberg, & Buglione-Gluck, 2015 
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through restoration of degraded lands (particularly through tropical peatlands and forest 
conservation), improved cropland and grazing land management, and cultivated organic soils. 
Further mitigation potential has also been found in water and rice management, set-aside 
land, land use change and agroforestry, livestock management and manure management 
(Smith et al, 2008). 
For some SIDS smallholders mechanisms like Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) have been explored (for instance in Fiji and Papua 
New Guinea). REDD+ is a financial mechanism to create value around the carbon stored in 
forests. It offers developing countries an incentive to reduce emissions from deforestation and 
degradation. For smallholders climate smart agricultural practices such as agroforestry and 
other activities to decrease forest degradation and enhance carbon stocks, (such as mangrove 
restoration) can capture the benefits of REDD+. However the realisation of  and 
implementation of REDD+ benefits would require strong institutions, and support from a 
wide range of stakeholder groups including producer and supply chain companies, financiers, 
non-governmental and civil society organisations, governments, as well as smallholders and 
their representatives, which are often found to be underdeveloped in the SIDS context.  
A recent project which could show promise is that of the Guyana Low Carbon 
Development Strategy (LCDS), developed in partnership with the Government of Norway. 
Guyana and Norway signed a memorandum of understanding wherein it was agreed that 
Norway would provide US$250 million to Guyana by the end of 2015 for avoided 
deforestation which are measured against indicators of enabling activities and of REDD+ 
Performance. The Guyana REDD+ Investment fund (for which the World Bank acts as 
trustee) is the financial mechanism through which financial support is channelled. A reported 
US$190 million performance based REDD+ payments have been made to Guyana. The 
lessons learnt from the LCDS could provide an example of best practice for SIDS.  
In summary mitigation is an important consideration for green growth and sustainable 
development in SIDS. Reducing energy import dependence and harnessing a sustainable 
energy future will protect the economy of SIDS and smallholders from external energy 
shocks. In addition mitigation will enable smallholders to create new opportunities and 
capture mitigation finance. 
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3.4.3 BUILDING RESILIENCE AND ADAPTATION 
Adaptation is defined as: the actions that people take in response to, or in anticipation 
of, projected or actual changes in climate, to reduce adverse impacts or take advantage of the 
opportunities posed by climate change. Whilst mitigation refers to actions taken to prevent, 
reduce or slow climate change, through slowing or stopping the build-up of greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere (Tompkins & Adger, 2003). 
Building resilience at the smallholder level must target both the physical and direct 
consequences of climate change but also the commercial consequences. This would involve 
safeguarding against the increased frequency of extreme weather events that include 
hurricanes, cyclones, floods and drought.  These events will persist even if we manage to 
curb warming below a reasonable level. Reducing exposure to risks is therefore paramount.  
Building resilience to climate change in small holder agriculture combines mitigation 
and adaptation to realise the goal of sustainable development and to create communities that 
are able to withstand shocks.  
3.4.4 ADAPTATION 
There is widespread consensus on the need for smallholders in SIDS to adapt to 
climate change in order to create resilient futures. Smallholders are a critical contributor to 
development, food security and poverty reduction in SIDS. With exogenous pressures of food 
prices and climate events, more people in SIDS are at risk of being driven into poverty. By 
helping smallholders and working towards developing a competitive and sustainable 
agricultural sector, SIDS can anticipate far reaching benefits, an important one of which will 
be enhanced food security. 
Adaptation projects are widespread in SIDS with measures to increase resilience at 
the regional and national levels at various stages of implementation.  Ground-level projects 
looking at structural aspects of agriculture are in operation as are projects that involve 
strengthening institutions, policy, and regulations.  These projects are being implemented by 
a wide array of actors which include the EU and UN agencies which also serve as Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) implementing agencies (activities include projects sponsored by 
GEF and non-GEF funded projects), multilateral financial institutions, bilateral development 
assistance agencies, private and civil society partnerships.  
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Through National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs), Least Developed 
SIDS have been able to identify their most urgent adaptation needs. Introduced by the 
UNFCCC, NAPAs are meant to be action oriented, country-driven, and flexible and based on 
national circumstances. However there is some concern that agriculture is underrepresented 
in some NAPAs (Huq & Huge, 2010).   
The way that food is grown, processed, distributed and consumed has a profound 
impact on the environment, societies, and economies. Smallholder adaptation and mitigation 
is not solely a process to create resilience against climate change but an opportunity to realign 
practices for people, planet, and prosperity.  
Smallholder adaptation would have to look at governance, technical, cognitive and cultural 
aspects, paying particular attention to identified barriers to adoption. Some of the barriers to 
adoption of adaptation interventions in SIDS have been identified as:  
 A lack of focus on the adaptive capacity needs of Local Government or Island 
Councils and communities.  
 Inadequate and inflexible support from international adaptation funding modalities for 
system transformations or to address root causes of vulnerability.  
 Failure to recognise the significance of cultural knowledge and practices in shaping 
adaptive choices of communities in SIDS (Kuruppu & Willie, 2015). 
 Inadequate financial support and political will to facilitate focused targeted and 
market-driven research for development. 
3.4.5 CLIMATE SMART AGRICULTURE 
It is possible that through low emissions and climate smart agriculture that we can 
realise co-benefits of adaptation and mitigation. Climate smart agriculture (CSA) was 
developed by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO).  They have 
defined CSA as “integrat[ing] the three dimensions of sustainable development (economic, 
social and environmental) by jointly addressing food security and climate challenges. It is 
composed of three main pillars: 
1. Sustainably increasing agricultural productivity and incomes; 
2. Adapting and building resilience to climate change; 
3. Reducing and/or removing greenhouse gases emissions, where possible. 
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CSA is an approach to developing the technical, policy and investment conditions to 
achieve sustainable agricultural development for food security under climate change” (FAO, 
2013).The method of CSA is holistic and site specific, with planning being highly farm, 
commodity and context specific. It attempts to understand, through a participatory process, 
the trade-offs and choices that farmers must make to become resilient to climate change. The 
CSA approach is achieved through ecosystem-based adaptation, which is defined variously 
as: 
 The use of biodiversity and ecosystem services to help people adapt to the adverse 
effects of climate change – CBD 
 The use of biodiversity and ecosystem services as part of an overall adaptation 
strategy to help people and communities adapt to the negative effects of climate 
change at local, national, regional and global levels – UNEP 
 The use of the biodiversity as part of the overall adaptation strategy to help people 
adapt to adverse impacts of climate change – GEF & IUCN   
There are several key components to this approach.  
1. It is context specific. It does not attempt to seek a global unifying solution as none 
exists.  
2. It aims for inter-sectoral and consistent policies, identifying interactions between 
sectors and stakeholders, preferably with management at the cabinet level.   
3. It seeks financial support for smallholders to transition, linking finance opportunities 
from the public and private sectors,  
4. It does not try to reinvent the wheel and respects traditional ecological knowledge, 
scaling up exiting successful practices where appropriate 
5. It understands that reform cannot be achieved by ignoring farmer’s needs. Thus it 
prioritises strengthening livelihoods by improving access to services, knowledge, 
resources (genetic and otherwise), financial products and markets 
6. It identifies barriers to adoption at all levels starting with the smallholder 
7. Disaster Risk Reduction is a key priority.  Strengthening institutions, building 
resilience and better preparedness across levels and sectors and accessing financing 
are vital to the CSA formula 
8. It considers climate change mitigation as a co-benefit especially in low-income 
agricultural-based populations.  
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Broadly, there are four major types of actions which can lay the foundation for effective CSA 
across agricultural systems, landscapes and food systems. These are:  
1. Expansion of evidence base and assessment tools enabling the identification of 
sustainable and adaptive agricultural growth strategies for food security which could 
also have mitigation potential. 
2. Building policy frameworks and consensus for implementation at scale  
3. Enabling farmer management of climate risks and the adoption of suitable agricultural 
practices, technologies, and systems through strengthening national and local 
institutions  
4. Developing financing options to support implementation, linking climate and 
agricultural finance (CCAFS & UNFAO, 2014). 
The CSA approach has attracted its fair amount of criticisms. A few of which are: 
inadequate understanding of CSA at the local smallholder level (where emissions reductions 
is perhaps less of a concern); lack of monitoring and accountability (Nambiza, 2014); a need 
for clearer political agendas and agricultural sector transformation pathways to abate 
confusion around the purpose of CSA (Caron & Treyer, 2016); it risks diluting or taking 
away from the agro-ecology movement; it is dominated by corporate/vested interests; it lacks 
a clear definition with standards and exclusions; it fails to address some key issues around 
land rights and seed systems; and underrepresented costliness of instigating CSA practices 
(MaCarthy, Lipper, & Branca, 2011).  However the CSA approach remains promising and 
can essentially be seen as an umbrella term which groups the various agricultural adaptation, 
conservation, and mitigation practices together. So across the value chain, from smallholders 
to consumer, stakeholders can have access to a large toolkit of methods to build resilience 
against climate change. 
Techniques in the CSA toolkit include and are not limited to: 
 Ecosystem-based approaches 
 Conservation agriculture 
 Integrated nutrient and soil management 
 Mulch cropping 
 Cover cropping 
 Alterations in cropping patterns and rotations 
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 Crop diversification 
 Organic agriculture 
 Land fragmentation (riparian areas, forest land within the agricultural landscape) 
 Reintroducing Endemic and traditional crops 
 Linking value chains 
 Microfinance development and access 
The CSA approach identifies adoption of adaptation measures as an important 
consideration. In doing so it realises that adaptation does not occur in a controlled space. 
Whilst creating measures is one challenge, ensuring the correct adoption of those measures is 
at times the bigger challenge. This is a subject that behavioural economists and psychologists 
have been grappling with for decades. Financing needs to consider the dissemination of 
adaptive solutions, implementation and adoption by stakeholders. 
3.4.5.1 MICROCREDIT IN THE CSA TOOLKIT 
The ability of smallholders to adapt to climate change is affected by their capacity to 
access technological interventions and training. Accessing microfinance can be challenging 
for farmers as they face rural constraints of low population density, isolated markets, 
seasonality, and highly covariant risk from exogenous factors such as climate, crop disease, 
and price movements. Nyasimi et al (2014) argue that increasing access to financial services 
is a key component of the CSA approach as it provides farmers with more input options – 
such as purchasing certified seeds – to increase productivity. Whilst microfinance can open 
up weather-based insurance schemes, and building risk reserves through savings, microcredit 
can enable prudent risk-taking. With their roles in land management and food security, 
women are key participatory stakeholders in the CSA infrastructure. Many microfinance 
institutions explicitly and consistently target women, which can empower and mobilize them 
to engage in CSA (Nyasimi et al, 2014).  
Microfinance institutions, by partnering with other agricultural organisations, can help 
clients finance CSA incrementally whilst also bringing to them the training and resources 
which can help them to mitigate and adapt (Rippey, 2012). For instance DFID Kenya 
designed a Smallholder Climate-Smart Agriculture Program to be delivered through its 
‘Finance Innovation for Climate Change Fund’. The program supports the scaling out of 
innovative private sector investments in agricultural adaptation/mitigation and resilience and 
providing repayable grants to selected agribusiness partnerships led by microfinance 
106 
 
institutions for lending to small scale farmers and value-chain actors. Farmers contracted to 
such microfinance partnerships have the option to take loans to produce commodities in line 
with CSA values. Farmers can use their loans to invest in activities that will increase their 
production efficiency (such as soil fertility management, purchase of appropriate seeds, and 
water harvesting) (Chesterman, & Neely, 2015).   
3.5 DISASTER RISK REDUCTION 
Climate change adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) should be pursued in 
concert in order to mitigate the negative effects of climate change and to reduce the risks and 
vulnerabilities that it presents.  Indeed the two are interrelated with the methods used in one, 
being appropriate to the other. Despite this policy integration is still weak, with an 
unproductive distinction existing between these two related concepts in the Pacific SIDS at 
least. These distinctions however are not as apparent at the community level, where 
initiatives to minimise risk and create resilience through adaptation often operate within a 
policy vacuum (UNISDR & UNDP, 2012). Indeed if we examine some of the methods to 
reduce risk from environmental and climate change impacts we will see that there really need 
not be a distinction between the two. These include: Diversification; the adoption of climate 
resilient crop varieties; sharing losses through insurance and other capital market mechanisms 
such as private reinsurance and collateralized markets; early warning systems and its 
communication to end-users.  
The integration of DRR into agricultural policy and its application across the 
agricultural value chain can facilitate the identification of barriers to production and detect 
private sector and market orientated approaches to reduce risks and create resilience.  
3.6 PARTICIPATORY VALUE-CHAINS 
The FAO define a sustainable and inclusive value-chain as “the full range of farms 
and firms and their successive coordinated value-adding activities that transform raw 
agricultural materials into food products that are sold to final consumers and disposed after 
use, in a manner that is profitable throughout the chain, has broad-based benefits for society 
and does not permanently deplete natural resources.” (FAO, 2014) 
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FIGURE 3-10: AGRICULTURAL PARTICIPATORY VALUE-CHAIN 
 
If the small farmer can get a larger share of the price paid by the final consumer of his 
product, then he/she is evidently better off and consequently in a less precarious and 
vulnerable position. 
Value-chain analysis takes place at all levels of production, with value being 
determined in end-markets. If a smallholder is using green technologies, lowering emissions, 
and conserving local ecosystems, then this is additional value that they are adding to their 
product, but one that can only be captured when consumers buy the product.  Certification 
bodies such as Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance, Bird Friendly, Soil Association and the Gold 
Standard can help smallholders capture this value. For instance, Fairtrade is working on 
developing the Fairtrade Carbon Credits Standard. This would be an add-on to the Gold 
Standard – a well-known carbon verification scheme. It will aim to enable producers to 
actively participate in the production and trade of carbon credits through climate smart 
agriculture, green energy, and forestry projects, capturing the value of emission reductions in 
the production process.  
Smallholders in SIDS face market integration challenges which can be problematic 
for food security and rural livelihoods. Poor economic geography, costly marketing 
infrastructure, and the lack of domestic value adding opportunities means that smallholders 
find it hard to compete in niche export and domestic markets. There are opportunities for 
domestic market integration, especially through linkages to the tourism industry. However a 
paradox that SIDS smallholders face is that often hotels and supermarkets prefer to import 
produce rather than sourcing from local farmers. Purchasing managers cite erratic supply, 
quality, quantity, high transaction costs and unreliable delivery and transport logistics for 
domestically grown fresh produce (Bammann, 2007).  
Addressing these barriers by consolidating stakeholder needs, product diversification, 
more efficient  and sustainable processing technologies, sustainable waste minimisation, 
better infrastructure, and policy integration are integral to the success of climate smart 
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agriculture, and to meet the triple bottom line of sound environmental, social, and economic 
development.. As CSA practitioners reach critical mass, it will become institutionalised. In 
order to get to this stage, project implementers would need: 
 To ensure the involvement of different stakeholder groups, with increased sector coordination 
 Support the professionalisation of farming enterprises 
 Shift away from project-based interventions to looking at driving structural change and 
regulation through programmes and market mechanisms 
 Mainstream sustainability until it becomes a licence to operate (Molenaar et al, 2015). 
3.7 ADAPTATION FINANCE 
The picture of adaptation finance is encouraging. There has been a large increase in 
public adaptation related finance in recent years. There was an estimated US$24.6 billion 
(range US$23-26 billion) in 2012/13, of which 90 per cent was invested in non-OECD 
countries. However how much of this is channeled to SIDS is unclear. As we can see from 
the figure below, net Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to SIDS has remained quite 
stable since 2009. The sharp increase in 2010 in the Caribbean region is attributable mainly to 
Haiti.  
FIGURE 3-11: NET ODA RECEIPTS TO SIDS IN US$ MILLIONS19 
 
SIDS will need access to greater financial resources in order to adapt. Financial 
support for improving smallholder agriculture could come from the traditional sources of 
development and environment finance as well as performance-based funding. The latter 
would include the sale of carbon credits (through for instance REDD+ mechanisms) or 
certified commodities, payments for ecosystem services, and Nationally Appropriate 
                                                             
19 Data Source: OECD DAC (2015) 
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Mitigation Action budgets, however this would require the development of better data and 
research infrastructure to measure emissions and carbon stocks, and subsequently capture 
mitigation finance to its full extent. In developing performance-based mitigation finance, 
SIDS can realise co-benefits of improvements in livelihoods and food security. Therefore it is 
important to enable the relevant infrastructure for SIDS to tap into this pool of financing.  
The largest global financing source for smallholders is the Adaptation for Smallholder 
Agriculture Programme (ASAP). This was launched by the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD) and aims to channel climate finance to smallholder 
farmers so they can access the information tools and technologies that they need in order to 
build resilience to climate change.  
In summary climate change adaptation is critical in creating resilient smallholders in 
SIDS. Through processes like CSA small holders can reduce risk from environmental and 
climate change impacts whilst also developing opportunities for green growth. Adaptation 
however does not occur in isolation and would require systemic change.  This would require 
expanding research and development of sustainable and adaptive agriculture, building cross 
sector policy frameworks, strengthening national and local institutions to enable management 
of climate risks at the smallholder level and developing novel financing options for 
widespread adaptation measures.  
3.8 CASE STUDIES OF CLIAMTE CHANGE IMPACTS ON SMALLHOLDERS IN 
SIDS  
3.8.1 HURRICANE IVAN IN GRENADA 
 In September 2004 Hurricane Ivan reached Grenada as a category three storm, in less 
than eight hours Ivan had devastated the island’s socio-economic infrastructure. 28 people 
were killed, and the OECS estimated that 90% of housing stock was damaged (equivalent to 
38% of GDP), 90% of hotel rooms were damaged (equivalent to 29% of GDP), the 
agricultural sector sustained major losses equivalent to 10% of GDP with the two main 
commercial crops of nutmeg and cocoa making no contribution to the economy for six to 
eight years following the hurricane. The list of damages continued with losses to schools, 
eco-tourism and cultural heritage sites, telecommunications and electricity installations 
leading to an estimated financial loss of US$900 million, over twice the country’s GDP. Prior 
to the hurricane, Grenada was projecting a positive economic growth rate of 5.7%, but in the 
110 
 
wake of the devastation negative growth of -1.4% was projected (OECS, 2004). As it moved 
towards Jamaica, Ivan was classified as a category 5 storm, devastating communities there 
also.  
This is the power of natural disasters. In the span of a few hours the devastation to 
communities can be massive, setting development back years if not decades. With projections 
of increased frequency and severity of extreme weather and climate events, the challenge for 
SIDS to survive is great. As magnitude and severity increase SIDS with their smaller 
resource base and limited development options, have a limited capacity to cope. The impact 
of sequential severe events on island ecosystems could mean that systems are unable to 
recover to their last best state. Agricultural reduction could decline as soils never recover 
from erosion, salination, or biological degradation through biodiversity loss.     
In Grenada, regenerating nutmeg and cocoa production post hurricane proved slow 
with the population characteristic of farmers being a hindering factor as older farmers lacked 
the incentive to replant crops with a long-term income profile.  In addition the loss of 
matureshade trees for cocoa production and the time intensive task of saving old and standing 
nutmeg trees meant recovery would take longer than expected (The World Bank, 2005)
20
.   
FIGURE 3-12: IMPACT OF HURRICANE IVAN ON AGRICULTURE IN GRENADA 
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 The World Bank (2005). Grenada: A Nation Rebuilding. An Assessment of Reconstruction 
and Economic Recovery One Year after Hurricane Ivan. Washington, DC: The World Bank.  
 Destruction of 70 percent of the 555,000 nutmeg trees. With a predicted reduction in 
production for five years following the hurricane and associated reductions in foreign 
exchange earnings of approximately 8%. 
 Considerable damages to the physical infrastructure supporting the nutmeg and 
cocoa industries 
 100% destruction of the 350 acres of bananas estimated at EC$1,440,134.  
 Destruction of 15.4% of the 120 acres of citrus estimated at EC$ 2,610,623.  
 Total destruction of 114.5 acres of vegetables valued at EC$2,792,000.  
 Destruction of minor fruits estimated at EC$2,792,000. 
 Around 20% of the 282 acres of roots and tubers valued at EC$837,125.  
 91% of forest lands and watershed were stripped of vegetation. 
 The livestock industry incurred estimated damages of EC$ 9,338,117.00 due to the 
loss of housing infrastructure and stock.  
 Damage to 150 miles of farm roads were incurred, with an estimated reconstruction 
value of EC$28.67 million. (FAO, 2008) 
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This case study illustrates the urgent need for investing in disaster risk reduction, 
resilience building, and climate change adaptation in SIDS. 
3.8.2  BANANA PRODUCTION IN THE WINDWARDS 
The Windwards banana producers are Dominica, St Lucia,  St Vincent and the 
Grenadines, with approximately 4000 farms, the majority of which are Fairtrade certified. St 
Lucia has the largest number of farmers. The average farm size is generally less than one 
hectare and 45% of smallholders are women (Support Caribbean Bananas, nd.). 
Banana production in the Windwards is going through a crisis with a loss of more than 
20,000 producers since the 1990s. There have been various factors contributing to this 
decline.  These include:  
 Increased competition from Latin American banana producers who benefit from 
lowered import tariffs to the EU 
 Increased incidence of natural disasters such as Hurricane Tomas in 2010 and greater 
prevalence of droughts 
 Disease outbreaks and specifically the black sigatoka 
With a 1% increase in rainfall, St Lucia’s banana exports would be expected to 
increase by approximately 0.27%, whilst the same percentage increase in temperature is 
projected to result in a 5.1% decrease in growth of banana exports. Under the IPCC climate 
projections, by 2050, banana exports are projected to be minimal with the cumulative yield 
loss to be an estimated EC$165 million (ECLAC, 2011). 
The loss of income from banana production will have an overwhelming effect on the 
livelihoods of smallholders in the Windwards. Significant capital investment by small 
farmers is required to enable diversification of farm systems and adopt best practice.   
3.8.3 TARO CULTIVATION AND SEA LEVEL RISE IN THE REPUBLIC OF THE 
MARSHALL ISLANDS (RMI)  
Taro is an important subsistence crop in the RMI where it was traditionally cultivated 
in taro pits in an agroforestry system (where coconut, breadfruit, and padanus were also 
grown). Pit cultivation however differs across atolls, with the practice almost extinct in some. 
Production of Taro and other crops has fallen dramatically as import staples have become 
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more popular.  In addition climate change threatens production through changes in rainfall, 
rising temperatures, climate variability, and sea level rise.  Wetter conditions will benefit 
some crops such as coconut, breadfruit and cassava, whilst declines in rainfall would hurt 
most crops and especially traditional subsistence crops such as yam and taro in the RMI.  
Sea-level rise in a real concern in the RMI and affects traditional agriculture. Sea 
level has risen 0.3 inches a year since 1993 and under a low emissions scenario is projected to 
have risen by 3.9–10.6 inches by 2030 (Pacific Climate Change Science Programme, 2013). 
Saline intrusion in soil and groundwater aquifers from rising seas are already making 
cultivation of crops like taro and yam no longer viable in some regions.  In addition storm 
and tidal surges flood taro pits with salt water, compromising the crops (Reti, 2008). 
To reduce its dependency on food imports there is a growing interest in subsistence 
agriculture and particularly Taro production in the RMI. However the challenges of rising 
sea-levels and shortage in elite seedlings limit progress (Nandwani et al, 2003)  
3.8.4  CASE STUDY: SMALLHOLDER ADAPTATION TO COCOA POD BORER IN 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
Smallholder livelihoods derived from Cocoa production were negatively impacted by 
a widespread pest in the East New Britain Province of Papua New Guinea. The cocoa pod 
borer (Conopomorpha cramerella) is a small moth that lays its larvae in the cocoa pod. The 
larvae then feed on seeds causing them to stick together. The result is undersized seeds of 
poor quality. The cocoa pod borer decimated harvests in the East New Britain Province of 
Papua New Guinea leaving many small farmers without income. Total production in the 
province fell from 22,000 tons in 2008 to under 4,000 in 2012.  
The cocoa pod borer will be impacted by climate change. The Pacific Climate Change 
Science Programme (2013) shows that temperatures have increased at a rate of 0.11 degrees 
Celsius since the 1950s and rainfall has become more varied in the PNG.  Higher humidity 
and rainfall patterns in cocoa production regions may impact incidence of the moth which 
favours hot and humid.  
A recent study by Curry et al (2015) looked at the interconnections between 
household responses, the local socio-cultural and economic context of smallholder 
commodity crop production and the wider institutional environment in which household 
choices and decisions are made to assess why the cocoa pod borer had such a drastic impact 
on yield in the East New Britain Province. The arrival of the disease presented smallholders 
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with an all or nothing scenario. At the farm level, the decision was to modernise and shift to a 
high-input and technically advanced cropping system or remain in their traditional foraging 
production strategy which is a low-input cropping system. Farmers would be required to 
adopt more market orientated values, new agricultural practices, and make major lifestyle 
changes, with more family labour time required and greater investment in cocoa plot. The 
shift to modernity would not be an easy leap, presenting smallholders with a decision that 
would require a fundamental shift in their value systems and moral frameworks.  
Prior to cocoa pod borer, smallholders in the East New Britain Province would 
practice a low input cocoa cropping system, with harvesting of cocoa being the main source 
of cash income. The low input cropping system allowed farmers to engage in other activities 
to diversify livelihoods.  Cocoa plots were interplanted with other crops to be sold at local 
markets. More time was spent on food crops employing the traditional swidden (slash and 
burn) cultivation technique. Importantly the low input system meant that family members had 
time to engage in the important socio-cultural activities that are integral to social wellbeing.  
The study found that after cocoa pod borer many famers did not return to cocoa 
production, with limiting factors being a lack of quality training and support services, the 
high labour demands which limited labour flexibility across a range of activities, and a 
reluctance to adapt through adoption of modern farming methods. The latter would mean a 
radical change in lifestyle and the suspension of indigenous economic and social values that 
underpin labour, production and social relationships. For instance, such adaptation would 
require farmers to adopt a savings culture to finance farm inputs. However, historically, 
cocoa farm income is utilised to meet socio-cultural obligations therefore savings would not 
always be reinvested into cocoa production. It was found that those farmers who did shift to 
cocoa pod borer farm management techniques did so with the help of credit facilities.  
This study adds to the evidence that smallholder adaptation decision-making is not 
independent of the environmental, political and socio-economic contexts of farming 
including the cultural values and historical experiences that have long shaped farming 
practices. Any adaptation strategy must consider this.  
3.8.5 PALAU LAND TO SEA APPROACH TO CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 
With sea level rise and saline intrusion impacting coastal growing areas in Palau, an 
ongoing Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change project (Ngiraingas, 2014) was instigated that 
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would focus on lowland taro cultivation, upland agroforestry, aquaculture and food 
processing.  
Partnering with local farmers and the Secretariat of the Pacific community, taro 
production is being tested by identifying varieties which are more resistant to salt.  The 
project is making use of indigenous knowledge in the construction of dikes to reduce saline 
intrusion to taro crops. To date the project has discovered three new salt-tolerant taro 
varieties to share across the pacific. Upland farming has not traditionally been practiced in 
Palau, but this method is being trialled to grow diverse crops such as bananas, lemongrass, 
soursop, pineapples, papaya, tapioca and taro, through ridge farming to conserve water, 
intercropping, and the use of organic fertilisers and compost to increase soil health.  
The aquaculture project was developed to curb the unsustainable harvesting of 
mangrove crabs which form an important part of the Palauan diet. The project saw the 
distribution of 20,000 crablets which were distributed to farmers to rear to maturity and 
develop sustainable hatcheries expertise. 
The project promoted growing and eating local food to increase local food production, 
reduce reliance on imported foods, and address the non-communicable disease crisis, The 
project has been training youth in local food processing and cooking, developing new recipes 
to substitute imported produce with locally grown. Though still in its formative stages, the 
project is also helping to develop local understanding of climate change adaptation.  
3.8.6 CASE STUDY: ORGANIC COCOA IN SÃO TOMÉ AND PRINCIPE 
In São Tomé & Príncipe, cocoa constitutes 95% of exports, with the country’s unique 
conditions enabling it to be the world’s only producer of the Ciollo cocoa bean – the rarest 
and most expensive type of cocoa on the market.   
In the 1990s however, the cocoa plantations were struggling because of drought, 
mismanagement, and falling global prices leading many producers to abandon cocoa 
production. Struggling to make a living, farmers begun to encroach into and clear the 
biodiversity rich forests of the region.  An IFAD supported project sought to change this 
trend through the establishment of public-private partnerships between local smallholders and 
organic and fair trade operators in São Tomé and Principe. 
The project – titled Participatory Smallholder Agriculture and Artisanal Fisheries 
Development Programme (PAPAFPA) – commenced in 2003 and would last for 13 years, 
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involving 500 farmers in 14 communities which by the end of the project had benefitted 1800 
small farmers, with a total of 2400ha under cultivation for cocoa (IFAD, 2014). 
The project went into partnership with Kakoa – a French organic chocolate producer – 
who ran an assessment on the value of the beans, finding value in the unique cocoa of the 
region. They committed to buying all organic cocoa produced by smallholders in the region 
whilst also provided technical and commercial advice alongside IFAD. The smallholders 
learnt to transition from the production of medium-quality to high-quality cocoa beans.  
The organic production of cocoa adjusted traditional cropping methods, which 
restored and used established shade forests in the region which supplied supplementary crops 
such as bananas, coconuts, mangos, papaya and breadfruit. The beans were fermented and 
dried through solar cocoa dryers and smallholders also learnt to minimise waste through the 
use of correct postharvest storage practices.  
A local research station endorsed the cocoa's aromatic qualities whilst an international 
certifier made sure that the beans produced were in fact organic.  Participating smallholders 
have seen their income increase on average from 25% below the poverty line to 8% above it.  
São Tomé & Príncipe’s use of cocoa production as a climate change adaptation strategy has 
highlighted: 
 The importance of facilitating local and regional market access through public-private 
partnerships 
  That sustainable production systems depends on healthy ecosystems 
 The importance of incentives for agro-biodiversity through value-chains (Firmian, n.d). 
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4 FIJI CASE STUDY 
76 
 
  
                                                             
76
 A stall holder in Namaka. He had relocated from Samoa because his village was threatened 
by rising seas. 
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4.1 FIJI BIODIVERSITY 
In the previous chapter we introduced the unique case of SIDS, here we reduce our 
focus to the case-study of Fiji, which forms the backbone of this thesis. As was mentionined 
in the previous chapter, nearly half of the world’s vascular plant and a third of its terrestrial 
vertebrate species are endemic to 34 biodiversity hotspots. Each hotspot houses an 
evolutionary treasure trove of endemic species yet only a third of these habitats remain, 
covering a mere 2.3% of the Earth's land surface. Fiji lies within one of the most threatened 
of these 34 hotspots - that of the Polynesia-micronesia biodiversity hotspot (Brooks et al, 
2002; Watling, 2011). Fiji consists of a group of volcanic islands resting in the South Pacific. 
The Archipelago includes 322 islands and 522 islets of which 106 are inhabited. The largest 
island of Viti Levu covers the majority of the land area and houses 69% of the population. 
The administrative and political capital, Suva, is the largest urban area, outside of Australia 
and New Zealand, within the South Pacific.  
In Fiji, for Viti Levu alone, it is estimated that climate related disasters can incur a 
cost equivalent to between two and four percent of Fiji’s GDP by 2050 (Bettencourt, 2011). 
In a  one degree centigrade warmer world, we have now reached a time where the effects of 
climate change are no longer a distant possibility but a reality with accelerated rates of 
climate variability already being felt in Small Island Nations such as Fiji. Not only has Fiji 
been experiencing an average annual increase in mean temperature by 0.15 degrees Celsius 
(consistent with global warming patterns) since 1950, but also greater ocean acidification, sea 
level rise and more extreme weather patterns (Australian Bureau of Meteorology & CSIRO, 
2011).  These are projected to get worse as we attempt to stabilize emissions to well below 
two degrees centigrade of warming.   
The four major ecosystems forming Fiji’s natural asset base are: open sea; coral reefs, 
lagoons and beaches; mangrove forests and estuaries; and tropical moist forests. A non-
exhaustive list of ecosystem services provided by these ecosystems are presented in Table 4.1 
along with a 1994 estimate of the monetary value of these services. 
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TABLE 4-1: VALUE OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES - FIJI, 1994   
Ecosystem Services Valued 
Unit Value 
(hectare/year) 
Total Value 
(million/year) 
Open Sea Climate regulation F$56  F$24,253  
  Food production F$0.07  F$31.92  
Coral reefs, lagoons & Recreation n/a F$336  
Beaches Disturbance regulation n/a F$307.2 
  Food production n/a 
Included with 
mangroves 
Mangroves & estuaries Food production, F$2,402 
  
F$100.88 
  nutrient cycling & habitat 
 
  Disturbance regulation F$2,500 F$105 
Tropical moist forest Climate regulation F$328 F$246 
  Water regulation & supply F$20.6 F$15.45 
  Raw materials provision F$87.9 F$65.9 
  Biodiversity preservation F$14.70 F$11.03 
Total All except climate regulation   F$973.38
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Fiji is undergoing a biodiversity crisis. The aforementioned ecosystems are faced with 
the anthropogenic threats of over-harvesting, pollution and conversion to alternative uses 
which largely relate to agriculture and tourism. Between 1992 and 2007 alone Fiji had lost 
70,000 hectares of forest cover (Lees, 2007). For Fiji, the continuing loss of mangroves, 
corals and natural forests would not just impact tourism and agriculture in the long-run but 
through the loss of biodiversity, the archipelago’s overall health. Islands possess extremely 
diverse and fragile ecosystems. They are treasure troves of evolution. The loss of one species 
can have far reaching consequences. Not only would you have you lost evolutionary data but 
that loss will impact all the other species which would have adapted in union with the other. 
In Fiji, of the terrestrial species: 11 endemic bird species are at risk of extinction, a further six 
near threatened whilst three of the native bat species, two endemic frogs, half of the palm 
species and a third of the varied reptiles are also classed as threatened (Lees, 2007). The 
marine species are not much better off with the effects of climate change and more direct 
                                                             
77 Sistro (1997) 
125 
 
human impacts such as over-harvesting threatening habitats (Knudy, Roelfsema, Lyons & 
Phinn, 2013; Kronen, Clua, McArdle & Labrosse, 2003).  
Fiji has taken steps in establishing both marine and terrestrial protected areas to safe 
guard its natural asset base. During the Barbados Convetion on Biological Diversity Fiji set a 
benchmark target of protecting 30% of its inshore and offshore marine areas by 2020 
however according to the Word Bank (2013) only 0.1% of territorial waters had protected 
status as of 2010. Locally Managed Marine Areas (LMMAs) however are widespread in Fiji, 
covering approximately 25% of Fiji’s inshore area (UNDP, 2012). The established LMMAs 
are being widely acknowledged as an ongoing conservation success story (UNDP, 2012) 
though the picture is not all rosy. The LMMAs can be seen more as ‘replenishment fisheries’ 
rather than a protected area initiative (Lees, 2007) and therefore it can be assumed that 
LMMAs would not be providing a completely effective ecological contribution towards 
biodiversity conservation (Jupiter et al, 2010). Fiji’s terrestrial protected areas in contrast are 
lacking in protection be it in the form of community based conservation or otherwise. Only 
1.7% of Fiji’s land area is protected (World Bank, 2013) Tourism, agricultural expansion, 
land right laws and the timber trade place pressure on the existing protected areas. 
Unfortunately, Fiji follows the expected trend of many developing nations which fall in 
biodiversity hotspots. These resource rich nations are generally plagued with corruption and 
lack institutional capacity (Jameson, Tupper & Ridley, 2002), which can impede conservation 
efforts.  
As Fiji’s main sectors are tourism and agriculture, the need for climate change 
adaptation becomes ever more pertinent. Coral bleaching and coastal erosion will threaten 
tourism while sugarcane farmers can expect higher variability in sugarcane yields.  In Nadi, a 
mainstay of sugarcane farming and the gateway of tourism, the need to instil adaptation 
targeting both climatic and non-climatic factors is apparent. The recent 2009 and 2012 flash 
floods comment on the need to fortify the Nadi catchment to greater occurrences of flooding 
whilst also combating major contributing factors facing the region such as water demand 
conflict, groundwater and surface water quality, saline intrusion, drought, deforestation, 
wetland and mangrove loss, environmental degradation and marine pollution (Wood, 2010).  
Tourism is a complicated sector in terms of conservation. Whilst it provides the 
largest sector contribution to the Fijian Economy, its direct contribution to the average Fijian 
family is marginal (Malani, 2002). At the same time mainstream resort style tourism places 
126 
 
undue pressure on Fiji’s terrestrial and marine ecosystems. For instance, in Nadi the Denarau 
Island resort development saw the clearing of 130 ha of mangrove forest in order to create an 
18 hole golf course and an elaborate resort complex. This extreme modification of the 
ecosystem has resulted in extensive erosion, chemical runoff into the coastal ecosystem from 
maintaining the grounds, depletion of marine life from habitat loss and an increased risk of 
flooding (Hall & Page, 2003). As the roots of mangroves act as natural sieves absorbing 
pollution and sediments, they provide protection to Fiji’s prized coral reefs. Their loss would 
impact tourism and commerce as mangroves are also habitats for reef fish during the earliest 
stages of their life cycle when they are at their most fragile state.    
When seen in conjunction with climate change, the loss of mangrove habitats 
becomes even graver. Climate change projections have predicted with very high levels of 
confidence: greater rainfall in the wet season with the frequency of days with extreme rainfall 
increasing, higher temperatures and a continuation of mean sea-level rise (Mimimura et al, 
2007). As mangroves prevent coastal erosion, protecting against swells and strong winds, and 
also absorb flood waters, there loss would also be the loss of a valuable buffer against the 
effects of climate change.  In Nadi the effects of the loss of this buffer is already apparent. In 
Figure 4.1 we can see that the 2012 flood plain had increased from the area inundated in 
2009. It is apparent that mangrove conservation is a no-regret adaptation response for the 
wide variety of ecosystem services they perform. However an undervaluation of mangroves 
continues to see their degradation (Agrawala et al, 2003). 
FIGURE 4-1:MAP OF FLOOD HEIGHTS AND INUNDATED AREAS – NADI - (VOCEA, 2012) 
127 
 
 
In Nadi, the severity and frequency of floods has seen local people begin taking up 
adaptive measures. For instance, people living within the Nadi river basin, following the 
floods in January 2009 and that in March 2012, homes that were wiped out were rebuilt on 
stilts (Figure 4.2). The January 2009 flood  alone was estimated to have cost  F$113 million 
in damages. It is projected that with climate change and the increasing severity of cyclones, 
an increase in wind speed by 20% could result in an increase in cyclone damage by 44-100% 
(Rao et al, 2013). This along with coastal erosion from sea-level rise and development is 
detrimental to ecosystems ability to protect against flooding. Ecosystem-based adaptation 
through coastal revegetation and conservation of mangroves, forests and buffer zones are 
presented as possible adaptation strategies  (Nunn, 2013) but greater support is needed for 
farmers in the region for whom the 2009 floods had a catastrophic impact with one estimate 
stating that 42% of farmers were unable to meet their basic subsistence needs, pushing many 
below the poverty line (Chandra & Dalton, 2010).  
FIGURE 4-2: NADI FLOOD ADAPTATION 
 
Unlike Nadi, Suva  is protected somewhat from flood waters and the full brunt of 
cyclones as it sits upon a hilly peninsula between Laucala Bay and Suva Harbour. The 
Capital was built atop of reclaimed swamps. As the most urban centre amongst the South 
Pacific Island groups, Suva is an important point of commerce and is politically significant in 
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the region. The city is fringed by Marine Protected Areas (MPA), such as the Suva Lagoon 
MPA and a 1083.35 hectare terrestrial reserve, Colo-i-Suva. Colo-i-Suva is a large forest park 
which draws in eco-tourism. It is also the playground for many locals with shaded walks and 
waterfalls. As communities also live around Colo-i-Suva crime has been an issue, ranging 
from theft of crops to serious violent crimes (Fiji Police Force, n.d). Colo-i-Suva is a 
contentious forest park – the vast majority of the native forest habitat was cleared to create a 
mahogany plantation in the forties and fifties. The plantation remains with its understory 
sheltering an assemblage of native plants. The park is largely the sole responsibility of a 
diminished Department of Forestry. It would seem however that the management of the park 
is to some extent lacking and also further complicated by local land ownership laws. This is 
not unique to the case of Colo-i-Suva. A poignant example of the lack of management in 
these parks and reserves is displayed in the case of Fiji’s only native mammals - bats.  
Fiji has at least six bat species which are important pollinators and seed dispersers in 
local forest ecosystems (Palmeirim et al, 2007). Of these, the critically endangered Mirimiri 
Arcondata or Fiji flying fox is endemic. Whilst the flying fox is mainly found on the island of 
Taveuni, Viti-Levu’s rainforests have also attracted bat species such as the vulnerable cave 
dwelling Notopteris macdonaldi, or Fiji blossom bat. These bats are threatened due to habitat 
loss, invasive predatory species such as the cat and mongoose, roosting disturbances and 
over-harvesting (Palmeirim et al, 2007; Malotaux, 2012). Data on Fiji’s bats is limited but a 
recent study found that two of the five known roosting caves for the Notopteris macdonaldi 
or Fiji blossom bat exist on the borders of Colo-i-Suva forest park with the bats foraging 
within the park. The Kalabu and Wainibuku roosting caves are threatened by the villages 
bordering the park who not only encroach upon the park thus threatening the bats habitat but 
also harvest the bats during the yam season. Waste disposal is also an issue with the Kalabu 
cave in particular becoming an informal waste dumping site which threatens the bats roosting 
habitat (Malotaux, 2012; Hubbard, 2004). The bats which forage within the park are also at 
risk of habitat loss with logging within the forest park being a real concern. As mentioned 
earlier, Colo-i-Suva is predominantly a mahogany plantation which has now reached 
harvesting age. The Department of Forestry rent the land upon which the park is formed from 
the native landowners (Kalabu village; Government of Fiji, 1953) for whom harvesting the 
mahogany trees once leases have expired is a lucrative option. 
The nature of land as leasehold from native landowners complicates matters for 
conservation and development. Land and terrestrial and marine natural resources are largely 
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owned by indigenous groups in Fiji
78. The concept of ‘Vanua’ or land, people and custom, is 
of great importance to native Fijians grounding them with a sense of belonging. For other 
Fijian citizens, in order to make use of the land and its resources permission must be sought 
from the native owners. Regarding marine resources, the controversial Qoli qoli bill of 2007 
saw ownership rights of traditional fishing grounds being transferred to indigenous groups. 
For Indo-Fijians, who are the largest ethnic group behind Fijians constituting 37% of the 
population and the majority sugarcane farmers, property rights becomes a controversial issue. 
Around 73% of Indo-Fijian sugarcane farmers have been cultivating their crop on lease hold 
land (Naidu & Reddy, 2002). Lease expiration and non-renewal perhaps fuelled by the 
country’s political instability following four coups d’état has caused displacement of 
thousands of Indo-Fijians.   
As one would expect, such instability has affected the economic and social structures 
in Fiji. With increasingly unstable weather events wiping out livelihoods, with investment 
and jobs threatened as a consequence of the coups, expiring leases and the lack of a 
democratic process for the past eight years – Suva has seen a surge in slums mainly housing 
Indo-Fijians. There is not much literature or data on these informal settlements however they 
are evident in the Suva-Nausori corridor. The corridor has seen the rise in squatter 
settlements with an estimated population of 82,000 (Storey, 2006). These settlements are 
evident on the coast and do encroach into the Colo-i-Suva forest reserve and other 
surrounding forests such as Sawani (Koto, 2011).  
FIGURE 4-3: SLUM SETTLEMENT NEAR COLO-I-SUVA FOREST RESERVE 
 
  
                                                             
78
 According to the Native Lands Trust Board, 86% of land is owned by indigenous groups 
through customary titles. 
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The Suva-Nausori corridor consists of the peri-urban region between the ocean to the 
south of Suva and beyond Colo-i-Suva in the north. It includes the Rewa river which runs 
through Nausori. The Rewa delta hosts one of the two largest mangrove ecosystems in Viti-
Levu. These mangroves are threatened by reclamation for agriculture, squatter settlements 
and other anthropogenic activities such as using the mangroves as a dump site 
(Mohanty,2006; Solomon & Kruger, 1996) . The Sovi basin for which the Rewa river is the 
largest sub-catchment is also of ecological significance. The Sovi basin is Fiji’s main 
terrestrial biodiversity storehouse. The Sovi basin protected area is the largest in Viti-Levu 
covering 20,000 hectares. The protected area, formed on a 99 year lease from local 
landowners, contains pristine native forests and some of the countries rarest biodiversity. The 
pristine forests are protected from encroachment by their remoteness and provide important 
ecosystems services such as water security to the settlements downstream (Chandra & 
Dalton, 2010). 
4.2 MICROFINANCE IN FIJI  
The slum settlements throughout Fiji lack in basic services (Kiddie, 2010). It does 
seem as though the slum dwellers have access to government supported and community 
based microfinance (Kim, 2013). The data on the use and effect of microfinance in Fiji is 
sparse though it has been suggested that two thirds of marginalised and vulnerable people are 
excluded from financial services (Sharma & Reddy, 2002 in Sibley, 2007). Urban dwellers’ 
financial exclusion remains unclear (Sibley, 2007). With 40 percent of the population living 
below the poverty line (Sano, 2008), the potential of microloans to alleviate poverty whilst 
also reaching conservation objectives is attractive.  Especially when coupled with the strong 
sense of community that grounds the Fijian and indeed Indo-Fijian identity and Fijian’s deep 
seated connection to the land and sea (Sano, 2008).  
Microfinance is still relatively young in Fiji. In 1999, following a conference on 
establishing microfinance in Fiji, the Government of Fiji allocated F$3 million and 
established the National Microfinance Unit (NMFU) to develop Fiji’s microfinance sector. A 
report on the sector in 2005 by the Punla sa Tao Foundation found that it was lacking. In Fiji 
rural households have few opportunities for trade as they have relatively comfortable 
subsistence livelihoods (Pacific Financial Inclusion Programme (PFIP), 2012). Coupled with 
low population density and spatial remoteness, the traditional Grameen model which was 
adopted in Fiji was not yielding results. MFIs were experiencing high transaction costs with a 
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low client base. In 2009, a new plan for financial inclusion was envisioned but never 
deployed. According to the PFIP (2012) financial services assessment, in 2009 there were 
nine key government backed microfinance institutions in Fiji which had 1,700 outstanding 
loans of which 540 were delinquent.  
Commercial banks which have microfinance branches however are proving more 
successful. In 2009 the Reserve Bank of Fiji established a requirement for all commercial 
banks in Fiji to have a microfinance branch (PFIP, 2012). ANZ partnered with the United 
Nations Development Programme to create a Rural Banking sector in order to reach the 350-
400K unbanked population. The service has been extremely popular with 73,000 deposit 
accounts as of 2011. Rural banking services are offered by way of mobile banking vans. 
Financial literacy is a key component of the service (Reddy, 2011). Fijians have a strong 
collectivist culture. Concepts such as ‘kerekere’ remain important cultural norms. Kerekere 
denotes unconditional sharing of one’s resources, as time and property are seen as communal. 
Such a concept does not lend well to savings. ANZ however teach clients the importance of 
meeting one’s own financial needs in order to better meet community needs (Hiatt, Hutchens, 
Ortiz & Powell, 2011) 
Savings are offered at 1.75% interest with a required opening balance of F$0.60. To 
discourage people from overly dipping into their savings there is a F$3.00 cost associated 
with withdrawal. To qualify for microloans, a client has to have saved for at least six months, 
and have the backing of their community leader. Effectively collateral thus becomes one’s 
own savings and social capital in the form of community backing. The loan model is that of 
individual lending. The loans can be applied to any worthwhile purpose and have a term of 
two years at 19 percent/annum. The minimum loan amount is F$60 and the maximum is 
F$1200 (Reddy, 2008). Recent data on default rates is lacking, however in a report by 
Blacklock (2006), the default rate was reported as less than two percent. Other lending 
models in Fiji are Credit Unions, ROSCAs and Co-operatives such as the Sugarcane Growers 
Fund (SGF). The SGF is a revolving fund which enables sugarcane farmers to access small 
loans and provides a buffer in times of disaster. However the author in discussion with 
microfinance institutions in Fiji and also through a review of the literature found that of the 
microlending services offered in Fiji, none had a direct link to climate change adaptation 
within their lending criteria.  
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4.3 THE FIJI LOCALLY MANAGED MARINE AREA (FLMMA) 
Throughout Viti-Levi one can see people living off the land. The rivers and sea 
provides proteins, whilst the land provides medicines, fruits and vegetables. The vast 
majority of the population do grow and catch a proportion of their own food (Thornton, 
2009). If development, environmental degradation and climate change threatens the ability of 
people to continue to do so, then solutions must be sought. With strong subsistence 
livelihoods and seemingly successful individual microfinance models, it would seem that 
merging environmental conditionality along with microloans could further secure existing 
livelihoods against the pressures of climate change.  Whilst such initiatives are lacking in Fiji, 
other inspiring models have risen.  
The most widespread and successful initiative has been the Fiji Locally Managed 
Marine Area (FLMMA). The FLMMA, established in the early 1990s, arose through local 
villagers taking charge of restoring the depleted resources within their Qoli qoli (traditional 
fishing grounds including reef, marine and lagoon areas) that are woven into their culture and 
traditions. The villagers soon expanded and formed a network through which knowledge, 
information and resources could be shared. They merged their local practices (such as 
establishing core ‘no-fish’ zones) with scientific monitoring and data collection. This data 
was then presented to relevant policy makers who then went on to provide the network with 
credibility and weighting through policy development (Veityaki et al, 2008). In Fiji, as in 
much of Micronesia, people’s identity comes from the land and sea. The cultural norm may 
therefore be strongly in favour of protecting these resources. 
The FLMMA is an example of collective management of a commons through 
community based conservation. Sano (2008) shows that Ostrom’s (1990) design principles 
are evident in the establishment of the Locally Managed Marine Protected Areas (LMMAs). 
Each area is defined by customary fishing right areas (or qoli qoli’s) and tabu (or restricted) 
areas which form the core Marine Protected Area. When Fiji gained independence in the 
1970, a dual ownership system was established with coastal waters and resources becoming 
State owned with traditional owners retaining exclusive rights within their qoli qoli’s. This 
has provided the LMMAs with legitimacy, with governmental support for its establishment 
and management (design principle 7).  One issue that arises through such an arrangement is 
that the non-indigenous population does not have rights to access the qoqliqoli’s. This means 
that they are excluded from the FLMMAs. Regardless, this parcelling intro traditional areas 
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has led to well defined and understood boundary areas which are more easily managed due to 
their size (design principle 1).  
Ostrom’s (1990) second design principle of clear harvesting conditions and 
congruence between rules and local traditions, is evident in the concept of Tabu. 
Traditionally Tabu areas were set up within a qoli qoli following the death of a chief 
forbidding resource extraction as a sign of respect. The Tabu would last for a 100 days, and 
following a memorial feast would reopen for harvesting (Sano, 2008). The current practice of 
setting Tabu areas borrows from and extends this traditional practice and remains successful 
as it fully utilises culturally acceptable practices for collective resource management. The 
third design principle of active participation in rule formation by resource users is met with 
community inputs being welcomed, however final rule decisions come from the chief which 
is the cultural norm however it does not always mean total compliance. Sano (2008) found 
that compliance requires whole community involvement in the decision making stages and 
well defined boundaries. The fourth design principle of monitoring is facilitated by NGOs 
such as WWF who train and assign residents as wardens. Wardens and villagers can issue 
graduated sanctions (design principle 5), which can be verbal warning, physical punishment, 
and police action. Local authorities and chiefs are in hand for conflict resolution; strong 
social norms necessary for group living also provides a deterrent for situations of conflict or 
rule breaking (design principle 6). Finally NGOs with their mobility and financial capability 
have enabled the growth of LMMA from a localised phenomenon to a national one, forming 
the FLMMA (design principle 8). 
The FLMMA network has gone on to win numerous awards, for instance the 2002 
Equator Prize. It has grown to include communities within six districts covering an 
impressive 25 percent of Fiji’s inshore marine area (World Resource Institute, 2008). The 
success of the FLMMA network is stated to lie within its participatory and collaborative 
focus, ensuring local communities are central to the functioning of the network, providing 
them with a sense of ownership, empowerment, cultural and livelihood security (Halverson & 
McNeil , 2008). Such a method can broadly be envisaged as the participatory management of 
protected areas, the establishment and maintenance of buffer zones, compensating or 
enabling viable substitutes to local people and promoting local and social development 
through novel methods such as eco-tourism and sustainable harvesting to name a few (Peters, 
1998; Damania et al, 2008).  
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Whilst collective management has had some positive impact on the health of marine 
resources, and as such improved the subsistence livelihoods of resource-owning units 
(members within a qoli qoli), it has not improved household income. Alternative mechanisms 
need to be sought to invigorate income generation, such as the development of alternative 
sustainable marine-based occupations (Lawson-Remer, 2013). This is where microloans 
again become an attractive prospect as it could be used to invigorate livelihoods.  
Whilst the FLMMA is indeed a step in the right direction, the fact remains that Fiji’s 
marine areas are under stress for the following reasons: LMMA lack the resources to monitor 
and pursue illegal poaches within their qoli qoli; over-fishing in near and deep water fisheries 
is prevalent and species numbers have drastically declined or are now extinct (such as nesting 
turtles for the former and two species of giant clams for the latter); Fiji lacks a government 
imposed quota for in-shore fisheries (Lees, 2007); and lastly as was mentioned earlier, rather 
than the more traditional permanent closures characteristic of protected areas which prohibits 
resource extraction,  FLMMA’s can be seen as fisheries regeneration with establishment of 
conditional closures which still enable people to harvest marine resources (Mills, et al, 2011).   
As the pressures placed by climate change increase it may be that some damage to the 
reef ecosystems in particular will be unavoidable. Increasing temperatures would take a toll 
on the fragile marine ecosystems and livelihoods. Coral bleaching would negatively impact 
upon the life-cycle and behaviour of marine species. Climate change adaptation can however 
present opportunities for people to enter into alternative livelihoods which focus on 
conservation. Coral plantations, mangrove reforestation, small scale sustainable farming and 
fishing can yield big results in the long-term.  
Of course differing capacities to cope, recover, and to instigate adaptive measures 
determines the vulnerability of societies to climate variability. In Fiji the implementation of 
climate change adaptation is hindered by the prevailing weak socioeconomic conditions and 
issues such as a lack of capacity (human, financial and technical) and the lack of consistency 
in the practice of good governance at national and local levels. As such adaptation should not 
be pursued in isolation but incorporated into development, security and overall biodiversity 
conservation agendas (Fujikura & Kawanishi, 2011). Microloans with environmental criteria 
can be a novel method through which to sustainably finance adaptive measures, invigorate 
livelihoods, and conservation behaviour.    
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This thesis started off as every PhD does with a research proposal.  The initial area of 
focus was microfinance and water – and specifically the efficacy of small loans on potable 
water in India. The conception of this research proposal commenced before I had decided on 
pursuing a PhD. It was an area I was extremely passionate about as water availability would 
only become more of concern with climate change, border conflicts, and growing populations 
and economies. It always disturbed me to know that I could open a tap and, without any 
effort, get access to something so integral to life whilst  783 million people remained without 
access to safe drinking water. Novel solutions to finance access would have been a value-
added area of research.  
I came across water.org and its use of microfinance to enable access to safe drinking 
water and sanitation. As we often find with such programmes you can find many good news 
stories but the critical exploration of efficacy is generally missing.  Water.org seemed like an 
ideal institution to partner with for my research. They were utilising microloans in a novel 
way and were showing this application to be highly successful. To scale up the concept and 
reach a wider population of those without access to  water a detailed impact assessment 
would have been of value. Indeed another benefit would have been of benefit for 
development practitioners and the organisation alike. Having approached them for a potential 
collaboration, I was pleased with the response and was asked to submit a proposal that 
outlined the methodology I would follow and the benefits of this research to the organisation. 
Whilst the organisation was interested in the research they were hesitant to allow it as a 
component of a PhD. Thus I had to move away from Water.org. The attractiveness of the 
research topic still remained. But an existing NGO working on microloans with a focus on 
water are few and far between. So the remit of the study was extended to environmental 
protection and biodiversity conservation.  
My area of interest was the Sundarbans and the vast and biodiversity rich mangrove 
forests which are increasingly threatened by encroachment. I found several small 
organisations that showed interest in working with me. The most promising was an 
Indigenous group who worked on catchment management in a remote area of the Sundarbans. 
As we progressed with our discussions unfortunately funding for the organisation was cut and 
they were forced to close operations. This was a rough time for many organisations, in the 
early days following the financial crisis.  
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Using my networks, I made contact with several other organisations outside of the 
Sundarbans. I finally found promise in one, The Association for Rivers and Coastal-
Ecosystems Conservation. This organisation worked on addressing abject poverty of the 
Chenchus, the indigenous people of the Nallamala forests of the Krishna River Valley. My 
contact, John Nagella, is the head of the organisation, and remains a passionate advocate of 
the Chenchus and in the conservation of the natural ecosystems which provides for them. 
The isolated nature of the Chenchus meant that they were often bypassed by 
microlending bodies. John was keen to get microbanking services to the population and found 
promise in its connection with conservation. Having shared several case studies with him, we 
begun to assess the feasibility of a research project that could also have practical benefit for 
the people of the Nallamala forests. I proposed two options: 
Option 1: A survey experiment which could be used to assess the feasibility of microloan in 
the Nallamala forests and be used as a basis through which to develop proposals to setup a 
microbanking facility in the region. 
Option 2: A randomized impact evaluation which would require partnership with a 
microlending body 
Both options were explored. We searched for microbanking organisations which 
would be interested in the project whilst also developing the concept of the survey 
experiment. Concurrently funding was sought. Unfortunately after endless rejections it soon 
became apparent that the project would not go through and at that stage the cost was one I 
could not bear. 
John and I are still in contact however and hopefully we can use this research to 
instigate a project in the future.  
So next, on my supervisor’s advice, I tried looking at the Bale Ecoregion in Ethiopia 
but again was constrained by finance. I went through other regions and had similar issues 
with financing. It felt like I was spending the majority of my time seeking funding, so I had to 
make the conscious decision to fund part of all of the research myself.  
By the end of 2011 I finally found an organisation that seemed perfect. Microsfere 
was a non-profit based in Lyon, France. Its objective was to assist the fringe communities 
living around protected areas in Ghana by combining rural development with biodiversity 
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conservation. They would aim to improve biodiversity conservation by supporting fringe 
communities in their pursuit of better livelihoods, as such reducing the pressure on natural 
resources in their areas. This is achieved through the creation of micro-enterprises facilitated 
through microcredit. The organisation worked in The Kakum Conservation Area in the 
Central Region of Ghana and the Amansuri Wetland Area in the Western Region. I would 
have to cover travel, accommodation and some research costs, but the organisation would 
have covered most other costs as the research would have functioned as an impact assessment 
to meet its 2013 project monitoring needs.  
I had received initial data, project reports, and developed a detailed research plan. 
Microsfere had already conducted baseline impact assessments in 2011, at which stage they 
would have been operating for two years already. They had conducted a total of 106 
interviews in Amansuri looking at four communities, whilst 195 interviews were completed 
in Kakum looking at eight communities. The interviews collected baseline data on the socio-
economic conditions of the participants as well as on natural resource issues. The expectation 
was that Microsfere would repeat data collection every two years, in order to have a mid-term 
first evaluation of the project’s impact on people’s livelihoods and on the protection of the 
natural resources by 2013. One community each from Kakum and Amansuri that did not 
receive microcredits from the organization was also selected and treated as controls – but the 
total sample size for these was just 21.  
 
The initial collection had some issues. For example: impact indicators of the 
microfinance intervention as related to the Amansuri Wetlands included alternative sources 
for extracting wood fuel than from wetlands and mangrove forests, change in dependence on 
wood fuel, change in local perception about the importance of the Wetland, observance of 
sustainable fishing methods, local support in protecting mangrove, wetland and coastal 
forests, changes in turtle egg consumption, and number of catch and releases of sea turtles. 
However, most of these indicators were not captured in the interview and where attempts 
were made the responses were not always reliable, with questions pertaining to illegal 
poaching of turtle eggs especially being vague.  
 
This initial assessment however provided the basis for a longitudinal study 
particularly for beneficiaries of the scheme. With my research planned, and a comprehensive 
outline of costs and research expectations completed, I bought my ticket to Ghana, found a 
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homestay and transport options, and was set to depart in May 2012. Unfortunately a few 
months before leaving Microsfere could no longer carry out the research as they had run into 
issues with financing. As a consequence they would have to halt activities till more funding 
came through.  
 
By this stage something had to change in how I would collect my data. I decided to 
shift my focus for a final time to Small Island States and use the survey experiment method I 
had developed for The Association for Rivers and Coastal-Ecosystems Conservation.  Small 
Island Developing States (SIDS) and especially Fiji is an area I had wanted to look at for a 
long time.  Not only is it my home, but as with other SIDS, it is particularly vulnerable to the 
impacts of climate change. I have seen Fiji change; I have seen lush mangroves and the Colo-
i-Suva reserve where we used to play slowly recede. In the latter squatter settlements have 
risen up, whilst the former has been redeveloped to build opulent resorts. I remember trying 
to spot flying foxes and waiting patiently for lizards. I remember how the cyclone would 
come and we would need to shore up wooden defences and camp out in the basement. I 
remember not having water, and having to run after water trucks to collect a rationed bucket. 
I remember when the floods came and the poverty that ensued. Smallholders suffered the 
most. Crops wiped out, no infrastructure to get help – these things would only get worse as 
climate change took hold. In Viti-Levu, the forests and mangroves that surrounded the 
poorest communities would be assets against climate change. The communities would need 
help to adapt their practices to become resilient as seasons and weather patterns changed. So I 
made contact with the Sugar Cane Growers Council, sought out help from the University of 
the South Pacific, and the Fiji National University for research assistance. The Fiji Sugar 
Cane Grower’s Council provided me with an office and support to start with, I also recruited 
two research assistants from them. A further two from the Fiji National University and one 
from the University of the South Pacific.  
I would have to entirely fund the research on my own. This would be a stretch as I 
was also already paying for the substantial portion of my fees not covered by studentships, 
and was under the limitations of a student work visa. The total cost came to a little under 
£5000. This included three months research, accommodation, the cost of flights and travel, 
research assistants, survey material, fees for loan repayments, transport, and a buffer in case 
of emergency.   
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The aim was for each research assistant and myself to collect data from 85 
respondents to have a total of 510 surveys. The reality was much different from my 
expectations.  
To start I commenced the study on my own by going to local markets and talking to 
producers. I had identified the Nadi, Suva, Nausori, and Lautoka markets as producers come 
from various locations either further inland or from coastal regions to sell their produce and 
would have allowed for a random sample of smallholders. I started off at the Nadi and 
Lautoka markets, using a simple random sampling via a random number table. After a grand 
total of five surveys, three in Nadi and two in Lautoka, I found that this strategy was going to 
be problematic. The surveys were taking two hours each to complete, as participants would 
stop to sell produce and chat to friends. Whilst this could have been managed, market 
officials halted efforts to select my sample from the market. In both locations officials would 
not let the research continue unless a substantial payment was made to them on a weekly 
basis. This would have quickly become unaffordable so instead I selected sample areas and 
recruited my research assistants according to those areas they could cover.  
Training and testing my research assistants were done in pairs where possible and 
took three days each. We did three test runs with farmers. It was here that it became apparent 
when conducting the experiment component of the survey, the exchange of money on the 
successful repayment of a loan would become an issue. When the monetary component was 
explained to participants, it was found that they would become hesitant to continue with the 
experiment. This was a blind spot in the experimental design as it did not consider the 
cultural shyness which bordered on a cultural taboo around the discussion and exchange of 
money in a village setting, especially with a stranger. So F$5 which would have been given 
on successful loan repayment instead became a participation reward. 
Once I was satisfied with the conduct of my research assistants, I gave them each 90 
surveys and other equipment with enough money to cover participation fees for 20 
respondents. I also gave them half their payment, and money to cover transport costs. After 
the completion of 20 surveys they were to return them to me or to a specified location and 
collect further participation fees and funds to cover transport.  
One research assistant, who came highly recommended by the Sugar Cane Grower’s 
Council, and had completed the training and test runs without any issues was given all his 
portion of surveys, the full participation rewards, a hefty transport allowance, and postage for 
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each set of 20 surveys as he was to collect data from further afield in the Western Division of 
the Island. The research would have taken four weeks considering transport time and also the 
very real effect of ‘Island time’.  
In the first week, I commenced conducting interviews on local perceptions of climate 
change by once again approaching producers in the markets for a ‘chat’. This proved really 
interesting. People wanted to talk, to share their experience and no officials tried to stop us. 
In addition, in the first week I focused on getting a feel of the microfinance institutions, 
revolving funds, and cooperatives that were in Viti-Levu. The idea was to review progress on 
returned surveys in the first week then shoot off to the Suva region to collect my data.  
 After the first week, I never saw or heard from two of the research assistants again. 
The one who went further afield kept saying the surveys were on the way but delayed 
because of rains. He assured me I was getting good responses, it was very exciting. After two 
weeks surveys had still not arrived, but we stayed in touch and he kept assuring me all was 
well. By the third week he returned. He had not bothered to follow the sampling strategy, and 
had decided to leave half of the surveys and all of the experiment empty.  Of the last two, one 
quit after one week with no surveys completed because it was too hot, and the last fell ill 
from the heat and could not complete the task. To be fair, it was extremely hot and humid. 
The people interviewed often expressed concern about the heat and its effect on their health.  
In that first week I had finished my interviews and had looked at a variety of 
microlending groups and organistions. In the second week I tried looking for replacements 
for my research assistants but could not find any that I felt I could trust with the work. So 
with days and money wasted, decided to collect the data myself. At this stage I had still 
counted on 85 surveys coming from the one remaining research assistant in the Western 
Division. I went ahead and recruited a further two assistants. They would act as translators 
and support to approach elders and participate in social conventions in Fijian villages when 
needed (only one would accompany me at a time). In order to gain permission to talk to 
residents in Fijian villages an offering or sevusevu must be made. This came in the form of 
Kava root which is pounded and created into a mildly sedating drink which is drunk in a 
ceremony. So together we set off to collect my data. It was slow going because of the very 
real effect of ‘island time’ where a meeting scheduled for 12pm could take place at three pm 
instead. Other factors were travel time, having to hike out to remote villages and locations, 
and lastly the norms that had to be followed at the Fijian villages would also be time 
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consuming. By the end of collection I had 205 surveys. Whilst a small sample, I was advised 
that this would be sufficient. 
Collecting the data by myself was in the end a good experience. I trusted my data, I 
was happy with the consistent information that was shared to participants. I was very aware 
of the risk of experimenter bias, this could have been spread out through research assistants 
but unfortunately this was not the case, as such the risk remains of such bias and must be 
stated as a weakness.  For a young researcher setting out on her own PhD research, some 
questions and lessons learnt were: 
 
 
  
Be prepared for the unexpected, with backup plans if the reality on the ground is different from 
that which you envisioned  
Have people you can trust on the ground 
You should consider an alternative and independent method sof collecting your data 
If you cannot and must work with an organisation - be realistic about the help they will provide 
Can you obtain your data online from places like World Bank Data or UN Stats? Can you pay for 
access to data sources? Will this meet your needs? 
If this is not possible - think realistically about the type of data you can collect 
Seek a research studentship if possible, if you can work with a team their support would be 
pricelss and the experience less lonely  
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6.1 SURVEY-BASED EXPERIMENT 
Framed lab and field experiments utilising behavioural and computational game 
theory have attempted to unpack microfinance mechanisms and the underlying strategies that 
are utilised by the actors in this environment. For example, Gine et al (2010) ran an 
experimental economics laboratory in Lima, Peru where participants were recruited to 
undergo various microfinance experiments (in a ‘game’ format) that looked at aspects of risk 
behaviour and group lending. The experiments involved simulated microloans whereby 
players were able to choose between risky and safe investments and were required to manage 
the risk of default. As is typical with microfinance, dynamic incentives were in place to 
moderate the rate of default. They found that group based lending did induce moral hazard 
but could be mitigated by allowing borrowers to form their own groups; however they also 
found that this led to very little risk-taking. 
Breza, Chandrasekhar and Larreguy (2011) utilised framed field experiments to 
understand how different contracting environments affected joint investment opportunities. 
They used a sample of 1080 subjects drawn from 45 villages in Karnataka, India. Building on 
a two-party sender and receiver trust experiment with the introduction of a third party judge 
in some treatments, they were able to explore how social network characteristics impact 
investment decisions. They found that social proximity could overcome weak institutions and 
achieve better investment levels whilst social distance had weaker investment levels. The 
introduction of a third party judge led to collusion in cases of proximity whilst socially 
distant judges facilitated better investments. In the aforementioned study the proximity of 
social networks provides the social incentives to uptake efficient investment behaviour. 
Influenced by the aforementioned experimental designs, we conceived of a framed 
field experiment which could be administered with limited time and resources. The 
experiment was designed so participants would receive a F$5 if they were successfully able 
to repay their loan, if they were unable to do so then they would not receive the fee. But as 
was expressed earlier, this monetary component did not work culturally.  
As no money was exchanged the research design can been described as a survey-
based experiment. Lab and field experiments both have their advantages and disadvantages. 
The use of standardised procedures makes it easier to replicate lab experiments whilst the 
highly controlled setting enables causal inference. However the artificial lab setting is not an 
accurate reflection of reality and thus leads to low ecological validity. Generalising findings 
to real life settings can be compromised. Field experiments on the other hand are more likely 
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to reflect real life as it is conducted in natural settings but as real life is complicated, it is 
difficult to control extraneous variables which may affect results and compromise 
replicability. The survey-based experiment does not necessarily distinguish it itself from lab 
and field experiments. Many experiments already involve survey methods. However it can be 
a highly flexible population-based experimental design. This method draws on a 
representative sample and randomly assigns them to conditions by the researcher. An 
advantage of such a method is that the representative sample does not have to show up to a 
location – but can complete the experiment in a natural field setting.  This can enable the 
researcher to reach more of the population of interest especially if they live in hard to reach 
areas.  
Whilst there are tremendous benefits to experimentation, the traditional laboratory 
context is not always suitable for all types of research questions. Mutz (2011) argues that the 
emphasis on experimental versus survey methods reflects a field’s emphasis on internal 
versus external validity.  However Mutz (2011) continues that population-based survey 
experiments challenge us to expand our methodological repertoire. Survey based experiments 
have gained value amongst researchers as they maximize the internal validity of an 
experiment, thus overcoming some of the obstacles that conventional survey data presents in 
terms of drawing causal inference. In it enables researchers to establish external validity by 
administering the experiment to a representative population sample. As Harrison and List 
(2004) note however such artefactual experiments can be logistically difficult, as was found 
in this study. In addition it is difficult to conceal experimenter effects. 
The type of survey-based experiment that was employed in this Thesis can be 
described as a choice experiment. Choice experiments make use of stated preference data. 
Here respondents are asked to choose between different options with are identified by their 
attributes.  Through the repetition of choices and varying attribute levels some of the things 
that researchers can identify are which attributes significantly influence choice, and the 
implied ranking of attributes (Hanley, Wright, & Adamowicz, 1998). However the choice 
experiment method has also be scrutinized, with one concern being that of incentive 
compatibility. This relates to the ability of the survey-based experiment to elicit truthful 
responses from the respondent. When not enforced it can lead to hypothetical bias which is a 
weakness of in stated preference studies.  
One way that incentive compatibility can be addressed is by the addition of statements 
that stress the meaningfulness and real impact of the results of the survey. For instance 
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respondents can be told that the choices they make will help inform policy and/or will be 
made available to decision makers. This can give greater weighting to their responses, 
making the hypothetical nature of the choice a real world value (McCartney & Cleland, 2010) 
In addition there are a broader set of questions which arise with such choice 
experiments. For instance respondents when presented with choices may elicit extremeness 
aversion (Simonson & Tversky, 1992). Extremeness aversion runs counter to the assumption 
of independence of irrelevant alternatives, a core assumption in multinomial logit models, 
which states that the preference between choices are no dependent on the presence or absence 
of other options (Chernev, 2004).  Here respondents may compromise on a choice they 
perceive to be less extreme. Furthermore economic theory assumes an attribute of a good or 
service has an inherent value which will not vary with context and an individual’s established 
preferences. However status quo bias tells us that when presented with a choice, people may 
prefer what they already know even if the attributes of the new alternative are better 
(Kahneman, Knetsh, & Thanler, 1991; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988).  
6.2 SAMPLING STRATEGY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTS SURVEY 
CONSTRUCTION 
6.2.1  SAMPLING STRATEGY 
The survey and framed field experiment was collected between November 2012 and 
January 2013 in 5 different locations in Viti-Levu. As we saw in the previous section, Viti-
Levu is the main island system in Fiji and the most densely populated. It houses some of the 
countries more encroached upon protected areas and has had the greater human impact from 
climate variability in recent years.  The sample (n=205) was collected by the author with help 
from two research assistants. Respondents were incentivised with a F$5 participation reward. 
As the research is focused on advancing knowledge of vulnerable communities in the 
developing world, the choice of sampling strategy to correctly represent these communities 
was very important.  
The target population consisted of those living by forests, rivers, mangroves and 
coastal areas. Commencing with a simple random sample the author approached producers in 
the main markets of Nadi, Lautoka, Nausori and Suva. Producers selling their wares in these 
markets generally come down from the highlands or the coastal regions to sell their goods. 
This would have enabled a broader and more representative sample. It was found however 
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that each survey would take upwards of two hours to complete in the market as stall holders 
would stop the survey to sell their produce and to chat to friends. In addition market 
authorities became increasingly problematic, seeking money to allow the research to 
continue. As such the sampling strategy was adjusted to stratified sampling with the 
population being divided into geographical groups consisting of villages close to or within 
fragile ecosystems (Figure 6.1). The specified areas were Koroyanitu protected area and 
highlands, Coral Coast marine protected area, Navua, Nausori, the Rewa delta and Colo-i-
Suva reserve.  Within each strata respondents were randomly selected with a random number 
sheet. The author was accompanied by one of two research assistants to gain permission to 
talk to residents in Fijian villages. Permission was sought through a sevusevu (offering) of 
Piper Methysticum root, locally known as Kava root, which was presented to the village 
head. In addition the research assistant acted as a translator when necessary. 
FIGURE 6-1:VITI-LEVU ISLAND-SCAPE MAP - (BERGEN, 2010) 
 
6.2.2 SURVEY – PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTS 
The survey collected information on household social characteristic, health 
information, land ownership, crop production, marine activities, and dependencies on the 
natural systems, income sources, expenditure, microcredit activities and loan characteristics. 
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It also collected information on perceptions of social, economic and environmental problems 
facing the country, attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control and behavioural 
intention regarding conservation behaviour. The survey can be found in Appendix A. 
The psychological constructs of Attitudes Towards Conservation, Subjective Norms, 
Perceived Behavioural Control and Behavioural Intention, were informed by the theory of 
planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). The final scales omitting those items removed for internal 
consistency and reliability, consisted of a 9-item Attitudes Towards Conservation scale, a 9-
item Subjective Norms scale, a 5-item Perceived Behavioural Control scale, and a 3-item 
Behavioural Intention Scale  (α=.90). Each item was measured on a 5-point Likert scale. 
The decision to utilise a 5-point scale was based on findings from a pilot study of the 
survey and experiment with 10 respondents. It was found that Respondents struggled with 
items that included a 7-point scale compared to a 5-point scale. As each question was posed 
to respondents verbally it was found that they had greater difficulty in recalling the 
measurement attributes of the 7-point scale. As such all scales were converted to the 5-point 
format.   
According to Ajzen (1991) attitudes towards a behaviour consists of an individual’s 
favourable or unfavourable evaluation or appraisal of the behaviour in question. Ajzen (1991) 
suggests an expectancy-value model of attitudes. Here, attitudes take the form of:  
EQUATION 6-1 
         
where attitudes are proportional to the summative value of the strength of a salient 
belief multiplied by the subjective evaluation of the belief.  This method requires focus 
groups and extensive piloting to determine each item to be included within the scale. 
However with budgetary and time constraints this was not possible in the current study. The 
pilot study of 10 respondents was deemed as an insufficient sample size to determine beliefs 
of the total population of interest.  
Instead it was decided to extend the basis of existing scales to reflect attitudes towards 
environmental conservation rather than adding a wholly novel attitude measurement scale to 
an already saturated field of enquiry. For instance, Dunlap and Jones (2002) estimated over a 
decade ago that there were between 700 to 1000 published studies which measure various 
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aspects of environmental attitudes, but a large proportion of these did not employ pre-existing 
measures of environmental attitudes. This has resulted in a saturation of measurements which 
perhaps conceptualise the environment quite differently (Corbett, 2006). In addition, having 
such a volume of measures reflects theoretical uncertainty in regards to the concept of 
environmental concern (Stern, 1992).  
Considering this, a scale was created based on value orientations. Through his review 
of the literature, Stern (1992) identified four broad value orientations reflected within the 
various measurement instruments utilised in the study of environmental attitudes. These 
orientations need not be mutually exclusive and rather may be operating simultaneously. The 
first reflects a new way of thinking which arguably replaces the common anthropocentric 
conception of people’s relationship with nature. This value orientation is represented in the 
“New Environmental Paradigm” (NEP).  Developed by Dunlap and Van Liere (1978) the 
NEP introduces a new world view where cultural and societal processes act as the 
fundamental factor of peoples concern for the environment. The ensuing NEP Scale was 
designed to measure people’s endorsement of this new worldview.   
The NEP challenges the Dominant Social Paradigm which forms the second value 
orientation. The Dominant Social Paradigm involves anthropocentric altruism. In this 
orientation, the driving factor for people’s concern for the environment is their belief that 
environmental degradation threatens the health and well-being of people (Taylor, 2000). The 
third orientation can be defined as egoistic concern. Here, concern is guided by perceived 
personal threats posed by environmental deterioration. The last orientation identified by Stern 
(1992) is that of religious or ideological concern. In this orientation, concern is a function of 
deeper religious or cultural values which boarder on our metaphysical understanding of the 
world (Nickerson, 2012). Later, Gardner and Stern (1996) added a fifth orientation which 
they labeled ‘ecocentric’ in which environmental concern is for the sake of the ecosystem. 
This orientation however has not been shown to be distinct from that of anthropocentrism 
(Stern, Kalof , Dietz & Guagnano, 1995).  
Bearing this in mind the Attitudes towards Conservation scale was created by 
borrowing items from an existing NEP where appropriate and including items to reflect the 
Dominant Social Paradigm, egoistic concern and religious concern.  Each item was directed 
towards the behaviour of interest – environmental conservation. The items were as follows:  
A1 The forest/river is sacred 
A2 Taking care of the forest/river is important for future generations 
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A3 The forest/river should be used by men as they see fit 
A4 The forest/river does not belong to men – Omitted for internal consistency 
A5 It is my duty to protect the forest/river 
A6 I will not harm the forest/river species because they are protected 
A7 I would stop others from hunting/poaching the forest/river species 
 
The NEP items included were as follows:  
A8 The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset  
A9 The earth is like a ship floating in space with only limited room and resources  
A10 There are limits to economic growth even for developed countries  
 
The scale had good internal consistency as measured by Cronbach’s alpha (α=0.73).  
TABLE 6-1: ATTITUDES TOWARDS CONSERVATION - DESCRIPTIVES 
Attitudes Towards 
Conservation Mean Sd 
A1 3.240 1.069 
A2 4.340 0.886 
A3 2.770 1.062 
A5 4.160 0.872 
A6 3.730 0.935 
A7 3.460 0.921 
A8 3.320 1.073 
A9 3.350 1.104 
A10 3.270 1.010 
 
TABLE 6-2: ATTITUDES TOWARDS CONSERVATION - MATRIX OF CORRELATIONS 
Attitudes 
Towards 
Conservation A1 A2 A3 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
A1 1.000                 
A2 0.255 1.000               
A3 -0.072 -0.187 1.000             
A5 0.265 0.419 -0.199 1.000           
A6 0.118 0.307 -0.196 0.503 1.000         
A7 0.192 0.222 -0.022 0.350 0.434 1.000       
A8 0.339 0.333 -0.012 0.313 0.170 0.396 1.000     
A9 0.348 0.363 -0.102 0.223 0.192 0.121 0.355 1.000   
A10 0.140 0.226 -0.102 0.253 0.139 0.125 0.291 0.407 1.000 
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The Subjective Norm scale is more straightforward. It assesses an individual’s 
perception of the social pressure to perform a certain behaviour. The items in this scale were 
as follows:  
S1 My family finds it important to protect the forest/river 
S2 My community finds it important to protect the forest/river 
S3 Our neighboring communities find it important to protect the forest/river 
S4 The authorities (government) find it important to protect the forest/river 
S5 Our elders find it important to protect the forest/river 
S6 The young find it important to protect the forest/river 
S7 My family’s approval of my treatment of the forest/river is important to me 
S8 My communities approval of my treatment of the forest/river is important to me 
S9 The opinion of others outside my family/community on my use of the forest/river is 
important to me 
 
The scale show good internal consistency according to Cronbach’s Alpha (α=0.87) 
TABLE 6-3: SUBJECTIVE NORMS - DESCRIPTIVES 
Subjective 
Norms Mean Sd 
S1 4.020 0.910 
S2 3.840 0.931 
S3 3.710 0.956 
S4 3.740 1.102 
S5 4.090 1.055 
S6 3.410 1.275 
S7 3.710 0.925 
S8 3.620 0.908 
S9 3.460 0.957 
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TABLE 6-4: SUBJECTIVE NORMS - MATRIX OF CORRELATIONS 
Subjective 
Norms S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 
S1 1.000                 
S2 0.699 1.000               
S3 0.431 0.587 1.000             
S4 0.451 0.413 0.583 1.000           
S5 0.335 0.474 0.319 0.190 1.000         
S6 0.502 0.463 0.369 0.608 0.223 1.000       
S7 0.609 0.709 0.490 0.501 0.455 0.507 1.000     
S8 0.480 0.481 0.681 0.601 0.231 0.521 0.610 1.000   
S9 0.330 0.328 0.549 0.408 0.171 0.382 0.379 0.668 1.000 
 
The Perceived Behavioural Control scale includes efficacy to perform the specified 
behaviour and the amount of control one has over the behaviour. The scale items were as 
follows:  
P1 I feel I can control the upkeep of the forest/river 
P2 I do not feel like I have any control over how to use the forest/river positively – 
Omitted for internal consistency 
P3 It is easy to live in a way that does not hurt the forest/river 
P4 I do not feel that I have the ability to protect the forest/river 
P5 It is easy for me to look after the forest/river 
P6 It is too great a task to survive and care for the forest/river.  
 
The scale showed adequate internal consistency (α=0.61). 
TABLE 6-5: PERCEIVED BEHAVIOURAL CONTROL - DESCRIPTIVES 
Perceived Behavioural Control Mean Sd 
P1 3.320 1.016 
P3 3.170 1.031 
P5 3.040 1.009 
P4 3.107 1.004 
P6 2.700 0.942 
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TABLE 6-6: PERCEIVED BEHAVIOURAL CONTROL - MATRIX OF CORRELATIONS 
Perceived 
Behavioural 
Control P1 P3 P4 P5 P6 
P1 1.000         
P2 0.144 1.000       
P3 -0.020 -0.269 1.000     
P5 0.241 0.394 -0.299 1.000   
P6 -0.278 -0.255 0.117 -0.199 1.000 
 
Behavioural Intention measures the motivational factors influencing the uptake of a 
particular behaviour. It indicates the amount of effort one is willing to put into the adoption 
of a behaviour. The items followed the  structure suggested by Jillian and colleagues (2004) 
which displayed strong internal consistency. The items were:  
B1 I expect to respect and sustainably use the forest/river 
B2 I want to respect and sustainably use the forest/river 
B3 I intend to respect and sustainably use the forest/river  
 
The resulting scale showed excellent internal consistency (α=0.90). 
TABLE 6-7: BEHAVIOURAL INTENTION - DESCRIPTIVES 
Behavioural 
Intention Mean Sd 
B1 4.02 .852 
B2 4.07 .798 
B3 3.98 .888 
 
TABLE 6-8: BEHAVIOURAL INTENTION - MATRIX OF CORRELATIONS 
Behavioural 
Intention B1 B2 B3 
B1 1.000     
B2 0.770 1.000   
B3 0.701 0.750 1.000 
 
To summarize, the final scales omitting those items removed for internal consistency 
and reliability, consisted of a 9-item ATC scale (α=.73), a 9-item SN scale (α=.87) a 5-item 
PBC scale (α=.61) and a 3-item BI Scale (BI; α=.90). Each item was measured on a 5-point 
Likert scale. The scales items were reverse coded where appropriate and aggregated to create 
a summative scale.   
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In the following chapters you will find that the scales have been treated differently. In chapter 
3 the individual measures are used to inform appropriate latent variables. This is to done to 
see whether the use of the summative scale is appropriate for subsequent analysis. In 
chapters 3 through 6 the items are aggregated to create a summative scale which has then 
been coded into a categorical variable. 
 
When summated, the Attitudes towards Conservation Summative Scale resulted in 
scores which ranged from 17-44. Scores between 17-26 indicated negative attitudes towards 
conservation, 27-35 indicated neither strongly negative nor strongly positive attitudes 
towards conservation, and scores between 36-44 indicated strongly positive attitudes towards 
conservation. These scores were coded to create a categorical variable with three categories: 
1. Negative attitudes towards conservation,  
2. Neither strongly negative nor strongly positive attitudes towards conservation,  
3. Strongly positive attitudes towards conservation 
The Subjective Norm scale assessed an individual’s perception of relevant others 
expectations for them to perform certain adaptive behaviours. The scores ranged from 12-45 
with scores between 12-23 indicating low subjective norms, 24-34 indicating moderate levels 
of subjective norms, and scores between 35-45 indicating strong presence of subjective 
norms. These scores were coded to create a categorical variable with three categories: 
1. Low subjective norms (not influenced by others expectations) 
2. Moderate levels of subject norms  
3. Strong subjective norms (highly influenced by others expectations) 
The Perceived Behavioural Control scale included items assessing self-efficacy to 
behave adaptively and one’s perceptions of control over the behaviour. Scores ranged 
between 7-20. Low levels of perceived behavioural control were indicated by scores between 
7-11, medium levels of perceived behavioural control were indicated by scores between 12-
15, and high levels of perceived behavioural control were indicated by scores between 16-20. 
As with the other constructs, these scores were coded to create a categorical variable with 
three categories.  
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1. Weak perception of behavioural control 
2. Medium levels of perceived behavioural control 
3. High levels of perceived of behavioural control 
Behavioural Intention, one of the core concepts within the TPB measures the 
motivational factors influencing the uptake of a climate adaptive behaviour. It indicates the 
amount of effort one is willing to put into the adoption of a behaviour. Behavioural intention 
scores had a range of 3-15 and indicated intention to engage in subsequent climate change 
adaptation and conservation behaviour. Low intention scores were represented by values 
between 3-7, medium intention was indicated by scores between 8-11 and high intention to 
engage in the behaviour was indicated by scores between 12-15. The intention scale was 
converted into a categorical variable with three categories: 
1. Weak intention  
2. Medium intention 
3. Strong intention 
The items were constructed to ascertain peoples protective beliefs, norms, and 
intentions regarding the environment. They were used to ascertain people’s internal motives - 
to take up investments that were not only adaptive but also protective of natural ecosystems. 
The sustainable use of natural resources which the survey questions assess may be seen as 
divergent from the specificity argument of the Theory of Planned Behaviour – where we 
measure attitudes et al. towards a specific behaviour.  
However we argue that is exactly what we are doing in the ensuing experiment. 
Firstly, asking respondents about their attitudes towards investment behaviour would have 
been quite abstract. The different investment choices which will be introduced in the next 
section would each have an impact on the environment, with some being more sustainable 
then others. Thus investment choice acts as a proxy to the ‘end’ behaviour - the sustainable 
use and protection of the forest/river ecosystems. These were the natural ecosystems that 
were in proximity to the sampled population. In addition, this allowed us to control for 
response and acquiescence bias to a certain degree. If we asked questions relating to the 
intended use of the microloan for sustainable investments then during the choice experiment 
we risk diluting actual stated preference by artificially leading respondents to a choice. 
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We can break down the process of measuring stated behaviour as follows: 
 
 
6.3 SURVEY-BASED EXPERIMENT 
The survey-based experiment was carried out following the administration of the 
surveys. The experiment was designed to collect data on environmentally protective 
investment preferences. Specifically how these preferences were affected when faced with 
different microloan incentive structures which did or did not impose environmental 
conditions. The experiment is depicted in Figure 6.2 and can be found in Appendix D. 
 
 
 
 
 
Sustainable/environmentally protective behaviour reflected in investment choice 
Adaptive 
(Sustainable, and environmentally 
protective) 
Neutral 
Non-Adaptive 
(Not sustainble nor 
environmentally protective) 
Intentions 
the most proximal determinant behaviour and hypothesised to be  congruenent with 
our internal drivers 
Intrinsic drivers of sustainable and environmentally protective behaviours 
Attitudes towards 
conservation 
Subjective norms  
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 
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FIGURE 6-2: FRAMED FIELD EXPERIMENT HIGH LEVEL SUMMARY 
Experiment - High level summary   
   Note: the summary diagram below does not detail the concept of ecosystem effect 
   Incentive Type Investment Choice Loan Conditions 
There are two lending periods 
under each incentive type, thus 
respondents play two rounds of 
the experiment for each Incentive 
Type 
Respondents selects an Investment 
choice for each of the two lending 
periods 
Determined by and incentive type and investment choice 
   
No Incentive  
Adaptive  • Interest (“i”) = 20% 
Mixed • Loan maturity (“M”) = 8 months 
Non-Adaptive • Required principal repayment (“P”) =100%  
   Dynamic Incentive 
 i.e. missed payment ceases 
current loan so that further 
returns on the investment cannot 
be accrued for that loan period. 
Adaptive  • i = 20% 
Mixed • M = 8 months 
Non-Adaptive • P = 100% or $300 
   
Green Incentive 
Ecosystem effect impacts interest 
rate depending on Investment 
Choice (see column Loan 
Conditions) 
Adaptive  • i = 0% 
  • M = 8 months 
  • P = 90%  
  Mixed • i =24% 
  • M = 8 months 
  • P = 100%  
  Non-Adaptive • i = 25% 
  • M = 6 months 
  • P = 100%  
 
Respondents were randomly assigned into a control group and a treatment group. The 
treatment group consisted of talking respondents through a climate change information leaflet 
which is displayed in Appendix  B, whilst the control group received no such information.  
The experiment consisted of two “lending models”. These were: a) individual liability 
loans where the respondent was solely responsible for their loans followed by b) joint liability 
loans with mutual responsibility of outcomes. The joint liability scenarios were played out 
with the researcher who mimicked the loan choice of the respondent in the individual liability 
scenario.  
The joint liability scenario was initially to be played out between participants rather 
than with the researcher however we found this difficult to implement. In Fijian communities 
in particular, it is culturally frowned upon to talk about money, thus there was a reluctance of 
people to conduct the experiment together.  The solution at the time was for the researcher to 
play the role of the second borrower, mimicking the participant’s investment choice from the 
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individual liability scenario. However this was argued to be a shortsighted and ultimately 
flawed solution as it would be hard to look past the issue of response bias and observer bias. 
The participants could be playing off the researchers expectations, and the researcher in turn 
could be influencing the direction of the response. As such the joint liability scenario was 
omitted from the study. 
The experiment started by setting the scene. Respondents were asked to imagine 
themselves as a smallholder farmer with their plot being near the closest forest/river 
ecosystem in the region. They would be offered a microloan to invest in their farm.  
Respondents started the experiment with a hypothetical loan of F$300 with a flat 
interest rate of 20% on the principal. This loan could be used to invest in one of three 
agricultural strategies which are determined by their investment choice and was explained to 
them with the help of the information cards and mangrove and vertiver hedge leaflets in 
Appendix C. Investment choices are outlined in Figure 6.3.  
 The experiment was conducted three times with three different incentive types. The 
incentive types determine the loan conditions; these were: no incentive, dynamic incentive, 
and green incentives. Under each incentive type there were two lending periods – so 
respondents could borrow twice under each incentive. The reason for having two periods was 
to see whether there would be congruence between choices across periods.  
 Investment choice differed in riskiness of the returns, sustainability, and impact on 
ecosystems. The choices were: 
FIGURE 6-3: INVESTMENT CHOICE 
 
Adaptive Mixed Non-Adaptive
 • Vertiver hedges • Chemical fertilizer • Chemical fertilizer
 • Organic fertilizer • Resilient seedlings • Chemical pesticides
 • Resilient seedlings • Mangrove seedlings for • Resilient seedlings
 • Mangrove seedlings   mangrove restoration
   for compulsory 
   mangrove restoration
Good Season 120 225 300
Bad Season 120 75 0
6 (Good) 3 (Neutral) 0 (Bad)
Investment 
components
Investment Choice
Returns on Investment - Determined by Die Roll
Ecosystem Effects
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The method in which returns would be calculated would be affected by the incentive 
type and random climate attributes. The latter was divided into good and bad seasons and was 
determined by a die roll. A roll of 1, 2 or 3 represented a good season (for instance: good soil 
fertility from appropriate rainfall and optimal temperature for crop production). A roll of 4, 5 
or 6 represented a bad season (for instance: extreme climate events such as erratic rainfall, 
drought, and increased severity of flooding).  So for example, the respondent chooses a non-
adaptive investment. They roll the die and it falls on a 2. This tells them that it was a good 
season and they had a fruitful harvest which yielded them F$300 return on their investment. 
A number value was assigned to translate the impact that the investment choice will 
have on the ecosystem. A high value was a positive impact and a low value was a negative 
impact. The impact that investments would have on the ecosystem would inform the interest 
rate only under the green incentive condition. The information people were provided was 
limited to the information cards in Appendix C. 
The experiments were carried out on a decision sheet which was filled out by the 
researcher. An example for each different incentive type was carried out by the researcher to 
aid their understanding of the experiment.  The respondents were presented with a calculator 
so as to decrease mental burden and to enable them to decide on the best investment strategy 
and calculate repayments however these proved to be difficult for respondents as such the 
researcher and research assistants would state returns.   
The different incentives types were as follows: 
1. A control, No Incentive condition which imposed no restrictions on the borrower. 
Borrowers can take out a loan of F$300, with a flat interest rate of 20% on the principal 
with monthly repayments and a term of 8 months.  
2. A Dynamic Incentive condition where defaulting on any repayments during any 
collection period would cease the loan at that point. Traditionally dynamic incentives 
would limit future loans if a borrower were to default or via progressive lending 
increase/decrease the principal for future loans. As we were still interested in the 
subsequent investment choice, the method employed within this experimental model 
explores how people may react when they are faced with a potential loss of future 
income.  
3. A Green Incentive condition where the characteristic of your investment was taken into 
consideration. Steeper losses are attached to the mixed and non-adaptive investments 
when compared to the adaptive. In addition the adaptive investment introduces rewards in 
the form of  partial funding of the principal. We want to test whether monetary incentives, 
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as present in environmental mortgages and PES, could in fact crowd-out intrinsic 
motivation. The selection of the adaptive investment would result in a partially funded, 
interest free loan of which borrowers only have to pay back 90% of their principal 
amount (F$270). This funding is available to them for the services rendered in 
maintaining the ecosystem through sustainable agriculture practices and rehabilitating 
mangrove forests.  
 
The mixed and non-adaptive strategies would result in an increased interest rate and 
shorter repayment term depending on the ecosystem effect of the chosen investment. It is 
explained that this is because of the inherent risk in these investments and their potential 
effect on future productivity and is used as a way to show the consequence on the wider 
environment of the respondents chosen investment. The ecosystem effect was given the 
values 0 for negative effect, 3 for neither good nor bad, and 6 for good effect. The 
ecosystem effect  would determine the borrowers interest rate (i) and repayment duration:  
If  ecosystem effect=3 (mixed  investment), i=24%, Repayment Term= 8 months  
If ecosystem effect<3 (non-adaptive investment), i=25%, Repayment Term=6 months 
The following script informed respondents of why the interest rate would differ according 
to the impact of investments on ecosystems: 
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Vertiver hedges, mangroves and organic fertilisers are good for the ecosystem. They do 
not harm the forest/river but instead protect and regenerate it. They will also allow you to 
have longer term security and returns by for example helping the soil, and protecting 
against cyclones.  Because of the protective nature of these elements in the adaptive 
investment, and your role in the upkeep of mangroves you are awarded a partial grant. 
Chemical fertilizers and pesticides may increase yield in the short term but they can also 
contaminate water, and reduce soil health. It can also be dangerous for local flora and 
fauna and is riskier for your future returns during a bad season. Therefore interest rates 
are higher for those investments which use ‘chemical elements’ as they are ultimately 
riskier. 
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6.3.1 OUTCOME VARIABLE CODING 
The subsequent outcome variable for analysis was coded from 1 to 5, which combined 
the investment choices across the two collection periods. This coding represented all the 
possible combination of investments the respondent could have chosen. Below is a 
breakdown of what the coding meant: 
 
TABLE 6-9: MATRIX OF INVESTMENT CHOICES ACROSS THE TWO COLLECTION PERIODS 
 
Adaptive Mixed 
Non 
Adaptive 
Adaptive  1, 1 1, 2 1, 3 
Mixed 2, 1 2, 2 2, 3 
Non Adaptive 3, 1 3, 2 3, 3 
 
FIGURE 6-4: POSSIBLE INVESTMENT PORTFOLIOS 
 
 
 
 
• Score equivalent = 1 
• Composition of investment: Adaptive + Adaptive 
investment choice 
Adaptive portfolio 
• Score equivalent = 2 
• Composition of investment: Adaptive + Mixed 
investment choice 
Moderately adaptive portfolio 
• Score equivalent = 3 
• Composition of investment: Mixed + Mixed OR 
Adaptive + Non-Adaptive investment choice 
Mixed portfolio 
• Score equivalent = 4 
• Composition of investment: Mixed + Non-adaptive 
investment choice 
Moderately non-adaptive 
portfolio 
• Score equivalent = 5 
• Composition of investment: Non-adaptive + Non-
adaptive investment choice 
Non-adaptive portfolio 
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6.4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The survey and survey-based experiment was composed of a total of 205 residents 
living in or near six fragile ecosystems in Viti-Levu. 17 villages were sampled. The sample 
population consisted of 75.1% Fijians, 24.9% Indo-Fijians, 42.4% females and 57.6% males. 
The average respondent was 41.6 years old with a range with 19 and 83 years of age. On 
average, they lived in households consisting of five people and generally were the head of the 
household (50.7%). The main occupation was farming (45.9%), followed by fishing (31.7%) 
and the remainder (22.4%) of respondents were in other forms of employment. 35.61% of 
respondents earned between F$0 and less than F$10 a day. 50.2% earned between F$11 and 
F$20 a day and the remaining 14.1% earned over $21 a day. In terms of education, 2.9% of 
the sampled population had no schooling, 18.5% went through some primary school, 16.1% 
completed primary school, 31.7% went through some secondary schooling, 24.9% completed 
secondary school, 2% went through a literacy campaign and the remaining 3.9% were in or 
had completed tertiary education.  
Regarding access to microcredit, 20.49% of respondents had no access to microcredit. 
39.51% of respondents were microcredit participants. Only 14% of people sampled had 
access to insurance, whilst 45.36% had access to savings.  
TABLE 6-10: DESCRIPTIVES OF DEMOGRAPHIC AND CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES 
          Frequency   
  Mean Sd Min Max 0 1   
Access to Credit 0.717 0.444 0 1 124 81 0.395 
Current 
Microloan 0.200 0.405 0 1 163 42 0.205 
Access to 
Insurance 0.140 0.349 0 1 176 29 0.141 
Access to 
Savings 0.450 0.499 0 1 112 93 0.454 
Female 0.424 0.495 0 1 118 87 0.424 
FarmFish 0.776 0.418 0 1 46 159 0.776 
Fijian 0.751 0.433 0 1 51 154 0.751 
Chief 0.073 0.261 0 1 190 15 0.073 
Y<F$10 0.356 0.480 0 1 132 73 0.356 
Household Size 5.200 2.265 1 13       
Age 41.600 13.186 19 83       
Size of loan 159.024 574.374 0 5000 
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 People were on average spending the most on food and personal social obligations each 
month. However, the reluctance of people to talk about their monthly expenditure questions the 
validity of the expenditure data collected. 
TABLE 6-11: EXPENDITURE PER MONTH 
Expenditure/Month Mean sd Min Max 
Food 81.268 70.858 0 300 
Housing 
maintenance/building  
25.161 64.310 0 
500 
Personal social obligations  49.424 86.502 0 600 
Non-religious social 
obligations  
27.468 46.393 0 
350 
Religious obligations 37.244 46.833 0 228 
Farm/marine investments 29.068 38.777 0 250 
 
Of the 108 people who disclosed how prior and current loans were spent, the majority 
was on maintaining current livelihoods followed by consumption spending.  
TABLE 6-12: USE OF LOANS 
  
What was 
loan used 
for? Percent 
Social 9 4.390 
Infrastructure (water, toilets, etc) 15 7.317 
Alternative livelihoods 6 2.927 
Maintaining current livelihood 25 12.195 
Buying food 2 0.976 
Medical care 5 2.439 
Personal spending (clothes, household 
items etc.) 
18 8.780 
Education 11 5.366 
Repaying other loans 17 8.293 
Not disclosed/No loan 97 47.300 
Total 205 100 
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7 CLIMATE CHANGE PERCEPTION IN FIJI  
 
81
  
                                                             
81 Smallholder in Nausori 
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7.1 ABSTRACT 
Through guided interviews (N=50) of market stall holders in Viti-Levu, Fiji, this study 
asked: 
What are the local perceptions of climate change in Fiji? 
The results indicated that the majority of those interviewed linked climate change to   
changes in weather patterns (such as rising temperatures, and heavier rains). In addition they 
generally attributed it to men made causes and for the most part did not know how to cope 
with the consequences of climate change.  
7.2 PERCEPTIONS 
In chapter _ I had the opportunity to talk to small farmers in the Caribbean about 
climate change in 2015. The region was in the grips of a terrible drought and small farmers 
were struggling. In fact they were finding that each year it became more difficult to farm their 
lands and maintain their livelihoods. We had organised a meeting over skype which included 
different parties of interest. We had academics, policy makers, NGOs, and a group of small 
farmers. Some of the gaps I had identified in my own research were being repeated by the 
farmers and the policy makers.  
The farmers stated that there was a lack of awareness on the issue. Whilst the changes 
in the climate were evident the concept of climate change was little understood. The 
frustration was that when an informed farmer tried to instigate a measure to conserve water to 
adapt and their neighbour or other non-smallholders carried on like business as usual, it 
negatively impacted the informed farmer’s activity and also deterred them from future 
actions. They also mentioned that all the great research and ideas of how to adapt to the 
climate change were often not reaching the farmers. Policymakers also identified that there 
was a need to understand local perceptions and attitudes towards climate change and also on 
developing strategies to distribute adaptation measures beyond relying on external experts or 
aide. A value add of the current research is that it complements and enlarges the small body 
of existing research on climate change adaptation perceptions in SIDS by asking: 
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7.3 MENTAL MODELS 
In order to investigate barriers to behaviour it is important to also look at the 
perceptions of local people to climate change. Subjective perceptions of climate change are 
important in shaping our responses, thus a significant barrier to climate change adaptation is 
how we perceive the problem (Oskamp, 2000). If we hold erroneous mental models of what 
causes climate change then the responses we shape will be formulated to address that 
erroneous belief set. The concept of mental models was first put forth by Craik (1943), who 
postulated that we develop small scale representations of the world. It is suggested that these 
models exist in both long-term and working memory, with the latter drawing on the former to 
support reasoning, and to solve problems (Nersessian, 2002).  
Cognitive systems create models of the problem space and these mental models are 
used to interpret external realities whilst external social mechanisms in the form of social 
rules, are used to structure and order the environment –guiding choice and shaping political, 
economic and social systems. External social mechanisms align mental models such that 
people with shared cultural backgrounds will have convergent mental models. As such whilst 
lack of awareness is an impediment to adaptive behaviour, other cultural factors which shape 
our perceptions can also be detrimental (Denazau & North, 1994). For instance, in Fiji short-
term planning perspectives prevail, this hinders the adoption of adaptive behaviours which 
generally have long-term outcomes (Lata & Nunn, 2012).  
Within natural resource management, mental model mapping techniques have become 
popular as it reveals how stakeholders perceive natural resource systems to function and 
those things which they find important within the system (Jones et al, 2000). In Fiji, climate 
change is by no means an ignored subject. There are regular public service announcements on 
What are the local perceptions of climate change in Fiji? 
• Islanders are used to climate variability. In Fiji climate has always been very 
variable but the severity of extreme events has been increasing in the last decade. 
As such we would expect that people are aware of changes in weather but perhaps 
link it to natural rather than anthropogenic processes.  
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the radio talking of climate change, and encouraging adaptation. Fijian village signs are 
emblazoned with their disaster preparedness status whilst billboards extol the virtues of 
conservation and the dangers of burning garbage (an extremely widespread and regular 
activity even in the main centre of Suva). However whether such messages have an effect is 
not clear. As the socio-cultural aspects of SIDS can influence the understanding of and 
subsequent actions relating to climate change (Basher, 2000), for those designing climate-
related policies and communications, understanding subjective perceptions to climate change 
is important.  
7.4 METHOD 
7.4.1 GENERAL INTERVIEW GUIDE APPROACH 
Interviews were conducted in English and Hindi. The guided questions were as 
follows: 1) Do you know what climate change is? 2) What do you think is its cause? 3) How 
does it affect you? 4) What can we do? 5) What help do you need? 6) Can you tell me a bit 
about changes you are seeing in the forests and the sea? For the majority, interviews lasted 
between 20 to 30 minutes. The interviews were recorded through the collection of detailed 
notes during and immediately after each interview. It was decided against using a tape 
recorder as it was evident that it made informants uncomfortable.  
The sample was composed of a total of 50 market stall holders. The markets were: 
Namaka market in Nadi (N=5), Nadi Market (N=15), Suva Municipal Market (N=15), and 
Nausori Market (N=15). Respondents were selected by random sampling which was 
generated through excel. The sample consisted of 23 (46%) Fijians, 21 (42%) Indo-Fijians 
and 6 (12%) other Pacific Islanders. Informants had an average age of 41.02 with a range 
between 17 and 74. The majority of informants were female, 28 (56%). Informants came 
from different provinces, with Yasawa’s and Nausori (10, 20% each) being most represented 
followed by Nadi and Suva (7, 14% each), and Lautoka and Ba (5, 10% each). Notes from 
each interview was collated in excel and dominant themes were coded.  Frequency and 
percentage tables were created to assess the most dominant themes for each question. 
Frequency distributions and percentages for each conservation point do not sum to the total 
number of informants as multiple themes could arise for each conversation point. 
When asked whether informants knew what climate change was (Figure 7.1), the 
dominant response was: a change in weather (28, 56%) with one informant commenting: 
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“lots of rain and then no rain”, and another answering: “change in weather, more floods now, 
more drought. And cyclone!” This was followed by greenhouse gases and global warming (7, 
14%) with one informant responding: “GHG. It's all chemistry...chemical reactions in the 
sky”. The third most common theme was the concept of ozone (4, 8%), and heat (4, 8%) with 
informants responding:  “It’s very hot, makes people lazy”, “Ozone and not enough water - 
sunlight absorbs lots of water and the weather is not suitable for crops”. Only three (6%) 
informants were unsure of what climate change was and would not hazard a guess.  
FIGURE 7-1: THEMES RELATING TO KNOWLEDGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
The main theme that arose when asked the cause of climate change (Figure 7.2) was 
pollution (14, 28%; “Pollution, too much rubbish in the sea...you see it all comes in with the 
tide. All sorts of things!”). This was followed by not knowing the cause (9, 18%) and in equal 
levels: GHG (“Carbon and the other GHG”), God (“God because we are in Kalyug {Hindu 
cosmic developmental stage}, everything is bad”) and people (“People... people don't care. 
They've forgotten how to live with the land. It's not everyone but especially in the cities. You 
see. {Gestures around} They build all this then forget.”; 7, 14% each). 
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FIGURE 7-2: THEMES RELATING TO SOURCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
The main theme arising when asked of the effect climate change had (Figure 7.3) was 
extreme weather (22, 44%) and crop failure (13, 26%) as demonstrated by one informant: 
“Big problem! Sugarcane is too wet. We have less [produce]. Things don't grow as well, 
Cassava didn't grow because of floods”. This was followed by sickness (7, 14%; “crops and 
animals getting sick.”, though human illness was attributed to climate change too, 
“disease...cancer”) and marine health (5, 10%; “fish catch is small, very hard”). 
FIGURE 7-3: EFFECT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON INDIVIDUALS 
 
When asked what actions could be taken to counteract these effects (Figure 7.4) the 
main theme was to pray (9, 18%; “Pray”), followed by uncertainty (8, 16%; “Don’t know!”), 
and resignation (6, 12% “What are you going to do? Other countries should look after smaller 
ones. Love is most important”, “Can’t do anything”). 
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FIGURE 7-4:ACTIONS TO COUNTERACT NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
Finally, advice, education, and awareness (15, 30%; “education should be ongoing, 
not limited to schools”) were the dominant themes that arose when asked what help could be 
provided to face the challenges of climate change (Figure 7.5).  Followed by government aid 
(9,18%; “Government aid for agriculture, need seeds and fertiliser”), praying (8, 16%; “Just 
pray”) and financial aid (7, 14%; “Advice, financial help for better nets and boats”). 
FIGURE 7-5: RESOURCES NEEDED TO TAKE ACTION 
 
7.5 DISCUSSION 
For island ecosystems climate variability is normal, and this is particularly true in the 
South Pacific. The effects of El Niño and La Niña results in high levels of natural variability 
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in climate related phenomena in this region. Natural climate change is thus a common 
occurrence. Adaptation to such variability is evident in the rich tapestry of traditional 
ecological knowledge within the region (McNamara & Prasad, 2014).  As such anthropogenic 
climate change would have been expected to be perceived as a fact of life in the islands. What 
we found was that the majority of those interviewed related climate change to a change in 
weather and for the most part attributed it to men made causes. The concept of a change in 
weather was linked to their direct experiences with more volatile and extreme weather events 
in Fiji and the effect it had on their livelihoods. This is not dissimilar to perceptions held by 
other Pacific Island communities (Australian Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO, 2011; 
Rasmussen et al, 2009).  
That informants for the most part attributed climate change to anthropogenic causes is 
indication that climate variability was seen to deviate from the natural climatic oscillations. 
This deviation was shown to affect the ability of informants to adapt to climate change. For 
instance, when asked what actions could be taken to ameliorate the impacts of climate 
change, major themes which emerged were a sense of helplessness and uncertainty. Prayer in 
particular was cited predominantly by those who saw climate change as caused by God. As 
such one can argue that prayer can be seen as a logical coping strategy and a common one for 
people who share similar beliefs regarding the origin of climate change (King, Snipper & 
Tawhai, 2008; Kaundjua, Angula & Angombe, 2012).  In a study looking at perceptions 
towards climate change around the world, Wolf and Moser (2011) found that Fijian’s and 
Indo-Fijian’s alike had a greater tendency to attribute climate change to their religious beliefs.  
It could be that when faced with anthropogenic climate change, informant’s coping 
appraisal of their ability to engage in adaptive behaviour was constrained by response 
options. This is reflected in the main themes which arose when asked about the type of 
assistance they would require to adapt. Constructive assistance in the form of education, 
government and financial aid, new seedlings and better fertilisers were often cited. Education, 
advice and awareness in particular arose as the dominant themes and as such the lack thereof 
can be seen as a barrier to engaging in climate adaptive behaviours. In terms of policy, when 
people are unable to understand the basis of proposed policies as it conflicts with their held 
mental models, then support for and adoption of policies will be limited. If however policies 
and initiative are tailored to work around shared mental models then you have greater chance 
of success (Sterman, 2008).  The study revealed that mental models of climate change did 
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suffer some misconceptions. These flawed mental models would restrict the ability to elicit 
effective coping strategies.  
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8 COGNITIVE DRIVERS, AND THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION ON 
STATED CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTIVE INVESTMENT 
BEHAVIOUR 
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 Dalo and Kumara vendor at ‘Nadi Central’ market. 
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8.1 ABSTRACT 
Using a survey and survey-based experiment (N=205), this study asked: a)What are 
the cognitive antecedents of stated  climate change adaptive microloan investment behaviour 
for people living in or near fragile ecosystems through the framework of the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour (TPB); b) What is the effect of information on stated adaptive investment 
behaviour. Using path analysis and Structural Equation Modelling, we found support for the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour. Attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control 
moderated intention which in turn mediated behaviour. The difference in investment choice 
between those who did and those who did not receive climate change and conservation 
information was not significantly different however we found that the correlation between 
intention and behaviour was only found to be significant in the presence of information. In 
addition for those in receipt of information, intention accounted for a greater amount of 
variance than in the absence of information. The interaction between information and the 
antecedents of behaviour does lend to interesting discussion. 
8.2 INTRODUCTION 
Small island states represent areas with the highest vulnerability and lowest adaptive 
capacity to climate change (Nance et al, 2014). These nations, built on fragile ecosystems, 
account for less than 1% of global GHG emissions and yet they must suffer the full brunt of 
the consequences elicited by anthropogenic climate change. There is an array of Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS) resting in the most threatened of the World’s 34 biodiversity 
hotspots (Brooks et al, 2002; Watling, 2011). Fiji compromises one of these SIDS.  Fiji and 
other SIDS are facing an uphill battle against the impact of climate change (Australian 
Bureau of Meteorology & CSIRO, 2011).
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 In Fiji, for Viti Levu alone, it is estimated that 
climate related disasters can incur a cost equivalent to between two and four percent of Fiji’s 
GDP by 2050, whilst for other SIDS the costs are far greater (Bettencourt, 2011). 
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 As we saw in the previous chapter, Fiji’s ecosystems are also faced with the anthropogenic 
threats of over-harvesting, pollution and conversion to alternative uses which largely relate to 
agriculture and tourism. Between 1992 and 2007 alone Fiji had lost 70,000 hectares of forest 
cover (Lees, 2007). Loss of mangroves, corals and natural forests would not just impact its 
main industries of tourism and agriculture but through the loss of biodiversity, the 
archipelago’s overall health is threatened and with it people’s livelihoods (Pelling & Uitto, 
2001). 
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Accordingly, SIDS are urgently in need of cost-effective and novel solutions to engage its 
communities to take up climate adaptive behaviours.   
This chapter aims to analyze the broader set of motives that shape people’s adaptive 
investment decision under a novel microlending context.  It does so through a survey-based 
choice experiment which was preceded by a survey of psychological measures. The study 
attempted to broaden the notion of the rational economic agent by employing one of the most 
used socio-psychological theories in the study of behaviour, the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(TPB). The survey-based experiment randomly assigned people living in or near fragile 
ecosystems in the island of Viti-Levu in Fiji into a treatment and control group and presented 
them with a microloan to invest in a choice of smallholder farming practices which varied in 
its level of adaptation. The treatment group was designed to test whether the provision of 
climate change information was a determining factor in the uptake of adaptive investments. It 
consisted of the provision of an information leaflet on the cause, local effects, and adaptive 
solutions to climate change. By focusing on motivations behind stated behaviour through the 
framework of the established Theory of Planned Behaviour, this paper offers a new 
perspective on microlending to finance climate adaptive behaviours. This can be of great 
utility to the development of new initiatives which hope to instigate behavioural change. 
Climate change adaptation in smallholders is a policy challenge, and one that will only be 
resolved by persuading people to change their behaviour. Indeed Sanderson (2002) has 
argued that for sound policy making a theory-based evaluation is essential. Examining the 
motivations behind behaviour, enables us to understand the processes which may 
subsequently influence behaviour.  
For example, say you want to encourage people in SIDS to grow and eat local foods 
to enhance food security and curb high food import bills. How do you shift people away from 
export diets? If you knew what people’s attitudes were towards local foods, whether referent 
others influenced their choice of food, whether they felt like they had any control of what 
they ate (because they do not cook or food prices are high) then you could understand what 
sorts of initiatives need to be designed to persuade people to grow and eat local foods.  
Information provision has been a tool used by policy makers to persuade people to 
adapt their behaviour but why is it important to see how information may interact with 
intrinsic motivations? According to Nickerson (1998) people tend to seek information that 
they consider supportive of favoured hypotheses or existing beliefs. They interpret the receipt 
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of information in ways that are biased to those hypotheses or beliefs.  He also finds that 
people will steer away from seeking, perhaps even avoiding, information that would be 
considered counterindicative to their held beliefs, and may even look for information that is 
instead supportive of alternative possibilities. To illustrate, let us imagine a climate change 
denier. He has a wealth of scientific and highly verified information on the fact of 
anthropogenic climate change, but he holds a mental model which is not congruent to this 
belief, and thus seeks evidence to the contrary to support his hypothesis.  So if you have a 
climate change adaptation strategy that involves the dissemination of information – it would 
be useful to not only ascertain whether it will have an impact on people, but also whether it is 
correlated with our intrinsic set of motives.   
We argue that by better understanding those factors which determine the behavioural 
outcomes under scrutiny, there is potential for the research to inform the more technocratic 
side of policy formation through informing targeted policy instruments. So by examining 
how certain behaviours can be achieved research such as this can contribute to closing that 
gap between the theory and practice of policy making (Nye Jr, 2008).  
As we have seen, novel financing methods are being developed to bridge capital from 
microloans to the local and global value of intact environmental resources to facilitate 
environmental stewardship. Methods include Wetland Internationals’ Bio-Rights model 
which effectively collateralizes intact ecosystems (van Eijk, & Kumar, 2009), integrated 
conservation and development programmes (Herrold-Menzies, 2006), integrated 
microfinance and Payments for Ecosystem Services projects (Forcella, 2011), and microloans 
for green technologies such as renewable energy (Wimmer, 2014). Considering that climate 
change adaptation and environmental conservation are underfunded (Gichira, Agwata & 
Muigua, 2014; Le Saout et al, 2013) cost effective initiatives such as the provision of 
information alongside the tools to engage in adaptive behaviour through microloans could 
potentially enable positive behavioural change. Depending on the type of information 
provided, it can aid in building adaptive capacity (Neil Adger, Arnell & Tompkins, 2005).  
According to Knowledge-deficit theory an increase in knowledge will lead to a change in 
behaviour (Shultz, 2002). Di Falco, Veronesi and Yesuf (2011), in a study that looked at the 
impact of climatic variables on a farmer’s decision to adapt found, and other variables that 
influence adaptive decisions – these variables included information from various sources and 
access to credit amongst others. They found that better informed farmers in the Nile Basin of 
Ethiopia had a greater probability to adapt to climate change as they placed less value on the 
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option to postpone adaptation. In addition, they also found that farm households with access 
to credit had a greater probability to take up climate adaptive strategies. This effect of 
information and credit access on farmers adaption decisions has been supported by others as 
well (Deressa, et al, 2009; Nhemachena & Hassan, 2007; Apata, Samuel, & Adeola, 2009). 
These studies hint that information, and microloans can be useful instruments to enable more 
prolific adoption of adaptation measures. 
Prompting environmental stewardship through such tools can greatly benefit from 
psychological perspectives of behaviour. Such a perspective can inform best practice and 
induce greater behavioural adoption by better visualising the drivers of behaviour. To the best 
of the author’s knowledge, previous research has not examined the cognitive drivers of 
climate adaptive microloan investment behaviours nor what role information plays in such 
decisions. Accordingly, we apply the conceptual framework of the theory of planned 
behaviour to explore the implications of cognitive characteristics on people’s decisions to 
adapt to climate change using a novel survey-based experiment. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge this is the first study employing an experimental procedure to assess the effect of 
information on the adoption of adaptive investments, and the first experimental study 
specifically looking at the cognitive drivers of microloan investment choice.  
8.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Bénabou and Tirole (2006) model individual choice through intrinsic, extrinsic and 
reputational motivations. Experimental games and empirical studies have demonstrated 
individual’s propensity to behave in a pro-social and fair manner (Kahneman, Knetsch & 
Thaler, 1986; Gowdy, 2008), a shift away from the classical notion of behaviour as governed 
by purely selfish motivations and a step into Homo reciprocans or reciprocal fairness 
reasoning (Bowles et al, 1997).  
Bénabou and Tirole (2003a) note that people face significant uncertainty regarding 
the costs and payoffs associated with their actions. The decision to engage in behaviour 
hinges on the individual’s self-confidence in her ability to engage in the action.  Imperfect-
information regarding one’s own ability is thus a factor in deciding whether to pursue a task 
with short-term costs and long-run payoffs. This holds particular poignancy when looking at 
climate change adaptation and more specifically when looking at the investment options 
presented by the microloan scheme in this paper as there is uncertainty around pay-offs.  In 
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their motivation-based theory they present a two person framework with an agent, and a 
principal who benefits from the agents performance. It is in the interest of the principal (in 
our case the lending organisation) to encourage self-confidence in the agent. The reason for 
this is because self-confidence in one’s ability will enhance the perceived expected return 
from effort (Bénabou & Tirole, 2003a). They note that in the absence of objective 
information on deep preferences (such as loyalty or faith) people can be affected by 
manipulations of salience such as reminders of personal responsibility, or information cues. 
They also note though that our self-knowledge is history dependent – when we are in a novel 
situation we look back at our prior actions in similar scenarios and obtain confidence from 
them (Bénabou & Tirole, 2006). This also depends on our disposition. For instance, over 
confident individuals with time inconsistent preferences have more at stake when they face the 
decision of learning the truth about themselves than more pessimistic agents, and as such they 
may avoid information which is detrimental to their self-belief (Zambrano, 2011).  
Bénabou and Tirole borrow from psychology to broaden the ‘Homo Economicus’ 
paradigm (Bénabou & Tirole, 2003a). Theories such as the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(TPB) can be of be additive to the understanding of motivations behind behaviour, by 
enabling us to understand peoples held belief structures. The TPB (Figure 8.1) is a rational 
choice-based model wherein one’s decisions are assumed to be grounded in subjective utility 
and cost-benefit rationality (Hübner & Kaiser, 2006). The TPB provides a model of human 
action and predicts the occurrence of a specific behaviour provided that it is intentional. It 
states that the constructs of attitudes towards the behaviour, subjective norms and perceived 
behavioural control will lead to intention to perform the said behaviour. Behavioural 
intention is in turn seen as the primary antecedent of volitional behaviour. This has been 
supported in meta-analytical reviews (Armitage & Conner, 2001; Ajzen, 2002).   
FIGURE 8-1: THE THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOUR 
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Within the TPB, attitudes refer to the positive or negative evaluation of the behaviour 
in question (Ajzen, 1991). Attitudes are determined by the total set of accessible behavioural 
beliefs linking the behaviour to various outcomes and internal accord. Subjective norms refer 
to the perceived social pressure to perform or avoid a particular behaviour. It includes 
normative beliefs which concern the perceived probability that important referent individuals 
or groups will approve or reject a given behaviour and one’s motivation to comply to referent 
others. Perceived behavioural control refers to the perceived ease or difficulty of performing 
the behaviour in question and is similar to the concept of self efficacy. It reflects past 
experiences and future impediments to behaviour.  The model requires the constructs within 
it to adhere to the principle of compatibility, wherein each construct is measured at the same 
level of specificity (for instance in looking at conservation behaviour one would need to 
assess attitudes, control perceptions, and subjective norms regarding the particular 
conservation behaviour of interest).   
The importance of the various constructs of the TPB has been shown to differ when 
looking at different target variables. For instance in a study looking at transferium (i.e. park 
and ride) use, De Groot and Steg (2007), found attitudes were the best predictor of intention,  
followed by perceived behavioural control and subjective norms. In contrast Godin and Kok 
(1996), in a review of the application of the TPB to health related behaviours, found that 
attitudes and perceived behavioural control were most often the best predictors of behavioural 
intention. They also found support for intention being the most proximal determinate of 
behaviour whilst half the studies in their sample also showed that perceived behavioural 
control directly influenced behaviour. In a study looking at household recycling, Terry, Hogg, 
and White (1999) found that people who identified less with a group (in this case their 
neighbourhood community), had a stronger relationship between perceived behavioural 
control and intention. Whilst for people who identified strongly with a group, subjective 
norms were a greater predictor of behavioural intention.  
One of the draws of the TPB in regards to environmental behaviour is in the 
incorporation of influences beyond one’s control. This assumes: 1) the predicted behaviour 
must partly be beyond volitional control and 2) how one perceives control should reflect 
actual behavioural control. Whilst the latter assumption has been contested as a flaw within 
the theory, the former fits well within the ecological domain (Kaiser, Wolfing & Fuhrer, 
1999). The theory has been applied widely to specific environmental behaviours such as 
recycling (Tonglet, Philips & Read, 2004; Nigbur, Lyons & Uzzell, 2010; Cheung, Chan & 
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Wong, 1999) conservation technology adoption (Lynne, Franklin Casey, Hodges & Rahmani, 
1995; Lam, 2006) and environmental activism (Fielding, McDonald, & Louis, 2008) – these 
studies have had mixed results when considering the strength of the moderating variables 
however generally it is found that intention is a strong predictor of behaviour. The TPB   has 
had some limited application in the Global South, where it has been used to probe the use of 
health protective behaviours such as condom use (Schaalma et al, 2009; Molla, Astrom & 
Brehane, 2007, Bryan, Kagee, & Broaddus, 2006). 
Recently studies have applied the TPB to various aspects of micro-banking. For 
instance Nance (2013) looked at microfinance tourism, whereby tourists invest in micro-
entrepreneurs or microfinance organisations. She applied the TPB to understand the 
investor’s perspective in continued investment following the end of their vacation. She found 
perceived behavioural control and attitudes to be strong predictors of investment intention. 
Jebarajakirthy and Lobo (2014) applied the TPB to youth’s intentions of seeking microloans 
in post-conflict zones in Sri-Lanka. They found that whilst positive attitudes and subjective 
norms improved behavioural intention, perceived behavioural control and knowledge of 
microloans did not. Ferdous & Polonsky (2013) on the other hand applied the TPB to 
understand ethical selling intention of financial salespeople in Bangladesh. They found that 
attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control influenced intention which in 
turn predicted behaviours; however perceived behavioural control did not directly influence 
behaviour. To the best of the authors’ knowledge no study has yet applied the TPB to 
investigate climate adaptive investment behaviour. For such a prolific development tool, 
relatively little is understood about the cognitive drivers behind microloan investment 
behaviours. So here we try to rectify that by asking two things: 
 
What are the antecedents of stated adaptive investment behaviour? 
• According to the Theory of Planned Behaviour, positive subjective norms, attitudes and 
perceived behavioural control will lead to positive intention to perform a behaviour.  
• As such we hypothesis that positive set of intrinsic motives would be reflected in 
positive intentions to conserve and protect natural ecosystems. 
• As intention is the most proximal determinant of behaviour – we hypothesis that  
positive intentions will increase the probability of choosing adaptive over non-adaptive 
investments.   
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8.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research used the methodology described in the methods section. Here we only 
looked at the no incentive lending condition, the summated and coded psychological 
constructs of attitudes towards conservation, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control, 
and behavioural intention as well as the individual indicators for each of the summated 
variables.   
8.5 EMPIRICAL METHOD 
The analysis method consisted of two subsets of Structural Equation Modelling 
(SEM). Such modelling utilises a series of statistical methods (such as Analysis of Variance, 
regression, and factor analysis) to investigate complex relationships between multivariate 
data.  This type of modelling has two components, a structural model and a measurement 
model. The measurement model is a Confirmatory Factor Analysis which estimates a 
continuous latent variable based on observed indicator variables. Once the factorial structure 
of the underlying constructs is validated the relationships between latent variables and other 
factors is examined. This forms the structural component.  
One of the main features of SEM is to compare the model to empirical data 
(Nachtigall et al, 2003). The ensuing comparison results in fit-statistics which enables as to 
assess how well the model and data match.  An acceptable fit statistic tells us that the 
assumed relationships between latent and observed variables – which form the measurement 
model – and those between the various latent variables – which form the structural model - 
are supported by the data. The fit statistics are often the main component that is reported in 
What is the effect of information on stated climate change adaptative investment 
Behaviour?  
• According to knowledge deficit theory access to information will allow people to 
make better informed choices - therefore providing information on the benefits of 
adaptive behaviour should be reflected in more adaptive stated behaviour. Thus our 
hypothesis is that infromation will  increase the probability of choosing adaptive 
investments. 
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the interpretation of results. In addition SEM is generally represented graphically rather than 
through equations.  
The first method used in this study is path analysis. In SEM, the causal relationships 
among unobserved latent variables are defined by a set of equations. In path analysis causal 
relationships amongst observed variable are defined instead. The second method was a full 
SEM. This latter was employed to assess whether the use of composite scores is appropriate. 
With the small sample size as models became more complex in subsequent chapters, the use 
of more complex methods in the SEM toolkit would suffer the same constraints of more 
typical analysis methods such as Multinomial logistic regression – namely the rule of 10 – 
which recommends 10 cases per variable (Westland, 2010; Starkweather & Moske, 2011).   
The software used was MPlus version 6 software (Muthen & Muthen, 2011) as it is 
one of the few packages that can handle categorical data in Structural Equation Modeling. 
The main assumptions of such models are: a theoretical basis for model specification, a 
reasonable sample size (N=200), complete data, continuous and normally distributed 
endogenous variables. However with categorical data MPlus uses the Means and Variances 
Weighted Least Square Estimator (WLSMV) which does not make any distributional 
assumption regarding the independent variable vectors and can handle correlated errors 
(Muthen, 1983). It has been shown to be a robust estimator for categorical data (Brown, 
2006).  
This kind of analysis is popular in the social sciences.  It can model complex and 
multivariate relationships simultaneously, and fit two or more groups. It is the only linear 
analysis method that allows us to for the complete and simultaneous test of all relationships. 
It is important to remember though that this type of analysis is a confirmatory technique to 
test theory. It does not imply causality.  
However it has been argued that it can be hard to interpret (Nachtigall et al, 2003). In 
the case of categorical data, when using the WLSMV estimator categorical outcomes are 
probit coefficients and the sign and significance is reported. However predicted probabilities 
can be calculated for probit probabilities and is shown in equation 2 and 4.  
For this study, to test the hypothesis that intentions are more likely to be enacted if 
they have been supplemented with climate change adaptation and conservation information, a 
simultaneous multigroup analysis with clustering at the village level, was specified for the 
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path model and the SEM. The antecedents of behaviour were examined through the 
theoretical framework of the Theory of Planned Behaviour. As with the study of any 
behaviour, by dissecting the antecedents to behaviour one can ultimately design better 
initiatives to facilitate behavioural change.  
The equations for the Path Analysis can be written as follows: 
EQUATION 8-1 
                     
                               
                                       
                 
                                                          
       
Predicted probabilities can be calculated by the following equation: 
EQUATION 8-2 
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EQUATION 8-3 
The Structural Equation Model is represented by the following equation: 
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Where η is a vector of endogenous latent variables, y is the endogenous indicators, x is the 
exogenous manifest variables, u is the outcome variable, v is a vector of measurement 
intercepts, Λ is a matrix of factor loadings, α is a vector of latent intercepts, B is a matrix of 
the latent variable coefficients, Γ  is a matrix of exogenous variable regression coefficients, γ 
is the exogenous latent variable regression coefficients, ξ is a vector of exogenous latent 
variables, β is the regression coefficients for the exogenous and endogenous latent variables 
on the outcome variable and ε, δ, ϵ, and ζ are error terms .   
Thus: 
EQUATION 8-4 
                   
                
                                     
                                   
                       
                            
                                         
Where B1-3, A1-10, S1-9, P1-6 are the scale items described in chapter 6 for the latent constructs. 
The conditional probability of u=1 response given the factor    and the covariate is given by: 
EQUATION 8-5 
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8.6 RESULTS 
8.6.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
To allow for more direct comparison with the data, scale items were coded 1-3, with 1 being 
negative, 2 moderate, and 3 being positive. Looking at the descriptive statistics we see that people 
generally had moderate attitudes (M=2.102, SD=0.637), whilst subjective norms (M=2.439, 
SD=0.620) and behavioural intention ( M=2.771, SD=0.455) tended towards positive. Perceived 
behavioural intention (M=1.776, SD=0.601) was found to be negative to moderate. The item 
correlations was weak for subjective norms and perceived behavioural control and moderate between 
the remaining variables. 
TABLE 8-1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS 
          Frequency 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 
Attitudes Towards 
Conservation 2.102 0.637 1 3 32 120 53 
Subjective Norms 2.439 0.620 1 3 14 87 104 
Perceived Behavioural Control 1.776 0.601 1 3 65 121 19 
Behavioural Intention 2.771 0.455 1 3 3 41 161 
 
Variable 
Attitudes 
Towards 
Conservation 
Subjective 
Norms 
Perceived 
Behavioural 
Control 
Behavioural 
Intention 
Attitudes Towards 
Conservation 1.000         
Subjective Norms 0.332 1.000       
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 0.355 0.082 1.000     
Behavioural Intention 0.318 0.341 0.295 1.000   
Looking at the difference in investment choice between the control and treatment 
groups, the likelihood ratio Chi Square (χ2 (4, N=205) =6.27, p=0.148) revealed that the 
treatment and control group was not significantly different from each other in the no 
incentive condition which was examined here. However in the subsequent analysis we see 
that two groups do differ in regards to behavioural intention. 
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FIGURE 8-2: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF INVESTMENT CHOICE 
 
 
8.6.2 MULTI-GROUP PATH ANALYSIS WITH WLSMV ESTIMATOR 
Analysis across groups was run simultaneously. The path diagram for the treatment 
and control groups are represented in figures 8.3, and 8.4 respectively. Model fit indexes 
were selected according to Hu and Bentler’s (1999) two-index presentation strategy. We have 
included the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), an absolute measure of 
fit which tells us how well the model, with unknown but optimally chosen parameter 
estimates would fit the population’s covariance matrix – thus it tests a null hypothesis of poor 
fit. The second is an incremental fit index, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI). The CFI assumes 
that all latent variables are uncorrelated, comparing the sample covariance matrix with this 
null model.  It tells us the percentage of covariation in the data that can be explained by the 
specified model. According to Hooper, Coughlan & Mullen (2008) a CFI greater than 0.95, 
and a RMSEA less than 0.06 would provide good fit.  
Without constraining the direct effect of perceived behavioural control to behaviour 
the model resulted in very poor fit (Path Model: RMSEA=0.122; CFI=0.636. As such a linear 
constrain was added so that perceived behavioural control equalled 0. 
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The ensuing overall path model showed excellent fit indicating that the data supported 
the theoretical model (RMSEA=0.044, CFI=1).   
We see across both models and groups that the constructs of the TPB were upheld. 
Positive attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control were correlated with 
positive behavioural intention. Intention, which is hypothesized to be the most proximal 
determinate of behaviour, only significantly predicted subsequent stated behaviour in the 
group that received climate change information, with the predicted probability of choosing 
adaptive investments being 0.502 (Table 8.2) compared to 0.226 in the control group (Table 
8.3) when behavioural intention was positive. The difference between choosing adaptive and 
non-adaptive loans was greater in the treatment group (diff=0.435) then the control 
(diff=0.952).  
With positive behavioural intention the probability of choosing the moderately 
adaptive or mixed portfolios was 0.827 and 0.728 respectively in the control group and 0.804 
and 0.716 respectively in the treatment group. The probability of choosing the moderately 
non-adaptive portfolio was 0.908 in the control group and 0.857 in the treatment group. We 
also found that intention accounted for more variance in the group that received information 
then not (R2=0.498; R2=0.402 respectively). 
FIGURE 8-3: PATH MODEL FOR THE GROUP IN RECEIPT OF CLIMATE CHANGE INFORMATION 
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TABLE 8-2: PATH COEFFICIENTS AND PROBABILITIES FOR GROUP IN RECEIPT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
INFORMATION 
 
Group: Climate     β S.E. p    
Behavioural Intention → 
Attitudes Towards 
Conservation 0.125 0.060 0.036 ** 
 
    Subjective Norms 0.076 0.029 0.010 **  
    
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 0.084 0.040 0.035 ** 
 
No Incentive → Behavioural Intention -1.854 0.798 0.020 **  
    
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 0 - -   
 
Attitudes Towards 
Conservation ↔ 
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 0.075 0.039 0.051 * 
 
    Subjective Norms 0.127 0.064 0.049 **  
Subjective Norms ↔ 
Perceived Behavioural 
Control -0.013 0.043 0.761   
 
 
Predicted Probability of Investment Portfolios if Behavioural Intention is Positive  
Adaptive 
Moderately 
Adaptive Mixed 
Moderately 
Non-Adaptive Non-Adaptive 
0.502 0.804 0.716 0.857 0.067 
 R2 Behavioural Intention=0.498; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
 
FIGURE 8-4: PATH MODEL FOR THE CONTROL GROUP 
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TABLE 8-3: PATH COEFFICIENTS AND PROBABILITIES FOR THE CONTROL GROUP 
Group: Control     Β S.E. p    
Behavioural Intention → 
Attitudes Towards 
Conservation 
0.140 0.050 0.005 **  
    Subjective Norms 
0.223 0.044 0.000 ***  
    
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 
0.283 0.053 0.000 ***  
No Incentive → Behavioural Intention 
-0.142 0.207 0.493    
    
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 
0 - -    
Attitudes Towards 
Conservation ↔ 
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 
0.188 0.040 0.000 ***  
    Subjective Norms 
0.135 0.067 0.044 **  
Subjective Norms ↔ 
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 
0.071 0.026 0.007 **  
 
Predicted Probability of Investment Portfolios if Behavioural Intention is Positive  
Adaptive 
Moderately 
Adaptive Mixed 
Moderately 
Non-Adaptive Non-Adaptive 
0.226 0.827 0.728 0.908 0.131 
R2 Behavioural Intention=0.402; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
 
8.6.3 MULTI-GROUP SEM MODEL 
The SEM had the same issue as the path analysis in regards to examining the direct 
effect of perceived behavioural control on stated behaviour. Without constraining this path, 
the resulting model displayed poor fit (RMSEA=0.061, CFI=0.776). For the constrained 
model, the RMSEA showed adequate fit (RMSEA=0.058), however the CFI did not 
(CFI=0.707).  Thus the path Analysis was a better fitting model. The results of the two types 
of analysis however were similar. 
The measurement model showed that the measured variables accurately reflected the 
desired latent constructs. The measurement model coefficients is displayed in Appendix E 
The probability of choosing the adaptive investment portfolio in the treatment group was 
0.597 compared to 0.055 for non-adaptive investments. Whilst intention did not significantly 
mediate behaviour in the control group, the probability of choosing the adaptive portfolio was 
only 0.159.  The difference in variance explained intention on subsequent stated behaviour in 
the treatment and control groups was also greater (R
2
=0.616, R
2
=0.434 respectively). The 
198 
 
Control group differed from the path analysis in that perceived behavioural control was not a 
significant moderator of intention (B=-0.033, p=0.896). 
FIGURE 8-5: SEM FOR THE GROUP IN RECEIPT OF CLIMATE CHANGE INFORMATION 
 
 
TABLE 8-4: SEM COEFFICIENTS AND PROBABILITIES FOR GROUP IN RECEIPT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
INFORMATION 
Climate     β S.E p   
Behavioural Intention ← 
Attitudes Towards 
Conservation 0.258 0.076 0.001 *** 
    Subjective Norms 0.337 0.083 0.000 *** 
    
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 0.244 0.067 0.000 *** 
No Incentive ← Behavioural Intention -0.257 0.050 0.000 *** 
    
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 0.000 - -   
Attitudes Towards 
Conservation ↔ 
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 0.359 0.076 0.000 *** 
    Subjective Norms 0.577 0.054 0.000 *** 
Subjective Norms ↔ 
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 0.304 0.087 0.001 *** 
       Predicted Probability of Investment Portfolios if Behavioural Intention is Positive 
Adaptive 
Moderately 
Adaptive Mixed 
Moderately Non-
Adaptive 
Non-
Adaptive 
0.597 0.909 0.881 0.927 0.055 
Behavioural Intention R2= 0.616; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
 
 
 
γ1 (0.244)***
β1 (-0.257)***
xp1,3,5,6***,
P1 1.065, P3 0.372, 
P4 0.023, P5 0.284, 
P6 -0.476
xa1-10*** 
A1 0.978, A2 0.577, A3 -
0.412, A5 0.764, A6 
0.667, A7 0.490, A8 
0.420, A9 0.459, A10 
0.367
xs1-9***
S1 1.087, S2 0.697, S3 
0.607, S4 0.563, S5 0.536, 
S6 0.614, S7 0.804, S8 
0.693, S9 0.527
No Incentive
ζ
γ2(0.258)***
γ3(0.304)***
0.359***
0.577***
0.304***
xb1-3***
B1 0.857, B2 0.774, 
B3 0.692
ε
ξ Perceived 
Behavioural 
Control
ξ Attitudes
ξ Subjective
Norms
η Intention
β1
199 
 
 
FIGURE 8-6: SEM FOR THE CONTROL GROUP 
 
 
TABLE 8-5: SEM COEFFICIENTS AND PROBABILITIES FOR THE CONTROL GROUP 
Climate     Β S.E p   
Behavioural Intention ← Attitudes Towards 
Conservation 
0.615 0.237 0.010 ** 
    Subjective Norms 0.323 0.079 0.000 *** 
    Perceived Behavioural 
Control 
-0.033 0.250 0.896  
No Incentive ← Behavioural Intention -0.399 0.137 0.678  
    Perceived Behavioural 
Control 
0.000 - -  
Attitudes Towards 
Conservation 
↔ Perceived Behavioural 
Control 
0.710 0.116 0.000 *** 
    Subjective Norms 0.615 0.094 0.000 *** 
Subjective Norms ↔ Perceived Behavioural 
Control 
0.435 0.082 0.000 *** 
       
Predicted Probability of Investment Portfolios if Behavioural Intention is Positive 
Adaptive 
Moderately 
Adaptive Mixed 
Moderately Non-
Adaptive 
Non-
Adaptive 
0.159 0.981 0.937 0.996 0.000 
Behavioural Intention R2= 0.616; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
 
 
 
γ1 (-0.033)
β1 (-0.399)
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8.7 DISCUSSION 
How we construct a behavioural response may thus be impacted by access to 
information.  To query this, we asked whether the provision of basic information on climate 
change could sway the uptake of adaptive investments through a path analysis and a 
Structural Equation Model (SEM) across groups. We found that both our models fit the 
theoretical framework of the theory of planned behaviour.  
As theorized, subjective norms, attitudes and perceived behavioural control were 
positively correlated to behavioural intention which in turn mediated behaviour. For the 
groups that received information on climate change, we did see a correlation between 
intention and behaviour. Whilst in the control group, in the absence of information, intention 
was not a significant moderator of subsequent behaviour. We found that intention accounted 
for a greater amount of variance in the treatment group compared to the control, and as 
hypothesised increased the probability of choosing adaptive over non-adaptive investments 
compared to the control group. In the previous chapter the notion of mental models was 
presented, if we applied that here than it could suggest that exposure to information could 
manipulate such models. If we thought of a mental model as a schema, representing a 
knowledge structure in memory, and a set of cognitive processes that allows for the 
manipulation and modification of the knowledge structures within the schema (Merrill, 2002) 
then it could be possible that where the schema is vague (as we saw with respondents 
understanding of climate change), information can fill gaps in the model.  
In the treatment group and control groups, the addition of a direct effect of perceived 
behavioural control on stated behaviour led to a poor fitting model, as such in subsequent 
analysis this direct effect was constrained. Perceived behavioural control has been shown to 
be a somewhat problematic construct within the TPB. For instance Bamberg and Moser 
(2007), in a meta-analytical review of 57 datasets found that the effect of perceived 
behavioural control was weaker on actual behaviour then on intention. In addition, the 
collective action nature of biodiversity conservation and climate change could mean that 
individual action is seen as futile or insignificant (Gifford, 2011; Oskamp, 2000). This is 
supported in the interviews, where informants made comments such as “what can we do?” 
and “can’t do anything”. Comments such as these indicate that people believed that they had 
little behavioural control over the outcome.  
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Interestingly in the control group, when people were not exposed to information 
regarding climate change adaptation and conservation, perceived behavioural control 
deviated further from the theoretical model. Firstly in the SEM ml we found that there was a 
negative relationship between perceived behavioural control and intention in the control 
group (B=-0.033, p=0.896), whilst this was not the case in the presence of information 
(B=0.244, p<0.001). Whilst in the path analysis we found that it did not positively covary 
with subjective norms in the information treatment (B=-0.013, p=0.761) which differed from 
the control group (B=0.061, p=0.007).  
In the control group, absence of information removed the significant effect of 
perceived behavioural control on intention. Hogwarth, Waterson and McDonald (2010) 
looked at whether information could influence travel behaviour in the UK. They found that 
perceived behavioural barriers were surmounted through the provision of well crafted 
information.  
  The finding that the probability of choosing climate adaptive over non-adaptive 
investments was greater when climate change information was presented provides support for 
the knowledge-deficit theory, whereby an increase in knowledge will lead to a change in 
behaviour (Shultz, 2002). That the tools to engage in adaptive behaviour were then made 
readily available via microloans with adaptive investment options would have lifted barriers 
to behavioural adoption and could have lead to better informed and more effective decision 
making. Information followed the survey instrument so we cannot make any causal links but 
hazard to conjecture that it did perhaps strengthen cognitive motivations.   
Grothmann and Patt (2005) note that when looking at climate change adaptation 
behaviour, it is important to distinguish between intention and actual adaptive behaviour 
because of a lack of objective adaptive capacity when intention perceptions are formed. 
Objective adaptive capacity includes things like time, money, knowledge, and support. 
Consequently there may be a disconnect between when adaptive intentions were conceived 
and subsequent adaptive behaviour. Accordingly, when comparing the control and treatment 
groups, we may say that the absence of information was detrimental to ensuing adaptive 
investment behaviour.  
Overall it was found that the TPB was a useful investigative tool through which to 
reveal the behavioural antecedents of microloan investment choice in poor communities in 
SIDS. We found that attitudes and subjective norms were positively related to behavioural 
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intentions regardless of treatment. Stronger attitudes towards conservation and subjective 
norms were associated with greater intention to behave in a manner that was protective of the 
forests and rivers. 
In order to increase communities resilience against climate change impacts, a holistic 
approach is required which considers weaknesses in the cognitive antecedents of behaviour. 
The effect of information is encouraging as it shows that it was sufficient in encouraging 
people to take up adaptive investments. The findings suggests a holistic microloans approach 
would challenge negative environmental attitudes, strengthen community perceptions and 
importantly inform of the risks and benefits of conservation and climate change adaptation 
behaviour in order to encourage people to take up environmentally responsible investments.  
Microloans which provide adaptive investment options and educate the borrower of 
climate change and the benefits of adaptation could remove barriers to action. By removing 
these barriers such microloans can strengthen objective adaptive capacity. In addition such 
microloans, when structured correctly, can be an effective response to the request for support 
by informants against the impacts of climate change. These included the need for advice, 
awareness, financial, and government aid. Considering this and the results of the survey-
based experiment, it would seem that microloans with adaptive investment options does show 
promise in meeting the triple bottom line of sound economic, social and environmental 
impact.  
The study has its limitations and these are shared throughout the thesis. Firstly the 
administration of the survey instrument came before the experiment which could have primed 
people to a certain response. The validity of self-reported data is also a concern. In addition, 
the small sample size does limit statements of generalisability. Lastly, as a true experimental 
method was not employed, we cannot infer causality. 
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9.1 ABSTRACT 
This study reports on the motives that drive smallholders in their stated climate 
adaptive investment behaviour when borrowing under novel microloan incentives. The 
incentive conditions consisted of: a green incentive, where returns were contingent on the 
chosen investments impact on the environment; dynamic incentive where returns were 
contingent on repayment; and a control, no incentive condition. Through a survey and 
survey-based experiment conducted in Fiji, a path analysis informed by the Theory of 
Planned behaviour was specified. Our model fit the data extremely well (RMSEA=0.03; 
CFI=0.966). It was found that a positive set of intrinsic beliefs positively influenced the 
intention to behave in an environmentally protective manner. Intentions in turn mediated 
behaviour in the green incentive condition with the probability of choosing an adaptive 
investment being greatest in this condition (0.346) then in the absence of incentives (0.057), 
or under dynamic incentives (0.051). This could indicate that the green incentive condition 
crowded-in intrinsic motivations. Demographic factors of ethnicity, occupation, participation 
in and access to credit also influenced the exogenous cognitive and endogenous behavioural 
constructs to varying degrees.   
9.2 INTRODUCTION 
As we have seen in the preceding chapters, the importance of acting on climate 
change cannot be overstated. The consequences will be far reaching, transcending borders, 
species and economies. The impacts have already proven to be life-changing with some 
small, low lying island nations in the Pacific facing displacement (Yamamoto & Esteban , 
2014), their communal and individual identities threatened, for the most part, by the activities 
of others in distant lands.  The recognition of climate change impacts is increasing the sense 
of urgency for societal adaptation, most urgently in the developing world where it poses a 
very real threat to development with the ability to reverse current progress in eliminating 
extreme poverty and exacerbating economic, political, and humanitarian stresses (Watkins, 
2007). As such development initiatives must focus on environmental dimensions alongside 
the economic and social.  
We have discussed how microfinance has the potential to meet the triple bottom line 
of sound economic, social, and environmental development; microinsurance and 
microsavings can reduce vulnerability to climate related risks for smallholder farmers, whilst 
microloans can help people to diversify incomes and invest in climate resilient technologies. 
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However there seems to be little literature on how microloans can be used to incentivise 
uptake of climate adaptive behaviour. In the preceding chapter we began nudging at this 
concept. Through the application of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) we were able to 
assess the antecedents of behaviour and the role of information in driving behavioural 
change. This chapter builds on the findings of the previous chapter by extending a modified 
model of the TPB (which omits the direct relationship of perceived behavioural control to 
behaviour) to assess behavioural responses to incentives.  
The notion of incentivising behaviour has come under scrutiny in recent decades. 
Economists have questioned human motivation and the effects of incentives thereupon 
through a framework grounded in rationality. More recently however, non-pecuniary motives 
have been found to be powerful motivators of behaviour. In fact, monetary incentives have 
been found, at times, to be detrimental to inducing the desired for behaviour. How we then 
attach incentives to climate change adaptation measures requires careful consideration if we 
hope for long-term adoption. Whilst incentivising environmentally protective behaviour is 
not a new concept in microlending, no study has to date looked at the deeper motivating 
factors which are engaged in the face of incentives induced by environmentally conscious 
microloans.  
Specifically, in this thesis, extrinsic incentives are represented by hypothetical 
pecuniary reinforcements. We measure intrinsic drivers by looking at peoples’ attitudes 
subjective norms, perceptions of behavioural control, and intentions towards environmentally 
responsible behaviours. If people have positive intrinsic inclinations then according to the 
theory of planned behaviour this should translate to congruent actions. However we are 
uncertain whether incentives will impact our internal drivers.   
As such, this chapter aims to provide input on how to integrate climate adaptation 
measures into microloans such that it can induce the uptake of climate change adaptation 
behaviours. It does so by examining the role of incentives on stated climate change adaptive 
investment behaviour. We ask: 
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What are the behavioural drivers of climate adaptive investments under different 
microloan incentive conditions  
• According to the theory of planned behaviour, behavioural intentions are the most 
proximal determinant of behaviour. Intention in turn is influenced by activity specific 
attitudes, subjective norms, and  perceived behavioural control. As such we hypothesis 
that : a) regardless of incentive condition behavioural intention should mediate 
investment choice.  b) attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control 
should moderate behavioural intention. 
Can environmental conditionality on loans induce uptake of climate adaptive investment 
behaviour?  
• We hypothesis that green incentives, if congruent with internal drivers of behaviour 
will crowd-in internal motivations - aligning intentions with subsequent stated 
adaptive investment behaviour.  
• Green incentives will thus increase the probability of adaptive investments especially 
if people are already that way inclined. 
Do demographic and contextual factors impact stated behaviour? 
• We hypothesis that the demographic variables of ethnicity and gender would influence 
stated behaviour.  Specifically, for Fijians, their cultural and spiritual connection to 
Vanua, the land and sea, is hypothesized to lead to the choice of more adaptive 
investment portfolios. In addition it is hypothesized that  this will also be reflected in 
the antecedents of behaviour, with Fijians being inclined to positive attitudes, 
subjective norms particularly.  
• Studies have shown that women are more inclined to environmentally protective 
behaviours. As such we hypothesis women to choose more adaptive portfolios over 
men.  
• Income and access to microcredit have also been shown as facilitators of adaptive 
behaviour. As such we hypothesis that higher incomes, access to credit and having a 
current microloan would be correlated with greater uptake of stated adaptive 
investments.  
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To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to dissect the behavioural 
antecedents of climate adaptive behaviour using microloan based incentives.  This research 
contributes to our knowledge of the efficacy of monetary and non-pecuniary incentives on 
inducing the uptake of climate change adaptive investments for small holder farmers in 
particular. In addition it suggests a novel climate adaptive incentive mechanism based on the 
incentive and motivation based theories. Lastly the novel experimental design contributes to 
knowledge of survey-based experiments in the global south.  
We build our investigation by borrowing from Bénabou and Tirole’s motivation based 
theory of prosocial behaviour, Kahnman and Tversky’s prospect theory and Ajzen and 
Fishbein’s Theory of planned behaviour. We argue that microloans attached with 
environmental conditionality as an incentive mechanism can guide people towards making 
adaptive investments over the more maladaptive.  We commence by looking at microloans 
and its application in conservation and adaptation before moving on to the conceptual 
framework.  
9.2.1 MICROCREDIT 
In the preceding chapters we have seen that microfinance has been linked to 
conservation and development projects. Novel financing methods to foster adaptation and 
conservation have also been developed by Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) 
practitioners linking the basis of microloans with PES. Such initiatives take on an ecosystem-
based approach to environmental management and development, safeguarding livelihoods 
and the needs of local people whilst also conserving biodiversity (Ounsted & Stolk, 2009). 
The ecosystem-based approach to conservation has been promoted by the Convention on 
Biological Diversity as it upholds its tenets of conservation, sustainable use and the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources. The notion is 
that well managed ecosystems can instigate poverty reduction.  
 An example of PES linked with microcredit can be seen in Cranford and Mourato’s 
(2014) choice experiment in the Intag river zone in Northern Ecuador. They draw on modern 
incentive theory to examine whether microcredit for ecosystem services (or Credit-Based 
(CB) PES) is a more viable tool then direct payments as experienced in PES. This works on 
the notion that credit-based incentives are supportive rather than controlling and as such 
would lead to crowding-in of intrinsic motivations. They constructed a novel choice 
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experiment to understand whether people preferred loans with or without environmental 
conditions. The environmental condition was to convert one hectare of land to agro-forestry. 
If people chose this option then they would enjoy a lower interest rate, however if they failed 
to meet the condition of the loan then normal interest rates would apply. They found that 
around 50% of respondents were willing to take loans with environmental conditions. They 
also found that the loss or gain of carrying out the environmental condition, and the 
magnitude of the incentive, influenced respondents choice. Specifically, at lower interest 
rates people were more likely to accept CB-PES. Cranford and Mourato (2014) note that 
whilst such a pairing of PES and Microcredit through conditional lending is gaining interest, 
there remains little application on the ground, and little empirical research on the topic.  
The usefulness of microcredit as an adaptive strategy has been recognized by certain 
environmental NGO’s such as WWF and CARE who have been implementing schemes 
whereby loans are attached with environmental conditionality through lending criteria. The 
criteria for securing loans vary widely, some for instance impose strict conditions prohibiting 
certain income generating activities such as charcoal production or wood cutting for sale 
(Wild, Millinga, Robinson, 2008) whilst others have modified the microfinance model to 
effectively collateralize environmental assets in order to create strong environmental 
incentives for conservation (Kaiser, Hübner, & Bogner 2005). The latter refers to the hybrid 
method, introduced in chapter 1, termed ‘Bio-rights’. The Bio-rights method was developed 
by Wetlands International and incorporates aspects of microloans along with payment for 
ecosystem services (Kaiser, Hübner, & Bogner 2005). The model relies on a community-
ecosystem approach and is driven by the hypothesis that by gaining income from conserving 
protected areas, vulnerable communities can enter into sustainable rural development. The 
whole community is engaged in initiatives and their position as stakeholders is validated 
through their active participation in evaluating and validating projects. The model distributes 
microloans at the group level to establish a sense of community, to buffer against default and 
enhance cooperation amongst group members. Microloans are used to move people away 
from unsustainable practices to more ecologically sound activities. The recipients receive 
active support in the form of technical training, participatory workshops and study visits. The 
microloan with interest is repaid by members actively conserving the environment. 
Whilst promising, the Bio-rights model has limited applicability due to a lack of 
enforceable property rights and contractual laws, which can present challenges when trying to 
influence conservation outcomes in local communities (van Eijk & Kumar, 2009). In addition 
the nature of property rights in developing communities may preclude some women from 
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being active Bio-rights member. It remains that gender differentials in regards to property 
rights is widespread in the Global South, and whilst women tend to have usufruct rights these 
too are often mediated by men (Moghadam, 2007). Furthermore, as with PES, sustained 
funding is required from the global community.  
In addition the deeper cognitive motivations which PES and Bio-rights engage within 
resource users are still little understood. How intrinsic motivations may be enabled by such 
models can be useful in the design of such initiatives. For instance, looking at a case study of 
community-based conservation in Peru, Cranford and Mourato (2011), found that through a 
mix of structural (which included providing alternative to degrading activities) and cognitive 
(which included the provision of information, and creating strong social norms of 
conservation) was able to create a culture of conservation. They suggest that market-based 
mechanisms such as PES can be introduced as a second-order incentive to reinforce the 
culture of conservation.  
9.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
9.3.1 INCENTIVES 
The role of incentives in positively and negatively reinforcing behaviours has long 
been a fascination of psychologists. An early example is that of Pavlov (1906) who used 
incentives to condition a salivation response in dogs. Relatively recent insights from the 
cognitive neuropsychological studies have been able to map the neural circuitry which is 
activated in incentive-driven behaviour. Such studies have shown that negative and positive 
incentives did result in slightly different activation pathways (Knutson, Westdorp, Kaiser & 
Hommer, 2000). It was Deci (1971) who first introduced the notion that monetary incentives 
may backfire. To test the effect of external incentives on internal motivations, he devised an 
experiment which consisted of three sessions and a control and treatment group. The task was 
to solve a puzzle with distractions in the form of magazines being present. For the treatment 
group, during the second session, a monetary reward was given for each puzzle solved. He 
found that after the monetary incentive, those in the treatment group spent less time solving 
puzzles then those within the control. It was as though they had lost interest in the task. 
Deci’s humble findings would go on to shake the foundations of the study of incentives and 
motivations. 
Since Deci, it has become evident that a complex and often non-additive relationship 
exists between material and psychological incentives (Miller & Prentice, 2012). Gardner and 
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Stern (1996) for instance found that there is a possibility that creating large incentives could 
be detrimental to behavioural change in the long-run by undermining people’s intrinsic 
motives for action. Such incentives could potentially lead to a conditioned dependency on 
immediate rewards which may inhibit sustained and voluntary behavioural restraint when the 
reward schema is removed.  
Contextual inference theory also attempts to explain incentive anomalies. Contextual 
inference suggests that people take cues from their surrounding environment as to what the 
appropriate response should be when faced with uncertain stimuli – essentially converting 
environmental cues into heuristics for action (Kahneman, 2011; Kamenica, 2012). For 
instance if you can have a choice to purchase a water filter or a sturdy bucket to carry water 
in and are offered an incentive for the former, you may think the filter has some issues with it 
and therefore stick with your bucket (Bénabou & Tirole, 2003a). Of course this is not always 
the case as has been displayed by Cohen and Dupas (2010). They found that cost-sharing 
reduced demand of insecticide treated bed nets by 75% compared to the free distribution 
scheme.  
Considering contextual inference, Kamenica (2012) suggests that less money and 
fewer options should be considered in incentive design (Kamenica, 2012). Smaller and 
simpler choice sets are more attractive to individuals then excessive choice sets because you 
can easily identify the utility of a decision. By offering too great a monetary incentive you 
may crowd-out intrinsic motivation as people become suspicious or complacent of the reward 
(Kamenica, 2008). In a green microloan example, if you offer to write off any loan repayment 
obligations in exchange for protecting the environment, this may come off as suspect and 
people therefore may not participate. However if you offer to reduce the interest rate this may 
prove more attractive. In addition, by offering people a limited and simple set of investment 
options could lead to greater adoption of adaptive measures. 
In their motivations based theory, Bénabou and Tirole (2006) show how intrinsic 
incentives (motivations) can be crowded-out by extrinsic incentives (such as monetary 
rewards). Three different types of motivations are present in their utility function. These are: 
intrinsic, extrinsic and reputational motivations. Intrinsic motivations can be explained as our 
internal drive to perform an activity or task. Intrinsic motivations are reflective of our internal 
beliefs and its study has been related to cognitive dissonance theory which suggests from that 
people have an inner need to ensure that their beliefs and behaviors are consistent. 
Inconsistent or conflicting beliefs leads to disharmony, which people strive to avoid 
(Festinger, 1962) Intrinsic motivation does not depend on the rate of external rewards and 
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punishments (incentives) but are driven by our own belief systems. Extrinsic motivation on 
the other hand comes from influences outside of the individual.  
Both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations vary independently of each other; hence it is 
possible for extrinsic motivation to crowd-out intrinsic motivation. This is called the over-
justification effect which refers to the observation that an expected external incentive can 
decrease a person's intrinsic motivation to perform a task. Markowitz and Shariff (2012) 
show why this effect is important when looking at climate change adaptation. In a review of 
the literature regarding climate change and moral judgment, they found that an important 
barrier to public action on climate change may be that it often fails to activate our moral 
intuitions which are important in forming relevant actions. They note that in using economic 
incentives as a mechanism to motivate behaviour, you can create conflict between two 
values, namely: materialism and environmentalism which are shown to be negatively related. 
They warn that the focus by policy makers on the framing of responses to climate change in 
economically beneficialy terms can actively inhibit individuals from developing intrinsic, 
non-materialist motives (for example, being true to their values and beliefs, virtue, and 
affiliation) to respond to the problem.   
Imagine, to stop the over extraction of turtle eggs a community is given a pecuniary 
reward to instead sustainably harvest them. Consistent reliance on extrinsic incentives to stop 
over harvesting can crowd out pre-existing intrinsic drivers of that behaviour which are 
formed by the agents held beliefs. If and when the extrinsic incentive is removed, there is no 
longer any motivation to continue performing that behaviour for its own sake. Thus, as 
economic incentives and benefits for climate adaptive behaviour changes over time, the focus 
on extrinsic motivators for individuals may be counterproductive in the long-run. So the 
worry here is that incentives may not be a sustainable solution for long-run climate change 
adaptive and environmentally protective behaviour.  
The final type if motivation in Bénabou and Tirole’s (2006) utility function is that of 
reputational motivation which refers to concern for one’s reputation. Reputational motivation 
varies with the public visibility of one’s behaviour.  If the behaviour is invisible to others 
then it is assumed that reputational motivation is lacking. Their two player principle-agent 
game shows  that the information the principle holds regarding the agent’s ability or 
regarding the task at hand does  have an effect on the efficacy of the extrinsic reward. Using 
Cooley’s (and preceding him, Adam Smith’s) concept of the ‘looking glass self’, the agent 
uses the principal’s perspective in order to learn about his or her ability. They show that 
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successful incentives would provide the agent with hidden information about themselves that 
increases their confidence or perceived ability to perform a task (Bénabou & Tirole, 2006).  
By introducing extrinsic incentives (such as monetary rewards) we alter the 
motivation sphere in such a way that it can change the meaning attached to a behaviour. For 
an intrinsically motivated person extrinsic incentives thus may conflict with the intrinsic in 
such a way that it negatively affects one’s desire to engage in the behaviour. The framing of 
the incentive in the private or public domain could in addition impact on one’s moral 
reputation which further influences behaviour.  Bénabou and Tirole (2002) show that when 
an individual lacks self confidence in their own ability to perform a task, then offering an 
economic reward can be counterfactual. His perception of his own ability may be further 
lowered by the incentive. Thus the likelihood of undertaking the task, when a person displays 
self doubt, is compromised by a monetary reward. 
We could argue that the Grameen microfinance model has traditionally relied on the 
reputational aspect as an incentive against defaulting (McDonnell, 1999) . In green iterations 
of microcredit the interplay between the aforementioned motivators is complex. When 
targeting groups who are dependent on the land and sea for livelihoods, but do not have the 
resources to carry out adaptive behaviours, are incentives even necessary or would the loan 
suffice? If these groups have strongly positive intrinsic motivations then according to Ajzen’s 
TPB (1985), this should lead to a greater intention to behave in a manner that is 
environmentally protective. Constructive incentives, such as a loan, could then positively 
influence one’s perception of their own ability to behave in an environmentally protective 
way.   
It is also important to consider the framing of the incentive.  Framing incentives with 
losses in mind can be interpreted very differently depending on one’s socioeconomic status. 
How the poor weigh losses is understandably distinct from that of the better off as their 
baseline position or reference points from which they can judge a loss, is unlike that of the 
wealthier. For the poor all existing choices are between losses. Ultimately the least costly loss 
is that which is the most likely to be chosen. Loss aversion can be seen as an innate desire to 
avoid situations which threaten our physical and mental wellbeing.  
The concept of loss aversion is modelled in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1986) prospect 
theory which tries to explain decision making under risk. The theory consists of a framing 
and valuation phase. Within the framing phase a representation of those elements (acts, 
contingencies and outcomes) which are of importance to the decision is constructed.  In the 
valuation phase, values are assigned to each prospect and a choice made. The four key 
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aspects to the theory are: 1) reference dependence, 2) loss aversion, 3) diminishing 
sensitivity, and 4) probability weighting.  There are two versions of the theory, original 
(OPT) and cumulative (CPT). With reference dependence, we measure utility of gains and 
losses from a neutral starting point that is not entirely governed by wealth.  Such a reference 
point takes into consideration our propensity to perceive and value changes in the attributes 
over absolute magnitudes (Barberis, 2012).  
The second component we have already discussed, basically loss aversion states that 
people are more responsive to losses then to gains. Loss aversion is influenced by decision 
weights which are in turn influenced by further cognitive aspects such as the certainty and 
possibility effects and the temporality of events. The latter refers to the propensity of decision 
makers to amplify present outcomes over future ones (Keren & Roelofsma, 1995). The 
possibility effect denotes the tendency of overestimating the importance or weight of low 
probability events whilst the certainty effect is the tendency to overweight certain outcomes 
over probable ones (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Possible neural substrates of the 
possibility and certainty effect may indicate that the two types of effects are bound by 
different cognitive processes thus framing of outcomes can elicit distinctly different cognitive 
pathways (Carter, Meyer & Huettel, 2010; Kahneman, 2011; Weber & Huettel, 2008; Zeng et 
al, 2013).  
The third component of diminishing sensitivity is that gains have a concave value 
function and the opposite for losses. Lastly, probability weighting refers to persons attitudes 
towards outcome probabilities in general such that the probability for each separate outcome 
is transformed into a decision weight (OPT). Alternatively it refers to a person’s attitudes 
towards the different probabilities for a gain or a loss (CPT) such that de-cumulative (losses) 
and cumulative (gains) probabilities are weighted as a function of consecutive losses or gains 
(Fennema & Wakker, 1997).  
In OPT, loss aversion is seen as a tendency towards the utility curve for losses to be 
steeper than the utility curve for gains when starting from a neutral reference point. This is 
the first element of Kahneman and Tversky’s theory, the second assumes a nonlinear 
transformation of the probability scale so that their weighting function is most sensitive to 
changes in probability closer to the ends of the curve at 0 and 1 and less sensitive to changes 
in the middle. Small probabilities are overweighed whilst the inverse is true for large 
probabilities (& Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). In their original model, separable decision 
weights led to a violation in stochastic dominance. Here we would expect that as probability 
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magnitude changes from bad outcomes to better outcomes, one’s prospect would improve. To 
manage this, CPT was developed. Here the value of an outcome is multiplied by a decision 
weight rather than an additive probability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). This allows the 
theory to be extended to prospects with a larger number of outcomes.   
When viewed in conjunction with hyperbolic time discounting – or the scalar decrease 
in negative and positive utility across time – prospect theory and specifically loss aversion 
becomes a significant consideration in environmental conservation where utility often is 
realised in the future. In evolutionary terms, loss aversion has been seen as an important 
adaptive strategy with Li and colleagues (2012) finding that men and women became more 
loss-averse when self-protective motives were primed. Their study is interesting as it shows 
that perhaps loss aversion is domain specific, and therefore not applicable to all decision 
scenarios. If loss aversion is indeed domain specific to protective motives then it could lead 
to useful insights regarding climate change adaptation programme design. For instance 
looking at Small Island Developing States (SIDS) for whom climate change threatens their 
cultural identity, framing adaptation as a way to protect one’s history, people and culture can 
be a powerful motivator to adopt adaptive behaviours.  Kahneman and Tversky (1986) show 
how loss aversion can be modified through creative framing of problem scenarios. Simply 
through the use of emotive words one can evoke a desired for reaction.    
We can find evidence for the neural substrates of decisions under risk through 
cognitive neuropsychology. For instance, Weber and Huettel (2008) used functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to explore probabilistic and intertermporal decision 
making. They presented subjects with a decision making task consisting of a series of choices 
between pairs of real monetary rewards. The rewards differed either in their relative risk or 
their relative delay. It was found that risky choices evoked greater activation in the posterior 
parietal (associated with: free will, planned physical movements and pain perception) and 
lateral prefrontal cortices (associated with: executive behaviour control), whilst choices 
involving delay evoked greater activation in the posterior cingulate cortex (associated with: 
human awareness although very little is known of this region) and the striatum (associated 
with: novel decision making and working memory). Importantly, they found that regions 
associated with reward evaluation predicted risky choices whilst those regions implicated in 
control decisions were implicated in the less risky and more delayed decisions. This indicates 
that risky and intertemporal choices elicit different cognitive processes. As such framing risk 
modules will impact the way in which we process it. Again, this highlights the importance of 
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the framing of incentives to elicit behaviour change as the incentive structure can produce 
different outcomes with regards to the relative weights placed on behavioural choices. 
When applying prospect theory to climate change adaption decisions, the location of 
our reference point will impact outcome evaluations. Loss aversions would state that the 
position of this reference point in the domain of gains or losses will impact subsequent 
responses. If outcomes of climate change are framed in the domain of losses then we would 
anticipate net benefits to be more attractive to the decision maker (Osberghaus, 2013). So for 
example imagine a subsistence farmer for whom climate change will increase the probability 
of losses in crop yield thus negatively impacting subsistence needs. This farmer starts from 
the reference point of losses. The farmer is offered the opportunity to invest in either a non-
adaptive or adaptive basket of agricultural tools. The adaptive will yield steady returns in the 
future whilst the non-adaptive has the potential to rapidly increase gains now but will 
certainly be detrimental to future yields. Under prospect theory and considering the certainty 
effect and temporality, it is reasonable to assume that the more attractive option to this farmer 
will be the non-adaptive basket where potential of loss is rapidly minimised in the immediate 
future. If however we reframed the baskets, so that the adaptive will increase yield 
indefinitely and minimise losses now, whilst the non-adaptive may increase yield but may 
also increase losses in the future then the adaptive investment becomes most attractive as it 
offers a certainty to minimise losses. It is intriguing that such decisions will probably employ 
different cognitive pathways depending on risk and control evaluations.  
How we conceive people should behave in order to lead better, more fulfilled lives 
has been debated over the centuries. For economists, the rationality of human beings is a 
primary and valid assumption. This assumption, divorced from psychological insights and 
framed by logical reasoning has been the base of many a normative model of decision 
making and risk. Behavioural economists, in moving away from this idealised conception of 
a model decision maker to one that is more realistic to the complex and messy nature of 
human thought processes, have opened a new window into the design of initiatives to 
ameliorate the lot of the poor. Ecosystem-based adaptation strategies can benefit from new 
insights offered by behavioural economics especially in the design of incentives structures.  
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9.3.2 BEHAVIOURAL ANTECEDENTS 
It is evident that the nature of incentives in eliciting the sought after behaviour tends 
to draw upon complex cognitive functioning’s. The salience of the incentive must be properly 
conceived of in order for it to be seen as a desirable reward structure thus provoking the 
crowding out of the undesirable behaviour and the uptake of that which is sought after. This 
indicates the importance of teasing apart the antecedents of behaviour in order to better 
understand the efficacy of incentive structures. Powerful imaging tools such as fMRI can be 
of great utility in understanding how behavioural responses are formed, alas the use of such 
technologies in assessing particular behaviours in the Global South is expensive and, 
unfortunately, unrealistic at the moment.  
Thus a natural starting point to behavioural antecedents is one’s beliefs and attitudes. 
The assumption here is that people behave in ways that are consistent to the beliefs and 
attitudes they hold (Nickerson, 2012). As with the assumption of rationality, humans have 
shown that they are more complicated then this assumption would tend to show. Indeed 
studies have shown that the nature of the relationship between attitudes, beliefs and behaviour 
is a cloudy one at best. For instance, Gardner and Stern (1996) show that in cultures where 
the prevailing religious ideologies have explicit pro-environmental teachings, the ensuing 
pro-environmental beliefs and attitudes do not seem to affect pro-environmental behaviour. 
However it has been shown that by measuring attitudes and behaviours on the same level of 
specificity and by addressing constraints and facilities on behaviour beyond one’s control 
(Kaiser, Wolfing &Fuhrer, 1999) does increase the attitudes predictive power.  
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) takes this into consideration. It states that 
the constructs of Attitudes towards the behaviour (AB), Subjective Norms (SN; which are 
significant others approval or disapproval to perform the behaviour) and Perceived 
Behavioural Control (PBC; which is the appraisal of one’s own ability to perform a 
behaviour) will lead to intention to perform said behaviour. Intention in turn is hypothesized 
to be the most immediate predictor of behaviour (Ajzen, 2002).  Attitudes, subjective norms 
and perceived behavioural control can be seen as intrinsic motivators. Subjective norms can 
also be regarded as a reputational motivator as it indicates our reputational concerns through 
the importance placed in referent others. A  formulaic representation can be conceived of as 
follows:   
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The TPB has provided useful insights into conservation and pro-environmental 
behaviour in the West particularly. For instance, Lynne, Casey, Hodges, and Rahmani,  
(1995) compared  the theories of Reasoned Action, Planned Behaviour, and Derived Demand 
to explain the adoption of water conservation technology by Florida strawberry farmers. 
Whilst they found support for the TPB, they also state that the incorporation of financial 
variables to express actual behavioural control could increase the models explanatory power. 
For the case of water conservation technology adoption, Lynne et al (1995) suggest that low 
PBC could in fact crowd-out behaviour. As such governments need to balance control with 
incentives and moral suasion.   
Other studies have successfully applied the TPB to look at sustainable agricultural 
practices (Beedell & Rehman, 1999), curb-side recycling (Tonglet, Phillips & Read, 2004), 
the adoption  of  sustainable business practices by executives and managers (Mancha, Muniz 
& Yoder, 2014), and environmental behaviours in the workplace (Greaves, Zibarras & Stride, 
2013). The success of this model and its parallels with Bénabou and Tirole’s motivation 
based theory made it an attractive option to test the cognitive drivers of microloan investment 
behaviour under differing incentive structures. In addition, considering its relative obscurity 
in explaining conservation behaviour in the South, the application of the model in this context 
can aide in understanding its utility in developing countries.  
It has been shown that when used in conjunction with lab and field experiments, the 
TPB can be a useful predictor of behaviours. For instance Bamberg (2002) utilized field 
experiments to assess how intentions are translated to behaviour. The behaviour in question 
was buying organic food. Bamberg (2002) introduced differing levels of monetary incentives 
for purchasing organic food and found that higher incentives did in fact translate to action 
within the TPB paradigm. 
9.3.3 DEMOGRAPHIC AND CONTEXTUAL FACTORS 
In this research, to better understand the determinants of stated adaptive investment 
behaviours and its antecedents, several demographic and contextual factors were included in 
the TPB model. These include gender, Status as chief, ethnicity, income, prior and current 
microcredit participation. 
Demographic and contextual factors which may influence behaviour and which have 
been explored in the TPB framework are attributes such as age, gender, religion, and income 
to name a few. For instance, in a study looking at environmental behaviour in youths, gender, 
224 
 
income, education and religious beliefs did not make a considerable impact on their 
environmental attitudes, behavioural intentions, actual behaviour (Niaura, 2013). However 
beyond the domains of the TPB, there has been much research to support the hypothesis that 
women are more inclined to environmentally protective behaviours. It has been argued that 
women have a special relationship with nature, and are particularly altruistic and caring in 
their environmental management (Jackson, 1993). Indeed in the Global South women a 
distinct role in: the management of  plants and animals in forests, drylands, wetlands and 
agriculture; in collecting water, fuel and fodder for domestic use and income generation; and 
in overseeing land and water resources. The extensive experience of women in the 
sustainable use of resources has included them in the climate change, and environmental 
conservation agenda as key actors of positive change (Meena, 1992; Pearson, 2000; 
Dankelman, 2002; Merchant, 2014; Vernooy, 2015) 
Similarly indigenous communities are often in possession of rich cultural heritages 
and traditional ecological knowledge that has been passed down from generation to 
generation on the sustainable use of resources (Cairns, 2015). In the pacific this is evident in 
the traditional practices around marine conservation. The use of tabu (or restricted) areas are 
commonplace as a traditional, and more sustainable harvesting and gathering methods (for 
instance through the use of line fishing, hand nets, bare handed catching, and vono (a method 
of fishing through the creation of an inshore trap) (Kittinger, 2013).  
Decisions affecting the management of the qoli qoli (traditionally defined fishing 
areas) and vanua (land-sea estate) are led by the clan chief.  The clan chief in Fiji is seen as 
the supreme guardian of the village’s parcel of land, waters, resources and resident 
indigenous people (Mühlig-Hofmann, 2007). It is this status as steward and guardian that 
makes us hypothesize that chiefs may be more inclined to make decisions which are 
environmentally protective. 
In addition we look at income, access to credit and current microloans as factors that 
influence behaviour. Semenza et al (2008) showed that lower income people had greater 
concern regarding climate change. This could be because of the additional risk that climate 
change poses on their livelihoods. Whilst Grothmann (Grothmann & Patt, 2005) found that 
the level of income had no significant explanatory power for adaption behavior. Other studies 
that investigate the impact of income on the adoption of climate change adaptive behaviours 
have found a positive correlation between income and adoption (Franzel, 1999). It could be 
that higher income farmers may be less risk averse, have better information access, and a 
longer term planning horizon (Deressa et al, 2009). In addition, we include access to credit  
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and current microcredit participation as factors which may positively predict subsequent 
adaptive stated investment behaviour as studies have shown that access to microcredit 
removes barriers to climate change adaptation in farmers (Bryan et al, 2006; Hassan et al, 
2008; Below et al,  2012). It has also been argued that microfinance services can create 
livelihood asset base through direct income effects, indirect income effects (from education and 
training), and non-pecuniary effects (for instance from stronger social networks and increased 
confidence) which can make them more resilient to shocks and enable their capability to take on 
adaptive behaviours (Hammill, Matthew, & McCarter, 2008). 
Lastly we include the treatment and control groups - which related to the presence or 
absence of information - from the previous chapter as a dummy variable as advised by 
Muthen and Muthen (2007) with small samples and more complex models.  
9.4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL METHOD 
A multi-stage sampling strategy was adopted. The first stage consisted of stratified 
sampling. Each strata indicated a geographic region defined as being close to or within fragile 
ecosystems in Viti-Levu.  The second stage consisted of simple random sampling within each 
strata. Sampling strategy is described in detail in Chapter 6. The resulting sample consisted of 
205 respondents.  The same experimental methodology described in Chapter 6 was employed 
here. Unlike the previous chapter, here our empirical analysis looks across all the incentive 
conditions – namely no incentive, dynamic incentive, and green incentive. In addition the 
following demographic variables were included: 
 
FIGURE 9-1: DEMOGRAPHIC AND CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES 
Description/Scale 
Ethnicity 0=Other 1=Fijian 
Gender 0=Male, 1=Female 
Occupation 0=Other, 1=Farmer/Fisher 
Status 0=Other, 1=Chief 
Income 0=Y>F$10, 1= Y<F$10 
 Access to Credit 0=No, 1=Yes 
Credit Participant 0=No, 1=Yes 
Control (No information 
offered) 0=Yes, 1= No 
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The survey preceded the survey-based experiment and explored cognitive drivers and 
collected demographic information. The framed field experiment introduced a ‘green’ 
incentive condition, the design of which was influenced by incentive theory, in particular 
looking at aspects of framing, contextual inference, and prospect theory.  The ensuing green 
incentive condition offered simpler and fewer choice sets with a small pecuniary reward. It 
also had a mandatory mangrove rehabilitation component to encourage biodiversity 
conservation. We also take note that the absolute subjective value of decisions under loss are 
greater than those under gain (Kahneman, Knetsh & Thaler, 1991). Thus non-adaptive 
investments carry monetary penalties so that they elicit greater losses then the adaptive 
options.   
The empirical method employed was that of Path analysis as described in the previous 
chapter. As before, the path analysis was clustered at the village level and specified using 
Mplus Version 6 software (Muthen & Muthen, 2011). Using a Weighted Means and Variance 
Estimator (WLSMV), Mplus estimates probit and linear regression coefficients, with the 
former being estimated for categorical outcomes. The WLSMV estimator is a robust method 
for categorical data. It uses a diagonal weight matrix, robust standard errors and mean and 
variance adjusted χ2 test statistic (Finney & DiStefano, 2006). This method has also been 
shown to be sufficient for medium sized models with sample sizes between 150 and 200 
(Brown, 2006) as is the case with the present study. 
The Path model can be written as follows: 
EQUATION 9-1 
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The predicted probability of investment choice was given as: 
EQUATION 9-2 
                             
                                              
                                             
                                             
                             
Where ϕ is the cumulative normal distribution, τ is the threshold which in Mplus is the 
inverse of the intercept, b is the unstandardised coefficient. And recalling that investment 
choice was: 
1) Adaptive portfolio 
2) Moderately adaptive portfolio 
3) Mixed portfolio 
4) Moderately non-adaptive portfolio 
5) Non-Adaptive portfolio 
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9.5  RESULTS 
Frequency distribution of investment choice across periods and incentives types 
revealed that the adaptive investment was the most popular option (Table 9.1). People were 
opting for the adaptive investments most in the green incentive conditions, followed by the 
no incentive conditions. 
TABLE 9-1: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF INVESTMENT CHOICE 
Incentive Type & 
Period Adaptive % Mixed % 
Non-
Adaptive % 
None Period 1 119 58 69 33.7 17 17 
None  Period 2 91 44.4 64 31.2 50 24.4 
Dynamic Period 1 85 41.5 71 34.6 49 23.9 
Dynamic Period 2 84 41.0 69 33.7 52 25.4 
Green Period 1 117 57.1 66 32.2 22 10.7 
Green Period 2 122 59.5 43 21.0 40 19.5 
 
We also evaluated whether the different conditions significantly differed from each other by 
way of a likelihood ratio chi square goodness of fit test. The null hypotheses that there was no 
significant different between conditions was rejected, with moderate association between the 
conditions (No Incentive*Green Incentive: χ2(16) 76.808, p=0.001; Cramer's V=0.338, 
p=0.001; Green Incentive*Dynamic Incentive: χ2(16)=79.256, p=0.001; Cramer's V =0.294, 
p=0.001;  Dynamic Incentive*No Incentive: χ2(16) 61.545, p=0.001; Cramer's V=0.274, 
p=0.001). We also saw that the treatment groups who were in receipt of climate change 
information did significantly differ from the control group in the dynamic and green incentive 
conditions, with moderate association between the conditions (Figure 9.2). 
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FIGURE 9-2: INCENTIVE CHOICE ACROSS TREATMENTS AND CONDITIONS 
 
 
9.5.1 PATH ANALYSIS 
 As with the previous chapter, the direct effect of perceived behavioural control to 
stated behaviour was constrained as this led to poor model fit (RMSEA=0.074, CFI=0.886). 
The constrained model had excellent fit statistics (RMSEA=0.03, CFI=0.966). The RMSEA 
tells us that we can reject our null hypothesis of a poor fit of the data to the model, whilst the 
CFI tells us that  96.6% of the covariation in the data can be explained by our model.  
The  theoretical model as expressed by our path analysis is represented in Figure 9.3. 
The path coefficients and probabilities are represented in Tables 9.2 to 9.5.  
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FIGURE 9-3: PATH MODEL  
C
h
ie
f 
 x
2
F
ij
ia
n
  
x
3
F
e
m
a
le
  x
4
F
a
rm
e
r/
F
is
h
e
r 
x
5
A
c
c
e
ss
 t
o
 C
re
d
it
  
x
6
C
u
rr
en
t 
M
ic
ro
lo
an
  
x
7
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
(N
o
 I
n
fo
rm
at
io
n
) 
x
8
Y
<
F
$
1
0
 x
1
S
u
b
je
c
ti
v
e
 
N
o
rm
s
A
tt
it
u
d
e
s 
T
o
w
a
rd
s 
C
o
n
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
P
e
rc
e
iv
e
d
 
B
e
h
a
v
io
u
ra
l 
C
o
n
tr
o
l
B
e
h
a
v
io
u
ra
l 
In
te
n
ti
o
n
N
o
 I
n
c
e
n
ti
v
e
D
y
n
a
m
ic
 
In
c
e
n
ti
v
e
G
re
e
n
 I
n
c
e
n
ti
v
e
γ 3
1
-3
4
 
γ 2
1
-2
4
 
γ 1
1
-1
4
β β β
β
1
β
2
β
3
ζ 2 ζ
3 ζ 4
ζ 1
γ 4
1
-4
7
   
   
   
   
 β
2
1
γ 5
1
-5
7
   
   
   
   
 β
2
2
γ 6
1
-6
7
   
   
   
   
  β
2
3
 
231 
 
The results were in line with the theoretical model. Intention was significantly and 
positively predicted by attitudes (B=0.224, p=0.080), subjective norms (B=0.393, p=0.036), 
and perceived behavioural control (B=0.404, p=0.016). When attitudes were positive and all 
other predictor variables were held at their mean then probability of moderately positive 
intentions was 0.952 and positive intentions was 0.991. The same case for positive subjective 
norms, saw an 0.812 probability of positive intentions, whilst perceived behavioural control 
saw an .707 probability of moderately positive and an 0.999 probability of positive intentions.      
Attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control were positively and 
significantly influenced by ethnicity, with Fijians having a 0.630 probability of positive 
attitudes, a 0.995 probability of positive subjective norms, and a 0.904 probability of positive 
perceived behavioural control. In addition status as a chief, and being female positively and 
significantly influenced behavioural control with a probability of positive behavioural control 
being 0.901 and 0.890 respectively.  Income increased the probability of negative (0.408) and 
neutral (0.959) attitudes.  
TABLE 9-2: BEHAVIOURAL ANTECDENTS AND DEMOGRAPHIC MODERATORS 
 
β S.E P Low Medium High
Behavioural Intention ←
Attitudes Towards 
Conservation
0.224 0.172 0.080
** 0.001 0.952 0.991
Subjective Norms 0.393 0.264 0.036 ** 0.000 0.000 0.813
Perceived 
Behavioural Control
0.403 0.229 0.016
** 0.000 0.707 0.999
← y<$10 0.015 0.154 0.820 0.408 0.959 0.282
Chief 0.105 0.352 0.207 0.261 0.822 0.433
Fijian 0.372 0.145 0.000 *** 0.127 0.468 0.630
Female 0.026 0.148 0.694 0.399 0.955 0.290
Farmer/Fisher 0.047 0.191 0.515 0.374 0.941 0.313
Subjective Norms ← y<$10 -0.100 0.184 0.234 0.196 0.978 0.968
Chief 0.009 0.402 0.925 0.133 0.934 0.983
Fijian 0.214 0.223 0.021 ** 0.056 0.707 0.995
Female -0.127 0.186 0.150 0.210 0.983 0.965
Farmer/Fisher 0.111 0.333 0.405 0.088 0.847 0.991
← y<$10 0.101 0.218 0.296 0.609 0.222 0.849
Chief 0.116 0.266 0.070 * 0.509 0.101 0.901
Fijian 0.199 0.171 0.003 ** 0.502 0.095 0.904
Female 0.192 0.144 0.003 ** 0.533 0.125 0.890
Farmer/Fisher 0.120 0.254 0.220 0.577 0.175 0.868
R2: Attitudes=0.176; Subjective Norms=0.092; Perceived Behavioural Control=0.151; Behavioural 
Intention=0.543; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001
Predicted Probabilities
Attitudes Towards 
Conservation
Perceived 
Behavioural Control
232 
 
So in the no incentive condition, holding all other variables constant, we see that 
Fijians were more likely to choose adaptive portfolios over non-adaptive with a probability 
difference of 0.291 between an entirely adaptive and an entirely non-adaptive portfolio. 
Similarly having a current microloan increased the probability of choosing an adaptive 
portfolio (probability difference of 0.222 between choosing an adaptive over a non-adaptive 
portfolio). 
TABLE 9-3: NO INCENTIVE COEFFICIENTS AND PREDICTED PROBABILITIES 
 
In the dynamic incentive condition, holding all other variables constant, the 
probability of adaptive and moderately positive investment choices increased for Fijians (B=-
0.045, p=<0.001; Predicted probability of an adaptive portfolio=0.356 compared to 0.002 for 
non-adaptive) and by having an existing microloan (B=-0.179, p=0.01; predicted probability 
of adaptive portfolio=0.120 compared to 0.017 for non-adaptive). Farmers and fisher folk 
also were more inclined towards adaptive (0.473) over non-adaptive investment portfolios 
(0.001). 
The control treatment (B=0.21, p=0.006), income (B=0.062, p=0.019) and access to 
credit (B=0.0159, p=0.006) significantly increased the probability of choosing more non-
adaptive portfolios with the moderately non-adaptive investment portfolio being the most 
popular choice with a probability of 0.558, 0.838, and 0.567 respectively. 
 
 
 
β S.E p Adaptive M A Mixed M N-A
Non-
Adaptive
←
Behavioural 
Intention -0.016 0.063 0.845 0.057 0.849 0.770 0.927 0.076
Perceived Behav 
Control
0.000 0.000 - 0.037 0.874 0.796 0.906 0.066
Control 0.108 0.212 0.244 0.031 0.672 0.560 0.807 0.123
y<F$10 -0.083 0.128 0.123 0.078 0.913 0.856 0.962 0.055
Chief -0.045 0.457 0.670 0.120 0.967 0.940 0.988 0.089
Fijian -0.482 0.234 0.000 *** 0.293 0.999 0.998 1.000 0.002
Female 0.023 0.131 0.689 0.031 0.679 0.568 0.812 0.062
Farmer/Fisher -0.011 0.183 0.874 0.002 0.064 0.035 0.136 0.004
Access to Credit 0.091 0.224 0.252 0.034 0.710 0.602 0.835 0.139
Current Microloan -0.392 0.218 0.000 *** 0.232 0.997 0.993 0.999 0.010
No Incentive R2= 0.231;  *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001; M A= Moderately Adaptive,                                                                     
M N-A= Moderately Non-Adaptive
Predicted Probabilities
No 
Incentive
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TABLE 9-4: DYNAMIC INCENTIVE COEFFICIENTS AND PREDICTED PROBABILITIES 
 
In the green incentive condition, holding all other variables constant, investment 
choice was significantly mediated by behavioural intention (B=-0.187, p-0.022), being Fijian 
(B=-0.525, p=<0.001), the treatment group (B=0.241, p=0.027), and status as chief (B=0.101, 
p=0.067). Behavioural intention and being Fijian inclined people towards more adaptive 
portfolios. With positive behavioural intention the predicted probability of a solely adaptive 
portfolio was 0.346 in contrast to a probability of 0.012 for an entirely non-adaptive portfolio. 
For Fijians the probability of choosing an adaptive portfolio was 0.573, compared to 0.002 
for non-adaptive. As in the dynamic incentive condition, farmers and fisher folk also were 
more inclined towards adaptive (0.771) over non-adaptive investment portfolios (0). 
In contrast, being in the control group, and status as Chief inclined people towards 
more non-adaptive portfolios. In the control group the probability of choosing an adaptive 
portfolio was 0.065, whilst it was 0.125 for non-adaptive. Similarly, for chiefs the probability 
of adaptive loans was lower at 0.061 than for non-adaptive (0.131).  
  
β S.E p Adaptive M A Mixed M N-A
Non-
Adaptive
←
Behavioural 
Intention -0.058 0.039 0.195 0.051 0.926 0.872 0.948 0.048
Perceived Behav 
Control 0.000 0.000 - 0.037 0.874 0.796 0.906 0.066
Control 0.210 0.197 0.006 ** 0.011 0.489 0.366 0.558 0.155
y<F$10 0.062 0.070 0.019 ** 0.026 0.792 0.691 0.838 0.090
Chief 0.016 0.246 0.752 0.008 0.981 0.960 0.987 0.187
Fijian -0.532 0.147 0.000 *** 0.356 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.002
Female -0.027 0.130 0.590 0.037 0.925 0.870 0.947 0.067
Farmer/Fisher -0.045 0.154 0.368 0.473 0.041 0.020 0.059 0.001
Access to Credit 0.159 0.183 0.006 ** 0.013 0.498 0.374 0.567 0.142
Current Microloan -0.179 0.181 0.010 ** 0.120 0.965 0.932 0.976 0.017
Predicted Probabilities
Dynamic 
Incentive
Dynamic Incentive R2=0.231;  *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001; M A= Moderately Adaptive,                                                         
M N-A= Moderately Non-Adaptive
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FIGURE 9-4: GREEN INCENTIVE COEFFICIENTS AND PREDICTED PROBABILITIES 
 
We found that the different incentive conditions positively covaried with each other as did the 
moderating constructs of the Theory of Planned Behaviour.  
 
TABLE 9-5: COVARIANCE COEFFICIENTS 
      Β S.E P   
No Incentive ↔ Dynamic Incentive 0.207 0.091 0.023 ** 
    Green Incentive 0.361 0.061 0.000 *** 
Green Incentive ↔ Dynamic Incentive 0.264 0.047 0.000 *** 
Attitudes 
Towards 
Conservation 
↔ Subjective Norms 0.354 0.096 0.000 *** 
  
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 0.381 0.063 0.000 *** 
Subjective 
Norms ↔ 
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 0.031 0.074 0.670   
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001         
 
As the investment portfolios were coded with 1 being adaptive and 5 non-adaptive, the 
negative correlation of the incentive conditions with the constructs of the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour shows that people were choosing more adaptive investment portfolios. 
 
 
 
 
 
β S.E p Adaptive M A Mixed M N-A
Non-
Adaptive
←
Behavioural 
Intention -0.187 0.072 0.022 ** 0.346 0.972 0.937 0.986 0.012
Perceived Behav 
Control 0.000 0.000 - 0.229 0.731 0.596 0.818 0.027
Control 0.241 0.283 0.027 ** 0.065 0.369 0.239 0.482 0.125
y<F$10 0.055 0.198 0.447 0.048 0.969 0.933 0.985 0.158
Chief 0.101 0.276 0.067 * 0.061 0.582 0.434 0.690 0.131
Fijian -0.525 0.196 0.000 *** 0.573 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.002
Female -0.020 0.179 0.764 0.771 0.016 0.006 0.032 0.000
Farmer/Fisher -0.038 0.259 0.651 0.235 0.852 0.749 0.909 0.026
Access to Credit 0.018 0.376 0.880 0.203 0.716 0.578 0.805 0.033
Current Microloan -0.155 0.319 0.196 0.296 0.968 0.931 0.984 0.016
Green Incentive R2=0.412;  *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001; M A= Moderately Adaptive,                                                              
M N-A= Moderately Non-Adaptive
Predicted Probabilities
Green 
Incentive
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TABLE 9-6: MATRIC OF CORRELATIONS 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 
Attitudes Towards 
Conservation 1             
2 Subjective Norms 0.403 1           
3 Perceived Behavioural Control 0.453 0.071 1         
4 Behavioural Intention 0.565 0.512 0.532 1       
5 No Incentive -0.151 -0.079 -0.114 -0.118 1     
6 Dynamic Incentive -0.251 -0.161 -0.182 -0.22 0.389 1   
7 Green Incentive -0.288 -0.207 -0.222 -0.321 0.492 0.543 1 
 
9.6  DISCUSSION 
In general when looking across the models, we found that a positive intrinsic set of 
beliefs regarding the environment favourably influenced self-reported behavioural intention.  
A similar finding on the moderating effect of attitudes, subjective norms and perceived 
behavioural control on intention to perform environmentally responsible behaviour is shown 
by Defrancesco and colleagues (2008). They found that a farmer’s attitudes, beliefs and 
relationship with neighbouring farmers and their opinions on environmentally protective 
behaviours significantly affected adoption of agri-environmental measures.  Further support 
for the moderating affect of attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control on 
behavioural intention can be found in studies looking at recycling (Boldero, 1995; 
Laudenslager, Holt & Lofgren, 2004) and public transport uptake (Heath & Gifford, 2002) 
amongst others.   
Behavioural intention was found increase the probability of choosing more adaptive 
investments in the green incentive condition. This supports the TPB’s assumption that 
intention, moderated by the aforementioned intrinsic variables, is the most proximal 
determinant of behaviour. Deviating from our hypothesis, intention did not mediate 
subsequent stated behaviour under dynamic and no incentive conditions. This could be an 
indication that the green incentive condition was able to engage people’s deeper motivations 
to undertake adaptive behaviour. Indeed as hypothesized we also found that adaptive 
investments over non-adaptive was greater under this condition. Thus, by using the 
framework of the TPB we were able to show that extrinsic incentives to facilitate the uptake 
of climate adaptive investments did not seem to crowd-out one’s environmentally protective 
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intrinsic motivations. As such, this study provides preliminary evidence to support the use of 
microloan incentives to facilitate the adoption of climate change adaptation behaviours.  
To further explore the intention-behaviour relationship we can turn to the literature on 
threat and coping appraisal. It is possible that the green incentive condition would have 
instigated threat appraisal by establishing a threat to future returns. The risks of income loss 
from non-adaptive investment would have outweighed the income gained via the adaptive 
option. The assessment of threat along with one’s coping appraisal would establish one’s 
investment decision. Coping appraisal consists of: a) response efficacy, or one’s appraisal of 
the efficacy of the behaviour in removing threat, which in this case is represented by 
investment options; b) self-efficacy or one’s ability to actually carry out the behaviour and 
lastly; c) response cost which is the assessment of the costs associated with carrying out your 
investment choice.  As such following the introduction of the threat the green incentive 
condition could have also provided a reasonable solution to the threat. This is achieved by 
presenting a choice of investment options of which the more adaptive investment choices 
would have been the most desirable. 
From a decision theoretic perspective, incentives should be designed such that when 
faced with several options with similar expected returns, the optimal choice should be that 
with the lowest expected outcome variance (Hodgson, Thomas, Whintle & Moilanen, 2009). 
Under the different incentive structures, it is reasonable to assume that one’s investment 
decision would have yielded different cultural, monetary and reputational outcomes. In the no 
incentive and dynamic incentive conditions, with no prompting of environmental 
considerations, investment decisions would be weighted by risk taking behaviour, with 
monetary outcomes perhaps being the foremost focus to maximize utility of a choice. In 
contrast the framing of the green incentive condition would have elicited a different balance 
of monetary, cultural and reputational outcomes such that it could have guided ones optimal 
choice towards the adaptive investment option. Under prospect theory the framing of a 
problem would impact the heuristics people employ in subsequent decision making. Tversky 
and Kahneman (1981) have shown that how we present choice-problems can significantly 
impact outcomes. Framing the same decision problem in different ways can elicit very 
different responses. In the current study by drawing attention to the environmental impact of 
one’s investment decision in the green incentive conditions could have influenced subsequent 
decisions.  
The ‘framing effect’ has also been shown to be susceptible to emotional stimuli 
(Mano, 1994; Druckmann & McDermot, 2008). Cognitive neuropsychological studies have 
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found that the Amygdala, a key part of the brain associated with emotional responses, is 
active in mediating decision biases (Adolphs, 2010; De Martino, Kumara, Seymour & Dolan, 
2006; Seymour & Dolan, 2008; Dolan, 2007). The survey which preceded the choice 
experiment may also have had an impact on decision making. The questions related to the 
TPB could have primed emotional responses to subsequent investment choices.  
It was also found that being of Fijian descent had a significant effect on outcomes and 
intrinsic motivations regardless of incentive type. Fijians had a higher probability of having 
positive attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control. In addition they had 
greater probability of choosing the more adaptive over non-adaptive investments. Looking 
back at threat appraisal, for Fijians the land and sea are deeply entwined into people’s sense 
of personal and cultural identity as evident in concepts like Vanua. The latter refers to the 
intimate relationship people have with the land and sea (Crosby, 2002; Bricker & Kerstetter, 
2006) which very much takes on a more holistic ‘community of beings’ worldview (Gadgil & 
Berkes, 1991). Here, humans are not seen to have dominion over the land, the sea and the 
species which populate it, but are seen as inextricably linked. Perhaps, it is this intimate 
relationship that draws Fijians towards adaptive investments when given the opportunity as it 
poses the least threat to their cultural identity. The elicitation of emotional responses through 
concepts such as Vanua could also incline people to adaptive investment options as it would 
enable them to protect their heritage. That Fijian’s were more inclined to opt for adaptive 
investments may be promising in generalising green incentives to other SIDS, especially in 
Polynesian islands and their outliers where similar folklores and associations with the land 
and sea exist (Thaman, 1994).  
We found that subjective norms were influenced positively by farm and fishing 
related occupations, whilst the effect was not as strong for perceived behavioural control and 
attitudes towards conservation. The effect of occupation on subjective norms is not 
surprising. Subjective norms after all consist of our perceptions of referent others beliefs 
regarding specific behaviour. As farmers and fishers are reliant on the land and sea for their 
livelihoods they can be expected to be more aware of climatic changes, and thus have more 
vocal opinions on how to behave in the face of such changes. That these groups believed it 
was important to protect their ecosystems is promising for conservation in Fiji and is evident 
in their traditional practices (Nainoca, 2011). We also found the probability of adaptive over 
non-adaptive investments was greater for farmers and fisher folk in the dynamic and green 
incentive conditions. For these groups, the least costly choice would have been the adaptive 
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option, as it provides the opportunity to safeguard against the potential loss of income in the 
immediate future and protects livelihoods in the long-run. 
Indo-Fijian’s formed the majority of the remaining ethnicity group. They were less 
likely to choose the adaptive investment regardless of loan condition. Looking at agricultural 
livelihoods in Fiji, Indo-Fijians predominantly are sugarcane farmers who work on leased 
lands (Narayan & Prasad, 2003). For this group perhaps the nature of land as lease-hold gives 
them less of an incentive to conserve the resource and more of an incentive to seek profit 
maximisation wherever possible. Regardless of occupation, in Fiji using marine and land 
resources often requires permission from the indigenous landowner (Trnka, 2005) which 
could influence their perception of responsibility for future upkeep of the resource. In 
addition, whilst Fijians live in village communities, Indo-Fijians often live in extended 
families. In the former it may be that responsibility for a resource is shared amongst the 
community and may go beyond financial concerns whilst in the latter it may be that the locus 
of responsibility is predominantly focused on the needs of the family system.   
We found that females and clan chiefs had a higher probability of positive perceptions 
of behavioural control. In Fiji women are very involved in the management of natural 
resources and have a rich tapestry of traditional ecological knowledge which may influence 
their control perceptions. Similarly for clan chiefs, as stewards of the land and sea, their 
ability to control resource use in their qoli qoli and land are reflected in their positive 
perceptions of behavioural control.  Interestingly however when presented with a green 
incentive chiefs had a negative correlation to stated adaptive behaviour – such that the 
probability of choosing non-adaptive portfolios was greater than for adaptive. For women, 
under the green incentive condition the probability of choosing adaptive portfolios whilst not 
significant was the strongest predictor of behaviour, with the probability of choosing adaptive 
loans being 0.771. This may suggest that targeting women to take up adaptive investment 
behaviours through green incentives could be beneficial.  
When looking at the frequency distributions of investment choice, we found that 
adaptive investments were chosen most often regardless of incentive type and lending model. 
The decision model that was offered to participants could be seen as decision making under 
risk (Damghani, Taghavifard, Moghaddam 2009). This implies that there is a level of 
uncertainty present and an inability to entirely control outcomes of one’s investment choice. 
The element of risk introduced in the experiment was climate. The climate variable impacted 
investment returns. In the no incentive condition, the riskier mixed and non-adaptive 
investments would have yielded greater returns more often. Looking at the simplest form of 
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decision making under risk – which assumes rationality, we would expect respondents to 
have used the information at hand to assign subjective probabilities to each investment choice 
under each climate event. It is assumed that a respondent would accept that investment which 
would maximise expected payoff – in this case the mixed loan.  
That the adaptive investment was chosen most often across all conditions does raise 
the concern of response bias. It could be assumed respondents chose the adaptive loan as they 
were primed to answer in an environmentally responsible manner considering that the survey 
preceded the experiment. Whilst response bias is always a threat, an alternative explanation is 
that adaptive loans, which provide the opportunity to conserve ecosystems (most directly 
through the provision of mangrove seedlings) and protect livelihoods, incorporate other 
values. As such  the choice of adaptive loans would go beyond monetary profit making 
decision rules and elicit a wider set of rules that are non-pecuniary in nature. Moral reasoning 
is also a consideration. With the possibility of the adaptive loans, our conception of the 
difference between right and wrong, and our understandings of justice may be engaged. As 
Kristiansen and Hotte (1996) state, “for moral actions, the nature of the self and the moral 
issue affect the process of moral reasoning and thereby value-attitude behaviour relations” 
(p.77). With strong cultural ties to the land and sea Pacific Islander’s may have a stronger 
moral connection to the natural world.  
Considering this, the choice of adaptive loans across all conditions could also indicate 
a protective mechanism against cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance describes the 
cognitive discord which arises through holding two or more conflicting beliefs. According to 
Festinger (1962) we strive to minimise disharmony which arises through holding conflicting 
attitudes and beliefs as it leads to psychological discomfort. Therefore those who were less 
inclined to taking risks and/or more inclined to environmentally protective behaviours, 
perhaps because of cultural norms, would have been more attracted to adaptive loans 
regardless of the loan condition.   
Whilst under prospect theory, the choice of adaptive loans could also be an indication 
of future profit maximisation and present loss aversion. This is in essence supporting the 
view that indigenous people, and in particular pacific islanders, are ‘natural conservationists’. 
For their societies to survive, small indigenous communities with a reliance on natural 
resources would have developed a culture of conservation as a measure to avoid loss 
(Johannes, 2002).  This is evident in their traditional practices, most perceptibly in those 
practices related to marine conservation. Further commenting on loss aversion, the sampled 
population were largely represented by the poor. For such a population Kahneman and 
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Tversky (1986) found that losses are weighted in a different manner, with all existing choices 
being between losses. The least costly choice is thus the most attractive. A good example of 
loss aversion can be seen in our finding that Fijians had a higher probability of choosing 
adaptive investments over non-adaptive across conditions whilst also displaying a greater 
positive affiliation with the natural world. For Fijians the adaptive choice would be the most 
attractive regardless of condition because in the long run it would be the least costly, 
protecting their cultural heritage and future yields whilst also reducing any stress that may 
arise through cognitive dissonance. In essence for this population adaptive loans may be seen 
as a self-protective mechanism (Li, Kenrick & Neuberg, 2012).  
A current microloan increased the probability of adaptive portfolios in the absence of 
incentives. Whilst under dynamic incentives access to microcredit had the opposite effect. 
This positive effect of a current microloan on adaptive investment choice could indicate that 
being in receipt of a current microloan gave people the confidence to engage in investments 
which take into account their future income and livelihood security over short-term coping 
strategies. This may be supported by a study by Mosley (2001) which looked at a small 
sample of rural and urban microfinance institutions in Bolivia. Overall, he found that the 
microfinance institutions had a positive impact on income and asset levels with poor 
households opting for low-risk, low-return assets which delivered longer term income 
security.  
That access to microcredit increased the probability of choosing moderately non-
adaptive investment portfolios only under the dynamic incentive condition would benefit 
from further investigation. It may be that access to credit can help to insulate consumption 
patterns from income variability from shocks by allowing households to take on more risky 
but profitable activities as was the case in the dynamic incentive condition (Hulme & 
Rutherford, 2002).  Within individual lending models, dynamic incentives have been shown 
to increase risky behaviour. Wydick (2010) found that such behaviour could be mitigated 
through group lending. As such a future direction could be to further investigate the incentive 
conditions under a properly designed joint-lending experiment.  
 Another important finding which links back to the previous chapter is that in the 
absence of information (the control treatment), the probability of non-adaptive investments 
was greater. This was only true though for the green and dynamic incentive conditions. It 
may be that these incentive structures presented a more cognitively demanding decision 
process. In order to simplify the decision process using the available information on returns 
could have weighted the non-adaptive investments as more attractive. When presented with 
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information on climate change, the respondent’s judgement of utility is repositioned by 
attention weights. Assuming that beliefs have intrinsic value, Golman and Lowenstein (2015) 
show, information can shift focus of attention and thus preference for certain choices.  They 
show how attention weights can specify how much a person is thinking about particular 
beliefs and, in turn, how much those beliefs directly impact utility. This also harkens back to 
Bénabou and Tirole (2003b) and the notion that imperfect-information regarding one’s own 
ability can be  a factor in deciding whether to pursue a task with short-term costs and long-
run payoffs.  
 
Overall, the finding that green incentive condition did induce people to take up 
adaptive investments more so then other loan conditions is promising. The adoption of 
adaptive technologies and behaviours which protect ecosystems were incentivized by 
converting the loan into a partial grant. This is similar to Wetlands International’s ‘Bio-
Rights’ model (Kaiser, Hübner, & Bogner 2005) however it differs in key ways. Firstly the 
loans can be made to individuals over groups, secondly it does not require complete buy in 
from the community, and thirdly it is not limited by enforceable property rights. In 
collectivist communities with strong subjective norms like those in Fiji (Van Deusen, 2009; 
Nainoca, 2011), the adoption of green loans by one member within a village may be 
sufficient in driving others to do the same. Indeed in communities with a strong established 
desire towards conservation (as perhaps indicated in Fiji with concepts such as Vanua and the 
widespread use of locally managed marine protected areas (Veitayaki, 2000)) microloans 
with green incentives are useful in getting people started with  adaptive measures.  
To conclude, the case study of Viti-Levu highlights the dynamics present in the 
uptake of green microloans. It is the first study to look at cognitive drivers of microloan 
uptake in a field setting.  We found that cognitive drivers are correlated with behavioural 
adoption which is bolstered further by incentive schemes.  For Governments and 
conservation agencies’ alike, this finding can help better devise lending conditions and 
adaptation initiatives. Merging environmental conditions into lending portfolios can be a cost 
effective way of reaching conservation and development targets in conjunction.  The 
randomised control field experiment was instigated to generate a model for green microloans. 
Through replicating the study in different contexts we can better assess its generalisability. 
However in the SIDS context in particular it is assumed the findings will hold as these 
microstates share a similarity in regards to their geospatial, socio-political, and economic 
characteristics as well as their connection to the ecosystems which they inhabit.  
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Adding to the limitations from the previous chapter, the survey experiment suffered 
from a major failing – that of ordered effects. The study failed to randomly rotate the 
incentive conditions. People were presented with the no incentive condition, when they had 
made their investment selections under that condition, they were presented with the dynamic 
incentive followed by the green incentive conditions. Subsequent analysis could mitigate this 
by rotating conditions. However Auspurg and Jackle (2012) show that there is variability on 
the presence of ordered effects in choice experiments, with some showing strong effects 
through fixed designs.  
An additional limitation is that of learning effects. By presenting people with two loan 
periods under each condition, they were able to learn from their first investment decision and 
use that to inform the next. However this could have been potentially mitigated by the 
presence of the random weather variable.  This ensured that respondents were unaware of the 
returns they would get in each loan period.   
Lastly the design of the incentive conditions makes it unclear as to what component of 
the green incentive is attributed to the uptake of adaptive investments. It could have been a) 
the information provided on the impact of investments on the ecosystem, b) the positive 
reinforcer of the partial grant for adaptive investments, c) the negative reinforce of higher 
interest rates for mixed and non-adaptive investments, d) or a mixture of all of these 
components. 
The solution would have been to deign three more incentives which teased apart points 
a through to c which would have allowed for a control against the confounding effect of the 
combined incentive structures represented in the green incentive condition. 
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10.1 ABSTRACT 
A multinomial logit model was used as a comparison to the path analysis in the 
previous chapter. The multinomial logit revealed that being Fijian, having a current 
microloan, and a point increase in perceived behavioural control increased the probability of 
choosing  adaptive investment options whilst being in the control treatment had the opposite 
effect. This complements our findings from the path Analysis. We also found that 
behavioural intention predicted stated behaviour only in certain choice categories across all 
conditions. Specifically it was associated with lower probability of choosing moderately non-
adaptive investments in the Dynamic and Green incentive conditions and increased the 
probability of choosing the mixed investment under the no incentive condition. The 
multinomial logit also revealed that farmers and fisher folk were more likely to choose 
moderately adaptive investments in the green incentive condition. Whilst path analysis has its 
limitations, the ability to simultaneously run equations to assess model fit, and its flexibility 
with complex models with causal structures makes it the preferred empirical method for this 
thesis, however multinomial logit can be a complementary method enhancing our 
understanding of the data. 
10.2 MEDIATION ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: 
 
The Structural Equation Modelling family of methods has gained prominence in some 
disciplines, allowing the flexibility of testing complex and often non-normal data through a 
set of indirect and direct relationships. These second generation multivariate techniques were 
developed as theory confirming analyses (Guarino, 2004). An alternative method to 
investigate categorical outcomes is multinomial logit regression. This extends binary 
regression to allow for more than two categories in the dependent variable. It is also flexible 
in that it does not assume normality, linerality, or homoscedasticity of the data.  
To question the current choice of our empirical model - namely mediation analysis 
To add to knowledge of first and second generation multivariate analysis methods by 
comparing the multinomial logit with path analysis. 
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Path Analysis sits within Structural Equation Modelling. Determining only the 
structural component of the causal model via observed variables. Whilst such modelling is 
growing in popularity in disciplines such as psychology and management, it is still 
approached with caution in others. The type of analysis proves attractive within these 
disciplines as it enables us to test more complicated models which are unable to be 
represented by multivariate and linear regression (Byrne, 2012). These second generation 
multivariate analysis methods  are an extension of the multi-variables family of regression. It 
tests model fit by comparing the covariance structure fit of the specified model to a best 
possible fit covariance structure, and allows for the simultaneous analysis of variables and 
measurement errors not aggregated in a residual error term (Gefen, Straub & Boudreau, 
2000).  McDonald and Ho (2002) distinguish path equations from regression equations as by 
saying that the latter “are essentially predictive and correspond to conditioning on 
observations of explanatory variables without manipulation—actual or theoretical… residuals 
in a linear regression equation are uncorrelated with the independent variables by definition. 
The disturbances (unexplained variations) in a path equation can be correlated with the causal 
variables in that equation.” (p.66). 
Whilst mediation analysis is attractive, it is not without its critics. With such methods 
there can be a tendency to wrongly infer causality (MacCallum & Austin, 2000), however 
this can only be shown through a true experimental method (such as a randomised control 
trial). In addition, one of the tenets of Structural Equation Modelling is to build your model 
on substantive theory, this a priori imposition of structure has been questioned with some 
suggesting that imposing structure does not automatically make the model sensible (Davcik, 
2014). If there is little theory on which to build ones model then other methods such as 
nonstructural or descriptive econometric models may be more appropriate.  
10.3 THE RANDOM UTILITY MODEL 
The random utility discrete choice model utilises the principle that a decision-maker 
will choose that outcome which maximises their utility. We can say: decision maker i can 
choose from a set of mutually exclusive alternatives, j=1,...J. 
The decision maker will obtain a degree of utility from each alternative. Whilst we 
cannot observe utility gain we can observe some attributes from the alternatives. The utility 
can be expressed by a deterministic Vij and random εij component. As εij is an unobserved 
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term, we are unable to exactly predict choice – instead we can say that the probability of an 
outcome is derived. 
We can express Utility as: 
EQUATION 10-1 
            
 
Utilising the framework of the multinomial logit regression we can model the 
probability if discrete outcomes. This method can enable us to measure the extent to which 
changes in the values of the independent variables will increase or decrease the probability of 
the event outcome – which in our case is respondent’s investment choice.  As with the 
structural equation modelling family of methods, multinomial logistic regression is 
considered an attractive analysis method for categorical data as it relaxes the assumptions of 
normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity.  
10.3.1 EMPIRICAL METHOD 
Multinomial Logit was carried out using STATA 13. Survey data was specified with 
the analysis clustered at the village level. With a Maximum Likelihood Multinomial Logit 
Model, the nature of the survey data (which specifies sampling weights) makes it difficult to 
test goodness-of-fit with typical measures such as the pseudo-R
2
 as the assumption that 
observations are independently and identically distributed is not met. An F-statistic however 
is given as a test of the null hypothesis – that all the slope parameters are jointly equal to 
zero. A significant F-statistic tells us that the relationship between the regressors and our 
dependent variable are significant and that we can reject the null hypothesis.  
So to look at the direct effects of the predictors on the outcome variable of investment 
choice by incentive type, the multinomial logit regression model for categorical outcomes can 
be specified as follows: 
EQUATION 10-2 
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This study introduced the incentive choice of respondents Yi into the framework of 
the equation above. We defined investment choice for the j for the ith respondent as:  
   
 
 
 
 
 
         
                                             
      
 
                          
                                    
              
 
 
 
 
 
One category was normalised in order to estimate the multinomial logit model. This 
category represents the reference state. The reference state in this approach is category 1: the 
choice of a purely adaptive portfolio. The normalised model is given by: 
 
EQUATION 10-3 
              
 
               
         
Here the alternative outcomes are represented by j. i denotes the individual, β is the 
vector parameter, xij is the vector of explanatory variables.  
The X explanatory variables consist of the direct mediators of behaviour (behavioural 
intention and perceived behavioural control) and the following factors: gender, ethnicity, 
income, occupation, prior microcredit participation, and current microloan. In order to 
interpret the results marginal effects were also estimated through the predicted probabilities 
of the categorical outcomes. The equation for marginal effects is given by: 
EQUATION 10-4 
    
   
              
 
   
             
Where    is the probability weighted average of the   . The log likelihood estimation to 
examine the probability of categorical membership is given by: 
EQUATION 10-5 
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Here   is the number of individuals who choose an outcome j. 
The multinomial logit was repeated for the different incentive conditions – namely, no 
incentive, dynamic incentive, and green incentive. 
Another multinomial logit model was specified for behavioural intention.  Using the 
same set of equations, the behavioural intention choice set was defined as:  
    
         
         
         
  
With X explanatory variables consisting of attitudes towards conservation, subjective 
norms, and perceived behavioural control.  
 
10.4 RESULTS 
The ensuing results are in line with the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives 
(IIA) hypothesis that is implicitly assumed at the outset of the estimating model. The IIA 
assumption was checked by running the Hausman-McFadden test. The associated test-
statistic is distributed as a χ2, and was found to be not significant. Following Hausman and 
MacFadden (1984), we take this as evidence in favour of the null hypothesis of equality of 
parameters, suggesting that the IIA holds and, ultimately, that the multinomial logit model is 
unbiased. The F-statistic was significant across all multinomial logit models (Moderators of 
Intention: F(6, 183)=9.72, p>F=0; Hausman χ2 (3)=0.17, p=0.983; No incentive: F(40, 
149)=9.09, p<0.001; Hausman χ2 (10)=0.11, p=1; Dynamic incentive: F(40, 149)=10.01, 
p<0.001; Hausman χ2 (10)=0.02, p=1; Green incentive: F(40, 149)=2.35, p<0.001; Hausman 
χ2 (10)=0.12, p=1, telling us that we can reject the null hypothesis that all the slope 
parameters are jointly equal to zero.  
 
When looking at stated behaviour, in general the marginal effects were quite small, 
with probabilities below 10% for the most part. However ethnicity was found to be the most 
significant predictor of stated behaviour.  
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10.4.1 ANTECEDENTS OF BEHAVIOURAL INTENTION 
To start we looked at the relationship between the constructs of the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour and behavioural intention. As hypothesised and consistent with the path model we 
found that the probability of positive behavioural intention increased with a one point 
increase in attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control by 0.067, 0.139, 
and 0.140 respectively.  
TABLE 10-1: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ON BEHAVIOURAL INTENTION 
Behavioural Intention ME S.E z p 
 
Negative 
Attitudes Towards 
Conservation -0.017 0.013 -1.330 0.183   
 
Subjective Norms -0.015 0.014 -1.140 0.254 
 
 
Perceived Behavioural 
Control -0.002 0.009 -0.160 0.871 
 
Moderate 
Attitudes Towards 
Conservation -0.049 0.040 -1.230 0.219 
 
 
Subjective Norms -0.123 0.042 -2.930 0.003 ** 
 
Perceived Behavioural 
Control -0.139 0.043 -3.250 0.001 *** 
Positive 
Attitudes Towards 
Conservation 0.066 0.039 1.700 0.089 * 
 
Subjective Norms 0.139 0.041 3.360 0.001 *** 
  
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 0.140 0.042 3.350 0.001 *** 
ME=Marginal Effects; p<0.10*, p<0.05**, p<0.001   
 
10.4.2 ADAPTIVE PORTFOLIO 
Holding everything else constant, in the no incentive condition, the conditional 
probability of choosing an adaptive portfolio in the control treatment significantly decreased 
by 0.128,  whilst access to credit significantly increased  the probability of choosing this 
portfolio by  0.271.  
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TABLE 10-2: MARGINAL EFFECTS - ADAPTIVE PORTFOLIO UNDER THE NO INCENTIVE CONDITION 
Adaptive ME S.E z P 
 Behavioural Intention -0.072 0.070 -1.020 0.309   
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 0.022 0.056 0.400 0.690 
 Control Group -0.128 0.063 -2.040 0.042 ** 
Farmer/Fisher 0.107 0.075 1.420 0.156 
 Female -0.013 0.065 -0.200 0.839 
 Fijian 0.143 0.088 1.630 0.104 
 Chief -0.023 0.119 -0.190 0.846 
 Y<F$10 0.041 0.064 0.640 0.521 
 Access to Credit 0.271 0.066 4.110 0.000 *** 
Current Microloan -0.006 0.030 -0.190 0.848   
ME=Marginal Effects; p<0.10*, p<0.05**, p<0.001 
 
In the dynamic incentive condition the probability of choosing an adaptive portfolio 
increased by 0.235 for Fijians and by 0.109 if one had access to microcredit. The control 
treatment significantly decreased the probability of choosing an adaptive investment portfolio 
by 0.142 as did having a current microloan by 0.108. 
TABLE 10-3: MARGINAL EFFECTS - ADAPTIVE PORTFOLIO UNDER THE DYNAMIC INCENTIVE 
CONDITION 
Adaptive ME S.E z P 
 Behavioural Intention 0.061 0.076 0.800 0.423   
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 0.003 0.042 0.060 0.952 
 Control Group -0.142 0.050 -2.850 0.004 ** 
Farmer/Fisher 0.026 0.069 0.380 0.705 
 Female 0.050 0.051 0.980 0.327 
 Fijian 0.235 0.048 4.890 0.000 * 
Chief 0.050 0.106 0.470 0.636 
 Y<F$10 -0.046 0.050 -0.920 0.355 
 Access to Credit 0.109 0.060 1.830 0.068 * 
Current Microloan -0.108 0.050 -2.180 0.029   
ME=Marginal Effects; p<0.10*, p<0.05**, p<0.001 
 
We see that in the green incentive condition, being in the control treatment 
significantly decreased the conditional probability of an adaptive portfolio by 0.182 whilst 
being Fijian increased the probability of choosing an adaptive portfolio by 0.524.  
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TABLE 10-4: MARGINAL EFFECTS - ADAPTIVE PORTFOLIO UNDER THE GREEN INCENTIVE CONDITION 
Adaptive ME S.E z P   
Behavioural Intention 0.072 0.068 1.060 0.290   
Perceived Behavioural 
Control -0.042 0.051 -0.820 0.410   
Control Group -0.182 0.061 -3.000 0.003 ** 
Farmer/Fisher -0.103 0.076 -1.360 0.173   
Female 0.091 0.063 1.450 0.148   
Fijian 0.524 0.057 9.270 0.000 *** 
Chief -0.048 0.124 -0.390 0.700   
Y<F$10 -0.018 0.061 -0.300 0.768   
Access to Credit 0.115 0.078 1.480 0.139   
Current Microloan -0.031 0.039 -0.790 0.427   
ME=Marginal Effects; p<0.10*, p<0.05**, p<0.001 
 
10.4.3 MODERATELY ADAPTIVE PORTFOLIO 
In the no incentive condition, being Fijian increased the probability of this choice by 
0.308.   
TABLE 10-5: MARGINAL EFFECTS - MODERATELY-ADAPTIVE PORTFOLIO UNDER THE NO INCENTIVE 
CONDITION 
Moderately Adaptive ME S.E z P 
 Behavioural Intention -0.007 0.073 -0.090 0.926   
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 0.012 0.053 0.230 0.819 
 Control Group 0.060 0.067 0.900 0.370 
 Farmer/Fisher -0.127 0.087 -1.470 0.142 
 Female 0.011 0.066 0.160 0.874 
 Fijian 0.308 0.057 5.390 0.000 ** 
Chief 0.188 0.130 1.440 0.149 
 Y<F$10 0.055 0.067 0.820 0.413 
 Access to Credit -0.013 0.076 -0.170 0.862 
 Current Microloan -0.040 0.038 -1.050 0.295   
ME=Marginal Effects; p<0.10*, p<0.05**, p<0.001 
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In the dynamic incentive condition, the control treatment significantly decreased the 
choice of the moderately adaptive portfolio by 0.110 whilst being Fijian increased the choice 
by 0.329. 
TABLE 10-6: MARGINAL EFFECTS - MODERATELY-ADAPTIVE PORTFOLIO UNDER THE DYNAMIC 
INCENTIVE CONDITION 
Moderately Adaptive ME S.E z P 
 Behavioural Intention 0.032 0.071 0.450 0.655   
Perceived Behavioural 
Control -0.038 0.056 -0.690 0.492 
 Control Group -0.110 0.061 -1.810 0.070 * 
Farmer/Fisher 0.045 0.085 0.530 0.594 
 Female 0.005 0.064 0.070 0.942 
 Fijian 0.329 0.055 5.990 0.000 * 
Chief -0.101 0.104 -0.980 0.329 
 Y<F$10 -0.018 0.063 -0.280 0.776 
 Access to Credit -0.098 0.071 -1.390 0.165 
 Current Microloan 0.062 0.037 1.680 0.093 *  
ME=Marginal Effects; p<0.10*, p<0.05**, p<0.001 
 
In the green incentive condition, occupation as a farmer or fisher increased the choice 
of moderately adaptive portfolio by a probability of 0.121, and being a chief significantly 
decreased by 0.188. 
TABLE 10-7: MARGINAL EFFECTS - MODERATELY-ADAPTIVE PORTFOLIO UNDER THE GREEN 
INCENTIVE CONDITION 
Moderately Adaptive ME S.E z P   
Behavioural Intention 0.038 0.069 0.540 0.588   
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 0.043 0.054 0.800 0.423   
Control Group 0.028 0.064 0.440 0.662   
Farmer/Fisher 0.132 0.068 1.930 0.053 * 
Female -0.061 0.063 -0.980 0.327   
Fijian 0.062 0.082 0.760 0.449   
Chief -0.188 0.075 -2.500 0.012  * 
Y<F$10 -0.008 0.063 -0.120 0.905   
Access to Credit -0.039 0.074 -0.520 0.601   
Current Microloan -0.002 0.042 -0.050 0.960   
ME=Marginal Effects; p<0.10*, p<0.05**, p<0.001 
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10.4.4 MIXED PORTFOLIO 
In the no incentive condition, as behavioural intention increased, the probability of 
choosing the mixed portfolio increased by 0.125. Whilst access to microcredit decreased the 
probability of this choice by 0.143. 
TABLE 10-8: MARGINAL EFFECTS - MIXED PORTFOLIO UNDER THE NO INCENTIVE CONDITION 
Mixed ME S.E z P 
 Behavioural Intention 0.125 0.069 1.800 0.071 * 
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 0.008 0.051 0.160 0.875 
 Control Group 0.062 0.052 1.190 0.233 
 Farmer/Fisher -0.057 0.077 -0.740 0.457 
 Female -0.051 0.052 -0.980 0.326 
 Fijian 0.037 0.085 0.430 0.665 
 Chief -0.086 0.075 -1.140 0.252 
 Y<F$10 -0.074 0.055 -1.360 0.175 
 Access to Credit -0.143 0.076 -1.870 0.061 * 
Current Microloan 0.021 0.031 0.680 0.499   
ME=Marginal Effects; p=0.9705; p<0.10*, p<0.05**, p<0.001 
 
In the dynamic incentive condition, being in the control treatment increased the 
probability of choosing this portfolio by 0.145. 
TABLE 10-9: MARGINAL EFFECTS - MIXED PORTFOLIO UNDER THE DYNAMIC INCENTIVE CONDITION 
Mixed ME S.E z P 
 Behavioural Intention -0.005 0.074 -0.070 0.947   
Perceived Behavioural 
Control -0.016 0.062 -0.260 0.795 
 Control Group 0.145 0.059 2.440 0.015 ** 
Farmer/Fisher -0.040 0.076 -0.530 0.596 
 Female -0.061 0.062 -0.980 0.325 
 Fijian 0.007 0.080 0.090 0.931 
 Chief 0.098 0.132 0.740 0.460 
 Y<F$10 0.069 0.063 1.100 0.270 
 Access to Credit 0.062 0.070 0.880 0.379 
 Current Microloan 0.033 0.038 0.870 0.382   
ME=Marginal Effects; p<0.10*, p<0.05**, p<0.001   
 
In the green incentive condition, there was no significant effect of the treatment group 
however a one unit increase in behavioural intention decreased the probability of choosing 
the same portfolio by 0.079.  
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TABLE 10-10: MARGINAL EFFECTS - MIXED PORTFOLIO UNDER THE GREEN INCENTIVE CONDITION 
Mixed ME S.E z P   
Behavioural Intention -0.079 0.046 -1.700 0.089  * 
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 0.032 0.044 0.730 0.468   
Control Group -0.001 0.045 -0.020 0.980   
Farmer/Fisher 0.015 0.047 0.310 0.753   
Female -0.042 0.041 -1.030 0.303   
Fijian -0.085 0.067 -1.270 0.206 
 Chief 0.185 0.128 1.440 0.149   
Y<F$10 -0.052 0.044 -1.180 0.239   
Access to Credit -0.044 0.057 -0.780 0.436   
Current Microloan -0.033 0.025 -1.290 0.198   
ME=Marginal Effects; p<0.10*, p<0.05**, p<0.001   
 
10.4.5 MODERATELY NON-ADAPTIVE PORTFOLIO 
In the no incentive condition, being Fijian significantly decreased the probability of 
choosing the moderately non-adaptive portfolio by 0.363. 
TABLE 10-11: MARGINAL EFFECTS - MODERATELY NON-ADAPTIVE PORTFOLIO UNDER THE NO 
INCENTIVE CONDITION 
Moderately Non-Adaptive ME S.E z P 
 Behavioural Intention -0.055 0.047 -1.160 0.244   
Perceived Behavioural 
Control -0.015 0.049 -0.310 0.758 
 Control Group 0.011 0.051 0.220 0.823 
 Farmer/Fisher 0.060 0.047 1.280 0.199 
 Female 0.041 0.049 0.830 0.409 
 Fijian -0.363 0.132 -2.760 0.006 *** 
Chief -0.058 0.113 -0.520 0.606 
 Y<F$10 -0.043 0.053 -0.800 0.425 
 Access to Credit -0.063 0.067 -0.950 0.343 
 Current Microloan 0.026 0.026 0.990 0.324   
ME=Marginal Effects; p<0.10*, p<0.05**, p<0.001   
 
In the dynamic incentive condition, a one unit increase in behavioural intention, and 
being Fijian decreased the probability of choosing this portfolio by 0.152, and 0.430 
respectively. Whilst being in the control treatment, and having a current microloan 
significantly increased the probability of choosing this portfolio by 0.144, and 0.060 
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respectively – though the marginal effect was quite weak in the latter. Perceived behavioural 
control increased the probability of moderately non-adaptive portfolio by 0.116. 
TABLE 10-12: MARGINAL EFFECTS - MODERATELY NON-ADAPTIVE PORTFOLIO UNDER THE DYNAMIC 
INCENTIVE CONDITION 
Moderately Non-Adaptive ME S.E z P 
 Behavioural Intention -0.152 0.056 -2.740 0.006 ** 
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 0.116 0.049 2.370 0.018 
 Control Group 0.144 0.053 2.730 0.006 ** 
Farmer/Fisher -0.048 0.080 -0.610 0.545 
 Female -0.003 0.055 -0.060 0.950 
 Fijian -0.430 0.087 -4.950 0.000 *** 
Chief 0.013 0.097 0.130 0.895 
 Y<F$10 -0.029 0.055 -0.530 0.596 
 Access to Credit -0.092 0.069 -1.320 0.186 
 Current Microloan 0.060 0.026 2.280 0.023 ** 
ME=Marginal Effects; p<0.10*, p<0.05**, p<0.001   
 
In the green incentive condition, as behavioural intention increased the probability of 
choosing moderately non-adaptive portfolio significantly decreased by 0.084, similarly being 
Fijian decreased the probability of the same portfolio by 0.422 whilst being in the control 
treatment, and to a lesser extent earning less than $10 a day, and having a current microloan 
increased the probability of choosing this portfolio by 0.110, 0.075, and 0.048 respectively.  
TABLE 10-13: MARGINAL EFFECTS - MODERATELY NON-ADAPTIVE PORTFOLIO UNDER THE GREEN 
INCENTIVE CONDITION 
Moderately Non-Adaptive ME S.E z P   
Behavioural Intention -0.084 0.031 -2.660 0.008 ** 
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 0.042 0.032 1.280 0.200   
Control Group 0.110 0.043 2.570 0.010 ** 
Farmer/Fisher -0.007 0.047 -0.140 0.888   
Female -0.029 0.043 -0.690 0.491   
Fijian -0.422 0.085 -4.960 0.000 *** 
Chief -0.107 0.044 -2.440 0.015   
Y<F$10 0.075 0.041 1.820 0.068 * 
Access to Credit 0.024 0.040 0.600 0.548   
Current Microloan 0.048 0.013 3.780 0.000 *** 
ME=Marginal Effects; p<0.10*, p<0.05**, p<0.001   
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10.4.6 NON-ADAPTIVE PORTFOLIO 
In the no incentive condition, as perceptions of behavioural control increased the 
probability of choosing this portfolio decreased by 0.027. Similarly being Fijian led to a 
decrease in choosing this portfolio by 0.021.  
TABLE 10-14: MARGINAL EFFECTS - NON-ADAPTIVE PORTFOLIO UNDER THE NO INCENTIVE 
CONDITION 
Non-Adaptive ME S.E z P 
 Behavioural Intention 0.008 0.015 0.520 0.605   
Perceived Behavioural 
Control -0.027 0.012 -2.360 0.018 ** 
Control Group -0.006 0.022 -0.280 0.776 
 Farmer/Fisher 0.018 0.015 1.150 0.251 
 Female 0.014 0.026 0.530 0.598 
 Fijian -0.021 0.009 -2.350 0.019 ** 
Chief -0.183 0.144 -1.270 0.204 
 Y<F$10 0.021 0.033 0.630 0.532 
 Access to Credit -0.052 0.037 -1.410 0.159 
 Current Microloan -0.001 0.002 -0.330 0.739   
ME=Marginal Effects; p<0.10*, p<0.05**, p<0.001   
 
In the dynamic incentive condition, having a current microloan significantly increased 
the choice of the non adaptive portfolio by 0.065. Whilst an increase in behavioural intention, 
perceived behavioural control, and being Fijian significantly decreased the likelihood of 
choosing this portfolio by 0.046, 0.064, and 0.149 respectively.  
TABLE 10-15: MARGINAL EFFECTS - NON-ADAPTIVE PORTFOLIO UNDER THE DYNAMIC INCENTIVE 
CONDITION 
Non-Adaptive ME S.E z P 
 Behavioural Intention -0.046 0.027 -1.720 0.086 * 
Perceived Behavioural 
Control -0.064 0.030 -2.110 0.035 ** 
Control Group -0.038 0.031 -1.200 0.231 
 Farmer/Fisher 0.017 0.027 0.630 0.529 
 Female 0.010 0.031 0.310 0.756 
 Fijian -0.140 0.050 -2.810 0.005 *** 
Chief -0.059 0.014 -4.120 0.000 
 Y<F$10 0.024 0.026 0.910 0.363 
 Access to Credit 0.019 0.040 0.470 0.638 
 Current Microloan 0.065 0.037 1.770 0.077 * 
ME=Marginal Effects; p<0.10*, p<0.05**, p<0.001   
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In the green incentive condition, an increase in intention, and being Fijian 
significantly decreased the probability of choosing a non-adaptive portfolio by 0.074, and 
0.079 respectively. Whilst a one unit increase in perceived behavioural control significantly 
increased the probability of this choice by 0.053 
TABLE 10-16: MARGINAL EFFECTS - NON-ADAPTIVE PORTFOLIO UNDER THE GREEN INCENTIVE 
CONDITION 
Non-Adaptive ME S.E z P   
Behavioural Intention -0.074 0.039 -1.900 0.057 * 
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 0.053 0.030 1.750 0.081 * 
Control Group 0.045 0.027 1.690 0.092   
Farmer/Fisher -0.037 0.035 -1.070 0.287   
Female 0.042 0.039 1.090 0.277   
Fijian -0.079 0.046 -1.720 0.085 * 
Chief 0.158 0.123 1.280 0.201   
Y<F$10 0.003 0.030 0.090 0.926   
Access to Credit -0.056 0.034 -1.640 0.102   
Current Microloan 0.018 0.006 2.790 0.005 ** 
ME=Marginal Effects; p<0.10*, p<0.05**, p<0.001   
 
10.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It has been suggested that the piecemeal method of analyzing moderation and 
mediation by estimating separate multinomial logit models, cannot provide information on 
unique incremental relationships between a system of variables, nor can it reveal mediated 
effects (Edwards & Lambert, 2007). As Duncan (1966) argues, the contribution of path 
analysis over the conventional regression framework is that it provides a calculus for indirect 
effects which become evident through the explicit representation of a causal scheme.   We 
cannot do a full comparison of results (for instance by comparing the difference in 
probabilities) as we would expect the multinomial logit and the path analysis to differ.  
One reason why discrepancies in results between the two methods would arise is due 
to the types of estimators employed. In Mplus with categorical variables, weighted means and 
variance adjusted least square (WLSMV) estimator is employed. Asparouhov (2005) 
compared this estimator with and without the weights and found that there was a bias when 
the weights were omitted, showing substantial selection bias arises if the weights are not 
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incorporated in the analysis. The estimator used in mutinomial logit is Maximum Likelihood 
(ML), Beauducel and Herzberg (2006) compared ML to WLSMV and found that the latter is 
better for smaller samples (N=250) and for outcomes with two or three categories. They note 
that the over rejection of correct models has been found for WLSMV estimation when based 
on variables with five and six categories and the same for ML estimation based on variables 
with five and six categories. Li (2014) also found that structural coefficients under ML 
outperformed WLSMV under symmetric data conditions but under asymmetric (as our study 
is) WLSMV was better and the robust standard errors of structural coefficients were also 
more precise.  
In path analysis, once path coefficients are estimated they are used to calculate the 
reproduced correlations through path decomposition. This process of computing all the 
underlying correlations between variables (i.e. indirect and direct effects) and is used to 
assess how closely the specified model fits with the empirical data.  Path analysis can add a 
causal relationship structure which multinomial logit cannot. It has been shown that there can 
be a substantial difference between the direct effect and the total effect including indirect 
effect (Ahn, 2002). In addition, another factor to consider is that the coefficients estimated by 
Mplus for categorical/nominal outcomes are probit rather than logit coefficients.  
Lastly, in mediated models the correlations between variables is decomposed into 
their direct and indirect effects. If income directly affects investment choice and indirectly 
through its affect on attitudes then there will also be a correlation between perceived 
behavioural control and investment choice which will also reflect the influence of income on 
perceived behavioural control which enables you to account for spurious relationships.  
However we did find similarities in both model predictions. We found that 
behavioural intention did play a role in subsequent stated behaviour for certain choice sets. 
Comparing the multinomial logit and the path analysis from the previous chapter we find the 
direction of effect to be similar when examining the antecedents of behavioural intention. 
Meaning positive attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control significantly 
predicted positive behavioural intention.  
In addition we found that as intention increased it decreased probability of choosing 
the moderately non-adaptive portfolio under dynamic incentives and decreased the 
probability of mixed and non-adaptive portfolios in green incentive conditions. An increase 
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in intention also increased the probability of choosing the mixed portfolio in the no incentive 
condition. Perceived behavioural control also was found to reduce the probability of choosing 
the non-adaptive portfolios across all but the green incentive condition for the choice of a 
non-adaptive portfolio. The results relating to intention, specifically across the green 
incentive condition are congruent with the path analysis and the hypothesis that incentives do 
not crowd-out internal drivers to act.  
As we saw in the path analysis, not receiving climate change information (i.e being in 
the control treatment) increased the probability of choosing non-adaptive investment options, 
whilst across both models, being Fijian also increased the probability of choosing adaptive 
investments.  Ethnicity was the strongest predictor of stated behaviour.  
The multinomial logit was able to add to our understanding of the path analysis data. 
For example, looking at the impact of access to credit and being a current microcredit 
participant, in the path analysis under the dynamic and no incentive conditions, access to 
credit was positively correlated with more adaptive investments, whilst holding a current 
microloan was negatively correlated with more adaptive investments. Whilst we cannot 
compare the probabilities because of their different functional forms, we can see that the 
probabilities of choosing across the different investments share directionality. 
One way to test these findings would be to execute the multinomial logit with the 
WLSMV estimator, which we went on to do (albeit a multinomial probit) and the results of 
which can be found in Appendix F. As Stata does not enable you to choose between 
estimators, this was done through MPlus where the WLSMV link with clustered data is a 
probit function. The results were less pronounced then the path analysis regarding the 
difference in probabilities across variables. We also found that the effect of intention on 
behaviour, which we previously saw in the green incentive condition as a mediated effect, 
was no longer evident as a significant mediator of stated behaviour. Under our theoretical 
model, it has been shown that intention alone is not a sufficient determinate of behaviour 
(Kiriakidis, 2015; Armitage & Conner, 2001). Thus path analysis would seem the more 
appropriate analysis method for this thesis as it allows us to simultaneously decompose 
parameters and get more unbiased coefficients and error terms which may arise from model 
misspecification  (Swamy et al, 2010). 
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Whilst in the path analysis income was a significant predictor of stated behaviour in 
the dynamic incentive condition, increasing the probability of non-adaptive investment 
choices, that effect was found here for the green incentive condition for the moderately non-
adaptive investment choice. In addition, in the multinomial logit we found that within the 
green incentive condition, occupation as a farmer or fisher increased the choice of the 
moderately adaptive portfolio. As this is our target population, this tells us that the green 
incentive condition was engaging farmers and fisher folk to take on more adaptive 
investments.  Why this effect was not found in the path analysis requires further investigation 
as this can be a potentially useful finding for policymakers. The green incentive condition 
was allowing famers and fisher folk to take up the moderately adaptive strategy as the 
equilibrium outcome. Enabling these groups to take up adaptive strategies through 
microloans with green incentives in Small Island Developing States can contribute to food  
and livelihood security.  
One of the benefits of multinomial logit is that it can tell us how the probability of an 
outcome significantly changes at each choice level.  However by not considering the additive 
and multiplicative transitions in the variance and covariances of the variables the results may 
over or under-represent some effects (Alavifar, Karimimalayer & Anuar, 2012). In addition 
in the next chapter we opt for a more complex model as Schwab (2002) offers sample size 
guidelines for multinomial logistic regression as a minimum of 10 cases per independent 
variable, the small sample size of the data in this thesis means that the model specified 
utilising multinomial logit and varieties of structural equation modelling is limited in its 
complexity.  
We justify the use of path analysis because of: 
 Its flexibility with more complex models (can model multiple outcomes at once and 
can have levels of independent and dependent variables whereas this is not the case in 
multinomial logit you can have only a dependent variable and a set of independents) 
 Model specification is based on theory and specifies relations a priori which suits the 
nature of this thesis, which test the established Theory of Planned Behaviour 
 It is a multivariate technique. Parameter estimates and overall fit statistics are 
determined by solving multiple related equations simultaneously. For this thesis, 
where we are testing the theoretical framework of the theory of planned behaviour, 
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the ability to determine how well the overall model and data match  is main reason for 
choosing path analysis over multinomial logit. In the latter we can only assess fit in a 
piecemeal fashion.   
 Path analysis also recognises the imperfect nature of measures by specifying residual 
error terms which reflects unexplained variance and measurement error of variables 
(Suhr, 2008).  
 Path analysis is estimated using the Means and Variance Adjusted Weighted Least 
Squares Estimator which is more robust to non-normal data and small sample sizes.   
 The graphical language of path analysis is a simple way to present complex 
relationships 
Path analysis is by no means the perfect empirical method, it has its limitations in that 
it does not imply causality, and can have interpretation difficulties. In addition we are unable 
to assess the marginal effects of predictors on each level of the outcome variable as in 
multinomial logit. In addition Cole and Preacher (2014) argue that path analysis with fallible 
measures can lead to measurement error and the over or under-estimation of coefficients, 
though this is true for multinomial regression as well. As both strategies have their merits and 
failing, our understanding of the data is ameliorated by the use of both techniques.  
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11 THE EFFECT OF SHOCKS90,  RESOURCE DEEPENDENCE AND 
PERCEIVED SEVERITY ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES 
ON THE INTERNAL DRIVERS OF BEHAVIOUR, AND STATED 
ADAPTIVE INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR 
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90 Perceived shocks and perceived threats are used interchangeably in this chapter. 
91
 Pine forests in Nausori Highlands by a sugar cane plantation. The pine trees are blackened 
by soot from slash and burn agricultural practices.  
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11.1 ABSTRACT 
Climate change adaptation is of vital importance for Small Island Developing States. 
To motivate uptake of climate adaptive investments, we must attempt to identify the broader 
set of motives which may drive the stated investment behaviour. Through the framework of 
the Theory of Planned Behaviour this study attempts to understand the moderators of 
behaviour by exploring resource dependence, perceived shocks, socio-demographic, and 
environmental and social issues which people may face. Using path analysis, it was found 
that perceived threats, and resource dependence could significantly impact cognitive 
antecedents of behaviour – negatively impacting perceived behavioural control in particular. 
Perceived severity and the aforementioned also moderated subsequent stated behaviour, with 
greater variability between between adaptive and non-adaptive investment choices under the 
no incentive and dynamic incentive conditions. The latter had a greater probablity of agents 
choosing non-adaptive over adaptive investments whilst in the former the opposite was true.  
11.2 INTRODUCTION 
The longevity and success of Homo sapiens sapiens over other hominin species can 
be told of as a story of successful biological and behavioural adaptation. In the relatively 
small space of time we have existed, we have faced drastic climatic events which have gone 
on to shape us, by enabling the evolution of behaviours to ensure our survival. This ability to 
adapt and to change the environment to meet our needs is also a cause for our current 
predicament. Anthropogenic climate change, associated with carbon emissions and land-use 
change, is distinct from natural climate variability, and can possibly be framed as the result of 
maladaptive behaviours. The ability of humanity to adapt is not in question. We have a long 
track record of successful attempts. Instead the question becomes how we can facilitate the 
most efficient adaptation to the current and future pressures of climate change.  
In the preceding chapters, under the framework of the theory of planned behaviour, 
the possibility of risk and threat exposure impacting adaptive behaviour was discussed. This 
chapter examines this by looking at how resource dependence, exposure to global and local 
shocks, and perceived severity of environmental and other socio-economic issues impact the 
antecedents of behaviour and subsequent stated behaviour. The purpose of this study is to 
better understand the mediators and moderators of behaviour, and its antecedents, to identify 
some of the barriers that may arise in  the adoption of stated climate change adaptive 
investments under different microloan incentive conditions by asking: 
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To the best of the author’s knowledge this is the first experimental study to look at 
exposure to shocks, perceived severity of environmental and socio-economic issues and the 
cognitive antecedents of stated adaptive investment behaviour. The study contributes to our 
understanding of the external (dependence on resources, climate and other risk exposure) and 
internal (attitudes, perceived behavioural control, subjective norms and perceived importance 
of environmental and social issues) factors that influence adaptive decisions.  In doing so, it 
contributes to the literature on drivers of environmentally protective behaviour and how they 
affect the investment decisions of people living by or near fragile ecosystem through the case 
study of a Small Island Developing State (SIDS), namely the island of Viti-Levu in Fiji.   
 
 
Are threat appraisal and resource dependence moderators of the cognitive antecedents of 
behaviour as  specified by the Theory of Planned Behaviour? 
• Where threat appraisal is defined as exposure to shocks - according to the Protection 
Motivation Theory when a threshold level of threat is experienced it instigates 
coping appraisal (or our efficacy to deal with the threat) which then mediates 
intention to act on the threat. In Fiji, with flooding and cyclones increasing in 
severity and frequency our alternative hypothesis is that schocks and resource 
dependence will impact the cognitive antecedents of behaviour.  
Do global and local shock exposure, resource dependence, and the perceived severity of 
environmental and socio-political issues  pose a barrier to the adoption of stated 
adaptive investment behaviour under different microloan incentive conditions? 
• The response options available to people will form their coping response which will 
be reflected in their choice of investment portfolios as either maladative or adaptive 
investments. 
• We hypothesis that the different incentive conditions will influence coping response. 
If people have positive internal motivations (which is reflected in behavioural 
intention), then we hypothesise that a) people will take on an adaptive coping 
response in congruence with their internal motivations when faced with shocks and 
perceived severity of issues and b) that this effect will be strongest under green 
incentives which will facilitate adaptive coping response. 
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11.2.1 WIDER MODERATORS OF BEHAVIOUR 
In the previous chapters we have explored the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). 
Whilst we have found that our data has supported the theoretical model, it is by no means a 
perfect theory of behaviour. For one, to test it we must rely on self-reported measures of 
attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control, which can cast doubt on the 
conclusions you can draw. Secondly the TPB conjectures that internal factors (like attitudes) 
are most important. However external factors – such as climate and other socio-economic 
threats can be important too.  The TPB cannot identify wider moderators or barriers which 
may influence subsequent behaviour. This can limit its real world utility (Ejeta, Ardalan, & 
Paton , 2014).  
We wish to examine how some of these factors may moderate the constructs within 
the theory of planned behaviour and subsequent stated investment behaviour especially as 
studies have shown exposure to a disaster can influence subsequent behaviour. For instance 
personal physical exposure to natural disaster was shown to lead to a temporary decrease in 
observed risk aversion, especially for older adults and the poor, with the effect increasing 
with the severity of the event (Ingwersen, 2014). Whilst threats to livelihoods such as crop 
damage and livestock predation have been shown to negatively influence conservation 
attitudes as has resource dependence (Baral & Heinen, 2007; Mir, Noor, & Khan, 2015).  
Chokor’s (2004) investigation into environmental concerns and resource values of the 
rural poor living by the Niger Delta is one study which shows how important it is to 
understand the different moderating factors of common pool resource use in rural 
populations. He assessed perceptions of severity of environmental issues utilising a scale that 
has been adapted for the Fiji context in this study. He found that in acutely deprived, 
communities there was no sharp separation between the anthropocentric and ecocentric bases 
of people’s environmental concerns and that with poor farmers the severity of issues could 
influence subsequent behaviour. For instance, he found that soil fertility losses, declining 
yields and land scarcity had led people to have less confidence in more traditional 
environmentally friendly processes. He found that these groups are environmentally rational 
however their lack of assets and resources meant that they were less able to embrace 
traditional environmental conservation measures. 
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11.2.2 THE PROTECTION MOTIVATION THEORY (PMT) 
A competing theory to the TPB is that of  Protection Motivation Theory (PMT). It is a 
particularly attractive model when looking at environmental behaviours because of its 
inclusion of two types of cognitive appraisals which we undergo in the face of environmental 
or interpersonal cues. These are threat and coping appraisal. Threat appraisal refers to one’s 
assessment of the severity of threat presented and one’s vulnerability to said threat. Threat 
appraisal can lead to fear appeal, or the affective state of fear (Maddux & Rogers, 1983). For 
example, for a person living in London, if we perceive the severity of the Ebola virus to be 
quite high but do not expect to be effected by this threat then levels of fear are also low and 
no steps may be taken in protecting oneself against infection. If however we lived in Sierra 
Leone, we may assess Ebola to be a severe threat and one that we are particularly vulnerable 
to. As one’s level of fear increases, it may prompt a greater protective mechanism.  Once a 
threshold level of threat is experienced, coping appraisal is elicited. As such how we protect 
ourselves is a direct response to threat appraisal and involves coping appraisal (Maddux & 
Rogers, 1983). 
Coping appraisal is quite simply the appraisal of the relative (to our own beliefs and 
capabilities) coping mechanisms available to us.  It consists of response efficacy, self efficacy 
and response costs. Response efficacy refers to our assessment of the effectiveness of the 
coping behaviour under consideration to neutralise the threat. Self efficacy is the assessment 
of our own ability to carry out the coping behaviour whilst response costs refer to the costs, 
both tangible and intangible, in carrying out the behaviour. Coping appraisal is similar to the 
concept of perceived behavioural control in the TPB. Both are related to Bandura’s (1982) 
self-efficacy concept, which refers to perceptions of personal ability. However perceived 
control allows for the addition of external factors (such as anticipated resources) which may 
influence our ability to carry out an action. In the PMT, high threat appraisal, positive 
response and self efficacy can induce greater adoption of a protective behaviour, however if 
the behaviour carries high costs then adoption will be negatively affected (Maddux & Rogers, 
1983).  
The PMT has been widely applied to health protective behaviours (Milne, Sheeran & 
Orbell, 2000). In a meta-analysis, Milne and colleagues (2000) found that the PMT was 
effective in predicting current over future behaviour and the threat and coping components of 
the model were of utility in predicting behavioural intentions. They also found that risk 
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perception was positively correlated with maladaptive health protective behaviours, 
indicating that high levels of perceived threat elicit a coping mechanism which may not 
necessarily be adaptive.  
The perception of threat posed by anthropogenic climate change is complex. The 
climate movement which begun to take root in the early seventies with the first United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, presented a far reaching and highly 
complex global problem which would require collective action across scales to secure the 
earth for future generations. It presented a threat where the costs of action could be high and 
where impacts would only slowly play out in an uncertain future. It could be that for people 
for whom the effects of climate change are not pertinent no threat response is evoked and 
thus no coping strategy deployed. In addition, the media’s portrayal of climate change, which 
generally appeals to fear motives and the distinct lack of useful information on adaptive and 
mitigative behaviours could also be a reason for maladaptive behaviours (Moser, 2010; 
Meneses, 2010). These behaviours can be as simple as denial, and taking on a business as 
usual stance.   
The  PMT has been gaining prominence in the study of climate change adaptation 
behaviours but remains limited in scope with only a handful of studies available (Grothmann 
and Patt, 2005; Grothmann & Reusswig 2006; Osberghaus, Finkel & Pohl, 2010; Dang, Li, 
Nuberg & Bruwer, 2014; Menzel & Scarpa, 2005). Grothmann and Patt (2005) adjusted the 
PMT to create a ‘socio-cognitive model of proactive private adaptation to climate change 
impacts’. In their model when a significant level of threat is detected, coping appraisal is 
activated. This in turn can lead to either adaptive or maladaptive coping responses. In the 
case of adaptive responses, intention to carry out the behaviour is formed. Intention can lead 
to actual behaviour if objective adaptive capacity is sufficient. The latter refers to things like 
adequate resources, support, knowledge, and money. Grothmann and Patt (2005) found 
support for their model through two distinct case studies: one looking at flood protection in 
Germany through private precautionary measures (Grothmann & Reusswig, 2006) and the 
other looking at subsistence farmer’s adaptive behaviour in Zimbabwe (Grothmann & Patt, 
2005). In the former, they found that the socio-cognitive model elicited greater explanatory 
power then the socio-economic model where income in particular failed to show significance 
in relation to adaptation. The qualitative Zimbabwe case study found that despite having the 
resources at hand (namely more resilient seeds) to adapt, a lack of intention was limiting the 
use of adaptive actions. This lack of intention was shown to arise from low risk perception, 
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despite climate information to the contrary, and the assessment of the utility of adaptive 
actions which were unfavourably perceived.   
In another German study, Osberghaus, Finkel and Pohl (2010) presented locally and 
globally focused information on climate change to a sample of people in Mannheim.  They 
found that increased perceived personal risk was associated with a higher need to adapt to the 
climate change impacts. However information was not a significant factor in the desire to 
engage in adaptive behaviour. They note that factors such as subjective norms could act as a 
barrier to behavioural change. In contrast, Dang and colleagues (2014) conducted face-to-
face interviews with 598 farm households across 13 provinces in the Mekong delta to 
investigate farmer’s assessment of climate change adaptation measures through the 
framework of the PMT. Through detailed questionnaires they explored perceived self-
efficacy, perceived adaptation efficacy and perceived adaptation costs. They found that belief 
in climate change, access to information and the usefulness and ease of access to objective 
resources, such as credit and agricultural extension, particularly influenced farmer’s 
assessment of adaptive measures.  
Lastly Scarpa & Menzel (2005) applied the constructs of the PMT to a contingent 
valuation study in an attempt to identify the primary sources of preferences that lead to a 
German samples willingness to pay for biodiversity conservation in developing countries. 
They provide a deeper understanding for the finite heterogeneity in preferences and 
supplement the preferred rational agent models that prevail economic theory with 
psychological rationality. They found that the application of PMT to payments for 
biodiversity protection revealed different forms of perceived realism for stated willingness to 
pay. For instance they found that problem focused people who perceived biodiversity can be 
protected, and believed that their payment could make a positive difference, also had a higher 
willingness to pay.   
To recap, in the PMT threat appraisal moderates coping appraisal which is akin to 
perceived behavioural control. With an adaptive coping response, intention to carry out the 
response in formed. By looking at exposure to shocks and resource dependence we add a 
dimension of threat appraisal to the framework of the TPB. We add severity of threats as 
moderators of behaviour as we cannot be sure of the causal path between the antecedents of 
behaviour and  perceptions of severity in our study.  
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We hypothesize that threat appraisal will moderate attitudes and subjective norms in 
addition to perceived behavioural control. Studies have shown that for adaption to climate 
change in farmers particularly is significantly influenced by perceptions and attitudes (Evans, 
Storer & Wardell-Johnson, 2010), whilst Dang (2014) noted that within the framework of the 
PMT subjective norms was a significant predictor of climate change adaptive behaviours in 
rice farmers in the Mekong delta.  
11.2.3 COLLECTIVE-RISK SOCIAL DILEMMA 
It is clear that anthropogenic climate change places a very real threat to the wellbeing 
of human and non-human species globally. In chapter 1 we saw that protecting the global 
climate, forests and the oceans requires collective action (Dietz & Ostrom, 2003). For 
individuals to not pollute rivers, to not overfish, to not burn forests and to not completely 
deplete natural resources places one in a social dilemma known as the tragedy of the 
commons (Hardin, 1968). The special case of a collective-social risk dilemma arises when a 
group must cooperate to reach a shared goal, which may lead to negative short-term 
economic effects,  in order to avoid the risk of a much greater collective future loss. The scale 
of the problem can dilute the urgency for individual action, and the temptation to free-ride on 
the contributions of others can become a pervasive issue. Generally we would expect the 
outcome of such a commons dilemma, under the lens of a rational-choice game theoretic 
perspective, to be the maximization of individual profits by approaching the Nash 
equilibrium of over-using the common-pool resource. However such a perspective cannot 
take into account the broad cognitive limitations (such as threat appraisal) and risk on 
individual decision making. By integrating cognitive models with choice experiments we 
may be able to better understand the cognitive pathways people employ to make decisions 
regarding the uptake of adaptive behaviours which would yield communal benefits in the 
long-run.  
In Fiji, an example of a collective risk dilemma can be seen in declining marine 
health. With a strong culture of subsistence fishing, failing marine ecosystems would greatly 
impact communities. To better govern this common pool resource, a collective risk solution 
for marine protection was formulated. Combining traditional ecological knowledge and 
modern conservation practices, community managed marine protected areas with ‘Tabu’ or 
no-take zones were set-up. The desire to free-ride is in part held in check through non-
pecuniary social and cultural incentives (Cinner & Aswani, 2007; Aswani, 2010).  
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Envisioning initiatives to address collective risk dilemmas could benefit from models of 
cognition (Kuruppu & Liverman, 2011) such as the PMT or the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour. It can identify the threat appeals which cause maladaptive or adaptive coping 
responses and can further indicate the utility of incentives.  
Our understanding of how exposure to risk influences threat and coping appraisal in 
vulnerable communities and their subsequent uptake of adative behaviours is limited. As yet, 
no study has looked at how risk exposure impacts the uptake of adaptive investment 
behaviours under different incentive conditions. As such this study aims to identify the  
motives which may influence the uptake of adaptive measures through the framework of the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour.   
11.3 CASE-STUDY CLIMATE RISK CHARACTERISTICS 
These questions are examined by using data from a survey-based experiment and 
survey questionnaire carried out on a sample of 205 people living in or near fragile 
ecosystems on the island of Viti-Levu in Fiji between November 2012 and January 2013. The 
selected case-study is of relevance as Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are generally 
amongst the most vulnerable to the pressures of climate change with high risk and low 
adaptive capacity (Pelling & Uitto, 2001). In addition the South Pacific has the additional 
stressors of El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) impacts.   
Strong natural variability across timescales is characteristic of our earth’s climate. 
Internal chaotic nonlinear dynamics of the oceans and the atmosphere coupled with the 
interactions between them generate variability across timescales. Events such as ENSO is an 
example of internal climatic forcing. External forcing can also influence the climate system.  
Anthropogenic climate change can be seen as an external force. At present, climate 
models are uncertain of the effects such external forcing has on ENSO events but regardless 
we do know that together these two influences on the climate system can result in more 
extreme climate events (Latif & Keenlyside, 2009). In 2012 the Fiji meteorological service 
established 13 new rainfall and 14 new temperature extremes. Two major floods occurred in 
January and March, with the March floods being the worst recorded in Nadi at that time. A 
severe tropical cyclone (Evan) affected Fiji in December 2012, with very strong and 
destructive storm, gales and hurricane force winds. Earlier tropical disturbances within the 
South Pacific also indirectly affected Fiji in 2012 (Fiji Meteorological Service, 2013). Since 
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the end of 2012, Fiji has continued to experience uncharacteristic and extreme climate events 
such as September 2014’s drought (Fiji Meteorological Service, 2014) and the devastating 
Cyclone Winston in February 2016. Whilst Fiji has always been affected by ENSO, the 
impacts of anthropogenic climate change which include ocean acidification, sea level rise, 
increasing temperatures, and more intense cyclones, are becoming more prevalent in recent 
decades (Kumar, Stephens & Weir, 2014; Banholzer, Kossin & Donner, 2014). 
Generally, disaster risk exposure (natural, economic crisis, and war) is a greater threat 
to the poor then for other population groups as they by and large experience greater exposure 
to the threats and have a lower risk bearing capacity (Pantoja, 2002). The uptake of adaptive 
measures becomes ever more important in order to increase the risk bearing capacity of these 
vulnerable groups. As we have seen information and the availiablity of resources such as 
credit can influence one's assesment of adaptive measures. Indeed access to microfinance can 
be an important tool in reducing risk taking behaviour by providing a safety net following a 
disaster (Arnold, 2008), which give people the tools through which to take up adaptive 
behaviours (Hammill, Matthew & McCarter, 2008), and empowering them in their daily lives 
(Odek et al, 2009). 
The compounding social, political, economic (Siikala, 2014; Prasad, 2014), and 
environmental concerns (Brooks & Adger, 2013) which are evident in Fiji make it an ideal 
site to explore what kind of threats influence the uptake of climate adaptive investment 
behaviours. The study contributes to our understanding of the drivers behind climate adaptive 
investment decisions, and in particular the influence of threats on such decisions. In addition 
it contributes to policy development and best practice for engaging people to take up adaptive 
investments by conceiving of ways in which to miminise threats. 
11.4 RESEARCH AND EMPIRICAL METHOD 
The survey preceded the framed field experiment and consisted of general 
demographic questions, resources use questions, perception of severity of socio-economic 
and environmental issues, risk exposure in the past year and psychological questions relating 
to subjective norms, perceived behavioural control and attitudes.  
The psychological and demographic constructs were the same as in the previous 
study. The survey also asked questions pertaining to global and local risk exposure, resource 
dependence, and the perceived severity of environmental and socio-economic issues. The 
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division of global and local risk consists of climate shocks experienced by many (Global) and 
shocks which may be more localised, pertaining to individuals. The severity of environmental 
and socio-economic issues were informed by Chokor (2004) who created a scale of 
environmental problems in rural Nigeria. Only those items relevant to Fiji were included and 
these were  
The same experimental method was employed as in the previous chapter. Using 
Mplus Version 6 (Muthen & Muthen 2011), a Path Analysis with Means and Variance 
Adjusted Weighted Least Square Estimator was specified. 
The Equations of the path model can be expressed as: 
EQUATION 11-1 
                                                                         
Where: Y1(Attitudes), Y2(Subjective Norms), Y3(Perceived Behavioural Control) 
                                   
 
                                                              
                                          
 
Where: U1(No Incentive Investment Choice), U2(Dynamic Incentive Investment 
Choice),U3(Green Incentive Investment Choice), and βx is perceived behavioural control. 
With conditional probabilities given by: 
EQUATION 11-2 
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Keeping in mind that Ui investment choice consisted of the following categories: 
                  
 
 
 
 
 
         
                                             
      
 
                          
                                    
              
 
 
 
 
 
11.5 RESULTS 
11.5.1 DESCRIPTIVES 
The same demographic characteristics apply as in the preceding chapter. Looking at 
the frequency distribution of perceived negative climate events we see that the majority of 
respondents did report experiencing the global shocks of floods (63.90%) and cyclones 
(90.24%; Table 5.3). This is in line with actual climate data for the year 2012 when Viti-Levu 
was hit by flash floods in January and March. In addition cyclone Evan was making its way 
through Viti-Levu in December, during the period of data collection. These constituted the 
most reported shocks, followed by local shock of crop disease (29.27%). Respondents were 
most reliant on marine and non-agricultural forest products in the dry season (60.97% and 
60.49% respectively). Cost of living (68.29%), water pollution (78%), forest destruction 
(36.59%), crime (32.68%), and soil infertility (29.27%) were cited as severe issues that 
people in Fiji faced. 
TABLE 11-1: FREQUENCY AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES, RESOURCE 
DEPENDENCE, PERCEIVED THREATS AND SEVERITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND OTHER ISSUES 
            Frequency   
  Variables Mean sd Min Max 0 1 % 
  Demographic and Contextual               
X1 Y<F$10 0.356 0.480 0 1 132 73 35.610 
X2 Chief 0.073 0.261 0 1 190 15 7.317 
X3 Fijian 0.751 0.433 0 1 51 154 75.122 
X4 Female 0.424 0.495 0 1 118 87 42.439 
X5 Farmer/Fisher 0.776 0.418 0 1 46 159 77.561 
X6 Access to Credit 0.717 0.444 0 1 124 81 39.512 
X7 Current Microloan 0.200 0.405 0 1 163 42 20.488 
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  Variables Mean sd Min Max 
Freq 
High* % 
  Resource Dependence by Season             
X8 Non-agricultural Forest Products, Wet 2.746 1.345 1 5 57 27.805 
X9 Non-agricultural Forest Products, Dry 3.707 1.117 1 5 124 60.488 
X10 Marine, Dry 3.790 1.150 1 5 125 60.976 
X11 Marine, Wet 3.249 1.189 1 5 74 36.098 
 
Description: Can you describe how reliant you are on Z10-14? (1-5 where 1=No reliance, 5=Very 
Reliant)*Frequency of high dependence on resources obtained by summing upper bounds on Likert Scale 
(4+5)  
  
  
  Perceived Threats Mean sd Min Max Freq Yes % 
X12 Flood 0.640 0.481 0 1 131 63.902 
X13 Drought 0.141 0.349 0 1 28 13.659 
X14 Season Late 0.141 0.349 0 1 29 14.146 
X15 Season Early 0.078 0.269 0 1 16 7.805 
X16 Cyclone 0.900 0.297 0 1 185 90.244 
X17 Hurricane 0.059 0.235 0 1 12 5.854 
X18 Disease, Plants 0.293 0.456 0 1 60 29.268 
X19 Disease, Animals 0.063 0.244 0 1 13 6.341 
X20 Illness, Human 0.146 0.354 0 1 30 14.634 
  Description: In the last year have you experienced... (0=No, 1=Yes) 
  
Perceived Severity of Local and Global 
Issues Mean sd Min Max Freq Yes % 
X21 Land Division 0.205 0.405 0 1 42 20.488 
X22 Land Scarcity 0.156 0.364 0 1 32 15.610 
X23 Water Scarcity 0.146 0.354 0 1 30 14.634 
X24 Drought 0.107 0.310 0 1 22 10.732 
X25 Human/Animal Conflict 0.283 0.452 0 1 58 28.293 
X26 Land Conflict 0.200 0.401 0 1 41 20.000 
X27 Infertile Soil 0.293 0.456 0 1 60 29.268 
X28 Forest Destruction 0.366 0.483 0 1 75 36.585 
X29 Air Pollution 0.190 0.393 0 1 39 19.024 
X30 Water Pollution 0.380 0.487 0 1 78 38.049 
X31 Land Pollution 0.288 0.454 0 1 59 28.780 
X32 Forest Fires 0.151 0.359 0 1 31 15.122 
X33 Flooding 0.288 0.454 0 1 59 28.780 
X34 Reduced Crop Yield 0.220 0.415 0 1 45 21.951 
X35 Plant Disease 0.205 0.405 0 1 42 20.488 
X36 Monocropping 0.044 0.205 0 1 9 4.390 
X37 Housing 0.141 0.349 0 1 29 14.146 
X38 Sickness 0.185 0.390 0 1 38 18.537 
X39 Cost of Living 0.683 0.466 0 1 140 68.293 
X40 Crime 0.327 0.470 0 1 67 32.683 
X41 Poverty 0.166 0.373 0 1 34 16.585 
  Description: Do you think Z15-19 is a severe issue? (0=No, 1=Yes) 
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11.5.2 PATH ANALYSIS 
FIGURE 11-1: PATH DIAGRAM 
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The resulting path model had excellent fit statistics (RMSEA=0.006, CFI=0.982). No 
constraints were imposed as in the previous path models. Our construct validity was very 
good,   with the data fitting the theoretical model very well. The RMSEA shows that we can 
reject our null hypothesis of a poor fit of the data to the model, whilst the CFI tells us that 
98.2% of the covariation in the data can be explained by our model. The model is depicted in 
Figure 11.1  and the path coefficients and probabilities are found in Tables 11.3 through to 
11.8. 
We found that perceived behavioural control (B=0.475, p=0.111), attitudes (B=0.373, 
p=0.037) and subjective norms (B=0.707, p=0.048) positively moderated behavioural 
intention, with the effect being significant for attitudes and subjective norms. However this 
effect was not as strong as found in previous chapters. Holding all other variables at their 
mean, positive attitudes increased the probability of medium intentions (0.991). Positive 
subjective norms increased the probability of medium and strong intentions (1 and 0.990 
respectively), as did positive perceived behavioural control (1 and 0.857 respectively).   
TABLE 11-2: COEFFICIENTS AND PREDICTED PROBABLITY - ANTECEDENTS OF INTENTION 
              
Predicted Probability 
 
      β S.E. P   
Nega-
tive 
Mode-
rate 
Posit-
ive 
Behavioural 
Intention ← 
Attitudes Towards 
Conservation 0.373 0.235 0.037 ** 0.135 0.991 0.165 
  ← Subjective Norms 0.707 0.233 0.048 ** 0.582 1.000 0.990 
  ← 
Perceived 
Behavioural Control 0.475 0.221 0.111   0.627 1.000 0.857 
R2: Attitudes=0.318; Subjective Norms=0.169; Perceived Behavioural Control=0.294; Behavioural 
Intention=0.62; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
 
Next we look at how demographic factors, shock exposure, resource dependence, and 
perceived severity of issues moderate attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural 
control.  Generally we found that there was a greater probability of medium and positive 
subjective norms when people perceived shocks and as resource dependence increased. The 
opposite effect was found for attitudes and perceived behavioural control. 
The factors which significantly affected attitudes were ethnicity and the global shock 
of cyclones and the local shock of illness. Fijians had a greater probability of positive 
attitudes (0.752), whilst the shock of illness in the past year increased the probability of 
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moderate to negative attitudes towards conservation (0.806, 0.311 respectively). Exposure to 
cyclones increased the probability of negative (0.649) and moderate attitudes towards 
conservation (0.996).  Irrespective of significance, resource dependence and shocks were 
correlated with negative and neutral attitudes whilst the demographic variables varied, 
income of less than $10/day had a higher probability of negative (0.518) attitudes then 
positive (0.482), as did females (negative= 0.570, positive= 0.430). The remainder were 
correlated with positive attitudes.   
TABLE 11-3: COEFFICIENTS AND PREDICTED PROBABLITY - MODERATORS OF ATTITUDES 
              Predicted Probability 
      β S.E. P-Value 
 
Negative Moderate Positive 
Attitudes 
Towards 
Conservation 
← y<F$10 0.06 0.267 0.821 
 
0.518 0.974 0.482 
← Chief 0.433 0.611 0.478 
 
0.371 0.884 0.629 
← Fijian 0.787 0.318 0.013 ** 0.248 0.687 0.752 
  ← Female -0.071 0.132 0.589 
 
0.570 0.986 0.430 
  ← Farmer/Fisher 0.157 0.241 0.514 
 
0.479 0.960 0.521 
 Resource 
Dependence 
← Forest Reliance - 
Dry Season 
-0.099 0.068 0.146  0.581 0.988 0.012 
  ← Forest Reliance - 
Wet Season 
0.081 0.132 0.543   0.510 0.971 0.019 
  ← Marine Reliance - 
Dry Season 
0.074 0.122 0.545   0.512 0.972 0.018 
  ← Marine Reliance - 
Wet Season 
-0.004 0.108 0.971   0.543 0.981 0.015 
 Perceived  ← Flood 0.055 0.221 0.804   0.520 0.974 0.017 
 Threats ← Drought 0.268 0.371 0.47   0.435 0.936 0.029 
  ← Season Came Late -0.453 0.314 0.15   0.712 0.998 0.004 
  ← Season Came Early 0.474 0.627 0.449   0.356 0.867 0.045 
  ← Cyclone -0.277 0.314 0.043 ** 0.649 0.996 0.007 
  ← Plant Disease 0.371 0.258 0.151   0.395 0.906 0.036 
  ← Animal Disease -0.168 0.496 0.735   0.608 0.992 0.010 
  ← Illness 0.598 0.271 0.028 ** 0.311 0.806 0.058 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001               
 
The shock of cyclones decreased the probability of high levels of subjective norms 
and increased that of medium (0.999) and low (0.325) levels of subjective norms. The arrival 
of a late season had the opposite effect with the probability of medium levels of subjective 
norm being 0.705 and high levels being 0.558. In general shocks and resource dependence 
were correlated with positive and neutral subjective norms as were the demographic 
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variables. With Fijians (0.484), chiefs (0.453) and farmer/fishers (0.441) with the greatest 
probability of positive subjective norms. 
TABLE 11-4: COEFFICIENTS AND PREDICTED PROBABLITY - MODERATORS OF SUBJECTIVE NORMS 
              Predicted Probability 
      β S.E. P-Value Sig Low Medium High 
Subjective 
Norms 
← y<F$10 -0.265 0.21 0.207   0.153 0.989 0.235 
  Chief 0.338 0.551 0.54   0.052 0.857 0.453 
    Fijian 0.415 0.524 0.428   0.044 0.820 0.484 
    Female -0.132 0.178 0.459   0.124 0.978 0.278 
    Farmer/Fisher 0.308 0.264 0.243   0.055 0.870 0.441 
 Resource 
Dependence   
Forest Reliance - Dry 
Season -0.01 0.069 0.88   0.101 0.961 0.321 
    
Forest Reliance - Wet 
Season 0.013 0.114 0.91   0.097 0.957 0.329 
    
Marine Reliance - 
Dry Season 0.077 0.093 0.408   0.086 0.944 0.352 
    
Marine Reliance - 
Wet Season -0.061 0.125 0.625   0.110 0.969 0.303 
 Perceived    Flood 0.055 0.326 0.867   0.090 0.949 0.344 
 Threats   Drought 0.206 0.272 0.449   0.068 0.909 0.401 
    Season Came Late 0.602 0.349 0.085 * 0.029 0.705 0.558 
    Season Came Early -0.357 0.324 0.27   0.176 0.993 0.208 
    Cyclone -0.833 0.496 0.093 * 0.325 1.000 0.099 
    Plant Disease 0.09 0.296 0.761   0.084 0.941 0.357 
    Animal Disease -0.117 0.467 0.802   0.121 0.976 0.283 
    Illness 0.206 0.36 0.567   0.068 0.909 0.401 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001               
 
Perceived behavioural control was significantly and positively moderated by 
demographic variables of status as chief, and being a female. Probability of neutral to positive 
perceptions behavioural control were influenced by status as chief (neutral=0.709, 
positive=0.197) and being a female (neutral=0.881, positive=0.122). Neutral to negative 
perceptions were influenced by the remaining demographic variables and most strongly for 
income (negative perceptions=0.169) and occupation as a farmer or fisher (negative 
perceptions=0.211) As with attitudes, the experience of shocks and resource dependence 
increased the probability of low and medium levels of perceived behavioural control.  
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TABLE 11-5: COEFFICIENTS AND PREDICTED PROBABLITY - MODERATORS OF PERCEIVED 
BEHAVIOURAL CONTROL 
              Predicted Probability 
      β S.E. P-Value Sig Low Medium High 
Perceived 
Behavioural 
Control 
← y<F$10 0.344 0.307 0.264   0.169 0.955 0.077 
  Chief 0.918 0.291 0.002 ** 0.063 0.709 0.197 
  Fijian 0.451 0.595 0.448   0.143 0.931 0.093 
    Female 0.604 0.373 0.106 ** 0.111 0.881 0.122 
    Farmer/Fisher 0.188 0.26 0.471   0.211 0.978 0.057 
 Resource 
Dependence   
Forest Reliance - Dry 
Season -0.144 0.106 0.174   0.318 0.996 0.028 
    
Forest Reliance - Wet 
Season 0.059 0.134 0.662   0.250 0.988 0.043 
    
Marine Reliance - 
Dry Season -0.108 0.135 0.42   0.306 0.995 0.030 
    
Marine Reliance - 
Wet Season 0.096 0.174 0.578   0.238 0.986 0.047 
 Perceived    Flood -0.217 0.325 0.505   0.345 0.998 0.023 
 Threats   Drought -0.68 0.592 0.25   0.526 1.000 0.007 
    Season Came Late -0.327 0.471 0.488   0.386 0.999 0.018 
    Season Came Early 0.229 0.799 0.775   0.199 0.973 0.062 
    Hurricane 0.096 0.844 0.909   0.238 0.986 0.047 
    Plant Disease -0.169 0.224 0.451   0.327 0.997 0.026 
    Animal Disease -0.14 0.66 0.832   0.317 0.996 0.028 
    Illness -0.506 0.44 0.25   0.456 1.000 0.011 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001               
 
Next we look at the direct effects of behavioural intention, the absence of information 
(treatment group), perceived behavioural control and the remaining mediators (socio-
demographic variables, resource dependence, exposure to shocks, and severity of 
environmental and socio-economic issues) on investment decisions across the different 
incentive types.  
11.5.2.1 NO INCENTIVE CONDITION  
Firstly, holding all other variables at their mean, positive intention significantly 
predicted behaviour. The probability difference between choosing an adaptive over a non-
adaptive portfolio was 0.335. Whilst positive perceived behavioural control increased the 
probability of people choosing the moderately adaptive (0.619) and moderately non-adaptive 
(0.779) portfolios. A similar effect was found for the absence of information.  
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The probability for choosing moderately adaptive was 0.462 and moderately non-
adaptive was 0.644.  Fijians had a greater probability of choosing adaptive portfolios 
(0.7204), the same was true for people holding a current microloan (probability 
adaptive=0.476; probability non-adaptive=0.0003).  
Generally we found the probability of adaptive investments was greater than for non-
adaptive when looking across resource dependence increased, perceived shocks and severity 
of threats. This effect was most pronounced for the following: Reliance on forest resources 
during the wet Season (Diff=0.173), the shock of floods (Diff=0.174), drought (Diff=0.197), 
early arrival of a season (Diff=0.383), animal disease (Diff=0.176), and illness (Diff=0.249). 
In addition to the perceiving the following as severe issues: land division (Diff=0.209), 
human and animal conflict  (Diff=0.209), and monocropping (Diff=0.457) 
Dependence on marine resources in the dry season significantly increased the 
probability of adaptive investments (0.109) over non-adaptive (0.013) though moderately 
non-adaptive portfolios had the highest probability of being chosen (0.883). 
The early arrival of a season and perceiving air pollution as a severe problem facing 
people in Fiji saw people favor adaptive investments portfolios (0.387 and 0.390 
respectively) over non-adaptive (0.0008 and 0.0007 respectively). Perceiving poverty as a 
severe issue increases  the probability of moderately adaptive (0.504) and moderately non-
adaptive (0.682) investment portfolios.  
TABLE 11-6: COEFFICIENTS AND PROBABILITIES - NO INCENTIVE 
 
β S.E. p Adaptive MA Mixed M N-A
Non-
Adaptive
← Behavioural 
Intention
-0.206 0.078 0.008 ** 0.336 0.990 0.978 0.997 0.001
Perceived 
Behav Control
0.134 0.054 0.013 ** 0.075 0.619 0.493 0.778 0.022
Control 0.601 0.247 0.015 ** 0.050 0.462 0.339 0.644 0.034
← Y<F$10 -0.159 0.168 0.345 0.189 0.923 0.865 0.971 0.005
Chief -0.201 0.589 0.733 0.200 0.934 0.883 0.976 0.004
Fijian -1.625 0.352 0 *** 0.720 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
Female 0.118 0.247 0.633 0.123 0.808 0.709 0.909 0.011
Farmer/Fisher -0.112 0.256 0.66 0.176 0.908 0.844 0.964 0.006
Access to 
Microcredit
0.313 0.307 0.308 0.088 0.685 0.564 0.828 0.017
Current 
Microloan
-0.98 0.243 0 *** 0.476 0.999 0.997 1.000 0.000
Predicted Probability
No Incentive
No Incentive
Demogra-
phic & 
Contextual
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β S.E. p Adaptive MA Mixed M N-A
Non-
Adaptive
← Forest 
Reliance - 
Dry Season
0.028 0.043 0.522 0.143 0.853 0.768 0.935 0.008
Forest 
Reliance - 
Wet Season
-0.118 0.113 0.295 0.178 0.910 0.847 0.965 0.006
Marine 
Reliance - 
Dry Season
0.19 0.092 0.038 ** 0.109 0.766 0.658 0.883 0.013
Marine 
Reliance - 
Wet Season
0.13 0.104 0.212 0.121 0.802 0.701 0.905 0.011
No Incentive
Perceived 
Threats
← Flood -0.123 0.4 0.759 0.179 0.912 0.849 0.965 0.005
Drought -0.204 0.297 0.493 0.201 0.935 0.884 0.976 0.004
Season Came 
Late
0.369 0.396 0.352 0.079 0.644 0.520 0.798 0.020
Season Came 
Early
-0.745 0.3 0.013 ** 0.384 0.995 0.989 0.999 0.001
Cyclone 0.385 0.32 0.228 0.077 0.632 0.507 0.788 0.021
Plant Disease 0.098 0.292 0.737 0.127 0.819 0.723 0.915 0.010
Animal 
Disease
-0.132 0.439 0.764 0.182 0.915 0.853 0.967 0.005
Illness -0.373 0.264 0.158 0.252 0.968 0.937 0.990 0.003
← Land Division -0.244 0.447 0.586 0.213 0.945 0.899 0.980 0.004
Land Scarcity 0.511 0.468 0.274 0.060 0.534 0.407 0.708 0.028
Water Scarcity 0.014 0.373 0.97 0.146 0.860 0.776 0.939 0.008
Drought* 0.026 0.37 0.945 0.143 0.854 0.769 0.936 0.008
Human 
Animal 
Conflict
-0.241 0.204 0.238 0.212 0.944 0.898 0.980 0.004
Land Conflict 0.173 0.349 0.62 0.112 0.777 0.670 0.890 0.012
Infertile Soil -0.096 0.329 0.771 0.172 0.903 0.836 0.961 0.006
Forest 
Destruction
0.028 0.41 0.946 0.143 0.853 0.768 0.935 0.008
Air Pollution -0.761 0.341 0.025 ** 0.390 0.996 0.990 0.999 0.001
Water 
Pollution
-0.204 0.26 0.432 0.201 0.935 0.884 0.976 0.004
Land Pollution 0.129 0.36 0.72 0.121 0.802 0.702 0.905 0.011
Forest Fire -0.006 0.425 0.99 0.150 0.868 0.788 0.943 0.008
Flooding -0.033 0.327 0.921 0.157 0.880 0.803 0.949 0.007
Crop Yield -0.149 0.365 0.683 0.186 0.920 0.861 0.969 0.005
Plant Disease 0.183 0.518 0.724 0.110 0.771 0.663 0.886 0.013
Monocropping -0.935 0.854 0.273 0.458 0.999 0.996 1.000 0.000
Housing -0.066 0.321 0.838 0.165 0.892 0.821 0.956 0.006
Sickness 0.124 0.369 0.737 0.122 0.805 0.705 0.907 0.011
Cost of Living -0.204 0.209 0.33 0.201 0.935 0.884 0.976 0.004
Crime -0.095 0.296 0.75 0.172 0.903 0.836 0.961 0.006
Poverty 0.548 0.279 0.05 ** 0.056 0.504 0.379 0.683 0.030
Predicted Probability
No Incentive
Resource 
Dependence
No Incentive R2=0.421; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001; M A= Moderately Adaptive,                                                                     
         M N-A= Moderately Non-Adaptive
No Incentive
Perceived 
Severity of 
Issues
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11.5.2.2 DYNAMIC INCENTIVE CONDITION 
Behavioural intention did not significantly predict investment behaviour (B=0.04, 
p=0.643) however perceived behavioural control (B=-0.226, p=0.058) and the absence of 
climate change information (B=0.68, p=0.004) did. For the latter the probability of choosing 
the moderately non-adaptive portfolio was greatest (0.576).  There was a greater probability 
of choosing the moderately adaptive, mixed and moderately non-adaptive portfolios with 
high levels of perceived behavioural control. The same was true for those with access to 
credit (B=-0.503, p=0.036), and viewing lower crop yields (B=-0.571, p=0.034) as a severe 
issue.  
Earning less than $10 a day and perceiving sickness as a severe issue increased the 
probability of choosing the moderately non-adaptive (0.824, 0.335 respectively) and non-
adaptive portfolios (0.1, 0.273 respectively) over the moderately adaptive (0.767, 0.255 
respectively) and adaptive portfolios (0.008, 0.0005 respectively).  Generally we found there 
to be a very small difference in the probability of choosing non-adaptive investments 
compared to for adaptive when looking across resource dependence, perceived shocks and 
severity of threats. 
Fijians had a higher probability of choosing adaptive (0.243) over non-adaptive 
(0.0007) investment portfolios. This is similar to our findings from previous chapters. 
TABLE 11-7: COEFFICIENTS AND PROBABILITIES – DYNAMIC INCENTIVE 
 
 
β S.E. p Adaptive MA Mixed M N-A
Non-
Adaptive
← Behavioural 
Intention
0.04 0.087 0.643 0.008 0.859 0.780 0.905 0.071
Perceived 
Behavioural 
Control
-0.226 0.119 0.058 * 0.054 0.996 0.991 0.998 0.012
Control 0.68 0.238 0.004 ** 0.001 0.483 0.364 0.576 0.181
← y<F$10 0.311 0.186 0.093 * 0.005 0.756 0.652 0.824 0.100
Chief -0.016 0.308 0.959 0.012 0.911 0.852 0.943 0.054
Fijian -1.593 0.405 0 *** 0.243 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.001
Female -0.013 0.281 0.964 0.011 0.910 0.850 0.943 0.054
Farmer/Fisher -0.077 0.23 0.737 0.013 0.929 0.878 0.956 0.048
Access to 
Microcredit
0.636 0.256 0.013 ** 0.002 0.518 0.397 0.610 0.170
Current 
Microloan
-0.503 0.24 0.036 ** 0.037 0.990 0.978 0.995 0.018
Dynamic 
Incentive
Demogra-
phic & 
Contextual
Predicted Probability
Dynamic 
Incentive
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β S.E. p Adaptive MA Mixed M N-A
Non-
Adaptive
← Forest 
Reliance - 
Dry Season
-0.022 0.1 0.828 0.012 0.913 0.855 0.945 0.053
Forest 
Reliance - 
Wet Season
-0.048 0.094 0.611 0.013 0.921 0.866 0.950 0.051
Marine 
Reliance - 
Dry Season
-0.117 0.152 0.441 0.015 0.940 0.894 0.963 0.044
Marine 
Reliance - 
Wet Season
0.121 0.135 0.369 0.008 0.859 0.779 0.905 0.071
← Flood -0.127 0.239 0.595 0.015 0.942 0.897 0.964 0.043
Drought -0.443 0.315 0.159 0.032 0.986 0.971 0.993 0.021
Season Came 
Late
-0.202 0.453 0.656 0.018 0.957 0.922 0.975 0.036
Season Came 
Early
-0.356 0.524 0.497 0.027 0.979 0.958 0.988 0.026
Cyclone 0.625 0.267 0.019 ** 0.002 0.527 0.406 0.618 0.167
Plant Disease -0.521 0.386 0.177 0.039 0.991 0.980 0.995 0.017
Animal 
Disease
-0.08 0.541 0.883 0.014 0.930 0.879 0.956 0.047
Illness -0.356 0.332 0.284 0.027 0.979 0.958 0.988 0.026
← Land Division -0.284 0.358 0.428 0.022 0.970 0.943 0.983 0.030
Land Scarcity 0.101 0.408 0.804 0.008 0.868 0.791 0.911 0.068
Water Scarcity 0.477 0.506 0.346 0.003 0.642 0.523 0.725 0.133
Drought* -0.677 0.434 0.118 0.053 0.996 0.991 0.998 0.012
Human 
Animal 
Conflict
0.133 0.293 0.65 0.008 0.853 0.772 0.901 0.072
La d Conflict 0.152 0.361 0.675 0.007 0.844 0.761 0.894 0.075
Infertile Soil 0.178 0.208 0.393 0.007 0.832 0.744 0.884 0.079
Forest 
Destruction
0.362 0.3 0.227 0.004 0.723 0.613 0.796 0.110
Air Pollution -0.634 0.395 0.109 0.049 0.995 0.989 0.998 0.013
Water 
Pollution
-0.219 0.285 0.443 0.019 0.960 0.926 0.977 0.035
Land Pollution -0.382 0.325 0.241 0.028 0.981 0.962 0.990 0.024
Forest Fire 0.31 0.269 0.249 0.005 0.757 0.652 0.824 0.100
Flooding 0.149 0.235 0.524 0.007 0.846 0.762 0.895 0.075
Crop Yield -0.571 0.269 0.034 ** 0.043 0.993 0.984 0.996 0.015
Plant Disease -0.201 0.489 0.681 0.018 0.957 0.921 0.975 0.037
Monocropping -0.677 0.596 0.256 0.053 0.996 0.991 0.998 0.012
Housing 0.482 0.331 0.146 0.003 0.638 0.519 0.721 0.134
Sickness 0.988 0.232 0 *** 0.001 0.255 0.168 0.335 0.273
Cost of Living -0.043 0.21 0.836 0.012 0.920 0.864 0.949 0.051
Crime -0.101 0.223 0.651 0.014 0.936 0.888 0.960 0.045
Poverty -0.223 0.283 0.431 0.019 0.961 0.928 0.977 0.035
Predicted Probability
Dynamic 
Incentive
Resource 
Dependence
Dynamic Incentive R2=0.559; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001; M A= Moderately Adaptive,                                                                     
                  M N-A= Moderately Non-Adaptive
Dynamic 
Incentive
Perceived 
Severity of 
Issues
Dynamic 
Incentive
Perceived 
Threats
293 
 
11.5.2.3 GREEN INCENTIVE CONDITION 
The green incentive condition presented some interesting results. Firstly behavioural 
intention did significantly moderate behaviour (B=-0.214, p=0.086), and the probability of 
choosing adaptive loans (0.196) was greater than non-adaptive (0.012) with positive 
intentions to conserve the forest and river ecosystems. 
Perceived behavioural control, which was a significant predictor in the last two 
conditions, was not under the green incentive condition (B=-0.058, p=0.494), however as 
with the last two conditions an increase in perceived behavioural control, increased the 
probability of choosing the moderately adaptive/non-adaptive and mixed portfolios.  The 
absence of climate change information increased the probability of choosing non-adaptive 
investments (0.333), as did being a chief (moderately non-adaptive: 0.29; non-adaptive: 
0.253), and perceiving water scarcity as a severe issue (moderately non-adaptive: 0.349; non-
adaptive: 0.227). 
Fijians had a greater probability of choosing adaptive (0.688) over non-adaptive 
(0.0001) investments as did those who experienced the shock of a drought (Diff=0.163), the 
early arrival of a season (Diff=0.223), illness (Diff=0.165) and the perceived severity of air 
pollution (Diff=0.169) and monocropping (Diff=0.198) as a major problem that the people of 
Fiji face. As we found with the no incentive condition, generally, we found there to be a 
greater probability of choosing adaptive investments compared to non-adaptive when looking 
across resource dependence, perceived shocks and severity of threats. 
FIGURE 11-2: COEFFICIENTS AND PROBABILITIES – GREEN INCENTIVE 
β S.E. p Adaptive MA Mixed M N-A
Non-
Adaptive
← Behavioural 
Intention
-0.214 0.125 0.086 ** 0.196 0.991 0.973 0.997 0.011
Perceived 
Behavioural 
Control
-0.058 0.084 0.494 0.093 0.923 0.841 0.962 0.034
Control 1.221 0.303 0 *** 0.003 0.086 0.037 0.154 0.333
← y<F$10 0.318 0.27 0.24 0.035 0.671 0.506 0.784 0.091
Chief 0.987 0.481 0.04 ** 0.006 0.185 0.093 0.290 0.253
Fijian -1.988 0.367 0 *** 0.688 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
Female 0.112 0.286 0.696 0.054 0.803 0.665 0.884 0.062
Farmer/Fisher 0.018 0.349 0.958 0.065 0.851 0.730 0.917 0.051
Access to 
Microcredit
-0.183 0.52 0.725 0.094 0.926 0.845 0.963 0.033
Current 
Microloan
-0.356 0.359 0.321 0.127 0.963 0.913 0.984 0.022
Green 
Incentive
Green 
Incentive
Demogra-
phic & 
Contextual
Predicted Probability
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β S.E. p Adaptive MA Mixed M N-A
Non-
Adaptive
← Forest 
Reliance - Dry 
Season
-0.083 0.091 0.363 0.079 0.893 0.793 0.944 0.041
Forest 
Reliance - Wet 
Season
-0.102 0.15 0.495 0.082 0.900 0.803 0.948 0.040
Marine 
Reliance - Dry 
Season
-0.133 0.118 0.262 0.086 0.911 0.820 0.954 0.037
Marine 
Reliance - Wet 
Season
0.023 0.109 0.83 0.064 0.849 0.727 0.915 0.052
Flood -0.341 0.292 0.244 0.124 0.961 0.909 0.982 0.023
Drought -0.567 0.308 0.066 ** 0.176 0.987 0.963 0.995 0.013
Season Came 
Late
0.655 0.46 0.155 0.016 0.408 0.255 0.544 0.159
Season Came 
Early
-0.76 0.459 0.098 * 0.231 0.995 0.985 0.998 0.008
Cyclone 0.176 0.412 0.67 0.021 0.445 0.322 0.377 0.435
Plant Disease 0.134 0.22 0.541 0.051 0.791 0.649 0.876 0.065
Animal 
Disease
0.339 0.498 0.496 0.033 0.655 0.489 0.771 0.095
Illness -0.573 0.348 0.1 0.178 0.987 0.964 0.995 0.013
← Land Division 0.171 0.475 0.718 0.048 0.769 0.621 0.860 0.069
Land Scarcity -0.169 0.411 0.68 0.092 0.922 0.838 0.961 0.034
Water Scarcity 0.904 0.381 0.018 ** 0.008 0.233 0.123 0.349 0.227
Drought* -0.283 0.47 0.546 0.112 0.950 0.888 0.977 0.026
Human Animal 
Conflict
-0.211 0.435 0.629 0.099 0.933 0.858 0.967 0.031
Land Conflict -0.012 0.291 0.967 0.069 0.865 0.750 0.926 0.048
Infertile Soil -0.143 0.212 0.499 0.088 0.914 0.825 0.956 0.036
Forest 
Destruction
0.156 0.277 0.573 0.049 0.778 0.632 0.866 0.067
Air Pollution -0.588 0.337 0.081 * 0.182 0.988 0.966 0.995 0.013
Water 
Pollution
-0.341 0.244 0.163 0.124 0.961 0.909 0.982 0.023
Land Pollution -0.2 0.325 0.538 0.097 0.930 0.853 0.966 0.032
Forest Fire -0.057 0.399 0.886 0.075 0.883 0.778 0.938 0.044
Flooding -0.505 0.319 0.113 0.161 0.982 0.952 0.992 0.016
Crop Yield -0.492 0.39 0.207 0.157 0.980 0.949 0.992 0.016
Plant Disease 0.144 0.362 0.691 0.050 0.785 0.641 0.871 0.066
Monocropping -0.682 0.542 0.208 0.208 0.993 0.978 0.997 0.010
Housing 0.248 0.432 0.566 0.040 0.720 0.561 0.823 0.080
Sickness -0.214 0.362 0.553 0.100 0.934 0.859 0.968 0.031
Cost of Living 0.143 0.245 0.558 0.051 0.786 0.642 0.872 0.066
Crime 0.312 0.336 0.353 0.035 0.675 0.510 0.787 0.090
Poverty 0.665 0.478 0.164 0.015 0.401 0.248 0.536 0.162
Green Incentive R2=0.591; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001; M A= Moderately Adaptive,                                                                     
M N-A= Moderately Non-Adaptive
Green 
Incentive
Perceived 
Severity of 
Issues
Green 
Incentive
Perceived 
Threats
Predicted Probability
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11.6  DISCUSSION  
As hypothesized, the Fiji case-study revealed perceived risk, resource reliance, and 
exposure to shocks did have a direct and indirect effect on adaptive investment decisions. 
Whilst overall the path analysis revealed that the data was supportive of the theoretical 
model, the effect of attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control on 
intention was weaker with no significant moderating effect of behavioural perceptions on 
intentions. The latter has been reported before. For instance in a systematic review of the 
application of behavioural theories on disaster risk reduction and preparedness, Ejeta, 
Ardalan, and Paton (2015) found that in studies employing the TPB, attitudes and subjective 
norms were mainly associated with preparedness for diverse hazards.  
As hypothesized, we also found that shocks and resource dependence impacted 
cognitive antecedents to behaviour. Dependence of resources and the experience of shocks 
increased the probability of positive and medium levels of subjective norms with the opposite 
effect for attitudes and perceptions of behavioural control. The experience of cyclones 
however was correlated with weak rather than positive subjective norms. This tells us that 
environmentally protective beliefs and perceived self-efficacy to engage in protective 
behaviours are negatively affected by shocks, whilst shared norms and values may be 
protective to our internal motivations. However with perceived threat of cyclones subjective 
norms were negatively. It is possible that the threat of cyclones negatively impacts on 
collective identities. The destructive force of ever more severe cyclones can devastate whole 
villages and scatter communities away from their usual support networks and people whom 
they look to for norm formation.   
In the framework of the PMT adaptation is assessed through the construct of coping 
appraisal which is akin to perceived behavioural control (or perceived self-efficacy and 
perceived adaptation efficacy). Coping appraisal can lead to maladaptation (for example 
wishful thinking or the denial of risks posed by environmental degradation and climate 
change) or the intention to adapt. In Chapter 7 we saw that local perceptions of climate 
change response were largely fatalistic. That perceived behavioural control did not moderate 
intention could be an indication of maladaptation in the face of threats, perceived behavioural 
control was negatively correlated with shocks and resource dependence as was attitudes.  
The negative skew could be because of structural failures in disaster planning and 
response at micro and macro levels, or a reaction to the consistent loss of crops and 
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livelihoods with more frequent and stronger cyclones or simply an artefact of a recent shock. 
We cannot draw conclusion without further data – such as adaptive strategies employed prior 
to the cyclone, loss of livelihoods, and community response.   
When looking at stated behaviour we found that exposure to cyclones was a barrier to 
adaptive investment behaviour.  In particular, under the green incentive condition there was a 
greater probability of choosing non-adaptive (0.435) over adaptive (0.021) investment 
portfolios, with a similar effect to a lesser extent under the dynamic incentive condition 
where the probability of non-adaptive investment portfolios was 0.167 over 0.002 for adaptive. 
Whilst in the absence of incentives the probability of moderately non-adaptive portfolios was 
the greatest (0.789). 
With climate change, the frequency and severity of extreme weather events such as 
tropical cyclones are projected to increase (Knutson et al, 2010). The need to better 
understand why such shocks may lead to maladaptive and riskier behaviour warrants further 
investigation. It could be that negative climatic events elicit an evolutionarily evolved fear 
module. Such a module is activated in the presence of recurring stimuli which poses a threat 
to survival. Evolutionary fear-relevant stimuli such as cyclones may more readily be 
associated with a conditioned fear response (Öhman & Mineka, 2001), which in this case 
may materialize as adaptive capacity or lack thereof. 
 A few months before this research took place, Viti-Levu underwent major flooding 
following a tropical cyclone. During the research Cyclone Evan once more brought on flash 
floods. The increased severity and occurrence of cyclones and flooding in Viti-Levu, coupled 
with inadequate disaster response and planning (Nunn, 2013) could have negatively impacted 
internal motivations by creating a more salient, and thus more cognitively accessible 
memory, which could have exerted greater influence on subsequent behaviour (Lavine et al, 
1996).  
As with the preceding chapters Fijians were more likely to choose adaptive 
investments, and also it was found that the absence of information was detrimental to 
adaptive investment decisions across conditions. Information has been shown to be a 
moderator of farmer’s assessment of climate adaptive measures by Dang et al (2014) in the 
framework of the PMT, whilst Bizuneh (2013) found that access to weather information was 
a strong predictor of climate change adaptation in farmers.  
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In the no incentive and dynamic incentive conditions perceived behavioural control 
was a significant moderator of stated behaviour albeit a weak one. Having positive 
perceptions of behavioural control increased the probability of moderately adaptive and 
moderately non-adaptive loans. Under the green and no incentive conditions we found that if 
people perceived a sufficient threat and believed that their actions could make a viable 
positive difference to ecosystems, then this was reflected in subsequent adaptive investment 
behaviour. That intentions were not crowded-out by the absence or presence of incentives in 
these two conditions could indicate that: a) people stay true to their internal motivations for 
engaging in a behaviour regardless of incentives b) green incentives crowd-in internal 
motivations or b) that dynamic incentives may crowd-out our internal motivations.  
In the no incentive condition, we found the probability of adaptive investments was 
greater than for non-adaptive when looking across resource dependence, perceived shocks 
and severity of threats. In the absence of incentives, this condition would have been a true 
reflection of peoples stated behaviour without any external manipulations. Maintaining 
cognitive consonance with internal motivations as reflected in behavioural mechanism 
employed here.  We can further investigate this by looking at the effect of behavioural 
intention under the dynamic incentive condition. Here future earning power was constrained 
if non-adaptive investments were chosen. We found that behavioural intention was not 
correlated with subsequent stated behaviour. In addition we found that there was less of a 
difference between the probability of choosing non-adaptive and adaptive portfolios across 
perceived severity of issues, shocks, and resource dependence. Those who had been exposed 
to shocks or viewed threats that impacted their earning power (cyclones, lower crop yields, 
and sickness) could have been more inclined to choose an investment package that offered a 
mixed bag of goods to hedge their bets and spread risk to minimize the effect of a potential 
loss in future earnings. Under the same condition we also saw that those who earned below 
$10  a day similarly chose foremost between the moderately adaptive and moderately non-
adaptive portfolios with a skew towards the non-adaptive portfolios. Again, as this condition 
limited the potential for future earning if repayments were not met, it speaks of greater risk 
taking behaviour amongst the lower income when future earning potential is constrained.   
Similarly in the no incentive condition the perception of poverty as a severe issue 
facing society shifted people away from adaptive investments to the moderately adaptive and 
moderately non-adaptive portfolios instead which would have allowed them to maximise 
utility whilst minimizing losses. Such a precautionary risk-spreading strategy makes sense 
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from a rational agent stand point and under the lens of loss aversion, where the central tenet is 
that losses will have greater impact on preferences then gains (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1991).  
 That intention was a significant mediator of stated investment behaviour is in line 
with the finding in Chapter 9. Under this condition, as under the no incentive condition, we 
found that there was a greater probability of choosing adaptive investments over non-adaptive 
even in the presence of perceived threats. So we see in the presence of rewards people’s 
internal motivations are not drowned out, however in the presence of an additional threat (as 
posed by dynamic incentives) adaptive responses are negatively impacted.  
 If people were opting for adaptive investment in the absence of incentives, what then 
makes the green incentive condition attractive as an instrument to drive adaptive behaviour? 
As we saw in the previous chapters, looking at the distribution of choice across incentives 
types, we found that the green, followed by the no incentive conditions induced people to 
take on adaptive investments more so then the dynamic incentive condition. In addition these 
incentive conditions did significantly differ from each other. This tells us that the framing of 
the green incentive condition mattered. Here people were framed as stewards of the 
ecosystem, with rewards given for their protective role. In addition they were given 
information on the effect of their investment on the ecosystem, which would also influence 
their interest rate. 
Whilst in the dynamic incentive condition no such framing was established nor impact 
information shared. Whilst we cannot state causality, we can speculate that the monetary 
constraints and rewards evident in the green incentive model, conditioned people away from 
free-riding. In the no incentive condition we would have expected respondent’s choice to 
approach the Nash equilibrium of non-adaptive investments. However in the absence of 
constraints to behaviour people self-organised against free-riding. It is plausible that within a 
society with a strong collectivist culture and high subsistence levels, employing such a 
conditional cooperation strategy is important for adaptive norm development (Kameda, 
Takezawa & Hastie, 2003).  
In summary, threat appraisal did influence the antecedents of behaviour and 
subsequent behaviour. We also found that perceived severity of threats influenced stated 
behaviour. Including shocks, resource dependence, and perceived severity of threats was a 
useful addition to the TPB and enabled a more fluent understanding of what drives adaptive 
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investment preferences. Anthropogenic climate change brings with it an increasing 
prevalence and severity of extreme climate events. People in SIDS are at particular risk of 
experiencing such threats. Therefore understanding their reaction to such threats is of utmost 
importance. The research revealed that perceived shocks and resource dependence do 
influence the cognitive antecedents of behaviour. Negatively impacting attitudes and 
perceptions of control and increasing the probability of positive subjective norms.  
In addition, as hypothesized, resource dependence, perceived shocks and perceived 
severity of socio-economic factors influenced adaptive investment different under the three 
incentive conditions. In the presence of green incentives and in the absence of incentives the 
factors increased the probability of adaptive over non-adaptive portfolios with the opposite 
found under dynamic incentives. 
 Regarding policy development, the research exposes the need to address the 
cognitive response to threats.  For instance, exposure to cyclones was negatively associated 
with adaptive investment choice indicating that there is a need for policy and institutional 
development around strengthening individual and public perceptions and responses to 
cyclones. The study revealed the utility of green incentives in engaging adaptive coping 
behaviours when faced with shocks and also indicated that such incentive may be more 
congruent with people’s internal motives to behave in an environmentally protective manner. 
When done right, incentives can be a powerful tool through which to engage people to 
positively invest in their futures. Further investigation in other contexts would benefit our 
understanding of how threat exposure influences cognitive coping and subsequent behaviour.   
As in the previous chapters, it is important to note that we cannot infer causality. 
However we can say that there were correlations that fitted our theoretical model. In addition 
the research relied on perceived shocks and did not distinguish between surveys collected 
before or after the cyclone which could have confounded impact on cognitive drivers and 
subsequent stated behaviour. There may have been large potential changes shortly after the 
event which are not reflected in our results. 
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12.1 SUMMARY 
Anthropogenic climate change poses the biggest threat to SIDS. In our case-study, the 
island of Viti-Levu in Fiji, the negative impact of climate change on agriculture alone can 
cost upwards of 23-52 million US$/year in damages by 2050 – or two to three percent of 
Fiji’s GDP in current terms. In other lower lying SIDS the costs will be far greater. A no-
regrets policy for climate change adaptation is already acknowledged by SIDS (UNFCCC, 
2005). For the international community, protecting SIDS is critical not only from a moral 
standpoint – as realistically these communities have not, for the most part, caused the 
problem but must bear the full brunt of it – but also from the standpoint of the provision of 
ecosystem services. SIDS are biodiversity powerhouses, unfortunately their terrestrial and 
costal ecosystems are under threat from climate change and development.  
Whilst such loss has negative economic impacts, at a more fundamental level, the 
greater loss is that to humanity.  Losing a species is one thing, but the loss of a whole island 
ecosystem is another. Imagine, millions of year’s worth of evolutionary data, extinguished 
within a few centuries. If biodiversity is the building blocks of life then surely there will be 
consequences to what scientists have termed the Anthropocene Defaunation (Dirzo et al, 
2014). Over the past 500 million years scientists have been able to identify five major 
extinction events. After each of these events it has taken at least 10 million years for the 
remaining species to regain a foothold by eventually branching out and evolving to restore 
biodiversity. In our current age of extinction, the loss of biodiversity is occurring at an 
astounding rate, being 1000 to 10,000 times greater than the fossil records from prehistoric 
times would suggest (Suzuki, 1999). As Wilson (in Suzuki, 1999) states “what humanity is 
doing now in a single lifetime will impoverish our descendants for all time to come” (p. 149). 
There is a theory put forth by E.O.Wilson named the Biophilia Hypothesis. In it he 
proposes that humans have an innate, genetically based, connection to other living organisms. 
Without some connection to the natural world, our subjective wellbeing is compromised. 
Kahn (1997) in a developmental psychology study looking at children’s environmental 
reasoning and values in the United States and the Brazilian Amazon found support for this 
hypothesis. Children, regardless of economic status, shared a universal ecological value and 
moral reasoning. With age, they found that homocentric reasoning appeared to be embedded 
within a wider ecological structure (or biocentric reasoning).  Since industrialisation, our 
ability to connect with the natural world is becoming increasingly difficult. According to the 
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biophilia hypothesis this disconnect has significant negative consequences on our 
development, impacting mental and physical development, stunting both sensory and spiritual 
growth (Barbiero et al, 2014).  
For vulnerable populations who live by fragile ecosystems, often nature forms an 
integral part of their identity as individuals and communities. The clouds signalling a storm, 
the rising tides and the monsoon rains weaves itself into the fabric of the society. It guides 
social practices and forms cultures deeply rooted to the land and sea. With the globalisation 
of society, loss of traditional practices, rapidly growing populations, and the resulting 
encroachment into fragile ecosystems we often see the displacement, culturally and 
physically, of traditional communities, often to the detriment to these ecosystems and 
cultures. These issues along with the problems posed by climate change, results in a 
multifaceted and complex dilemma. We are now in a space where we must reconnect with the 
ecosystems which sustain us in order to save them. The way in which society views nature at 
present, relative to the history of literate culture, as a commodity to be used is fairly new. It is 
clear our current practices are not sustainable; there is an unmistakable need to adapt our 
behaviour. How do we go about doing this? There is hope, not in any one solution – there are 
no panaceas to such a complex problem – but through novel combinations we must believe 
that we can create a better future.  
In the preceding chapters we have initiated a case for microloans for climate change 
adaptation. We have seen that when used as a strategy within ecosystem-based management 
regimes it can be of utility in creating adaptive capacity. In this thesis we identified how 
design aspects of microloans may drive adaptive behaviour. When trying to change 
behaviour, it is important to understand its cognitive drivers as our internal cognitive motives 
will interact with those external to us and shape subsequent behaviour.  
In the first instance, we took note of the fact that regardless of whether they have 
environmental goals attached or not, the role of the borrower’s behaviour in the success of 
microloans is in itself an important research topic. It is therefore important to distinguish 
between cognitive-behavioural aspects that extend beyond microloans with environmental 
objectives and those elements that are specific to environmental objectives. We explored this 
through the application of the Theory of Planned Behaviour. We clearly found that positive 
attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control relating to adaptation and 
conservation behaviour led to greater intention to perform the said behaviour. Interestingly, 
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we found that intentions significantly moderated subsequent behaviour in the treatment group 
where climate change information was provided. That such a simple solution can potentitally 
drive the adaptive investment behaviour in the context of microloans is a promising cost-
effective solution. Overall this seems to indicate that microloans nurturing the development 
of positive attitudes, self-efficacy, and subjective norms through information dissemination 
can positively influence adaptive investment behaviour.    
Qualitative data was also collected on climate change perceptions of the rural and 
coastal poor in Fiji. We found that whilst people were vague about what climate change was 
(generally seen as a change in weather) they did attribute it to anthropogenic causes 
(pollution and GHG’s). However perceived solutions and responses to climate change 
revealed behavioural barriers. Coping strategies for the most part could be described as 
maladaptive, perhaps indicating that held mental models of climate change had gaps or 
constraints (such as viewing God as the cause rather than men). However that information 
was able to influence behaviour also suggests that it can correct mental schemas and induce 
action. Overall the findings supported knowledge deficit theory, showing that increased 
knowledge can positively influence behaviour.   
Next we looked at how different microloan models and incentives influenced 
behaviour. The mode of enquiry required a novel experimental design. Drawing on incentive 
and decision making theories, a green microloan incentive condition was created which 
effectively penalised non-adaptive behaviour and rewarded adaptive investment decisions. 
The reasoning behind such a design was to evoke loss aversion as people are more sensitive 
to losses then they are to gains (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). In addition a control condition 
(which was utilised in the previous study) and a dynamic incentive condition modelled on 
common microlending practice was specified. Here, a prominent finding was that behavioural 
intention significantly mediated adaptive investment behaviour in the green incentive 
condition with the probability of choosing adaptive portfolios being greater the non-adaptive 
under this condition. Ethnicity was also a prominent determinant of the antecedents of 
behaviour and of subsequent stated behaviour, with Fijians having a greater probability of 
positive internal drivers and making adaptive investment choices.  
Lastly we looked at how perceptions of threat, resource dependence, and perceived 
severity of environmental and other issues impacting stated behaviour and its cognitive 
antecedents. Again, utilising the framework of the Theory of Planned Behaviour we found 
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that certain types of climatic threats negatively impacted internal drivers (specifically having 
experienced cyclones). As with the previous study we found that in the presence of  green 
incentives positive intentions were more so congruent with stated adaptive behaviour.  
Furthermore exposure to risk, resource dependence and severity of socio-environmental 
issues all influenced subsequent behaviour in different ways depending on incentive 
conditions.  The findings offer a perspective on the uptake of non-adaptive and adaptive 
investment behaviours.  
To summarise we found that those with a predisposition towards adaptive and 
protective behaviours also intend to behave in an environmentally protective and climate 
adaptive manner. However intention does not always reflect behaviour. We found that 
through the provision of information and green incentives, behavioural intention could be 
translated into the choice of more adaptive over non-adaptive stated microloan investment 
behaviour.  Whilst we found that perceived risk, resource dependence, perceived severity, 
and demographic factors are also determinants of subsequent stated behaviour, we ultimately 
conclude that microloans with environmental incentives were shown to effectively increase 
the probability of choosing adaptive over non-adaptive investments and as such has the 
potential to increase adaptive capacity by creating value around good behaviour. Indeed we 
can further argued that green incentives crowded-in internal motives to behaviour in an 
environmentally protective manner. 
Wilson (1999) conceives the origin of moral instinct as rising from the dynamic 
relationship between cooperation and defection. At the same time our cognitive structures 
have evolved so that we can navigate this dynamism such that we can create future orientated 
mental scenarios. For some, this ability to essentially ‘mentally time travel’ is described as a 
defining trait of our species (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007),  however there is evidence that 
Scrub Jays may also do the same (Raby, Alexis, Dickinson & Clayton, 2007). Such a trait 
enables us to organise our actions so that we may reach our best possible future. From a game 
theoretic perspective, the prisoners dilemma would say that the best possible outcome when 
faced with a moral problem of defecting or not would be to cooperate.  
Cooperative strategies have an evolutionary basis enabling Darwinian genetic fitness. 
As such genes which predispose cooperative behaviour would prevail in the cultural 
evolution of our species (Wilson, 1999). When seen in conjunction with our qualitative study 
that found mental models of climate change were not exactly accurate, it could be inferred 
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that the introduction of green incentives and of information can re-frame climate change and 
conservation as a moral dilemma by putting forth defection and cooperation clauses. It does 
so by introducing an indication of how different investment behaviours can impact one’s 
ecosystem, which could ultimately harm their community and the wider environment.  In this 
study, the finding that Fijian’s cognitive appraisal of environmentally protective behaviours 
was generally more positive and  that they were more inclined to adaptive behaviours, could 
be an indication of such moral reasoning where cooperation (for the good of the community 
rather than the family unit) is perhaps viewed more so as strength. From the perspective of 
the ‘looking glass self’ (Cooley, 1902) which states that our self-representations are affected 
by the evaluations that others have of us, within a collectivist community as evident in Fiji, 
we would expect that if the cultural norm is one of conservation then there would be a strong 
incentive to cooperate with the norm and opt for adaptive investment options.  
In addition by offering limited choice set of investment choices and green incentives 
could present people with simpler decision frameworks. In effect people are able to simplify 
choices in terms of pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses and gains (Kamenica, 2008). When 
viewed under loss aversion which is an innate desire to avoid situations which threaten our 
physical and mental wellbeing, the simplest choice becomes that which minimises present 
and future losses. Bénabou and Tirole (2002) note that for an intrinsically motivated person, 
extrinsic incentives could be a detriment to ones internal drive to engage in a behaviour. 
Moreover, if a person lacks self confidence in their own ability to perform a task, than a 
monetary reward could further impinge on their perceived ability. However we have found 
that if incentives are well designed, than they need not crowd-out intrinsic motivations but 
instead may bolster them by presenting people with effective response options.  
For a complex problem like climate change, when looking at vulnerable populations 
in developing countries we must consider their understanding of the problem and its 
solutions. In our sample, we found that people’s conception of solutions were generally 
lacking. However microloans are able to be a novel way in which to offer a constructive 
solution and as such increase cognitive coping schemas and adaptive capacity. 
12.2 POLICY CONTRIBUTION 
Gowdy (2008) notes that “climate change policy should begin with identifying the 
incentives for selfish behaviour in the “atmospheric commons” and then finding ways to 
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minimize this behaviour and maximize incentives for cooperative solutions” (p637). When 
looking at policy recommendations, economists generally offer insights based on the rational-
actor model of behaviour. In contrast, behavioural economists and psychologists would offer 
recommendations that start with the viewpoint that humans do not obey the laws of rational 
choice theory (Gowdy, 2008). Such a starting point opens the policy conversation to explore 
more realistic models of human behaviour as thus forming appropriate responses to climate 
change.  Rational choice based models however have been the kindling to the irrational agent 
perspective. Without it, we may still be in the neo-classical position of methodological 
individualism.  
The roots of rational choice theory are uncertain, however its position in economic 
theory was secured in Hobbes’ (1928) Leviathan in 1651. Here we were given a solution to 
bring order to the chaos of human behaviour. The model has gone on to influence positive 
and normative political theory and remains a backbone to economic thought. In the last 
century however empirical tests have shown that the model is lacking (Oppenheimer, 2010) 
with Sen (2002) stating “it is important to reclaim for humanity the ground that has been taken 
from it by various arbitrarily narrow formulations of the demands of rationality” (p.51) Ostrom 
(1998) and her work on collective action found that the predictions of some rational thought 
models (namely the prisoners dilemma) did not hold. She found that individuals can achieve 
better than rational results through cooperative behaviour. In her behavioural theory of 
collective action she puts reciprocity, trust and reputation as critical elements in 
understanding behaviour. Her work on common property problems and institutional design 
has gone on to have a major impact in policy and institutional design.  
In psychology, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) challenged one of the key elements of 
the rational agent model – that of consistency of choice. This assumed that evaluation of 
choices is not affected by the way in which they are presented. However in prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) the framing effect has shown that how a choice is presented 
may in fact change ones frame of reference which in turn will impact payoff decisions. 
Indeed we found that framing incentives in terms of environmental objectives and monetary 
and non-monetary incentives elicited different results.  Through empirical examination, 
prospect theory has become a useful tool in explaining risk behaviour in different policy 
regimes (Levy, 1997; Mercer, 2005).  
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Whilst there is a growing interest in interdisciplinary research, there remains a limited 
application of psychological models of behaviour in the Global South regarding climate 
change adaptation behaviour. Applying such behavioural models within such contexts is 
important to better understand the drivers of the climate adaptive behaviour in the Global 
South.  On another level, applying models such as the Theory of Planned Behaviour within 
such a context is important for determining external validity and ultimately widening the 
scope of its application. If successful, such models can be a very useful policy and project 
design tool when looking at climate change adaptation behaviour.  
  As Duflo and Banerjee (2008) state: “effective policy-making requires 
judgements about the efficacy of individual components of programs, without much 
guidance from a priori knowledge, however, it is also difficult to learn about these 
individual components from observation (i.e. non-experimental) data” (p.153). The 
research presented here employed an experimental deign to better understand the drivers  
of climate change adaptation microloan investment behaviour through a psychological 
framework.  Regarding policy this research is able to give a few clues to climate change 
adaptation, and microlending policy.  We found that: 
a) Intrinsic motivation is an important determinant of behaviour and can be positively 
manipulated through extrinsic incentives. 
b) Absolute income is not the only driver of behaviour. To change human behaviour you 
must consider cognitive drivers. 
c) Context matters and incentives can influence the framing of reference and subsequent 
responses.  
In addition it provides a valuable summary for policy makers on the challenges that 
SIDS face and an indication of some of the responses available to SIDS smallholders in 
becoming climate change resilient. Designing policy initiatives that are congruent with 
internal motives for SIDS smallholders could facilitate uptake of adaptive behaviours such as 
Climate Smart Agriculture. Whilst incentivised microloans could be a delivery mechanism 
for Climate Smart Agriculture. 
12.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
A general model limitation was that of sample size (n=205).  The small sample 
size limited subsequent analysis (the use of more complex multinomial logits and 
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Structural Equation Models) and generalisability of the findings to different contexts. 
The research was focused on SIDS, as they are a high priority area for climate change 
adaptation, with their unique ecosystems, remote locations and high vulnerability to the 
impacts of climate change.  At the recent UN Conference for Small Island Developing 
States which was held in Apia, Samoa on September 4
th
, 2014, the need for action on 
climate change was the dominant theme. Member states reaffirmed commitments to help 
SIDS in achieving mitigation and adaptation targets. Critical partnerships between 
governments, international organisations and other major groups were forged in order to 
invest in and support SIDS in the vision of a sustainable future. Novel solutions such as 
that introduced in this thesis can be an important tool to meet such objectives whilst the 
insights from this thesis can be useful for policy formation.  
The cultural, social, economic and environmental similarities that exist between 
SIDS (UNFCCC, 2005) does bode well for the external validity of the thesis. However 
as microloans for ecosystem-based adaptation is not limited to the context of SIDS 
extending the research to other contexts would be useful. A future direction could be to 
replicate the study at Busara experimental economics laboratory whose sample consists 
of residents from the Kibera slum in Nairobi. Here microloans can be focused on 
enhancing the capacity for climate change adaptation in slum dwellers. Honing the 
survey and experimental design and creating a mobile game application is another route 
which would be of utility to capture agent responses on the field. This would be a 
method to improve data collection and perhaps enable a wider sample.  
In addition, it is important to note that the derivatives of Structural Equation 
Models, as those used within this thesis, cannot prove casual relationships without 
meeting the conditions of time precedence and robust relations in the presence and 
absence of other variables (Lei & Wu, 2007). We can instead say that our null hypothesis 
was rejected and that variables were correlated rather than infer causality without a true 
experimental design. Increasing sample size, and including longitudinal data, and real 
monetary consequences would be a future direction to pursue.  One way this can be 
achieved may be through following Giné and colleagues (2010) method of setting up an 
experimental economics laboratory where experiments can be run over several months.   
  By not including real monetary consequences in survey based experiment the 
research cannot reflect actual behaviour. The exchange of real money at the end of each 
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lending period would have led to better representation of real world choices and 
therefore could potentially have increased the validity of the research.  
As with any self-report based instrument an additional concern over the three 
studies is that of response bias and in particular the problem of consistency motifs 
(Podsakoff et al, 2003). Here respondents attempt to maintain consistency by organising 
their responses in a consistent manner which may not be reflective of real life situations.  
Another common method bias could be that of item priming. It could be that by 
delivering the survey instrument prior to the survey-based experiment, subsequent 
adaptive investment behaviour was primed. These concerns could potentially be 
controlled through a longitudinal study design where surveys are administered on day 
one and the framed field experiment with real monetary consequences taking place on 
succeeding days.   
In addition, the design of incentives would have benefited from further conditions 
where 1) rewards on adaptive investments are maintained however no constraints are 
placed on non-adaptive investments. 2) no information on ecosystem impacts is given 3) 
no rewards are given for adaptive investments but non-adaptive investments come with a 
cost. This would be an interesting future direction as it can elicit better understanding of 
contextual inference and loss aversion which will help develop better incentives. 
Without the looming prospects of a loss would people have still favoured the adaptive 
investment or would we have seen a different result altogether?  
Lastly the mental burden of calculating returns in investment did mean that we 
lost some useful data. However this did not impede the quality of results as we were 
aware of whether returns would be negative or positive (as specified by climate 
elements). Whilst this thesis did not make use of this data, there remains scope for 
additional papers from this information. That respondent’s were not comfortable with 
doing the calculations and preferred to make a choice based on whether returns were 
negative or positive would be considered in future designs.  
12.4 FINAL REMARKS  
We saw in Chapter 2, that SIDS and smallholders in particular are amongst the most 
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. SIDS realise the uncertainties surrounding 
climate change projections, and that adaptation can be costly and requires a change in societal 
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norms and behaviour. A no-regrets principle is needed in order to make effective use of the 
resources at hand. The UNFCCC (2005) identify weak institutional capacity and limited 
financial resources as key constraints to building adaptive capacity in SIDS. The lack of well-
structured institutional frameworks which can implement climate change adaptation across 
sectors and scales will hinder adaptation. Whilst limited financial resources means that 
adaptation can divert development aid from other key socio-economic priorities. As such 
novel solutions to building adaptive capacity need to be sought.  We have shown that 
microloans with the right design principles may be able to increase adaptive capacity.  
With anthropogenic climate change, the threat to some low lying islands is that of 
cross-scale extinction; whole unique habitats with millions of year’s worth of genetic data, 
and socio-cultural identities may one day only exist as memories within history books. But 
hopefully this will not come to pass as such a loss feels too great. However what is evident 
now is that these island ecosystems are already feeling the effects of climate change. More 
extreme climatic events not only threaten livelihoods but also can induce psychological 
distress (Ahern et al, 2005). To protect these vulnerable nations it is essential to pursue 
adaptation with vigour. The complexity of climate change requires cross-scale adaptation 
involving networks across different levels to work together in order to develop appropriate 
cross-level responses. Here we have examined microloans for ecosystem-based adaptation as 
one aspect of such a cross-scale response. Those of us who come from the islands are 
underrepresented in the global arena. We have little voices and, for the most part, shallow 
pockets. 
During the UNFCCC 21
st
 Conference of the Parties (COP21), which was widely 
acknowledged as the last opportunity to take action against anthropogenic climate change, 
SIDS and the Vulnerable 20 were amongst the most inspiring. With dedicated resolve they 
fought for nothing less than 1.5
o
C to survive, and indeed they majority of countries (106) 
endorsed this target. Whilst 1.5
o
C was not in the text, the target of well below 2
o
C of 
warming with a ratcheting mechanism is better than at 2
 o
C or below 2.5
 o
C.  For SIDS the 
reality is that they are at the forefront of climate change. As it is now, they are already 
experiencing an exponential increase in loss and damage. Cyclone Winston in Fiji in 
February 2016 is a perfect example. The cost of the cyclone is still being tallied but initial 
estimates are upwards of F$1 Billion with the loss of 80% of sugar cane crops in Viti-Levu 
(ABC News, 2016). 
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In these countries smallholders form the majority of farms. For agriculture to become 
resilient to the ever increasing pressures of climate change adaptation must be pursued with 
haste.  At COP21, agriculture was on the agenda for the first time. Concepts like climate 
smart agriculture were presented as solutions – and mechanisms for financing envisioned.  It 
was noted that whilst there are hundreds of funds operating in the agricultural sector, 
especially in the developed world context, most focus on large to medium-scale agriculture. 
The small and micro-scale farms synonymous with smallholders, and which still form the 
majority of rural agriculture in the developing world,  is under represented by funds and often 
dependent on effective microfinance operations  in the locality. Financing adaptation for 
smallholders can be troublesome with, for instance, some barriers being: land ownership, 
access to education and training, entrenched and sometimes unsustainable cultural practices, 
access to appropriate technologies and  certification schemes (such as Rainforest Alliance, 
Fairtrade, and Organic). The focus during COP21 on agriculture and the Sustainable 
Development Goal’s targets relating to food security and climate change has stimulated 
support for smallholder agriculture funds, with the largest being the FAO’s ASAP fund. 
Alternative investment structures have also been proposed such as structured finance which 
brings together an array of actors, creating different risk layers to suit different investor needs 
and technical assistance for investees to mitigate risk. To reach the ‘last mile’ end of the 
pyramid populations microfinance and micro-insurance become important delivery 
mechanism for adaptation finance and initiatives such as Climate Smart Agriculture. 
For SIDS moving forward from COP21 and commencing to implement adaptation 
strategies will be difficult. That’s why looking at instruments such as microloans to reach 
local levels is useful. Indeed microfinance even made it into the COP21 draft Paris Outcome 
text of March 9
th: “55[(b) Establish a financial technical panel to explore approaches for:… 
(ii) Providing support for microfinance initiatives]” (UNFCCC, 2015). Whilst this was not in 
the final text, it does show that conversations around the utility of microfinance as a delivery 
mechanism were being had.   
The Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals are the types of 
multilateral commitments that usher a sea change in the way we envision our future. For 
SIDS such developments could not arrive a moment too soon. The urgency to adapt means 
that policymakers and implementers need to act with well conceived projects. To preserve the 
future of smallholders, to establish food security, and to protect the interests of the poorest 
and most vulnerable amongst them, SIDS need to create climate resilient communities. 
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Ill conceived initiatives may do more harm than good. For instance microfinance in its 
popularized Grameen form has limited utility for a countries sustainable development 
trajectory. When loans are used to smooth consumption or crowding the market with another 
untrained and unsupported entrepreneur, we are not investing in developing the human 
capacity needed for sustained and real growth.  If done right however microloans are 
certainly a useful tool in the sustainable development toolkit, incentivizing desired for 
behaviours. The time sensitive nature of implementing adaptive measures in SIDS means that 
understanding the utility of such tools in driving human behaviour can lead to more efficient 
project designs. The psychosocial perspective presented in this thesis enables us to 
understand the internal motives of stated adaptive microloan investment behaviour. In doing 
so it offers a way in which to understand human behaviour, by retaining the human in the 
equation.  
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13 APPENDIX A  
 
Relevant Survey Questions 
 
Household Demographics 
     1 How many people are in your household? 
    2 What is your Age 
      3 Gender 
       4 Are you the head of your home? 
     5 Marital Status 
      6 Level of Education  
      7 Main Occupation 
      8 Social Status 
      9 Income 
       10 Credit Participant 
      11 Participation Status 
      12 Type of Credit 
      1 No each person in the household from 1 to 20  
2 Age= 0-110             
3 M= Male; F= Female         
4  1= Head of HH; all others relate to relation to HH Head: 2= Spouse; 3= Child 4=Grandchild; 5= 
Great Grandchild; 6= Brother/Sister; 7= Relative; 8= Boarder; 9= Other (Please explain) 
5 1=Married; 2=Single; 3=Widowed; 4= Divorced; 5= Separated; 6= Defacto   
6 1= No schooling; 2= Some primary school; 3= Completed primary school; 4= Some secondary 
school; 5= Completed secondary school; 6= Literacy campaign; 7= Microfinance training 
(Please explain); 8= Other(please explain) 
7 1= Farmer or Family farm worker; 2= Domestic work (incl housewife);      
  
3= Manual work (builder/mason/carpenter etc); 4= Tailor; 5= Weaver; 6= Craftworker; 7= 
Blacksmith; 8= Foodseller; 9= Driver/mechanic; 10= Skilled factory worker; 11=Teacher; 12= 
Health worker;  13= Govt worker; 14= Soldier; 15= Religious worker; 16= Student at school; 
17= Child helping with domestic/farm work; 18= Child too young to help; 19= Not in labour 
force; 20= Other (Please explain) 
8 1= Chief; 2= Clergy; 3= Other (Explain)         
9 1= 0-10/day; 2= 11-20/day; 3=  >21/day         
10 1= no participation; 2= Participation         
11 1= Active; 2= Non active; 3= dropout         
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12 1= Women's association; 2= NGO; 3= ROSCA; 4= Bank; 5= Cooperative; 6= Moneylender; 7= 
Family/friends; 8= Other___(specify) 
 
 
Health Status 
  13 Healthy  Y  |  N 
 
Malnourished   Y  |  N 
 
Dehydrated   Y  |  N 
 
Dengue Fever   Y  |  N 
 
Aids   Y  |  N 
 
Diabetes   Y  |  N 
 
Age related disability 
(explain)   Y  |  N 
 
Other (Please explain)   Y  |  N 
 
 
Land Ownership 
  14 Own Land? Y  |  N 
 15 Owned Since   
 16 Rented out Y  |  N 
 17 If rental land, When was land rented?    
18 Who from?      
14 Circle Y or N     
15 mm/yyyy     
16 Circle Y or N     
17 mm/yyyy     
18 
1=Govt;  2=Chief; 3= Indian;  4= Fijian; 5= Other 
(Explain) 
 
19 Which area do you live in?           
19 eg: Suva, Viti Levu           
       
 
Do you live close to: Circle Name 
   20 Forest Y  |  N      
21 Mangroves Y  |  N         
22 Coast Y  |  N         
20 If yes then what is the name of the forest/coastal area?       
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Livestock and domestic animals 
    
  
23 24 25 26 27 
  
Sheep Cattle Horse Bees Poultry 
 
How many           
 
Annual Income           
  
28 29 30 
  
 
How many Goat Dogs 
Other 
(explain) 
  
 
Annual Income       
  23-
30 enter amount 0 to 1000 and approx annual income $       
       31 How many months did your livestock produce last season? 
  
 
Crop Cultivation 
     32-
43 Circle Yes (Y) OR No (N)  32 33 34 35 
   for each crop. Dalo Cassava Yaqona Yams 
 32-
43 Circle season crop cultivated  Y  |  N Y  |  N Y  |  N Y  |  N 
   : Dry (D) or Wet (W) D  |  W D  |  W D  |  W D  |  W 
 
  
36 37 38 39 
 
  
Vegetables Fruits Ginger Root crops 
 
  
Y  |  N Y  |  N Y  |  N Y  |  N 
 
  
D  |  W D  |  W D  |  W D  |  W 
 
  
40 41 42 43 
 
  
Coconuts Sugarcane Copra 
Other 
(explain) 
 
  
Y  |  N Y  |  N Y  |  N Y  |  N 
 
  
D  |  W D  |  W D  |  W D  |  W 
 
       
 
Marine Fisheries 
     
  
Yes or No? Month 
   44 Finfish Y  |   N     
   45 Beche-de-mer Y  |   N     
   46 Octopus Y  |   N     
   47 Seaweed Y  |   N     
   48 Lobster Y  |   N     
   49 Mud Crab Y  |   N     
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50 Bivavle Molluscs Y  |   N     
   51 Prawn/Shrimps Y  |   N     
   52 Corals Y  |   N     
   53 Seaslug etc Y  |   N     
   54 Other (state) Y  |   N     
   55 Other (state) Y  |   N     
   56 Other (state) Y  |   N     
   57 Other (state) Y  |   N     
   58 Other (state) Y  |   N     
   44-
58 Circle Yes (Y) OR No (N) and number months caught/collected in: 1=Jan; 2=Feb; 3=Mar; etc 
       59 How many months did your food production last (0-24) 
    
 
Income 
 
 total 
Income % 
(0 - 100%) 
Household Members 
responsible for income 
generating activity 
60 Local labour      
  61 Migratroy labour       
  62 Sale of crops       
  63 Sale of livestock       
  64 Non Plant Marine life (fish, molluscs etc)     
  65 Mangroves       
  66 Corals       
  67 Plant based marine life       
  68 Sale of livestock produce       
  69 Petty trade       
  70 Sale of natural resources - forest plants     
  71 Sale of natural resources - forest wood     
  72 Sale of natural resources - forest animals (Specify)   
  73 Remittances/gifts       
  74 Self employment Crafts       
  75 Self employment Other (specify)     
  76 Other (specify)       
  60-
76 Approximate percentage of total income         
60- 1=Home Owner; 2=Spouse; 3=Sibling; 4=Grandparents; 5=Cousin; 6=Children; 7=Other (Explain) 
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A Reliance on non agricultural forest products by season 
  
  
No 
reliance 
Very 
little 
reliance 
Some 
reliance 
Very 
reliant 
Completely 
reliant 
 77 Dry 1 2 3 4 5 
 78 Wet 1 2 3 4 5 
 
        B Reliance on marine products by season 
   
  
No 
reliance 
Very 
little 
reliance 
Some 
reliance 
Very 
reliant 
Completely 
reliant 
 79 Dry 1 2 3 4 5 
 80 Wet 1 2 3 4 5 
 
        C Reliance on Food Aid by season 
    
  
No 
reliance 
Very 
little 
reliance 
Some 
reliance 
Very 
reliant 
Completely 
reliant 
 81 Dry 1 2 3 4 5 
 82 Wet 1 2 3 4 5 
 77-82 ASK: On a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being no reliance and 5 being completely reliant, 
   can you describe how reliant you are on a,b,c?      
77-83 circle number the best describes your reliance for each season   
Ease of Access to Drinking Water       Circle 
     
83 
Do you have access to drinking water 
in your home? Y | N 
     84 If yes then is it reliable Y | N 
      
 
85 If no then where do you access water from? 
   85 1= Village tap; 2=River; 3= Pond/Pool; 4= Rain water collection; 5= Forest;  
  6= Mountain; 7= Underground reservoir       
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Adverse Events 
     
 
In the last year have you experienced: 
   
  
Circle 
About when 
was this?  
   86 Flood Y   |    N 
     87 Drought Y   |    N 
     88 Season came late Y   |    N 
     89 Season came early Y   |    N 
     90 Cyclone Y   |    N 
     91 Hurricane Y   |    N 
     92 Disease (Plants)  Y   |    N 
     93 Disease (Animals) Y   |    N 
     94 Illness/death (human) Y   |    N 
     95 Other (explain) Y   |    N 
     96 Other (explain) Y   |    N 
     97 Other (explain) Y   |    N 
     86-97 Circle yes or no for any event that has affected livelihood in the last year  
  and state when it occurred (mm/yyyy)       
 
 
Expenses 
     
 
Approximately how much do you spend on 98-108 by month and year?  
 
 
Are any paid via loans? 
    
    
$/Month $/Year 
Paid via 
Loan? (Y/N) 
98 Food         
99 Health 
  
      
100 Farm/marine investments        
101 Microenterprise investments       
102 Housing maintenance/building       
103 Rent           
104 non religious social obligations       
 
(investing in community) 
 
      
105 Personal social obligations        
  (Marriage/birth/death etc)         
106 Religious obligations         
107 Loans to family/friends 
 
      
108 Interest repayments        
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98-
108 write approx amount by month and year, circle Yes or No for whether it is paid by loan 
 
 
Credit 
       
 
These next questions ask about your access to credit 
   109 Do you have access to credit facilities? Y  |  N 
    110 Name of Loaning body 
      111 Type of Collateral 
      112 What was loan used for? 
     113 Date of loan 
      114 Size of loan 
      115 Borrowing limit 
      116 Current loan 
 
Y  |  N 
    117 Repayment period 
      118 Loan length 
      119 Repayment conditions 
      120 Interest rate 
      121 Access to savings 
 
Y  |  N 
    122 Access to insurance 
 
Y  |  N 
    123 Access to other banking services Y  |  N 
    110 Name           
111 a: social; b: environment; c: assets           
112 a: social; b: infrastructure (water, toilets etc); c: Alternative livelihoods (please explain); 
  d: maintaining current livelihoods (please explain); e: buying food; f: medical care; g: personal 
spending (clothes, household items); h: education; i: repaying other loans;   
113 mm/yyyy               
114 F$               
115 F$               
117 a: weekly; b: every two weeks; c: monthly; d: other (explain)       
118 mm/yyyy - mm/yyyy             
119 list any conditions placed on type of activities allowed under loan     
120 %               
         
 
Training 
       124 Any Training Given? Y  |  N 
     125 Type of Training/ed 
      125 a; relating to managing loan       
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  b; relating to creating alternative trade based livelihoods       
  c; relating to other education           
  d; relating to sustainable use of environment         
  e; relating to general environmental education         
 
 
Severity of Problems 'adapted from Chokor' 
    
   
Perceived Cause Solution 
128 Poor division of land 
Y | N 
   
129 Land Scarcity 
Y | N 
   
130 Water scarcity 
Y | N 
   
131 Drought 
Y | N 
   
132 Conflict between people and animals 
Y | N 
   
133 Conflict over land 
Y | N 
   
134 Infertile soil/land degradation 
Y | N 
   
135 Destruction of forests 
Y | N 
   
136 Air Pollution 
Y | N 
   
137 Water Pollution 
Y | N 
   
138 Land Pollution 
Y | N 
   
139 Forest/Bush Fire 
Y | N 
   
140 Flooding 
Y | N 
   
141 Poor crop yields 
Y | N 
   
142 Plant pests and disease 
Y | N 
   
143 Monocropping - planting only one crop 
Y | N 
   
144 Poor housing and hygiene 
Y | N 
   
145 Sickness 
Y | N 
   
146 High cost of living 
Y | N 
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147 Crime/insecurity 
Y | N 
   
148 Poverty 
Y | N 
   128-148 Do you think (128-148) is a severe problem facing Fiji today? What 
do you think is the cause of this problem? Do you have a solution?         
  Perceived cause and solution are open questions for respondents.         
 
149 
Please list any species (plant and/or animal) that you think is                                at risk in your 
region 
 
List: 
150 What do you think of this species? 
151 Why do you think it is at risk? 
 
The following questions are all recorded on a scale of 1-5. Be as honest as possible 
 No one will judge you AND there are no right or wrong answers. 
Forests also include mangroves  
1 Strongly disagree, 2 Disagree, 3 Neutral, 4 Agree, 5 Strongly Agree 
  
Attitudes Towards Conservation (ATC)           
152 The forest/river is sacred 1 2 3 4 5 
153 Taking care of the forest/river is important for future generations 1 2 3 4 5 
154 The forest/river should be used by men as they see fit 1 2 3 4 5 
155 The forest/river does not belong to men 1 2 3 4 5 
156 It is my duty to protect the forest/river 1 2 3 4 5 
157 I will not harm the forest/river species because they are protected 1 2 3 4 5 
158 I would stop others from hunting/poaching the forest/river species 1 2 3 4 5 
New Environmental Paradigm (NEP)           
159 The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset 1 2 3 4 5 
160 
The earth is like a ship floating in space with only limited room and 
resources 1 2 3 4 5 
161 There are limits to economic growth even for developed countries 1 2 3 4 5 
Subjective Norms (SN) towards conservation           
162 My family finds it important to protect the forest/river 1 2 3 4 5 
163 My community finds it important to protect the forest/river 1 2 3 4 5 
164 Our neighbouring communities find it important to protect the forest/river 1 2 3 4 5 
165 The authorities (government) find it important to protect the forest/river 1 2 3 4 5 
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166 Our elders find it important to protect the forest/river 1 2 3 4 5 
167 The young find it important to protect the forest/river 1 2 3 4 5 
168 My family's approval of my treatment of the forest/river is important to me 1 2 3 4 5 
169 My communities approval of my treatment of the forest/river is important to me 1 2 3 4 5 
170 The opinion of others outside my family/community on my use of the  1 2 3 4 5 
 
forest/river is important to me 1 2 3 4 5 
Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC)           
171 I  feel I can control the upkeep of the forest/river 1 2 3 4 5 
172 I do not feel like I have any control over how to use the forest/river positively 1 2 3 4 5 
(PBC) Efficacy to perform            
173 It is easy to live in a way that does not hurt the forest/river 1 2 3 4 5 
174 I do not feel that I have the ability to protect the forest/river 1 2 3 4 5 
175 It is easy for me to look after the forest/river 1 2 3 4 5 
176 It is too great a task to survive and care for the forest/river 1 2 3 4 5 
Behavioural Intention(BI)           
177 I expect to respect and sustainably use the forest/river 1 2 3 4 5 
178 I want to respect and sustainably use the forest/river 1 2 3 4 5 
179 I intend to respect and sustainably use the forest/river 1 2 3 4 5 
Self Construal           
180 The wellbeing of my family is more important then my own 1 2 3 4 5 
181 The wellbeing of my village is more important then my own and my families 1 2 3 4 5 
182 The wellbeing of the earth is most important 1 2 3 4 5 
183 The feel happiest when I am surrounded by nature 1 2 3 4 5 
184 I feel happiest when I am surrounded by family  1 2 3 4 5 
185 I feel happiest when I am surrounded by friends 1 2 3 4 5 
186 I feel happiest when I am alone 1 2 3 4 5 
  
We will now do a short exercise where we order what we think is important for well-
being for humans and animals. You have a list of items infront of you, and I will go 
through each and explain it. Please order the items according to importance with 1 
being most and 10 being least (H=Humans, O=Other Species)   
  
Extracted from Nussbaum (2006) 
RANK 1-
10 
Capabilities List  for Non-Human Animals H  |  O 
1. Life. Being able to live a life of normal length (for that species); not dying 
prematurely.   |  
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2. Bodily health . Being able to have good health which includes reproductive health, 
adequate nourishment  and adequate shelter .   |  
3. Bodily integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; being able to be 
secure against violent assault, including sexual assault, whilst also have the opportunity 
for those physical processes which come naturally to the species.  |  
4. Senses, imagination, thought. Ensuring animals have access to those situations that 
give them pleasure, such as a pleasing, environment which implies protecting animal 
environments. In addition it implies banning those activities which cause unnecessary 
pain on non-human species, such as hunting. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, 
think, and reason—and to do these things in a "truly human" way, a way informed and 
cultivated by an adequate education. Having freedom of speech and thought.  |  
5. Emotions. Realising and respecting the wide array of emotions evident in non-human 
species and not engaging in activities that purposefully invoke negative emotions. In 
humans being able to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified 
anger.  |  
6. Practical reason. Being able to engage in critical reflection about the planning of 
one's own life as is appropriate for the species.  |  
7. Affiliation. Being able to form attachments and to form bonds and interrelationships. 
Being shown respect and dignity for your humanity and that of the species  |  
8. Other species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to other animals and 
the natural world  |  
9. Play. Being able to play, laugh and enjoy fun activities  |  
10. Control over one's environment. Respecting non-human animal’s territorial 
environments be it in a domestic or wild setting. Being able to participate in political 
choices, being able to own property, have property/land rights, working in with 
equality  |  
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14 APPENDIX B  
 Information Leaflet 
Climate Change is caused by human activities like driving cars, farming, burning coal and 
cutting down forests. These activities produce greenhouse gases – mainly carbon dioxide, 
methane and nitrous oxide. These gases gather in the atmosphere wrap around the earth and 
trap the sun's heat. This makes the world’s climate heat up, known as ‘global warming’.                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
So what can you do? You need to adapt to climate change and protect 
against more change by looking after the forests. 
 
In Fiji, cutting down forests (and mangroves), slash and burn agriculture and 
pollution are big problems that cause water pollution, soil erosion, drought 
and the loss of species. Forests are important to you because they regulate 
climate, provide natural pest control, they make soil healthier, prevent 
erosion and also absorb flood water. Mangroves not only act as a natural 
sieves preventing rubbish from being washed out to sea but also absorbs 
pollution. They also are important for reef fisheries (giving species a place to 
grow). In addition mangroves and other types of forests are important 
sources of firewood and building material. 
 
 
What can we do?  
 Plant mangroves, and trees – to restore habitats 
 Practice sustainable farming – for example, less use of chemical pesticides and fertilisers, water management, 
planting more then one crop, using special seeds that are able to withstand climate changes.  
 Planting native species  
 Planting Vertiver Grass Hedges 
 Beekeeping  
  
 
 
In Fiji you can see climate change in 
higher temperatures, sea level rise, 
ocean acidification (which kills corals 
and other marine life), more intense 
cyclones, droughts, floods, disease 
and less availability of fresh water. 
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15 APPENDIX C 
The following were presented as information cards to help understand investment components.  
 
What are the Benefits of Vertiver Hedges? 
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16 APPENDIX D  
Survey-Based Experiment 
 
IMAGINE THAT YOU ARE A FARMER WITH THREE INVESTMENT CHOICES.
Loan Size: $300
Interest 20% (flat) = $60
Repayment schedule Monthly over 8 months therefore: $45/month
You Investment Choices are: (explain in detail)
Ecosystem 
Effect (EE)
Good Season
(Dice roll 1,2,3)
Bad Season
(Dice roll 4,5,6)
A Good - 6 120 120
B Average - 3 225 75
C Adverse - 0 300 0
Return 
Vertiver hedge, organic fertiliser and seeds (mangroves, veg, plants)
Seeds (mangroves, veg, plants), Chemical fertiliser
Chemical pesticides and fertiliser
Instructions: You will play a total of 3 individual liability and 3 joint liablility games. (a two -player game) . Each game'has two periods. Each period has 8 rounds. In each 
period  you are given a $300 microloan to invest in either A,B or C. In each round a dice is rolled to decide what type of seasonyou will have (1,2,3 = Good Season, 3,4,5 = 
Bad Season). Depending on the climate and your investment choice, you will make or lose money and have different impacts on the environment. Each round you must 
keep note of how much money you have made or lost. 
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GAME 1 - Individual Liability 
 Control
CLIMATE Investment Repayment  = Return
1 2 3 4 5 6 A, B or C  - -45 Write amount made 
Period 1) 1 when dice is thrown
2
3 Write investment choice 
4
5
6
7
8
Period 2) 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
GAME 4 - Joint Liability 
Control
Climate Investment  - Repayment  = Return
Player2 
Investment Type Returns
1 2 3 4 5 6 A, B or C  - -45 A, B or C
Period 1)1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Period 2) 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
This time you and I both receieve a microloan of $300 dollars each which we have to 
pay back by the end of the period with 20% interest. Repayment of  $45 is taken  at the 
end of each round.
You receive a microloan of $300 with a fixed interest of 20% each 
period. You have to slowly pay back your loan over 8 months. A 
month is represented by a 'round'. This means you need to pay back 
$360 over eight rounds ($45 per round = £360). The lender collects $45 
when you finish each round if you are able to make your payment. If 
you don't have enough money that round, repayment is taken at the 
end of the 8th round. 
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GAME 2 - Dynamic Incentive
Climate Investment Repayment  =  Return IF Repayment is less then 45 THEN STOP PLAYING
1 2 3 4 5 6 A, B or C  - -45  <$45 (Y/N)
Period 1) 1 Y  |  N
2 Y  |  N
3 Y  |  N
4 Y  |  N
5 Y  |  N
6 Y  |  N
7 Y  |  N
8 Y  |  N
Period 2) 1 Y  |  N
2 Y  |  N
3 Y  |  N
4 Y  |  N
5 Y  |  N
6 Y  |  N
7 Y  |  N
8 Y  |  N
GAME 5 - Joint Liability Dynamic Incentive
Climate Investment  - Repayment  =  Return
IF YES THEN STOP 
PLAYING
Player2 
Investment Type
IF YES THEN 
STOP PLAYING
Total Group 
Returns
1 2 3 4 5 6 A, B or C  - -45 < 45 (Y/N) < 45 (Y/N) (P1 + P2 returns)
Period 1) 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Period 2)1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
You receive an individual microloan as before. However this time, if can't pay $45 in a round then you 
cannot procede to other rounds and must start again with a new microloan of $300 in period two.
You and I receive a microloan of $300 each. If one 
player is unable to make their $45 repayment, then 
the other must cover them. If both cannot then both 
have to stop playing.
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GAME 3 - Green Microloan
Climate
Investment
Ecosystem 
Effect (EE)
Less than 3 If yes then Repay
If no then 
REPAYMENT
1 2 3 4 5 6 A, B or C  - A (6), B(3) or C(0) Y  |  N  -$46.5/-$62.5 -33.75  = Return
Period 1) 1 Y  |  N
2 Y  |  N
3 Y  |  N
4 Y  |  N
5 Y  |  N
6 Y  |  N EE<3 repayment Due
7 Y  |  N
8 Y  |  N
Period 2) 1 Y  |  N
2 Y  |  N
3 Y  |  N
4 Y  |  N
5 Y  |  N
6 Y  |  N EE<3 repayment Due
7 Y  |  N
8 Y  |  N
GAME 6 - Joint Liability Green Microloan
Climate Investment
Ecosystem 
Effect (EE) <=3
If yes then 
Repayment If no then REPAYMENT Player2 EE Less then 3
If yes then 
Repayment If no then REPAYMENT
1 2 3 4 5 6 A, B or C A (5), B(3) or C(0) Y/N -46.5 -33.75  = Return A (5), B(3) or C(0)Y/N -46.5 -33.75  = Return
Period 1) 1
2
3
4
5
6 EE<3 repayment Due EE<3 repayment Due EE<3 repayment DueEE<3 repayment Due
7
8
Period 2) 1
2
3
4
5
6 EE<3 repayment Due EE<3 repayment Due EE<3 repayment DueEE<3 repayment Due
7
8
This time we include the impact of the loan on the Environment (Ecosystem effect). If your investment choice has an impact on the 
You and I receive a microloan of $300 each. Whichever player has a positive impact on ecocystems (MORE THAN 3) recieves an interest free loan of which only 90% of the principal or $270 needs to be paid back 
(at 33.75/round). Whichever player has an EE <=3 will have an increase in interest to 24% on the principal (@46.5/round). If either of your impact in any other round is LESS THAN 3 then both players repayment 
period decreases to 6 months. 
This time we include the impact of the loan on the Environment 
(Ecosystem effect). You receive a microloan of $300 as before. If your 
investment choice has an impact on the environment GREATER THAN 
3 then you receive an interest free loan and must pay back only 90% 
of your principal ($270).If it is EQUAL TO 3 then your interest rate 
increases to 24% (46.5/month). If your impact is LESS THAN 3 then 
your interest rate increases to 25% and your repayment term reduces 
to 6 months (repay 62.5/month)
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17 APPENDIX E 
Here you will find the measurement model coefficients and their associated R2 values for the 
treatment (Table 17.1) and control groups (Table 17.2) from Chapter 8.  The measurement 
model maps the scale measures to it s theoretical constructs. We see that the measurements 
models were similar across groups and fit the specified latent constructs.  
TABLE 17-1: MEASUREMENT MODEL COEFICCIENTS – TREATMENT GROUP 
Climate     β S.E. p R2 
Attitudes 
Towards 
Conservation 
→ A1 0.978 0.088 0.000 0.956 
  A2 0.577 0.051 0.000 0.333 
  A3 -0.412 0.075 0.000 0.169 
  A5 0.764 0.047 0.000 0.583 
              
    A6 0.667 0.067 0.000 0.445 
    A7 0.490 0.038 0.000 0.240 
    A8 0.420 0.079 0.000 0.176 
    A9 0.459 0.077 0.000 0.211 
    A10 0.367 0.062 0.000 0.135 
Subjective 
Norms 
→ S1 1.087 0.136 0.000   
  S2 0.697 0.063 0.000 0.485 
  S3 0.607 0.060 0.000 0.369 
    S4 0.563 0.053 0.000 0.317 
    S5 0.536 0.045 0.000 0.288 
    S6 0.614 0.068 0.000 0.377 
    S7 0.804 0.060 0.000 0.647 
    S8 0.693 0.052 0.000 0.480 
    S9 0.527 0.054 0.000 0.278 
Perceived 
Behavioural 
Control 
→ P1 1.065 0.062 0.000   
  P3 0.372 0.051 0.000 0.138 
  P4 -0.023 0.022 0.287 0.001 
    P5 0.284 0.051 0.000 0.080 
    P6 -0.476 0.045 0.000 0.226 
Behavioural 
Intention 
→ B1 0.857 0.038 0.000 0.735 
  B2 0.774 0.021 0.000 0.599 
  B3 0.692 0.035 0.000 0.479 
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TABLE 17-2: MEASUREMENT MODEL - CONTROL GROUP 
Control     β S.E. p R2 
Attitudes 
Towards 
Conservation 
→ A1 0.914 0.089 0.000 - 
  A2 0.647 0.049 0.000 0.419 
  A3 -0.436 0.057 0.000 0.190 
  A5 0.688 0.039 0.000 0.474 
    A6 0.536 0.060 0.000 0.287 
    A7 0.500 0.043 0.000 0.250 
    A8 0.394 0.064 0.000 0.156 
    A9 0.425 0.073 0.000 0.181 
    A10 0.373 0.067 0.000 0.139 
Subjective 
Norms 
→ S1 1.116 0.084 0.000 - 
  S2 0.776 0.046 0.000 0.601 
  S3 0.504 0.057 0.000 0.254 
    S4 0.596 0.060 0.000 0.356 
    S5 0.441 0.029 0.000 0.194 
    S6 0.667 0.065 0.000 0.445 
    S7 0.825 0.040 0.000 0.680 
    S8 0.665 0.036 0.000 0.442 
    S9 0.526 0.047 0.000 0.277 
Perceived 
Behavioural 
Control 
→ P1 0.928 0.072 0.000 - 
  P3 0.357 0.040 0.000 0.128 
  P4 -0.023 0.022 0.288 0.001 
  P5 0.239 0.040 0.000 0.057 
    P6 -0.501 0.048 0.000 0.251 
Behavioural 
Intention 
→ B1 1.011 0.031 0.000 - 
  B2 0.788 0.030 0.000 0.621 
  B3 0.911 0.041 0.000 0.829 
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18 APPENDIX F 
This section provides the results of the Multinomial Probit with WLSM estimator that 
was presented in the discussion section of Chapter 10. The model was just identified χ2 test 
statistics equal to the degrees of freedom. This means that the ‘perfect’ fit statistics we get 
(RMSEA=0; CFI=1) does not mean that there is no discrepancy between the sample and the 
model-implied covariance matrix, rather that there are not enough restrictions placed on the 
model H1 model making it difficult to reject Ho. 
 
 
β S.E p Adaptive M A Mixed M N-A
Non-
Adaptive
No 
Incentive ←
Behavioura
l Intention 0.093 0.166 0.573 0.048 0.613 0.510 0.744 0.165
Perceived 
Behavioura
l Control -0.153 0.097 0.115 0.176 0.961 0.933 0.984 0.043
Control 
Treatment 0.242 0.208 0.245 0.051 0.641 0.539 0.768 0.156
Farmer/Fis
her -0.025 0.186 0.891 0.094 0.840 0.768 0.914 0.092
Female 0.086 0.139 0.536 0.050 0.629 0.527 0.758 0.160
Fijian -1.251 0.237 0 *** 0.991 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
Y<$10 -0.173 0.137 0.206 0.192 0.970 0.947 0.988 0.038
Chief -0.166 0.446 0.71 0.186 0.967 0.943 0.986 0.040
Access to 
Credit 0.303 0.219 0.167 0.011 0.165 0.108 0.273 0.365
Current 
Microloan -0.947 0.215 0 *** 0.927 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
No Incentive R2=0.235; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001; M A= Moderately Adaptive,  M N-A= Moderately Non-
Adaptive
Predicted Probabilities
β S.E p Adaptive M A Mixed M N-A
Non-
Adaptive
Dynamic 
Incentive
← Behavioura
l Intention
-0.159 0.179 0.375 0.104 0.967 0.946 0.976 0.098
Perceived 
Behavioura
l Control
-0.017 0.096 0.855 0.046 0.839 0.775 0.868 0.192
Control 
Treatment
0.529 0.205 0.01 ** 0.012 0.433 0.342 0.483 0.386
Farmer/Fis
her
-0.131 0.155 0.399 0.054 0.875 0.820 0.899 0.171
Female -0.073 0.121 0.547 0.048 0.849 0.788 0.877 0.186
Fijian -1.608 0.165 0 *** 0.449 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.008
Y<$10 0.159 0.071 0.025 0.029 0.716 0.631 0.757 0.255
Chief 0.075 0.244 0.758 0.035 0.770 0.692 0.806 0.229
Access to 
Credit
0.486 0.174 0.005 ** 0.013 0.467 0.374 0.517 0.370
Current 
Microloan
-0.441 0.182 0.015 ** 0.097 0.962 0.937 0.971 0.104
Dynamic Incentive R2=0.397; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001; M A= Moderately Adaptive,  M N-A= Moderately Non-
Adaptive
Predicted Probabilities
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The results did differ from the path analysis. We select only a few variables to base 
our comparison on here: in the green incentive condition, whilst not significant – adaptive 
over non-adaptive investments had similar probabilities in the Multinomial Probit  when 
stated behaviour was regressed on intentions as it did in the Path analysis for the green 
incentive condition (path analysis adaptive= 0.346, non-adaptive= 0.012). Whilst we saw 
women had a greater probability of choosing adaptive investments in the path analysis under 
the green incentive condition (0.771), the same was not found in the probit. Probability of 
Fijians choosing adaptive investments was similar across the dynamic and green incentive 
conditions (path analysis dynamic incentive= 0.356; green incentive= 0.573). The probability 
of choosing non-adaptive investments was more pronounced in the dynamic and green 
incentive conditions when stated behaviour was regressed on high perceptions of control 
(compared to path analysis dynamic incentive=0.066; Green incentive=0.027) and the 
absence of information (compared to path analysis dynamic incentive= 0.155; Green 
incentive=0.125). 
β S.E p Adaptive M A Mixed M N-A Non-
Adaptive
Green 
Incentive
← Behavioura
l Intention
-0.318 0.234 0.174 0.325 0.995 0.990 0.998 0.055
Perceived 
Behavioura
l Control
-0.059 0.129 0.648 0.109 0.854 0.781 0.900 0.207
Control 
Treatment
0.589 0.274 0.032 ** 0.023 0.317 0.224 0.402 0.479
Farmer/Fis
her
-0.11 0.256 0.666 0.097 0.821 0.739 0.875 0.226
Female -0.053 0.172 0.757 0.088 0.790 0.701 0.850 0.244
Fijian -1.661 0.187 0 *** 0.599 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.011
Y<$10 0.126 0.191 0.509 0.062 0.673 0.567 0.751 0.303
Chief 0.474 0.285 0.097 0.030 0.402 0.299 0.492 0.434
Access to 
Credit
0.028 0.352 0.937 0.075 0.741 0.642 0.809 0.270
Current 
Microloan
-0.346 0.298 0.246 0.144 0.918 0.867 0.947 0.162
Green Incentive R2=0.394; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001; M A= Moderately Adaptive,  M N-A= Moderately Non-
Adaptive
Predicted Probabilities
